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Abstract 
 
 
Following their conquest of Punjab, the British erected an administrative apparatus that 
relied heavily upon the support of the province’s powerful landed elite. The relationship 
between the two was one of mutual benefit, with the British using their landed allies to ensure 
the maintenance of order and effective economic accumulation in exchange for state patronage. 
Over a century and a half later, the politics of Pakistani Punjab continues to be dominated by 
landowning politicians, despite significant societal changes that could have potentially eroded 
their power. In order to answer the question of why this is so, this thesis uses a historical 
institutionalist approach to argue that the administrative framework emerging out of the initial 
bargain between the colonial state and the landed classes gave rise to a path-dependent process 
of institutional development in Punjab that allowed the latter to increasingly entrench 
themselves within the political order during the colonial and post-colonial periods. In doing so, 
the landed elite were also able to reinforce their bargain with the colonial state and, after 
independence, the Pakistani military establishment, perpetuating a relationship that facilitated 
the pursuit of the interests of the actors involved. 
In order to account for this path-dependent process of institutional development, this 
thesis treats the initial period of colonial rule in Punjab as a ‘critical juncture’, tracing the factors 
that led the British to rely on the landed elite for support, and enter into the bargain between the 
two actors that drove subsequent institutional developments. The thesis then explores the 
mechanisms used to perpetuate this arrangement over time, focusing in particular on the use, by 
the state and the landed elite, of legislative interventions, bureaucratic power, and electoral 
politics, to reinforce and reproduce the institutional framework of politics in Punjab. Finally, the 
thesis also looks at points in time during which this dominant institutional path has been 
challenged, albeit unsuccessfully, with a view towards understanding both the circumstances 
under which such challenges can emerge, and the lessons that can be learnt from these episodes 
with regards to the prospects for the creation of a democratic and participatory politics in the 
province. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction 
 
Landlords, like all other men, love to reap where they never sowed. 
   Adam Smith 
 
 
In 1894 Lord Elgin, the Viceroy of India, hosted a durbar for which 
invitations to attend were extended to some of Punjab’s largest and most powerful 
landholders. Under the Mughals and the Sikhs, durbars had provided local elites and 
chieftains with the opportunity to present themselves at court and offer their services 
to the ruling monarch in exchange for wealth and protection. The symbolic 
significance of Lord Elgin’s durbar was not lost on either the colonial government or 
the landholders who constituted the edifice upon which British rule rested in Punjab. 
For all their economic and military strength the British in Punjab, like their 
predecessors, required the assistance of local landed elites to ensure the collection of 
revenue and maintenance of order in the province. Actively ensuring this 
collaboration required the colonial state to cultivate a close relationship with its 
landed allies by providing them with a tremendous amount of state patronage in return 
for their loyalty. 
Following the conquest of Punjab in 1849, the British were faced with the task 
of erecting an administrative apparatus that would ensure order and accumulation. 
Over the course of the next century, the construction of this framework for control and 
extraction took place through a series of incremental adjustments, with institutional 
change and adaptation occurring in response to changing societal contexts, political 
exigencies, and shifts in colonial policy. Having aligned themselves with the 
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province’s rich peasantry and traditional aristocracy, recognising that these elements 
of the Punjabi elite were instrumental to the effective exercise of state authority, the 
colonial government actively undertook institutional interventions that protected the 
interests of its landed allies. Under colonial rule in Punjab, landed elites were able to 
virtually monopolise politics in the province, using their privileged position within the 
colonial administrative schema to bolster their own position relative to other groups 
and classes in society, while simultaneously using their influence and power to pursue 
the interests of the colonial regime. 
At one level, the British reliance upon Punjab’s rural elites was not entirely 
unexpected. When the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh established their rule over Punjab in 
1799, following decades of instability, war, and peasant rebellion directed against the 
Mughals (Alam, 1986; Gupta, 1996 [1943]), the potential had existed for a complete 
transformation of the political order. Instead, while the upper echelons of the political 
hierarchy were reshaped, the hereditary landed elites who had formed the core of the 
Mughal administrative system at the local level were incorporated within the new 
regime (Grewal, 1990, 95). Similar opportunities for radical political change arose as 
a result of the dislocations that accompanied the transition to British control and the 
creation of Pakistan. While formal control over the state may have shifted as regimes 
were replaced, these transitions were marked by a significant degree of continuity as 
the cooptation and cooperation of Punjab’s landed elites remained central to systems 
of governance instituted by successive unrepresentative and largely authoritarian 
regimes. The enduring strength of this relationship between the state and Punjab’s 
landowning classes, and its ability to reproduce itself over time, is evinced by the fact 
that post-Partition, despite a range of economic, political, and social changes, 
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Punjab’s rural power-holders continue to play a significant role in Pakistan’s politics 
(Alavi, 1974; Waseem, 1994b). 
This study seeks to provide an explanation for the persistence of this landed 
power in Punjab. It will be argued that this persistence is a result of the reproduction 
and reinforcement over time of an institutional framework of politics premised on a 
bargain in which Punjab’s landed elites have provided support and other services to 
authoritarian colonial and post-colonial regimes in exchange for state patronage. It 
will be shown that this bargain has allowed the landed elite to entrench themselves 
within a dominant position in the political, social and economic structure of Punjab. 
The concept of path dependence is used in this study to understand this process of 
institutional evolution, showing how the institutions that emerge out of key founding 
moments can come to shape future interactions between actors negotiating the 
distribution of power within society, creating incentives for adhering to established 
institutional patterns while increasing the costs associated with alternative institutional 
paths. Process tracing will be employed as a methodological tool through which to 
identify and examine the causal mechanisms that have given rise to this path 
dependent trajectory of institutional development in Punjab, with an emphasis on 
understanding how transitions from one regime to another, as well as other significant 
historical junctures, can impact subsequent trajectories of institutional continuity, 
change and adaptation.  
For the purpose of this study, focusing on Punjab as a single case is 
analytically advantageous for a number of reasons. By virtue of its demographic 
strength, economic productivity and strategic geographical position, Punjab has 
historically been of critical importance to successive regimes in the region, and 
understanding the political role played by the Punjabi elite is vital to unpacking the 
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dynamics of broader, state-level politics. This has been particularly true in the post-
colonial epoch, when the outcomes of elections in the province have always been 
crucial to deciding Pakistan’s political dispensation. 
Historical Overview 
 
 The local government elections held in Pakistan in 2001 were significant for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, they represented the first attempt by the military 
government of General Pervez Musharraf to garner some measure of electoral 
legitimacy in the face of growing criticism at home and abroad. Secondly, the 
elections were conducted under the rubric of reform, with the government arguing that 
its plans for the devolution of power to the local level through non-party based 
elections would ensure transparent and accountable governance. It would 
subsequently emerge, however, that there was little evidence to suggest that this latest 
exercise in electoral competition constituted a substantive shift away from the 
traditional pattern of politics in Pakistan. Despite the government’s claims that the 
elections had brought in a new tier of local politicians untainted through association 
with Pakistan’s widely discredited political parties, the results of the elections made it 
clear that traditionally powerful actors in Pakistan, with the Punjabi landed elite in 
particular, continued to play a significant role in the political process (Akhtar et al., 
2007). Elections to the national and provincial legislatures, held the following year, 
yielded similar results (Zaidi, 2004; Waseem, 2005). 
 The results of these elections were not unexpected or unique as elections held 
throughout Punjab’s history have generally followed a similar pattern. In 1951, barely 
four years after the end of British rule, Punjab’s landed elites were able to use their 
economic and social clout to dominate elections to the district boards and provincial 
legislatures. Even the elections of 1970, which brought Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s populist 
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PPP to power following years of agitation against the military government of Ayub 
Khan, did not represent a significant divergence from this trend. While the PPP’s 
victory arguably brought about an opening up of the political space, particularly given 
the party’s strong support amongst the urban and rural poor, the election results 
showed  there had been little more than a limited redistribution of power away from 
the traditional landed aristocracy and towards the rich peasantry (Ahmed, 1972;  
Ahmad, 1978; Burki, 1988). The dominant landed classes in Punjab were able to 
retain their political position, consolidating it in the elections held under the military 
government of Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s, and subsequently in the decade of democracy 
that preceded Musharraf’s military coup in 1999.  
 The electoral dominance of the Punjabi landed elite in the decades following 
independence from colonial rule demonstrates how little politics has altered since the 
colonial era. The first elections in Punjab were held in 1883, with the colonial 
government introducing limited forms of representative government in the province as 
part of an attempt to rule more effectively. Based on limited franchise, with the power 
to vote only being granted to large landowners, these elections brought into power a 
small number of leaders who were able to act in an advisory capacity to the governor 
of the province. In the decades that followed, both the franchise and the ambit of 
elected representatives were gradually expanded, although institutional constraints 
were introduced that ensured the continual reproduction of the political power of the 
regimes landed allies. By 1937, repeated rounds of elections at the district and 
provincial levels had continually returned candidates who were members of the 
Punjabi landed elite (Yadav, 1987), with the elections of 1946 displaying a similar set 
of results despite the fact that they had been won by the nationalist Muslim League.  
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 Although it could be argued that the electoral success of the Punjabi elite was 
a result of the preferential treatment it received from the colonial government, it was 
the existing power of the landed classes that would eventually make them the 
cornerstone of colonial rule in the province. In pre-colonial India, where agricultural 
surplus formed the primary source of revenue and wealth, control over land and, more 
importantly, cultivators and their produce, was of central significance to any ruling 
authority (Fuller, 1989). Lacking the infrastructural capacity to centralise control over 
land, the Mughal emperors in India relied upon a complex chain of intermediaries, 
ranging from provincial governors and jagirdars to local level clan leaders and 
zamindars, to provide the means through which indirect rule could be established over 
the empire (D’Souza, 2002, 8-10; Hintze, 1997). In addition to collecting revenue for 
the empire, these intermediaries also performed another incredibly important function 
– the suppression of dissent and rebellion. Recognising the need to curtail the 
potential for revolt, either by the peasantry or disaffected local and regional power-
holders, the Mughal emperors actively sought to accommodate elites who could use 
their own social and economic influence, as well as military force, to ensure the 
stability of the system. In return for these services, elites aligned with the Mughal 
regime received a share of the revenue collected, and also acquired the political 
legitimacy that was borne out of association with the Mughal emperor (Alam, 1986, 
Habib, 2000). 
 The need for pre-colonial regimes in India to extract agricultural surplus led to 
the cultivation of a class of landed elites who could pursue the state’s economic 
interests while simultaneously enforcing the state’s authority. What strengthened the 
position of these landed elites, however, was the fact that the possession of land 
allowed these landholders to consolidate their own economic and political power. The 
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jajmani system that enforced the division of labour between different castes and clans 
in the villages of India ensured the existence of different occupational groups, each of 
which had discrete links to the productive process (Fuller, 1989). Thus, a clear divide 
existed between landless workers, artisans, and landowners, which, in tandem with 
ties of kinship and caste, provided the basis for the creation of strong group identities. 
Within this social hierarchy, landholders tended to enjoy the most prestige, and were 
often able to buttress their power through the use of their influence within the village 
and through their association with other landholders.  
 In Punjab, the presence of this village-level division of labour was the 
foundation for the biraderis1 that would subsequently come to form the basis of 
political mobilisation in the province. An example of this was to be found in the Sikh 
peasantry who, drawn primarily from the Jat biraderi, had migrated from Sindh and 
whose presence in Punjab had begun to expand by the mid-Sixteenth century (Grewal, 
1990; Major, 1996). Persecuted by the Mughals, and eventually drawn into open 
conflict with the state, Sikh biraderi linkages provided them with a powerful means 
through which to coordinate resistance in Punjab, and eventually allowed for the 
creation of a consolidated Sikh polity under the leadership of Ranjit Singh. The 
conquest of Lahore by the Sikhs in 1799 may have only been made possible after 
almost a century of constant war and unrest involving an increasingly weak Mughal 
state, Afghan invaders, and a variety of regional rebels, but it did demonstrate that 
biraderi was an important social and political, as well as economic, source of 
organization.   
                                                 
1
 Often incorrectly equated with castes or tribes, biraderis are occupationally stratified, endogamous 
kin-groups. While there can be a number of sub-divisions within a given biraderi, the basic 
differentiation is between biraderis of landless labourers, artisans, cultivating tenants, and landowners. 
See Alavi (1972b), Ahmad (1977), and Rouse (1988). 
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  When the British annexed Punjab in 1849, on the surface it seemed that there 
were fundamental differences between the new colonial government and the Mughal 
and Sikh regimes that had preceded it. The biggest difference between them was the 
infrastructural power at the disposal of the British colonial government in terms of the 
state’s institutional capacity, logistical reach and ability to penetrate society. By 
eventually setting up a formal, modern bureaucracy that closely regulated and 
controlled agricultural production in the province on a scale that had simply not been 
possible under previous regimes (Ali, 1988, 9) and by putting in place a legal system 
that could implement and enforce a plethora of laws designed to protect the interests 
of the British government and its landed allies, the British government was able to 
engender an institutional transformation that greatly expanded the power of the state 
and its ability to monitor, and respond to, developments at every level of government. 
Linked to the growth of the state’s infrastructural power was the increasing 
centralisation of its military capacity. While the Mughal and Sikh regimes had 
depended on local and regional allies to provide troops for campaigns, the British 
Indian Army existed as a unified force under the sole command of the central 
government. Given the colonial state’s increasing ability to micro-manage governance 
through the expansion of its infrastructural power, and its military independence, there 
was apparently little need for the British colonial government to align its interests 
with those of the local landholding elite in Punjab. 
 However, as argued by Anil Seal (1971; 1973) and Christopher Bayly (1997), 
the strength of the British colonial state in India was often exaggerated and their hold 
over society remained tenuous at best, dependent always on the collaboration of 
indigenous elites and classes who played an instrumental role within the colonial 
system of governance. Though the state had a degree of autonomy from social forces 
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and pressures, its autonomy was circumscribed by its reliance on the traditional 
power-holders that supported it. In the case of Punjab, this led the British to nurture 
the support of indigenous landholding elites. Local allies in Punjab, possessing both 
economic and social power through their access to land and position within traditional 
networks of kinship, provided a means through which the colonial administration 
could overcome some of the limitations it faced when governing the subcontinent. 
Indeed, through their system of district and local level governance, the British 
emulated the experience of their predecessors and appointed locally influential 
landowners to be revenue collectors.  
 One of the more significant aspects of the British government in Punjab was 
the extent to which it evolved over time, undertaking slow, incremental institutional 
adaptation in order to cope with changing societal and political circumstances. 
Initially, in the period immediately after annexation, the province was ruled by a 
Board of Administration (BoA) consisting of only three members. Constructing the 
colonial government from scratch, the BoA was forced to confront a variety of 
different issues, not least of which was devising a system for revenue collection, and 
often took policy decisions based on the limited knowledge that was available, or in 
line with prevailing colonial doctrine on matters of government. The colonial state’s 
relationship with the traditional landed elite, at least in the initial phases, was 
governed by these constraints and it was only after the Indian Revolt of 1857, and the 
consolidation of the Punjab government in the 1860s, that the British in Punjab were 
able to institute and maintain a relatively coherent policy with regards to their landed 
allies. Although this policy was often subject to adjustment over time, and while the 
colonial government’s preferential treatment of the landed elite often led it to 
undertake measures that altered the institutional framework of governance being 
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erected in Punjab, illustrated most dramatically by the introduction of the infamous 
Land Alienation Act of 1900, it was clear that British interests in Punjab were quite 
firmly and arguably irrevocably aligned with those of the province’s landed classes. 
 As the decades went by, the colonial government in Punjab instituted a 
number of different measures that, directly and indirectly, benefitted their landed 
allies. Guided by their quest for greater revenue, as well as their increasing 
dependence on Punjab as a recruiting ground for the Indian army (Yong, 2005), and 
informed by their perception of biraderi in Punjabi society, the British actively 
cultivated the support of agriculturalist biraderis and local chiefs, making them a 
focal policy concern. Thus, when the British established the canal colonies in central 
Punjab at the end of the 19th Century, bringing into cultivation millions of acres of 
hitherto barren land, or when they began to include Punjabis within the formal 
administrative apparatuses of the state, priority was given to the inclusion of 
landholders within these schemes (Ali, 1988).  
 State-landholder relations under the colonial regime reached their peak in the 
first few decades of the 20th Century, when the introduction of limited representative 
government and electoral politics provided a new means through which the power of 
both the colonial government and the landed elite could be reinforced. In addition to 
informal associations formed by the landed elite to lobby the government for 
additional support, political parties such as the Unionist Party came to be dominated 
by these actors, and would in turn remain the most powerful force in Punjabi politics 
for decades to come (Talbot, 1988a). In essence, these actions formally 
institutionalised the province’s patronage politics, with the arena shifting from the 
durbar to legislative assemblies and district boards. Having had their economic power 
guaranteed by the Land Alienation Act, the landed elite were also able to use their 
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local level influence to acquire greater involvement in the state bureaucracy (Ali, 
1988). They were thus placed in a position where they could use their political power 
to provide patronage to clients and constituents at the local level, becoming conduits 
to a state that was otherwise unreachable. The ability to establish patron-client ties of 
this nature strongly reinforced the dominant position of the landed elite in Punjabi 
society. 
 The effects of colonial collaboration with Punjab’s landed elite were made 
manifest by the turn of the century, when India had begun to the see the emergence of 
both an indigenous bourgeoisie and an educated elite that sought increasing 
representation within the state. At a time when nationalist sentiment had started to 
envelop politics in much of the rest of the country, Punjab remained largely 
undisturbed and stable. This was not least due to the efforts of the landed elite, who 
used their influence and power to actively retard the growth of nationalism in the 
province (Ali, 1991). Cracks did eventually appear in this arrangement, particularly in 
response to the economic strain of the two world wars and the logic of national 
electoral politics (Puri, 1985; Jalal, 1999b), leading to the eventual collapse of British 
rule in Punjab and the defection of the province’s landholding classes to the 
nationalist camp. Nonetheless, British policy with regards to Punjab’s landed elites 
had allowed for a century of largely stable and profitable rule. 
 In the years following partition, the Punjabi landed elite were able to 
consolidate and expand their power, using their entrenched position within the 
institutional framework of the state to adapt to the changed political context in a way 
that allowed them to continue pursuing their economic and political interests. This 
was illustrated most starkly during the regime of Ayub Khan, the military general who 
seized control of the government in 1956. Seeking democratic legitimacy through an 
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exercise in electoral politics, Ayub Khan instituted a system of ‘Basic Democracy’ 
that empowered an elected electoral college to vote for the legislative assemblies and 
president. As political parties had been banned by the Ayub Khan government, only 
candidates possessing independent economic and social clout were able to claim 
electoral victory, and Punjab’s landed classes once again became instrumental in 
ensuring the stability and legitimacy of yet another authoritarian regime (Waseem, 
1994b, 145-153), and would continue to play such a role for military regimes in the 
future as well (Cheema et al., 2006; Dewey, 1991a). Over time, their power to 
dominate electoral competitions would also provide the landed classes with the 
opportunity to deeply enmesh themselves within democratic party politics. 
 Landed power in Punjab was also reinforced by the ability of the landed elite 
to effectively use their position to stymie successive attempts at introducing more 
stringent agricultural taxation and land reform (Hussain, 1989). By the 1980s, this 
political clout had yielded additional economic dividends, with many elements of the 
traditional landed elite using their power to expand into industry (Husain, 1999). At 
the local level, the structure of patronage politics that had been constructed in the 
colonial era continued to operate and while the power of the landed elite to 
economically coerce their subordinates was weakened over time with the spread of 
capitalism and the increasing importance of the urban economy, the ability to provide 
access to a largely dysfunctional state came to constitute one of the key foundations of 
the power of Punjab’s landed elite (Wilder, 1999). 
While the institutionalised relationship between authoritarian regimes and the 
landed elite did evolve and adapt to a changing societal context as the decades wore 
on, the fundamental exchange of political support for patronage that formed the basis 
of the relationship between the two remained unchanged in essence, and would 
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continue to be a central feature of Pakistani politics in the post-colonial epoch. Having 
entrenched themselves within the formal apparatuses of colonial political control, the 
landed elite in Punjab were able to hold on to their positions in the state and in the 
political parties for decades after partition despite a wide array of societal changes that 
could have potentially eroded their power.  
Literature Review 
 
 In this section, a brief overview will be provided of existing literature that is 
relevant to understanding the persistence of landed power in Punjab. Much of this 
literature tends to focus exclusively on events and processes within specific regimes, 
often creating artificial divisions between the colonial and post-colonial epochs that 
overstate the extent to which political processes in the province are marked by 
historical disjuncture. In line with the temporal divisions that characterise the 
literature, this review will begin by outlining relevant work the colonial period before 
moving on to the post-colonial epoch. In each case, further subdivisions within the 
literature, along thematic and analytical lines, will also be highlighted and discussed 
accordingly. 
 Literature on colonial rule in Punjab can be divided into different themes and 
analytical categories. These include work done by colonial administrators in their 
official and private capacities, historians’ accounts of British government in Punjab, 
and more recently, critical appraisals of the effects of colonial rule in the province. 
The first category, namely the work of colonial administrators themselves, provides 
interesting contemporary insights into British rule in the province. In addition to the 
three volumes of district gazetteers that were compiled by the colonial government in 
Punjab, a number of semi-official publications like Ibbetson’s Punjab Castes (1901), 
Tupper’s volumes on Punjab Customary Law (1880), and Cust’s Manual for the 
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Guidance of Revenue Officers (1868), all provide glimpses into the workings of the 
official mind in the colonial period as well as the colonial view of Punjab and Punjabi 
society. Writing in their private capacities, Trevaskis (1928), Darling (1928), and 
Thornburn (1983 [1886]) provide firsthand accounts of the circumstances that 
surrounded many of the decisions taken by the colonial government with regards to 
the Punjabi landed elite and the defence of their mutual interests. While all of these 
accounts tend to exhibit a clear bias in favour of the colonial government, they are 
invaluable supplements to the official reports, correspondence, and other documents 
that pertain to colonial governance and revenue collection. 
 In addition to the above-mentioned contemporaneous accounts of the colonial 
administration in Punjab, historians have sought to provide accounts of the processes 
that underpinned the development of colonial power in the province. In attempting to 
understand why the formal apparatuses of colonial rule assumed the form that they 
did, Eric Stokes’ (1959) The English Utilitarians and India provides a masterful 
account of the different debates and ideologies that informed revenue and 
administrative policy in the founding century of British colonial power in India. This 
theme is developed by Metcalf (1962; 1964), van den Dungen (1972), Penner (1986), 
and Lee (2002), all of whom examine how the debates highlighted by Stokes shaped 
the administrative practices and perceptions of the Punjab government in its initial 
years.  However, by focusing almost exclusively on official debates and the 
development of the formal apparatuses of colonial rule, these studies leave largely 
unanswered the question of how these institutional changes impacted Punjabi society.
 In attempting to answer this question, Bayly (1973), Metcalf (1979) and 
Washbrook (1997) examine how colonial governance was premised upon the 
cooptation of local elites through patronage politics. While these studies do not focus 
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specifically on Punjab, they do highlight the ways in which colonial governance 
evolved in response to changing political and economic imperatives, with lasting 
effects on the structure of local politics. This is a theme that is developed in Imran 
Ali’s (1988) seminal study of the relationship between the Punjabi landed classes and 
the colonial state in the canal colonies that were created at the end of the 19th Century. 
Focusing on how the colonies were designed to facilitate greater accumulation by the 
colonial state, while simultaneously reinforcing the economic and political position of 
the state’s landed allies, Ali’s study emphasises the extent to which this project 
strengthened the ties between the Punjabi landed elite and the state. In particular, 
attention is given to the way in which the canal colonies project resulted in the greater 
incorporation of the Punjab’s landed classes within the colonial bureaucracy. Another 
dimension of this relationship is captured by Barrier (1967; 1968) and Puri (1985), 
who both highlight how the decisions by the colonial state sometimes generated 
resistance from the regime’s allies which, in turn, led to revisions in colonial policy. 
Talbot (1988a; 1988b) and Gilmartin (1988) also look at the interplay between state 
and dominant classes in the colonial era, with the former charting the evolution of the 
relationship between the British and the Punjabi landed elite, and the latter focusing 
on the patronage the colonial government extended to specific biraderi networks and 
landowning religious leaders who demonstrated loyalty to the regime. On a separate 
but related note, Yong (2005) and Saif (2010) argue that the political significance of 
the province, and the fact that its landowning biraderis proved to be a reliable and 
abundant source of recruits for the colonial army, necessitated the implementation of 
policies that would guarantee stability in the province. For these authors, the 
governance of Punjab was inextricably linked with the need to protect the broader 
strategic concerns of the colonial government in India. 
 16
These works, while raising critical questions about the relationship between 
the landed elite and the colonial state, can offer only limited insights into the politics 
of the post-colonial period. Literature on this period can also be divided into a number 
of categories, each of which will be discussed in turn in the remainder of this section. 
The first of these categories specifically looks at the economic dynamics of Punjab, 
particularly in terms of the legacy of colonialism and the inequality that characterises 
the rural economy. The second category encompasses work on elections, party 
competition, and the formal political process. These largely descriptive studies are 
supplemented by literature that identifies the social bases of different political parties 
and groups in Pakistan, focusing on how their interaction with each other underpins 
the dynamics of key political events. A related category is that of explicitly Marxian 
analyses of the interaction between state and class in Pakistan. The final category of 
literature discussed in this review is that of ‘institutionalist’ analyses that attempt to 
trace out and explain institutional continuity and change in Punjab and Pakistan. 
Colonial literature on the economy of Punjab tends to paint a picture of 
province inhabited by a contented peasantry benefitting from enlightened policies and 
decades of economic growth. Recent scholarship has, however, increasingly 
questioned this account. Mishra (1982), Nazir (2000) and Mukherjee (2005) highlight 
the disruptive effect of colonial economic policy, placing an emphasis on how 
indebtedness, rising inequality, and declining productivity characterised this period. 
Ali (1987; 2004) traces out the impact of colonial agricultural policy on growth in the 
post-colonial period, arguing that institutional structure bequeathed by colonialism 
acted as a serious impediment to economic development in Punjab. Alavi (1976), 
Hussain (1988) and Niazi (2004) examine Punjab’s Green Revolution and the way in 
which it allowed the rural elite to invest in capitalist agriculture, deepening their 
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economic power. The extent to which Pakistan’s agricultural economy is dominated 
by these elites is described in studies by Husain (1999) and Khan (2006), both of 
which also explain changes in the nature and composition of Pakistan’s rural 
economic elite over time. 
Moving on to the literature on the formal political process in Pakistan, 
Friedman (1961), al-Mujahid (1965), Maniruzzaman (1966) and Weinbaum (1977) 
provide a descriptive overview of the local, provincial and national level elections that 
took place in the years immediately following partition. Rais (1985; 1997) and 
Waseem (1994a; 1994b) offer a more detailed account of electoral competition in the 
1980s and 1990s, focusing on the potential for democratic consolidation after repeated 
episodes of military rule. Focusing specifically on Punjab, Wilder (1999) provides a 
comprehensive view of the province’s electoral history, identifying the existence of 
completely different rural and urban electoral dynamics in Punjab, and supplying 
evidence to suggest that politics in the countryside continues to be dominated by 
patron-client ties and biraderi linkages.  
While all this work on elections provides valuable empirical data on the 
political process in Pakistan, little explanation is offered for the underlying processes 
of political continuity and change that have shaped the country’s politics over the 
decades since independence. In an attempt to understand these processes, considerable 
scholarly attention has been paid to the regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s first 
popularly elected Prime Minister, and leader of the populist PPP. In analyzing the 
political basis of the PPP’s power and its popularity, Burki (1988) and Jones (2003) 
both trace out the roots of the party to the movement that toppled the military 
government of Ayub Khan, and argue that despite its popular support, the PPP 
government was unable to transform its democratic mandate into a shift towards mass 
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politics, preferring instead to compromise with traditional elites and elements of an 
increasingly powerful rich peasantry. This was most clearly evident in the regime’s 
lack of commitment to the implementation of land reforms, even though a pledge to 
implement these had been one of the cornerstones of its electoral campaign. Faced 
with opposition from powerful landed actors, many of whom would be instrumental in 
orchestrating the collapse of the government in 1977, the regime remained largely 
incapable of instituting any measures that would have significantly altered the balance 
of economic power in the countryside (Herring, 1979; Hussain, 1989).  
In addition to these studies, more recent scholarship on elections in Pakistan 
has attempted to understand the means through which military regimes have 
attempted to acquire electoral legitimacy. Cheema, Khwaja and Qadir (2006) look at 
local level elections held under military regimes in Pakistan, and conclude that the 
banning of political parties at this tier of government effectively allows military 
regimes to acquire electoral legitimacy without having to bargain with organised 
parties, while simultaneously empowering sets of local level politicians beholden to 
the state for continued patronage. A similar argument is made by Shah (2005) who 
extends the argument to national-level elections and uses the example of the 
Musharraf regime to illustrate the way in which military governments in Pakistan 
have actively co-opted political parties in an attempt to shore up their power. 
Rich as they are in historical narrative, the works cited above nonetheless fail 
to offer much in the way of causal explanation for the political outcomes they 
document, remaining largely descriptive in their analyses of political events. In 
contrast with this, work in the Marxian tradition has sought to more explicitly 
highlight the relationship between the state and dominant economic classes within 
Pakistan.  Nations (1971), Alavi (1974), Ahmad (1978), Ahmad (1981), and Gardezi 
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(1983) attempt to delineate the class structure of Pakistan, and offer accounts of the 
political roles played by the different classes they identify. Ahmad (1973) and Rouse 
(1988) provide detailed ethnographic studies of power and domination at the local 
level in Punjab. However, it is Hamza Alavi’s (1972a) article on the overdeveloped 
post-colonial state that remains the most influential work in this category, arguing that 
the structure of Pakistani politics must necessarily be understood in terms of the 
institutional legacy bequeathed by the colonial government. Alavi claims that the state 
in Pakistan is ‘overdeveloped’ because of the autonomous power enjoyed by the 
bureaucracy and military relative to the propertied classes within the country, thus 
explaining the persistence of authoritarianism in Pakistan.  
A different approach to studying the institutional legacy of colonialism 
focuses more on the impact of colonial administrative apparatuses on subsequent 
political developments. Lange, Mahoney and vom Hau (2005) compare the 
developmental levels of former Spanish and British colonies to support the argument 
that the ‘liberal’ institutions of British colonial rule were conducive to relatively 
higher levels of development following independence. Lange (2009) develops this 
argument to suggest that the extent to which the British employed direct or indirect 
mechanisms of rule was an important determinant of post-colonial political fortunes. 
In his study, Lange suggests that direct rule, with an emphasis on the creation of 
integrated, formal mechanisms of governance, was more likely to lead to the 
emergence of bureaucratically strong states than indirect rule which, through the use 
of intermediaries and local authorities, would give rise to weak central states 
characterised by high degrees of patrimonialism. While Lange’s (2009) analysis rests 
on a comparison of different African colonies, he suggests that India fits a hybrid 
model, with characteristics of both direct and indirect rule. 
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Although these comparative studies of the effect of British colonialism 
describe some of the ways in which colonialism shaped post-independence political 
and economic trajectories, they do not focus specifically on the persistence of  
authoritarianism in Pakistan. Ayesha Jalal’s (1995b) Democracy and 
Authoritarianism in South Asia provides an answer to this question, and remains an 
important contribution to the debate on institutional continuity in Pakistan. In her 
introduction to the book, Jalal argues for the need to focus on conceptualizing the 
development of the state and politics in Pakistan as being the result of a historically 
constituted institutional legacy that was bequeathed by colonial rule, and whose roots 
lay in events that took place well before partition and independence.  As such, she 
embarks upon a comparative analysis of politics in South Asia, arguing that recurrent 
military rule in Pakistan and the persistence of authoritarian political tendencies 
within the Indian state, despite the presence of formal democracy, can both be 
explained by examining the structure of colonial governance and the existence of a 
colonial state possessing a strong military and bureaucracy. Particularly in the case of 
Pakistan, Jalal’s analysis provides valuable insights by describing how the military’s 
role in politics can be traced back to how it and the bureaucracy were able to supplant 
civilian politicians who lacked the organizational capacity and popular support 
necessary to take effective control of the state.  
More recent institutionalist analyses of Pakistan’s politics have attempted to 
overcome this problem by focusing more specifically on the processes that 
underpinned the continuity which characterised the transition from the colonial to the 
post-colonial epoch and beyond. Stern (2001), Adeney and Wyatt (2004) and 
Subrahmanyam (2006) argue that the Muslim’s League dependence on Punjabi 
landlords and lack of popular support, coupled with ethnic conflict, posed 
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fundamental challenges to the consolidation of democracy in an area that lacked 
integrative political institutions that could have promoted consensus. Aziz (2008) uses 
the concept of path dependence to account for Pakistan’s repeated episodes of military 
rule, showing how the military is able to consolidate its power by using its control 
over government to acquire resources and control the political space through the 
implementation of measures aimed at curtailing civilian politicians, allowing for 
greater military intervention in subsequent years. While this study provides important 
insights into how the institutional framework of Pakistan’s politics are subject to path 
dependent processes of evolution, it fails to account for the power that continues to be 
wielded by groups other than the military, and the ways in which these groups are 
themselves able to further entrench themselves within the political process. 
Although the literature on politics in Pakistan and Punjab provides important 
analytical frames within which to understand the mechanisms and structures that 
influence the political process, there is currently a gap in the literature in terms of 
understanding precisely how institutional continuities have resulted in the persistence 
of landed power in Punjab. Matthew Nelson’s (2002) study of local politics in Punjab 
is one notable exception in this area. In attempting to explain the, ‘microfoundational 
logic of post-colonial path dependence’, Nelson argues that the persistence of the 
colonial model of local level politics cannot be traced to the effect of formal 
administrative institutions. Instead, given the scale of agrarian transformation in 
Punjab since the end of colonialism, Nelson suggests that the power of the landed elite 
stems from its ability to use political networks formed around access to land, 
traditional village-level informal institutions, and relations of kinship, to provide local 
constituents with access to the formal institutions of the post-colonial state, 
particularly in matters pertaining to dispute resolution and the inheritance of property.  
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Although this explanation provides a compelling account of the dynamics of 
land-based, factionalised politics at the micro-level in Punjab, it leaves largely 
unexplored the way in which these local level processes channel into the structure of 
provincial and national level politics.  Despite changes in the nature of state and 
society in the post-colonial epoch, politics in Punjab remains determined not only by 
issues of control at the local level, but also by the crises of legitimacy that prompt an 
authoritarian state to buttress its rule through the exploitation of social networks 
dominated by traditionally powerful landed elites. The model of local politics in 
Punjab that existed under colonialism continues to exist not just due to factional 
competition at the local level, but also because of the historically embedded 
institutional continuities between the post-colonial state and the regimes that preceded 
it, with the post-colonial state’s search for legitimacy mirroring the quest for order 
and support that characterised the colonial epoch. 
Finally, drawing on the framework employed by Banerjee and Iyer (2005) to 
explain the institutional effects of colonial property regimes on contemporary 
economic outcomes, Cheema, Mohmand and Patnam (2009) use micro-level data 
from villages in the district of Sargodha to suggest that rural politics continues to be 
dominated by elements of the traditional landed elite. They claim that the institutional 
framework of colonial politics and revenue extraction in Punjab allowed these elites 
to maintain their political and economic dominance despite the de jure institutional 
transformations that characterised the transition from the colonial to the post-colonial 
regime.  Their paper argues that the persistence of the power of these traditional elites 
can be ascribed to a process of path dependence put into motion by colonial 
institutional interventions in Punjab. However, it does not outline the exact 
mechanisms through which institutional reproduction and adaptation took place over 
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the decades between the introduction of colonial government in Punjab and the 
present day. Its micro-level analysis also raises questions about the extent to which its 
results can be generalised to the provincial and national level politics. 
The brief review given above of existing literature on politics in Punjab and 
Pakistan highlights the diversity of approaches taken to analysing political dynamics 
within the province. It also identifies key variables and conceptual categories 
employed by other scholars in their attempts to explain the pattern of politics in 
Punjab. As has been shown, scholarship in this area is rich in narrative detail about the 
events and processes that have characterised political outcomes in the time period that 
is the object of this study. The literature reviewed is also useful for tracing out 
instances of continuity and change from regime to regime in Punjab, and 
understanding the processes that have underpinned these developments. What this 
review has also illustrated, however, is that there remains a need to examine how 
processes of institutional reproduction and evolution have contributed to the 
persistence of landed power in the province. 
Structure of the Study 
 
In this introductory chapter, the aims of this study have been delineated, and 
an historical overview of politics in Punjab has been provided, with particular 
emphasis on the persistent political role that has been played by the province’s landed 
elite. The literature on the subject has also been reviewed, outlining the insights and 
conceptual tools that can be derived from extant scholarly work while also 
highlighting some of the gaps and shortcomings that characterise it. In chapter two, 
the methodological framework employed by this study will be explained, emphasising 
how path dependence provides a means through which to explain institutional 
persistence. The use of process tracing to examine the mechanisms through which the 
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landed elite in Punjab have retained their power will also be considered, with an 
emphasis on how the concept of critical ‘foundational’ and ‘contestational’ junctures 
can be used to distinguish between transformational and incremental institutional 
change. Finally, the chapter will elaborate on the way in which the concepts of state 
and class are employed in this study. 
 Chapter three focuses on the period from 1849 to 1901, examining the 
imperatives that initially informed the construction of British rule in the province. 
Emphasis will be placed on examining specific instances of institutional development 
in which the interplay of ideology and interest shaped colonial policy, leading to the 
co-optation of Punjab’s landed classes during the foundational juncture of 1849-1868. 
The chapter will also look at how the bargain between the state and the landed elite 
acted as a mechanism underpinning the path dependent nature of institutional 
development in Punjab, focusing on how the British and their landed allies set about 
pursuing their mutual interests. A particular focus is placed on how this was done in 
the newly-populated Canal colonies, with the analysis showing how the colonial 
state’s decision to align itself with Punjab’s aristocracy and rich peasantry increased 
its dependency on these classes over time, as evinced by the eventual introduction of 
the Land Alienation Act of 1900 and the consolidation of a political regime in which 
the landed classes played a central role.  
Chapter four also deals with the colonial period. However, while chapter three 
deals with the formative, foundational years of British rule in Punjab, chapter four 
examines the way in which the introduction of limited representative government in 
Punjab allowed for the deepening of the relationship between the colonial state and 
the landed elite in the period from 1901-1947. In particular, the chapter focuses on 
three main mechanisms through which the bargain between the state and the landed 
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elite was reproduced and reinforced; the use of electoral politics to maintain the 
landed elite’s monopoly on political power, the utilization of bureaucratic networks 
and linkages to receive and disburse patronage, and the role of legislation and 
legislative politics in shaping the institutional framework of Punjab’s politics.  
Chapter five concludes the section on colonial Punjab with a brief examination 
of the events leading up to Partition, as well as the events of the first ten years of 
democratic rule in post-independence Pakistan. While some attention will be paid to 
the exact circumstances that led to the end of British rule in 1947, and the imposition 
of Martial Law in 1958, the core emphasis of the chapter is on the role of factional 
politics in splintering, and re-forging, landed power. Through an analysis of the 
factional splits that led to the collapse of the Unionist Party, and the rise of the 
nationalist Muslim League, it will be argued that the period of time around Partition 
represented a contestational juncture in which the possibility for institutional change 
was opened up, and then stymied. It will be shown that in the context of state 
weakness triggered by the Second World War, competition for patronage and power 
led formerly pro-British landed politicians to defect from their bargain with the 
colonial state, seeking alternative political means through which to safeguard their 
interests. While this had the effect of bringing down colonial rule in the province, it 
will be shown that it also ensured that the landed elite were able to survive as a 
powerful political force post-independence. The implications of this are then explored 
through an account of the Muslim League’s first ten years in power after partition. 
Here it will be argued that, like the last decade of colonial rule, factionalism splintered 
the power of the landed elite, preventing them from potentially consolidating their 
control of the state. At the same time, Pakistan’s powerful military-bureaucratic 
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establishment was able to make use of this factionalism, playing different political 
groupings off against each other in the pursuit of its own interests. 
Chapter six explores in more detail the relationship between authoritarianism 
and the landed elite in Punjab, and is divided into three main sections. After first 
providing an account for the persistence of military power in Pakistan, an analysis is 
presented of the factors giving rise to the formal re-entrenchment of the state-landlord 
bargain under Ayub Khan.  Following an exploration of the regime’s attempts to 
sideline the landed elite, it will be argued that the military, when faced with the same 
constraints that confronted the colonial state in terms of effectively governing the 
country, engineered a rapprochement with the Punjabi landed elite that saw the state 
exchange patronage for support. This state-landlord bargain subsequently drove the 
regime to institute a course of institutional development aimed at securing the 
interests of its landed collaborators through the use of the same mechanisms that had 
been deployed by the colonial state.   The final section of the chapter provides a brief 
account of how these mechanisms were deployed by the Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf 
regimes to bolster their own power, illustrating the path dependent nature of Punjab’s 
political trajectory following the re-instatement of the state-landlord bargain.  
Chapter seven examines the mechanisms through which landed power is 
reproduced in the post-colonial period, emphasising precisely how the landed elite 
themselves have used their historically entrenched sources of social power to 
dominate electoral politics, access bureaucratic networks, and legislate, with each of 
the mechanisms complementing the others to ensure the perpetuation of the landed 
elite’s power.   
Chapter eight, which is the final substantive chapter of the thesis, engages in a 
within-case comparison of the anti-military movements of 1968-69 and 2007, 
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focusing on how these two instances represented potential ‘contestational’ junctures 
during which the inertia of Punjab’s path dependent, landed politics could have been 
overcome. The chapter examines the circumstances that gave rise to these movements, 
and then explains how the mechanisms underpinning the enduring persistence of 
landed power in Punjab would ultimately dilute the radical potential of these moments 
in time.  
Finally, the thesis concludes with a summary of the arguments presented. 
After briefly revisiting the methodological underpinnings of the thesis, an overview is 
provided of the mechanisms of production and reproduction that have contributed to 
the persistence of landed power in Punjab, and reinforced the relationship between the 
landed elite and the state. Then, after a discussion of the insights gleaned from the 
analysis of failed attempts at changing the institutional status quo, the thesis ends with 
a few tentative thoughts on the future of landed power in Punjab. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Methodology, Analytical Tools, and 
Concepts 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but 
under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from 
the past. 
                Karl Marx2 
Introduction 
 
This chapter lays out the study’s methodological framework. In the first 
section, a brief review will be provided of some of the classic works of historical 
sociology, highlighting the key variables and methods that are employed in this 
tradition of scholarship. The second section provides an evaluation of the qualitative 
case study method employed in this study, and considers the costs and benefits of 
using such an approach. Section three, on historical institutionalism, will elaborate on 
this approach as a subset of historical sociology, and will outline the conception of 
institutions that informs this study. The fourth and fifth sections are on path 
dependence and critical junctures respectively, explaining what these concepts are and 
how they can be used to develop an understanding of institutional persistence and 
change. Process tracing, which is the method used in this study to trace out the causal 
mechanisms underlying path dependence, will be described in the sixth section. After 
a brief note on the use of primary sources, the chapter concludes with two sections on 
class and state in Punjab. As these two variables are of crucial importance to the 
                                                 
2
 The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm 
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analysis, these sections will outline exactly how they are conceptualised in this study, 
thereby informing the overall argument presented. 
Historical Sociology 
 
Informed by an understanding of the ways in which past events can shape and 
influence contemporary outcomes, sociological analysis has long made use of history 
to illustrate and substantiate causal claims drawing on Marxian and Weberian 
traditions of analysis to inform its understanding of how large-scale processes unfold 
(Skocpol, 1984). Examples of such work include Moore’s (1966) study of political 
outcomes associated with the transition to industrialised societies, focusing on how 
conflict and cooperation between different classes, in the context of specific agrarian 
economic frameworks, determining political trajectories. Anderson’s (1974) analysis 
of the emergence of feudal absolutism in Europe relies on comparable conceptual 
categories, attributing the outcome to the way in which feudal elites modified extant 
political institutions to maintain their hold on power in the face of increasing peasant 
autonomy and resistance. Tilly (1978) examines the way in which intra-elite 
competition and contestation for power can lead dominant groups to cultivate 
alliances within society, ultimately resulting in the capture of state power by those 
actors that are best able to utilise the resources at their disposal. 
In contrast with studies that primarily focus on competition between different 
classes and social groups while treating the state as an arena for contestation, Skocpol 
(1979), conceptualises the state as an autonomous actor whose activities directly 
influence political processes and interactions between different social groups, defining 
the setting within which revolutionary groups would be able to successfully seize 
control of state power. The notion that states can possess varying degrees of 
independent institutional strength and capacity is also employed by Tilly (1990), 
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whose analysis of Western European state development focuses on how the growing 
revenue demands fuelled by warfare led rulers and managers within emerging state 
bureaucracies to bargain with increasingly powerful capitalist classes trading 
resources for political patronage. Mann (1986a) examines how the state and different 
classes in society are situated within networks of economic, political, military, and 
ideological power, with the ability to draw upon these different sources of power 
contributing to the ability of these actors to influence political outcomes. The common 
thread running through all of these studies is a recognition of how the state, and actors 
within it, can exercise power independently and can pursue interests that may or may 
not coincide with those of groups in society. 
Building on these insights, more recent historical sociological studies have 
attempted to examine the effect of timing and sequence on political outcomes. Collier 
and Collier (1991), when examining the incorporation of labour movements and 
working classes within Latin American states, analysed the effect the timing of such 
moves had on subsequent political trajectories. Similarly, Pierson’s (1994) work on 
welfare states illustrates how extant institutional configurations of welfare provision 
in Britain and the USA during the 1980s played a role in constraining the extent to 
which these governments could subsequently reform and change them. Ertman 
(1997), in his analysis of European state development, argues that the points in time at 
which states are drawn into military competition, rather than warfare in and of itself, 
are likely to  have lasting legacies for institutional development. 
This brief review of some of the literature within the historical sociological 
tradition serves a number of key purposes. Firstly, it illustrates the types of variables 
that are frequently employed by historical sociologists to explain outcomes such as 
state formation or democratization. Classes and interest groups, along with state elites 
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and functionaries, constitute the primary actors influencing political outcomes, and 
variables such as state autonomy, working class organisation, and the timing of 
military competition, all are examples of factors that can contribute to the construction 
of robust causal explanations for specific outcomes of interest. Secondly, the literature 
provides insights into the causal mechanisms underlying different political processes. 
For example, the reduced capacity of the state to impose coercive sanctions upon 
actors contesting its power could have the effect of bolstering the chances of 
revolutionary success, and the types of power resources available to actors can shape 
the means by which they pursue their interests. Thirdly, these studies illustrate how 
historical sociology tends not to produce invariant laws governing different political 
processes. Instead, the explanations provided are largely middle range, identifying 
structural similarities across cases while remaining sensitive to historical detail and 
temporality when outlining causal mechanisms. Good historical sociology seeks to 
explain large-scale processes by incorporating nuance and complexity, rather than by 
developing blanket models for potentially diverse sets of cases (Tilly, 1995; Clemens, 
2007).  
The Case Study Method 
 
The qualitative case study methodology employed by mainstream historical 
sociology allows for incorporating the specificities of the processes being studied 
while employing organizing concepts derived from a broader range of theoretical and 
empirical literature. Combining deductive and inductive approaches to arrive at causal 
explanations, qualitative case studies draw on extant theoretical frameworks to define 
variables and processes of interest while allowing for the empirical testing of 
hypotheses and the reformulation of causal propositions in the light of emerging 
evidence (Goldstone, 1998; Gerring, 2004). They also provide for an approach that is 
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particularly tailored towards uncovering ‘causes of effects’ particular to specific 
outcomes relating to a single or small group of cases, as opposed to quantitative 
research methodologies that are better geared towards evaluating the ‘effects of 
causes’ across a relatively large number of cases (Bennett and Elman, 2006a, 457-
458). This research methodology facilitates the in-depth examination of particular 
units circumscribed by spatial and temporal boundaries, allowing for a variety of 
analytical tasks to be performed, ranging from the testing and reinforcement of 
existing hypotheses to the establishment of new causal claims. Although qualitative 
case studies have been criticised for having high degrees of selection bias, and for 
their inability to generate testable theoretical propositions with a wide range of 
applicability (Collier and Mahoney, 1995; Goldthorpe, 2000), their sensitivity to 
context, relative lack of omitted variables, and detailed examination of specific 
outcomes, events, and cases allows for a degree of conceptual validity that might 
otherwise be lost by employing broader, empirically grounded statistical analyses 
generalizing across a large number of cases (Bryant, 1994; Bennett and George, 2005, 
19).  
 Although qualitative case study analysis is not suited to large-N comparisons, 
it has often been used to provide causal explanations for processes occurring across a 
small number of cases or even a single case. Given this study’s focus on Punjab, a 
single-N research design allows for an in-depth examination of the processes and 
mechanisms underlying institutional development. Choosing single-N over 
comparative case studies does, however, involve methodological trade-offs, with the 
latter often being considered to provide the basis for more valid causal claims. 
Rueschemeyer (2003) argues that this need not be the case when considering how 
single cases contain within themselves multiple data points that can effectively test 
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and generate hypotheses. Similarly, Tilly (1997) argues that considering a case to be a 
singular entity obscures the ways in which causal mechanisms and variables function 
at different levels of analysis within the spatial and institutional boundaries of a case. 
Indeed, within a single-N study, a range of ‘informal’ units can be analysed 
concurrently with the primary object of study in order to provide the study with 
greater analytical leverage (Gerring, 2004, 344).  As such, while the primary case 
could be country, province, or other unit or analysis, focusing on further divisions and 
levels within such units can greatly strengthen the explanatory power of a single-N 
research project.  
Following from these observations, it is possible to see that even though the 
main unit of analysis in this study is a single province, comparisons across time and 
space inevitably lead to a wider set of data points being used to formulate, and test, 
the thesis’ central argument. Whether it is by looking at the dynamics of local level 
politics in rural Punjab to ascertaining the effect of federal legislation on provincial 
state powers, by contrasting the experiences of different districts, cities, and regions, 
or by examining the relationship between the colonial and the post-colonial, the 
‘Single-N’ research design employed in this thesis is one that makes use of within and 
cross-case analysis to strengthen the causal claims being made by tracing the 
connections between different spatial and temporal levels of analysis. Therefore, 
while this thesis uses a ‘Single-N’ design in that it focuses on a specific territory, this 
emphasis does not preclude the inclusion of a broader range of observations and 
variables. 
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Historical Institutionalism 
 
  In recent years, drawing in part on developments in economics, analyses of 
political outcomes have increasingly focused on the role played by institutions. The 
assumption underlying institutionalist analyses is that institutions, as rules and 
constraints governing human interaction (North, 1991), are fundamental to 
understanding the decisions taken by actors in any given political context. These rules 
can take formal shape at different levels of analysis, from electoral systems and 
economic regimes to laws and systems of social stratification. Within the social 
sciences, Hall and Taylor (1996) identify three dominant ‘institutionalisms’, namely 
rational choice, sociological, and historical institutionalism, each of which is 
distinctive in how it conceptualises the ways in which institutions develop, how they 
impact different actors within society, and the different beliefs, practices, and rules 
that they embody. Thus, rational choice institutionalism views society as being 
comprised of utility-maximizing agents acting strategically within given institutional 
contexts, while sociological institutionalism views institutions as embodying 
particular beliefs and norms that structure interaction between different actors in 
society, informing preferences, interests, and worldviews. Historical institutionalism 
draws on both of these traditions and seeks to explore the different factors and 
processes that trigger and underlie institutional development over time, and the effects 
these processes have on actors within society. In common with historical sociology, 
Steinmo (2008) argues that the historical institutional approach simply provides a 
means through which to understand why actors make particular choices in certain 
historical contexts, and how these choices can have an impact on subsequent 
outcomes.   
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 Despite their conceptual differences, however, the different variants of 
institutionalism can be critiqued for the lack of attention they give to the structure-
agency dichotomy (Hay and Wincott, 1998). At the extremes, proponents of rational 
choice institutionalism assume that actors have unchanging preferences that inform 
utility-maximizing strategies within exogenously given institutional frameworks, 
while sociological institutionalists suggest that institutions exert an almost 
deterministic effect on the actions taken by different sets of actors. Historical 
institutionalism potentially provides a solution to this problem by conceptualising the 
interaction between agents and institutions as being mutually constitutive. While 
institutions can and do impose constraints on actors, playing a role in the shaping of 
their interests (Immergut, 1998, 20-22), they can also evolve and change over time, 
often in response to exogenous shocks but also due to strategic decisions taken by 
actors themselves (Hay and Wincott, 1998). Rather than viewing either institutions or 
actors as static, historical institutionalism conceptualises both as being subject to 
change over time as circumstances and constraints develop. 
Thelen and Streeck’s (2005) definition of institutions provides a way in which 
to operationalise the conception of action and context within historical 
institutionalism. Defining institutions as regimes that constitute, “a set of rules 
stipulating expected behaviour and ‘ruling out’ behaviour deemed to be undesirable’ 
(2005, 12-13), Thelen and Streeck argue that the effectiveness of institutions rests on 
the extent to which rules can be enforced reliably without contestation. Given that 
institutional rules are often open to interpretation by the actors that are constrained by 
them, and that loopholes in these rules can provide escapes from certain types of 
constraints, the authors suggest that actors can make use of these factors to initiate 
processes of institutional change. The institutions-as-regimes approach thus allows for 
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an understanding of how institutional frameworks often contain within themselves the 
seeds of their own evolution.  
Conceiving of institutions as regimes that can be contested and changed allows 
for several analytical advantages. Firstly, it captures competition and conflict between 
different stakeholders within any institutional arrangement, particularly in terms of 
contestation over the exact interpretation and implementation of any given set of 
rules. Those involved in creating institutions, and those governed by them, can thus 
attempt to reconfigure or maintain institutional frameworks in line with their own 
interests by attempting to change or exploit extant rules (Thelen and Streek, 2005, 14-
15). Secondly, understanding institutions as regimes governing interaction between 
actors also provides a means with which to identify the various mechanisms employed 
by these actors to generate institutional change. As such, differentials in access to 
power or resources, privileged access to decision-making, feedback loops, and 
loopholes within formalised rules could all be factors shaping the strategies adopted 
by different actors to initiate endogenous institutional change. Thirdly, viewing 
institutions as regimes open to challenges and contestation allows for the possibility 
of regimes being constantly created and recreated by actors struggling to pursue their 
own interests (ibid,16-18).  
Path Dependence 
 
Within the methodological framework of historical institutionalism, using the 
concept of path dependence helps to understand how the relationship between the 
state and its landed allies has developed and evolved. Put simply, path dependence 
implies that events that take place at a particular point in history are likely to influence 
subsequent events. Originally employed as a concept within economics to explain the 
persistence of specific, often suboptimal, outcomes, path dependence suggests that 
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institutions, once put in place, become ‘locked-in’ and increasingly difficult to 
overturn as the benefits associated with adapting to them outweigh the costs involved 
in switching to alternatives (David, 1985; North, 1991; Liebowitz and Margolis, 
1995). The assumption here is that adopting a specific path of institutional 
development at a key point in history makes it increasingly difficult to switch to 
viable alternatives that may have been available at that moment.  
One of the key characteristics of path dependent processes is the presence of 
mechanisms through which entrenched institutions are reinforced and reproduced over 
time. Pierson (2004) uses the notion of increasing returns to illustrate how institutions 
and political processes subject to path dependent developmental trajectories persist 
due to the creation of self-reinforcing feedback loops that increase the costs, over 
time, of adopting alternatives. As actors invest in the skills required to work within a 
particular institutional context, and as corollary institutions emerge within the extant 
framework, institutional reproduction tends to occur as a result of the increasing costs 
associated with adopting different institutional choices. Given the presence of 
asymmetrical power relations in society, actors who derive greater benefit from their 
position within an institutional framework can also use the resources at their disposal 
to impose constraints on their rivals while endeavouring to maintain the institutional 
status quo (ibid.; Khan, 1995).  It is also important to note that the idea of self-
reinforcing path dependence does not mean that institutional change cannot take 
place; instead, institutional change follows a particular path as actors adapt to 
changing situations. An example of this is the passage of pro-landlord legislation in 
colonial Punjab; although each new law represents a change in the institutional 
framework, these changes are informed by previous legislative interventions and the 
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broader logic of the bargain between the state and the landed elite.  Figure 1 below 
illustrates how self-reinforcing sequences of this type can be conceptualised. 
 
 
Figure 1: Self-reinforcing sequences3 
 
The ‘increasing returns’ approach described above is a persuasive explanation 
for institutional reinforcement and stickiness. However, as argued by Schwartz 
(2004), few institutional arrangements are able to constantly provide increasing 
returns to actors, and can potentially lead to diminishing returns as resources are 
exhausted and avenues for further development are limited. In such situation, 
explanations for path dependence reliant on self-reinforcing sequences are unable to 
account for institutional persistence given that the costs associated with sticking to an 
established institutional path may outweigh those that would be incurred by switching 
to an alternative framework. For Mahoney and Schensul (2006, 466) while ‘forever 
increasing returns’ would lead to an increased likelihood of a given institutional 
framework being reproduced, it is also possible that returns can diminish, possibly 
due to the exhaustion of avenues for further institutional development, till they reach a 
point of equilibrium where the probability of institutional reproduction becomes 
constant. What this means in practice is that the presence of constant returns may be 
sufficient to ensure institutional reproduction provided the costs of adopting an 
                                                 
3
 Adapted from Mahoney, 2000, 514.  
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alternative institutional path continue to outweigh the benefits of not doing so. For 
example, the capacity to continually exercise power over rivals or subordinates, even 
if this level of power were to remain relatively static, would represent a constant 
return leading to institutional reproduction. On the other hand, in the case of Punjab, 
the slow urbanisation of the province would be an example of an alternative 
institutional tendency that could eventually make it too costly to maintain state-
landlord bargain of diminished importance amidst the emergence of powerful non-
agrarian actors. 
The focus on increasing returns can be contrasted with the ‘reactive 
sequences’ approach advocated by Mahoney (2000; 2001). Here the emphasis is on 
how the emergence of particular institutions can influence subsequent actions by 
triggering responses, sometimes unintended, that may not have otherwise occurred. 
Rather than simply reinforcing initial outcomes, reactive sequences are characterised 
by, ‘backlash processes that transform or perhaps reverse earlier events... [in] a chain 
of tightly linked reactions and counterreactions’ (Mahoney, 2000, 26-27). Where self-
reinforcing sequences, defined by the presence of increasing returns and positive 
feedback, contribute to institutional persistence, reactive sequences illustrate the 
potential relationship between path dependence and institutional change. This is 
shown in Figure 2, where ‘X’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’ represent discrete outcomes linked 
together by a chain of events initiated by event ‘B’. 
 
Figure 2: Reactive Sequences 
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  For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that the two approaches 
mentioned above are not mutually exclusive; path dependent processes of institutional 
development can be subject to self-reinforcement or reaction at different points in 
time, particularly when considering how both approaches allow for the emergence of 
new actors that can constitute sources of support or opposition for the system. For 
example, the emergence of the bargain between the colonial state and the Punjabi 
landed elite led to implementation of a regime of property rights that provided the 
latter with preferential access to land which, in turn, enabled them to reinforce their 
institutional position. However, the laws that protected the landed elite also led to the 
emergence of money-lending capitalists who threatened the rural order by 
expropriating landlords who used land as collateral for their debts. The very same 
colonial interventions that set up the self-reinforcing sequence of state-landlord co-
operation also had the unintended consequence of creating actors that opposed this 
new institutional dispensation. As will be discussed in much more detail in the next 
chapter, these two opposing tendencies came to a head in the years leading up to the 
passage of the Land Alienation Act in 1900, with the resolution of this particular 
conjuncture itself being informed by the institutional legacy of the past. 
One of the major criticisms of path dependence is that the approach is too 
deterministic, implying that actors are subordinate to the effects of past events over 
which they have no control. Also, the notion that institutions may be locked into 
particular historical trajectories often obscures the degree to which they are contested, 
with path dependence failing to provide plausible accounts for why alternatives are 
selected despite the costs associated with such decisions (Thelen, 1999, 396-399).  As 
stated above in the discussion on historical institutionalism, structure and agency need 
to be treated as being mutually constitutive. In this study, an attempt has been made to 
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understand not just why institutions are reproduced, but also how this happens as a 
result of the actions and strategies of particular actors.  
One approach to doing this is suggested by Crouch and Farrell (2004) who 
argue for the need to examine the ways in which rational actors can, within their 
societal contexts, calculate the potential benefits and pitfalls associated with 
institutional switching and, based on the resources and information available to them, 
choose alternative options even if the short-term cost is high. A related approach 
conceptualises events within causal sequences as constituting episodes of problem-
solving (Haydu, 1998). Here, actors at crucial junctures can draw on their various 
historically constituted power resources, capacities, and experiences to arrive at 
updated solutions for recurring problems, triggering institutional transformations and 
the adoption of alternative institutional paths. Using a game-theoretic model, Greif 
and Laitin (2004) argue that actors, when responding to their environment, can 
modify their behaviour and use their resources to influence the processes of 
negotiation and contestation that lead to institutional change. As will be seen in the 
following chapters, similar processes of calculation and contestation have informed 
the institutional development of Punjab over time.  
Critical Junctures and Path Dependence 
 
In order to show how contingent events lead to ‘paths’ of institutional 
development that might not have otherwise emerged, scholars of path dependence 
have focused on the role played by founding moments or ‘critical junctures’. Collier 
and Collier (1991, 27) define a critical juncture as, ‘a period of significant change, 
which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or in other units of 
analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies’. For a juncture to be 
critical, it must fulfil certain criteria. Firstly, critical junctures are generated by 
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cleavages4 that emerge out of antecedent conditions (Collier and Collier, 1991, 31); 
these are events or triggers, exogenous and/or endogenous, which initiate the 
transition from established institutional patterns to new ones. Secondly, critical 
junctures open up the possibility of institutional change by presenting a range of 
possible options that could constitute new institutional formations. Thirdly, while the 
duration of critical junctures can vary, their end-points are marked by the emergence 
of legacies characterised by the presence of stable institutional outcomes. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly for path dependence, critical junctures must be marked by a 
certain degree of contingency, with outcomes that are theoretically impossible to 
predict; as argued by Mahoney (2000) the presence of indeterminacy shows how 
relatively random, small, or exogenous factors can lead to the selection of particular 
institutions (from amongst a cohort of equally viable possibilities), with this helping 
to deal with the problem of constant causes.  
Constant causes can be said to operate when the persistence of an institutional 
framework can be attributed to antecedent conditions and causal mechanisms, as 
opposed to distinct processes of reproduction initiated by its emergence (Collier and 
Collier, 1991, 37; Schwartz, 2004). An example here would be the causes leading to 
the co-optation of local elites by agrarian bureaucratic empires for the appropriation 
of agricultural surplus. In the case of Punjab, for all the institutional distinctiveness of 
the colonial state, it could be argued that the emergence of a state-landlord bargain 
was simply rooted in the same constant causes that underpinned similar relationships 
between landed elites and the state under the Mughals and Sikhs. For there to be path 
dependence, it would have to be shown that colonial interventions created a ‘path’ 
that would not have otherwise been generated. 
                                                 
4
 This is a sui generis use of the term, referring to key events rather than enduring divisions in society. 
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Figure 3: Critical Junctures5 
 
 Understanding the role played by contingency during critical junctures can 
help determine the extent to which emergent institutions are created independently of 
antecedent conditions. However, as Mahoney and Schensul (2006) acknowledge, the 
extent to which contingency is important is disputed by scholars working on path 
dependence. For instance, Goldstone (1998) and Mahoney (2000) emphasise the need 
for there to be high levels of contingency for path dependent outcomes to not be 
generated through the operation of constant causes. Lacking antecedent influences, 
critical junctures thus become more like ‘turning points’ within which the adoption of 
alternative trajectories deviating from established, inertial paths depends largely on 
‘availability and chance’ (Abbot, 1997, 93). On the other hand, Collier and Collier 
                                                 
5
 Adapted from Collier and Collier (1991) 
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(1991), Pierson (2000; 2004), and Schwartz (2004) treat contingency as being of less 
importance, largely because a focus on chance and indeterminacy can obscure the role 
played by existing causal mechanisms in generating new institutional outcomes. The 
point is best expressed by Katznelson (2003, 292), who criticises the causal role 
played by contingency for, ‘commit[ting] itself [i.e. path dependence] to a particular, 
highly partial, view of institutional genesis, a haphazard mixture of chance and 
opportunism’, and argues instead for a recognition of the way in which events are 
rarely, if ever, entirely contingent and free from the influence of existing factors. 
Furthermore, as Collins (2007) points out, individual decisions or events are rarely 
able to generate deviation from broader historical trajectories. 
This thesis attempts to navigate between these opposing points of view. 
Contingent critical junctures are important because they show how institutional 
outcomes are often the unexpected results of responses to uncertainty. Given that 
institutional paths can often be sub-optimal, in terms of their persistence despite the 
presence of alternatives that might be theoretically preferable, understanding precisely 
why these paths are taken requires an understanding of how the factors shaping such 
decisions are sometimes arbitrary. Nonetheless, since there can never be ‘pure’ 
contingency during any critical juncture, the presence of constant causes does not 
preclude the emergence of path dependent institutional trajectories provided actors are 
presented with at least two possible policy choices (Pierson, 2000). When deciding 
between multiple options in conditions of uncertainty, actors will rely on existing 
experiences, resources, and inclinations to inform their decisions.  
Focusing on critical junctures to explain path dependence also illustrates the 
importance of initial conditions and events in determining subsequent institutional 
outcomes, and helps to trace sequences of institutional development. However, as 
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seen in the discussion of reactive sequences above, path dependent processes can be 
subject to revision or challenge at points in time far removed from their initial 
founding moments. As the example of the Land Alienation Act shows, these events, 
while not necessarily resulting in a fundamental reconfiguration of extant institutions, 
can nonetheless exert a significant impact. In order to conceptualise the importance of 
these junctures, this study differentiates between ‘foundational’ junctures, which give 
rise to particular paths of institutional development, and ‘contestational’ junctures, 
which represent important challenges to the system. These two types of juncture share 
a number of characteristics; they represent periods of potential change, they are 
characterised by a degree of contingency with regards to potential outcomes, and they 
generate stable institutional configurations. What differs is their effect; foundational 
junctures lead to the creation of new institutional frameworks, empowering particular 
sets of actors governed by their own logic of reinforcement and reproduction. 
Contestational junctures, on the other hand, represent the emergence of new actors 
and institutional paths that unsuccessfully seek to replace those already in place, and 
which can sometimes be characterised as failed reactive sequences. 
 The concept of contestational junctures is important to this study for a number 
of reasons. Firstly, they illustrate the ways in which path dependent processes can 
generate contradictory tendencies and conflicts that can surface as challenges to the 
system at different points in time. Secondly, these junctures provide important 
insights into the processes of institutional change and adaptation; examining how 
elites invested in reproducing the status quo respond to the challenges of new rivals 
can show the precise mechanisms through which institutional reproduction takes 
place. Thirdly, failure, as a key characteristic of contestational junctures, demonstrates 
the limits to potential strategies for institutional change, and the extent to which 
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entrenched, path dependent processes of institutional development are difficult to 
overturn. In other words, a successful contestational juncture could potentially be a 
new foundational juncture. 
 Figure 4 is a stylized depiction of the relationship between foundational and 
contestational junctures. In the diagram, B represents a set of self-reinforcing actors 
and institutions generated by an initial foundational juncture. At the same time, X, Y 
and Z represent a parallel tendency, generated by exogenous factors or even a reactive 
sequence, characterised by an alternative set of actors and institutions. The two 
tendencies collide at point T3, which represents a contestational juncture. Again, the 
clash between land and capital prior to the passage of the Land Alienation Act would 
be an example of this. Here, the alternative sequence fails to fundamentally alter the 
institutional status quo, and B remains the primary institutional outcome, albeit with 
some alterations (in this case, the maintenance of the state-landlord bargain through 
the passage of the Land Alienation Act). The capacity for change at this moment is 
captured by B’ and Z’. The former represents a potential alternative outcome in which 
B is fundamentally altered (transforming the contestational juncture into a 
foundational one). The latter shows how the alternative sequence itself may be 
transformed, potentially triggering a new contestational juncture in the future.  
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Figure 4: Relationship between Foundational and Contestational Junctures 
 
One final point that must be made about critical junctures is that they are 
relatively rare. This study begins with an analysis of the foundational juncture from 
1849-1868, and then focuses on the contestational junctures of 1900, 1944-47 and 
1968-1971. While these are not the only episodes of upheaval or even change in 
Punjab and Pakistan, they represent the most significant instances in which the 
bargain between the state and the landed elite was challenged. Particularly with 
regards to the contestational junctures, it is important to note that their uniqueness is 
in part attributable to the role played by ‘new’ actors; in 1900, these were 
moneylenders in the countryside, in 1944-47 they were the nationalist political parties 
and in 1968-1970, they were the urban working classes. This is in contrast with, for 
example, episodes such as Pakistan’s first military coup in 1958, and the anti-Bhutto 
movement of 1977, both of which were significant events in their own right, but 
which did not involve direct challenges to the state-landlord nexus, or the emergence 
of radically new actors attempting to transform the status quo. 
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Process Tracing 
 
In this thesis, the form of path dependent explanation used to explain the 
persistence of landed power corresponds to what Mahoney (2000, 517) calls the 
‘power’ approach, whereby institutional reproduction is understood in terms how elite 
groups actively work to strengthen the institutions that reinforce their position relative 
to other groups. The exact mechanisms through which this takes place can, following 
Collier and Collier (1991), be divided into two main types, namely mechanisms of 
production and mechanisms of reproduction. As can be seen in Fig. 5, the two types 
of mechanism correspond to different stages in the development of a path dependent 
institutional trajectory. Mechanisms of production govern the selection of a particular 
institutional outcome from the range of options available during a foundational 
juncture. In the case of Punjab and the persistence of landed power, this mechanism 
would be the bargain that leads the state to extend support and patronage to the landed 
elite in exchange for ensuring order and accumulation at the local level. Once the 
mechanisms of production have generated a stable institutional configuration, 
mechanisms of reproduction govern its self-reinforcement through the provision of 
increasing or constant returns, and the creation of positive feedback loops.  
In order to accurately establish the relationship between these mechanisms and 
institutional development, it is essential to engage in an in-depth exploration of the 
empirical and historical evidence available. However, deploying history to bolster 
causal claims involves more than simply narrating chains of events while relying upon 
a ‘Seussian explanation’ that asserts, ‘it just happened that this happened first, then 
this, then that, and is not likely to happen that way again’ (Goldstone, 1998, 833). 
Instead, as an alternative to narrative accounts rich in descriptive content but lacking 
in explanatory power, causation can be established by, breaking down big events into  
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Figure 5: Processes, Mechanisms, and Path Dependence 
 
causally connected sequences of events, and examining each link in the chain’ (Tilly, 
1995, 1602).  Referred to as ‘process tracing’ (Bennett and George, 2005; Mahoney, 
2003), this approach involves disaggregating narratives into sequences of smaller, 
interconnected episodes. Selected and demarcated on the basis of broader theoretical 
assumptions regarding their hypothetical relationships to the outcome of interest, the 
episodes are then tested for their causal effect by determining the ways in which they 
are, as determined through the available historical evidence, connected to other 
episodes within the causal sequence. By tracing out the interconnectedness of 
different episodes within a broader narrative, and by mapping out the causal 
mechanisms and variables underlying the particular effects they have on each other, it 
becomes possible to establish a chain of causality linking the dependent variable to 
the hypothesised independent variables (Checkel, 2005). 
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Process tracing itself can take a number of forms, ranging from the provision 
of narrative accounts of processes, to generating analytic explanations functioning 
within the context of specific theoretical propositions (George and Bennett, 2005, 
210-211). As such, process tracing can be deployed as a research method used to 
evaluate or establish hypotheses rooted in particular theoretical traditions. Rational 
choice and functionalist models of political change, for example, could both 
potentially be tested or generated using the evidence gleaned from process tracing. 
This flexibility allows a variety of theoretical approaches to be employed when 
exploring questions involving complex causal sequences characterised by features 
ranging from the existence of interaction effects to endogeneity and path dependence 
(Bennett and Elman, 2006b; Vennesson, 2008). 
 A number of considerations need to be taken into account when employing 
process tracing. Even when broader units of analysis, such as states, are selected as 
the primary cases to be examined, the sensitivity of process tracing to questions of 
temporality and sequence requires that the time periods under consideration be 
carefully selected. In addition to the way in which chosen starting and end points can 
influence the relative causal weight and significance constituent events occupy within 
the narrative (Bearman et al., 1999), the persuasiveness of causal accounts derived 
through the use of process tracing is largely dependent on the extent to which the 
hypothesis under investigation is corroborated or negated by the empirical data that is 
yielded by detailed historical analysis. Restricting the analysis to relatively short 
periods of time reduces the amount of evidence available to support a particular 
explanation, and the choosing of too lengthy a historical timeframe opens up the 
possibility of potentially multiplying the number of disconfirming observations that 
could bring into question the validity of any causal claims (Bennett and Elman, 2006a, 
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459). In this study, an attempt has been made to address these concerns by applying 
strict selection criteria to the timeframe and episodes that are analysed, particularly 
during episodes of bargain-making and contestation, 
Referring again to Fig. 5, it is possible to see the relationship between causal 
mechanisms and process tracing. Taking the example of the period during which the 
foundational juncture in which the state-landlord relationship was institutionalised in 
Punjab, the mechanism linking the annexation of Punjab in 1849 (the generative 
cleavage) to the passage of the Tenancy Act of 1868 and consequent consolidation of 
the institutional framework (the stable outcome) can be tested by establishing the 
relationships between the different constituent events and processes that occurred 
between these two points in time. As shown in Chapter 3, the state-landlord bargain 
which drove institutional development in this period evolved as the British responded 
to basic constraints, namely the need to create an effective administrative system for 
Punjab, and the co-optation of traditional elites after 1857 to ensure the maintenance 
of order. Here, the colonial state used its power to bolster potential allies in society 
who responded by deploying their own resources to buttress British rule and their own 
institutional position. Process tracing facilitates an exploration of the different factors 
that underpinned these developments, and the causal links between them, together 
constituting the mechanisms of production during the foundational juncture. 
Subsequent chapters in the thesis demonstrate how process tracing also helps to 
disaggregate the mechanisms of reproduction underlying path dependent institutional 
persistence; by focusing on the relationships between bureaucratic power, electoral 
politics, and legislative interventions at different points in time, it becomes possible to 
see how the state-landlord bargain is reinforced through positive feedback loops and 
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increasing returns, strengthening the power of the landed elite concurrently with the 
entrenchment of the dominant institutional trajectory. 
A Note on Primary Sources 
 
 As noted by Pierson and Skocpol (2002), historical institutionalists have 
traditionally relied on secondary sources for much of their data.  This is true for this 
study as well, although some effort has been made to make use of primary sources to 
supplement the empirical strength of the analysis, especially where the secondary 
sources themselves are lacking. For the most, archival government documents from 
the colonial and post-colonial periods, as well as Legislative Assembly Debates, have 
been employed to demonstrate the logic of state and landlord politics. The use of these 
specific sources is deliberate; the latter, in particular, have thus far been the subject of 
very little scholarly attention, and both offer first-hand accounts of how the state and 
landed politicians arrived at different decisions, and made use of their position to 
reinforce their power. 
 Before proceeding, it is important to point out that official government 
documents in Pakistan are often difficult to access, with this difficulty being 
exacerbated by the enforcement of stringent rules preventing access to classified 
documents, the majority of which deal with events from the late 1960s onwards. 
However, given the emphasis placed on initial founding conditions in this study, 
documents on the first two decades of independence have been used liberally to 
demonstrate the persistence of the institutional framework of colonial rule. For 
subsequent events, Legislative Assembly Debates have been used to fill in the gaps 
left by the secondary sources.   
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The Concepts of Class and State in Punjab 
 
 Although existing work in the historical institutionalist tradition provides 
important methodological and conceptual insights, it is important to bear in mind the 
fact that the processes of institutional development that took place in South Asia were 
fundamentally different from those that occurred in the mainly advanced capitalist 
countries that the majority of the literature focuses on. While certain broad structural 
similarities are arguably common to these diverse developments, such as the existence 
of the state and different classes in society, it is necessary to develop context specific 
versions of these variables to avoid conceptual stretching (Sartori, 1970; Mair, 2008). 
The term ‘class’, for instance, could potentially refer to a wide variety of different 
actors, and using the term without any specificity could cause it to lose some of its 
analytical meaning.  
State and class are core to this study because of the way in which they can 
accurately capture the attributes and interactions of the major actors involved in 
Punjab’s institutional development. To ensure the validity of these concepts when 
applying them to the case of Punjab, and to set out the conceptual terrain of the thesis 
in terms of state-society relations, this section will outline the how notions of state and 
class inform this study. For class, an attempt will be made to specify the rural class 
structure of Punjab while paying close attention to the impact of long-term economic 
change on the development of capitalist classes in the province. When looking at the 
state, emphasis will be placed on understanding how its autonomy, rooted in the 
‘overdevelopment’ of the colonial state, has impacted its relationship with different 
elements of society over time. 
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Class 
 
The concept of class is crucial to understanding the social structure of Punjab 
not only due to the economic stratification of rural Punjab, but also due to the 
enduring relationship between class and political power in the province. Historically, 
control over land formed the core of political authority within rural India, with the 
ability to control cultivators and lay claim to the product of the land being of central 
political significance during the Mughal and, indeed, subsequent epochs (Fuller 
1989). At the local and regional levels, political power inevitably came with control 
over land and was buttressed by the fact that control over land was also often 
accompanied by considerable amounts of prestige and loyalty from village- and 
regional-level kin groups (Neale 1969). 
In order to capture the different attributes and dimensions of class power in 
Punjab, this section draws on the work by Ahmad (1973; 1977), Patnaik (1980), 
Bhattacharya (1983), and Prakash (1984) to create a typology of class that 
distinguishes between different classes on the basis of three main features: 
capital/property ownership, labour exploitation, and social status. Fundamentally, the 
concept of class derived from these attributes is one that recognizes how class is not 
merely an economic category, but also a relational one. Hence, while the ownership of 
capital/property may indicate economic wealth, income and consumption alone are 
not sufficient for understanding the constitution of a class, even though they may be 
important determinants of class position and status. Instead, the ownership of 
capital/property is important precisely because it implies the existence of a particular 
relationship of exploitation and domination within the broader context of economic 
production. As such, in the case of the Punjabi countryside, the ownership of land, or 
lack of it thereof, does not just simply provide a basis by which to differentiate 
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between different classes on the basis of income—it also suggests that those with 
ownership of land are in a position to exploit the labour of those who lack property of 
their own. It is this capacity to exploit and subordinate labour that guarantees the 
power of the different elements of the landed classes in Punjab, particularly in the 
period preceding partition in 1947. In addition to providing the landholding class with 
economic strength, the control over labour that comes with the ownership of property 
enables the landholding class to more effectively dominate political and social life in 
the countryside. 
Using data obtained from Calvert (1925) and Khan (2006), Tables 1 and 2 
show the evolution of landholding patterns in Punjab by setting out changes in land 
ownership and concentration over time. Table 3 indicates the number of landless 
households in Punjab as a percentage of the total number of households, while Table 4 
displays trends in the use of wage labour in rural Punjab. It is possible to arrive at 
some conclusions based on the data given above. Purely in economic terms, there is a 
definite tendency towards the concentration of land ownership and the consolidation 
of the economic power of the different elements of the landowning class relative to 
other segments of the population. Between 1925 and 2000, the number of landholders 
owning less than 12.5 acres increased significantly, even as those owning more than 
this amount became fewer and fewer in number. The declining number of medium 
and large landholdings can be explained by taking into account land fragmentation 
and the operation of market forces after independence (amidst the elimination of laws 
enforcing primogeniture and the restriction of land ownership to particular segments 
of the rural population). Indeed, the increase in the number of marginal and small 
holdings points towards the increasing impoverishment of medium-level landholders 
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Table 1: Land distribution amongst landholding households in Punjab 
 
 Percentage of farmed area 
Holding type 1925 1972 1980 1990 2000 
Marginal holding (up to 5 
acres) 12% 5% 7% 11% 16% 
Smallholding (5 to 12.5 
acres) 26% 30% 33% 40% 47% 
Medium (12.5 to 50 acres) 35% 50% 46% 41% 39% 
Large (more than 50 acres) 25% 20% 21% 29% 14% 
Table 2: Landholding types as a percentage of the total farmed area 
 
 1972 1980 1990 2000 
Landless 48.2% 50.0% 55.4% 50.3% 
Table 3: Landless households as a percentage of total village households 
 
 1972 1980 1990 2000 
Family workers as % of family members 55% 60% 29% 37% 
Permanent hired labour 7% 4% 2% 3.4% 
Casual labour 30% 45% 50% 44% 
Table 4: Types of labour employed in agricultural households 
 
over time, implying the emergence of an increasingly large ownership divide between 
the largest landowners and everyone else. The increase in the size of the landless in 
the same time period, as well as the increase in the amount of casual labour employed 
in Punjab, points towards the growth of wage labourers as a category in Punjab. The 
rise in wage labour, and the increasing number of small and marginal holdings, can be 
attributed to a number of factors, ranging from increased mechanization to land 
fragmentation and even diversification away from agriculture, but the overall picture 
Class 
Category Size of Landholding 1925 1972 1980 1990 2000 
Poor 
Peasantry 
Marginal holdings (up to 5 
acres) 58% 46% 47% 54% 61% 
Small holdings (between 5 
and 12.5 acres) 26% 30% 30% 28% 27% 
Middle 
Peasantry 
Medium holdings(between 
12.5 and 50 acres) 12% 21% 19% 15% 11% 
Rich 
Peasantry and 
Landed 
Aristocracy 
Large holdings (more than 50 
acres) 4% 4% 3% 2% 1% 
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remains clear. The agrarian economy continues to be dominated by a small class of 
landowners who, as the main sources of employment within the village, continue to 
wield a tremendous amount of economic power in the countryside.  
In addition to the criteria of property ownership and labour exploitation, it is 
also necessary to understand the role played by social status in forging class identities. 
In this context, social status broadly refers to the position of a given class in the rural 
hierarchy and can be said to approximate to membership within a biraderi. 
Historically in Punjab, the distinction between those who did and those who did not 
have access to land formed the basis of the biraderi system that structured social 
relations in the province. Agriculturalist biraderis, namely those with de facto 
ownership over land, or those who cultivated land, occupied an economic and social 
position that was completely different from that occupied by the biraderis of the 
artisans who performed non-land-related services in the village. At the bottom of the 
hierarchy were the landless poor who were not members of the artisanal biraderis. 
Although biraderi also regulated social life in a wide variety of areas, ranging from 
marriage to dispute resolution, it was primarily a means through which to enforce 
occupational specialization and stratification. 
In the pre-colonial and colonial eras, membership within land-controlling 
biraderis brought with it political benefits. Seeking to co-opt the dominant elements 
of the peasantry with a view towards ensuring order and accumulation, these regimes 
actively cultivated the support of landed biraderis like the Jats and the Rajputs. 
Indeed, the majority of the province’s traditional aristocracy was drawn from these 
biraderis, and the rich peasantry comprised almost entirely the biraderis. Linked 
through bonds of kinship and, often, common economic interest, biraderis often 
formed the basis of the political mobilization of Punjab’s landholders and were 
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instrumental in consolidating the collective power of these actors. What must be borne 
in mind when discussing biraderi, however, is that it does not act as a completely 
perfect proxy for economic class. While biraderi did often determine a person’s 
occupation and degree of access to land, biraderis were not completely impermeable 
categories. As such, members of a non-agriculturalist biraderi could potentially own 
land and vice versa. Related to this is the fact that differences could exist, in terms of 
status and economic power, within biraderis occupying similar positions on the 
occupational scale. Thus, for instance, Jats, Rajputs, and Arains were all 
agriculturalist biraderis, but they did not enjoy equal levels of prestige and power. 
More often than not, the social dominance of any given biraderi would be dependent 
on geographical and demographic factors, like the region in which the biraderi was 
located and the number of members it had in that particular area. At a purely political 
level, however, particularly under the colonial regime, these nuances were of little 
significance. Notwithstanding these variations, biraderi membership was a reasonably 
accurate indicator of land ownership and social position, and it was on this basis that 
colonial policy was eventually constructed. The institutionalization of biraderi as 
political power that took place under colonial rule would have an effect on 
developments in the post-colonial context. 
Taking the different determinants of class together - property ownership, 
labour exploitation, and social status - it is possible to then identify two different sets 
of capacities that can be used to further refine the distinction between different classes 
and, indeed, fractions within classes. Broadly, and to varying degrees, classes can 
possess the capacity to impose sanctions on rival groups and to engage in collective 
action. Sanctions here are understood to be of two types. Negative sanctions are those 
that impose costs, such as the use of violence or economic dominance against rivals 
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and subordinates. Positive sanctions, on the other hand, can include the provision of 
services such as access to the state and dispute resolution. The ability to impose 
sanctions of either type depends on the economic strength of a class as well as on its 
social status. In the case of the landowning class in Punjab, the capacity to bring 
sanctions to bear against other classes in society forms the basis of its importance to 
authoritarian regimes. 
Social status and economic power are also linked to a class’ ability to 
undertake collective action. As mentioned earlier, biraderi networks can form the 
basis for political mobilization, and the resources available to dominant classes can 
allow them to use these means of informal organization to interact with the state and 
pursue common interests. Collective action can also assume the form of participation 
within formal organizations, such as political parties and civic associations. The 
Unionist Party colonial Punjab would be examples of this, as would be association 
through political parties in the post-colonial period. Ahmad (1973) suggested that 
economic independence is fundamental to the capacity to organize collectively in 
Punjab and argued that the ties of dependence that link the landless and poor to the 
landed in Punjab severely circumscribe the extent to which the former can mobilize 
on a common platform. 
Based on the attributes and capacities discussed above, it is possible to arrive 
at a more nuanced picture of class in Punjab than one based solely on economic 
criteria. While the primary determinant of class is property ownership, there are 
important distinctions to be made between different fractions of the landed class. The 
traditional aristocracy, who have historically been at the apex of the rural hierarchy, 
are large landholders possessing tremendous social status. The heads of regional 
biraderi groups and large jagirdars would be examples of individuals belonging to 
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this grouping. Similar to the traditional aristocracy are the rich peasantry who, like the 
aristocracy, possess both land and status, but not to the same degree. Village-level 
lambardars and chaudhris would be examples of the rich peasantry. Both the 
aristocracy and the rich peasantry possess land beyond their capacity to engage in 
self-cultivation and, hence, engage in labour exploitation either through the 
employment of wage labour or by taking on tenants. Broadly speaking, these actors 
can also be conceptualized as constituting the dominant element of the landed class in 
Punjab, historically enjoying the greatest access to the state, and control over politics, 
in the countryside. References to the landed elite in this thesis refer to this particular 
coalition of landed class fractions. 
Subordinate to the aristocracy and rich peasantry in Punjab’s rural hierarchy 
are the middle peasantry, defined as such by their possession of enough land to subsist 
through self-cultivation (usually between 12.5 and 50 acres) without having to exploit 
the labour of others. The bulk of the grantees in Punjab’s canal colonies would 
exemplify this group of autonomous peasant proprietors. By virtue of their economic 
independence, this group also possesses the capacity for independent collective action 
and political mobilization, despite lacking the means through which to impose any 
kind of sanctions on other classes in the rural political economy. As can be seen in 
Table 1, this category of landowners has been gradually squeezed out of the agrarian 
economy in post-colonial Punjab due to land fragmentation and demographic 
pressures. Finally, at the bottom of the rural hierarchy are the poor peasantry 
(possessing small amounts of land that are insufficient for subsistence agriculture) and 
the landless, both of which are dependent on, and necessarily sell their labour power 
to, the landed classes, consequently lacking both status and the capacity to engage in 
collective action. 
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Over time, with the development and spread of capitalism, changes have taken 
place in the class structure of Punjab. In the rural arena, changes had begun to take 
place by the end of the nineteenth century with the increasing emergence of rural 
wage labourers as a result of the decline of traditional artisanal occupations. This 
change was accompanied by a more formal stratification of the hierarchy of 
landownership, with a clear divide emerging between the traditional aristocracy, the 
rich peasantry, and small peasant proprietors possessing enough land to sustain 
themselves and their families. As the process of capitalist development progressed, 
and as colonial controls on the sale of land were relaxed in the post-colonial period, 
the stratification of landholdings increased even further. Land fragmentation over time 
and capitalist development also impacted the rural class structure, widening the gap 
between the landed and the landless while also resulting in the further development of 
a rural proletariat (Ahmad 1977). 
The development of more ‘capitalist’ social relations in the agrarian economy 
has been accompanied by the emergence of a class of industrialists in the cities. The 
core of this class migrated to Pakistan from the former Muslim-minority provinces of 
Northern India (Papanek, 1972; Levin, 1974), and was able to take advantage of 
government policies aimed at fostering the growth of industry in the new country. 
While this strategy met with mixed results, and was often subject to considerable 
revision and even contestation (Papanek, 1967; Burki, 1977), it did nonetheless result 
in important changes to the economic structure of Pakistan. In Punjab, although the 
power of these large capitalists has remained limited to the cities, except in cases 
where former landowners have diversified into agro-industry, the rise of these actors 
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and their increasing economic strength could, in time, constitute a threat to the power 
of the landed elite in the countryside (Amjad, 1983; White, 1974). 
In addition to these industrialists, it is important to acknowledge how the 
process of capitalist development has also created a new class of capital-owning 
businessmen and entrepreneurs in the province, spread across dozens, if not hundreds, 
of small towns and cities. Distinct from Punjab’s small class of large capitalists, this 
new ‘middle’ or ‘intermediate’ class has been the subject of considerable debate, not 
least of all because of the way in which it is conceptualized as being key to economic 
flows and politics within the province (Alavi 1998b; Cheema 2003; Sayeed 1996; 
Zaidi 2005).  
At a fundamental level, the emergence of the ‘middle’ classes in Punjab is 
representative of the broader economic changes that have taken place in the province. 
Yet, while it is possible to identify actors in Punjab who fit the economic criteria used 
to identify these middle classes, it is difficult to argue that these actors constitute a 
single class with clearly defined interests. For one, while these actors may be 
interested, at an abstract level, in the transfer of land, capital, and state patronage 
away from the more dominant economic classes (Sayeed 1996), it is necessary to 
recognize that the middle classes in Punjab engage in a wide variety of economic 
activities that can give rise to differing sectoral interests and political inclinations. 
Indeed, rather than articulating themselves as a consolidated class, the middle classes 
tend to pursue their interests strategically, aligning themselves in a fragmented 
fashion with the classes and political groupings that can provide them with the most 
opportunistic gain (Ahmad 1985). Thus, while the middle classes may occupy a 
substantial economic and even demographic position within the calculus of power and 
politics, particularly given their economic independence and corresponding capacity 
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to engage in collective action free from the constraints imposed by rival classes, their 
tendency towards fragmentation weakens their power as a class (to the extent that the 
label of ‘class’ accurately describes these actors). 
This is a picture that is complicated by a further observation on the nature of 
the middle classes and one that is more directly relevant to the argument presented in 
this thesis about landed power in Punjab. First, capitalists are not new to Punjab. 
During the colonial period, a predominantly urban class of capitalist moneylenders 
was an important source of credit for the rural economy and continued to grow 
increasingly economically powerful until it was constrained by the intervention of a 
colonial state that was wary of the ability of this class to disturb the rural social order. 
While this class otherwise remained marginal to the political interests of the colonial 
state due to its lack of mooring within the countryside itself and subsequent lack of 
political and social power, it nonetheless constituted a class not dissimilar to the 
‘middle’ classes present in contemporary Punjab (Banga 2005; Daechsel 2006). Once 
this class had been constrained by the colonial state, however, the provision of rural 
credit was a task that was taken up by large landholders with a surplus of capital. This 
illustrates a second important point about the middle classes in Punjab. In addition to 
being geographically and economically fragmented, it is necessary to recognize that, 
particularly in the agro-industrial sector, many of the ‘new’ capitalists in Punjab are 
old landholders (Alavi 1998b, 29–30).6 In addition to the class of capitalist farmers 
that emerged in the 1960s during the Green Revolution7, dominant elements of the 
landed class (both the aristocracy and the rich peasantry) were also able to situate 
                                                 
6
 It is interesting to note that, as pointed out by Khwaja and Mian (2005), the agro-industrial companies 
(producing textiles and food), representing the nexus between land and capital, are more likely to be 
politically connected to sources of state patronage than businesses not directly linked to the agrarian 
economy. 
7
 As has been comprehensively established by Alavi (1976) and Hussain (1988), subsidies and support 
extended to farmers as part of the Green Revolution in the 1960s were disproportionately monopolized 
by politically connected landed elites who used them to strengthen their economic position. 
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themselves within the processes of industrial diversification and accumulation that 
were initiated in this period, cementing a coalition of class fractions that existed 
during the colonial period as well. Indeed, in the 1960s, the government itself 
identified big landlords as being key to the development of industry in the province 
due to their possession of surplus that did not necessarily have to be re-invested in 
agriculture.8 Rather than creating a dichotomy between a ‘new’ class of capitalists and 
an older class of ‘feudals’, the process of capitalist development in Punjab blurred the 
distinction between these two types of propertied actors. While it would certainly be 
overstating the case to suggest that the entire middle class in Punjab can be 
characterized in this fashion, particularly when bearing in mind the fact that not all of 
the middle classes have roots in the countryside, just as many elements of the middle 
class in the countryside may not have landowning antecedents, it is nonetheless 
important to recognize how a significant portion of this new class is not new at all and 
simply represents another example of how the elements of the traditionally dominant 
landed class are able to adapt to changing societal circumstances. 
The implications of this for the exercise of class power in Punjab are clear. 
Instead of representing an emergent class carving a niche for itself in an economic and 
political terrain dominated by the parochial interests of the traditional rural order, 
elements of the new middle class in Punjab, particularly in the countryside, may 
simply represent the adaptation of the old elite to the new conditions of capitalist 
accumulation in Punjab. As such, given their antecedents, many elements of the new 
middle class may also be able to call upon historically evolved sources of power, 
similar to those employed by the members of the landed class, to further expand their 
interests and entrench themselves within the institutional framework of Punjabi 
                                                 
8
 Industrial Potential of the Rural Areas of Pakistan, 1967, Government of Pakistan, London School of 
Economics and Political Science Library (LSE).  
 65
politics. Also, while the propertied classes may engage in real conflicts of interest, 
between land and capital or between the urban and the rural, they remain united in a 
common need to continue the domination of the subordinate classes. In the final 
analysis, considering how they thus remain, ‘different segments of a single 
continuum… without any structural criterion differentiating their interests’  (Alavi, 
1976, 339) the middle classes are not as antagonistic to the traditional order as might 
otherwise be expected, 
The State  
 
In order to understand the relationship between class and state in Punjab and 
Pakistan, it is first necessary to begin with the observation that the colonial state in 
South Asia was endowed with a degree of infrastructural (bureaucratic) power and 
autonomy (Mann, 1986b; Barkey and Parikh, 1991) that allowed it to operate 
relatively insulated from the pressures imposed by interactions with society. 
Predicated on conquest and extraction as an ‘instrument for oppressing entire 
societies’ (Chandra, 1980, 280), the colonial state was able to establish a relationship 
of domination over the different sections of indigenous South Asian society, 
maintaining the capacity to define and pursue its agenda in the face of potential 
opposition from both its opponents and collaborators. Indeed, with regards to the 
latter, the autonomy of the colonial state allowed it to pick and choose its partners in 
South Asian society, undertaking institutional interventions on their behalf and 
providing them with a degree of insularity from rival groups in society.  
 One influential argument that traces the reproduction of this state form in 
Pakistan has been advanced by Ayesha Jalal (1990a; 1995b), who attributes the 
ascendancy of the military and bureaucracy in Pakistan to a number of proximate 
causes at the time of partition, each of which combined to place these two actors in a 
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position where they could assume formal control of the state. The relative lack of 
popular support for the Muslim League and its consequent organisational weakness, 
the threat of war with India and the need to prioritize military spending, foreign 
support and assistance for the military in the context of the Cold War, and the 
pressure of setting up a central state apparatus (as opposed to fully-functioning 
provincial apparatuses, set up under the Government of India Act, 1935) created a 
situation in which the Muslim League, lacking the organizational capacity needed to 
cope with the pressures of refugee resettlement, economic management, and inter-
provincial discord, ceded policy and decision-making authority to the much more 
fully developed, organized, and experienced military and bureaucracy that had been 
the proverbial steel frame of the colonial state. This tendency would come to be 
reinforced over time, ensuring the persistence of authoritarian control even in 
instances of democratic rule.  
 When dealing with the question of why military governments in Pakistan have 
historically accommodated and defended landed interests, Jalal provides a state-
centric account that sees this relationship as being one of the many strategies 
consciously adopted by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy to gather support and 
legitimacy for itself. For Jalal, the state chooses its partners and collaborators, 
reproducing its position of dominance, relative to society, over time. This description 
of the Pakistani state shares certain similarities with accounts of the developmental 
state. For example, the literature on South Korea emphasises the bureaucratic 
professionalism and capacity of a post-colonial state that is able to deploy its 
resources in pursuit of its chosen developmental agenda. According to Evans (1995), 
this resulted in the South Korean state pursuing a policy of economic intervention 
through which it chose to provide particular sections of the industrial capitalist class 
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with the support and patronage necessary for their further development. In turn, these 
actors provided the state with information that allowed for better economic planning 
and resource allocation, thereby embedding the state and capital within a mutually 
beneficial relationship legitimated by South Korea’s economic success. Kohli’s 
(2004) description of the South Korea as a ‘cohesive-capitalist’ developmental state, 
while not incompatible with Evans’ fundamental premise, focuses instead on how the 
state was able to narrowly define the country’s developmental agenda by equating 
national security with economic advancement in the context of a hostile international 
environment. For Kohli, this economic nationalism provided the state with legitimacy 
and its autonomy, coupled with its tremendous repressive capacity, allowed it to then 
intervene in the economy as it chose, using its expertise to manage capital while 
simultaneously ensuring the compliance of labour. 
Following the logic of Jalal’s argument, the technical superiority of the post-
colonial military-bureaucratic state, in terms of its organizational capacity relative to 
non-state actors, and its ability to draw on external sources of support, allows it to 
both choose its partners in society, and legitimise itself through appeals to national 
security. However, it is here that the parallels with the South Korean developmental 
state collapse, as Jalal’s view of the state in Pakistan arguably overstates the extent to 
which it is able to work independently of domestic political forces. As Leftwich 
(1995) has demonstrated, successful, autonomous developmental states have 
historically only emerged under conditions in which ‘weak’ societies failed to prevent 
the consolidation of state power before the development of powerful indigenous 
capitalists, and the intervention of foreign capital in the domestic economy. Even 
though authoritarian states like Pakistan did legitimise themselves through appeals to 
national security, this alone was not sufficient to guarantee the state’s ability to pursue 
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an autonomous developmental agenda (Kohli, 2004, 390); the success of countries 
like South Korea and Taiwan was at least partly rooted in the absence of strong 
agrarian elites or other domestic actors who could impose constraints on the state’s 
autonomy, with these having been largely eliminated under Japanese colonialism.  
This point can be proven further with reference to the case of India, where 
Migdal (1998), applies his idea of ‘weak’ states encountering ‘strong’ societies during 
the colonial era as an illustration of how state institutions and power are often 
captured or compromised at the local level by entrenched elites possessing the 
resources to resist the control of the state. This corresponds with the argument that, 
even though the colonial state in India possessed a degree of autonomy and capacity, 
British colonialism’s emphasis on indirect rule through intermediaries resulted in the 
creation of institutions that were imbricated with the power of local elites (Seal, 1971; 
Lange, 2009). Even in Punjab, where state-led bureaucratic management of society 
was undertaken on a large scale, landed elites remained key to the establishment and 
maintenance of British authority. Thus, in a more contemporary context, Kohli (2004, 
221-290) categorises India as being a ‘fragmented-multi-class’ state where, despite 
the presence of a strong, central state apparatus, the colonial and post-colonial state 
was unable to effectively exercise its autonomy when faced with the need to 
accommodate a plurality of entrenched interests in society. A similar argument has 
been advanced by Hansen (2005) who claims that authority in India is characterised 
by multiple layers of sovereignty, with the state being subjected to capture by local 
level elites who, for all intents and purposes, come to perform many of its political, 
economic, and social functions. As the evidence from the Indian case shows, it is 
problematic to assume that the state, in both its colonial and post-colonial variants, 
was confronted by a society rendered entirely subordinate to its power. 
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Applying these insights to Pakistan, Hamza Alavi’s (1972a) analysis of 
authoritarianism and state power is useful in that it accommodates the historically 
evolved relationship between the state and the traditional elite. For Alavi, the power 
of the military and bureaucracy in Pakistan marked a continuation of the colonial 
political order, with an ‘overdeveloped’ state continuing to exercise a degree of 
autonomous power. Under colonialism, the coercive and administrative apparatuses of 
the state had been used to dominate and subordinate the indigenous classes in South 
Asia while pursuing the interests of metropolitan capital and its local agents. Post-
independence, however, the state in Pakistan had to contend with the power of the 
landed classes and a national bourgeoisie which, freed from the constraints of overt 
colonial control, possessed the potential to impose limits on both state power and a 
metropolitan bourgeoisie functioning in an economy that was still locked in a 
subordinate position within the global capitalist system. However, in a situation where 
none of these three elements of the ruling classes could claim domestic political and 
economic dominance, Alavi argued that the post-colonial state was able to exert 
‘relative’ autonomy, drawing on its own capacities and resources to mediate between 
these classes, acting to preserve the extant social and political order, while also 
playing a role in directing, and benefitting from, economic production and the 
appropriation of surplus. At the same time, its relationship with the propertied classes 
ensured that the post-colonial state did not remain entirely insulated from society, 
generating support and legitimacy for itself through these actors. 
Although Alavi’s theory helps to better understand the relationship between 
state and class in Pakistan, objections can be raised to his particular view of state 
autonomy. For one, as argued by Alavi himself (1982), state autonomy in the 
developing world was necessarily constrained by the existence of the ‘structural 
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imperative of peripheral capitalism’ and the role played by the post-colonial state in 
managing a developing economy within the broader system of global capitalism. As 
such, while the state could exercise autonomy relative to domestic class actors, it 
would remain structurally bound to pursue a path of capitalist development dictated 
by its position in the global economy. When viewed in this way, it is also important to 
note that external pressures other than the imperatives of global capitalism could 
shape state autonomy in different ways at different points in time; during the colonial 
era, for example, the actions of the Punjab government were influenced not only by 
the central government in India (and, indeed, by developments in Westminster), but 
also by ideological trends, like utilitarian liberalism, that emanated from the external 
environment. In the post-colonial context, a similar point can be raised; in the 
aftermath of partition, Cold War politics and alignment with the United States 
provided the Pakistani military with external support that arguably strengthened its 
hand against domestic political actors (Jalal, 1989; 1990b).  
With regards to internal political dynamics, Saul (1974) and Wood (1980), 
argue that the extent of the autonomy of the post-colonial state over time may be 
overstated, particularly when taking into account the development of capitalism and 
the subsequent emergence of the national bourgeoisie, or indeed the neo-colonial 
metropolitan bourgeoisie, as dominant class actors possessing the means through 
which to curtail their rivals in society and reign in the state through the mechanisms 
made available by the institutionalization of formal democratic politics post-
independence. Omvedt and Patankar (1977) make this argument more explicitly in the 
South Asian context, suggesting that the post-colonial state is a necessarily capitalist 
one due to its position within the global capitalist economy, and due to the emergence 
of a more coherently organised domestic capitalist class enmeshed within the flows of 
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the world economy. Chibber’s (2003) use of path dependence to account for the 
capture of the Indian state by capitalist interests over time can be seen as a 
demonstration of the mechanisms underpinning this transition, with his analysis 
illustrating the processes through which autonomous state power could be eroded as a 
result of capitalist development. Finally, Leys (1976) shows that far from being 
overdeveloped, colonial states actually tended to be quite small relative to the 
populations they governed, and actually experienced greater growth post-
independence with the expansion of military and public sector spending. Leys also 
raises the question of specifying exactly what the class character, and thus interests, of 
the bureaucracy and military would actually be, given that their origins would not 
necessarily be in the same social milieu as the dominant propertied classes. 
Based on the points made above, it could be argued that where Jalal (1985; 
1995) fails to account for the limits to state autonomy and power in Pakistan, Alavi 
(1972a) insufficiently explains the persistence of these attributes in the face of 
increasing capitalist development and the entrenchment of elite interests. To navigate 
between these two positions, and arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between state and class in Pakistan (and Punjab), it is necessary to first 
focus on one of the key differences between the two arguments. By partly attributing 
the autonomy of the post-colonial state to the in-fighting between the propertied 
classes, Alavi recognises that the relationship between state and class is a strategic 
one, determined not only by the power of the state, but also by the power of the 
classes it confronts in society. Therefore, while Alavi’s argument does not contradict 
Jalal’s emphasis on the organisational superiority of the state, the effects of state 
dominance are treated differently; rather than simply impeding democratization and 
marginalizing civilian politics to pursue an entirely autonomous agenda, the power of 
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the military-bureaucratic oligarchy represents a means through which the interests of 
the different elements of the ruling classes are realized and protected through the 
actions of the state. Instead of confronting and constraining non-state elites, the state 
actively works with, and even for, them.  The implications of this for Punjab are clear; 
in this study, the very metaphor of a ‘bargain’ between the colonial state and the 
landed elite implies the existence of a relationship between two distinct actors 
possessing capacities and resources being deployed for their mutual benefit. The 
ability of the state to enter into a bargain necessarily entails the existence of some 
autonomy, with the landed elite playing a role in perpetuating it by trading support 
and legitimacy for power and patronage  
Here Jessop’s (1990) ‘strategic-relational’ view of the state sheds further light 
on the paradoxical nature of state autonomy in Pakistan. This approach to 
understanding state power, which draws on the work of Poulantzas (1978), recognises 
that the state is a ‘social relation’ whose power, ‘is a form-determined condensation of 
the balance of forces’ but whose form is also, ‘the crystallization of past strategies… 
privileging some over other current strategies. As a strategic terrain the state is located 
within a complex dialectic of structures and strategies’ (Jessop, 1990, 269).  For Hay 
(1999), this approach is useful because it allows for a conceptualisation of the way in 
which the state and its institutions are ‘strategically selective’, favouring certain 
strategies over others even as continued rounds of interaction with different social 
actors, ‘transform… the context within which future strategies are formulated and 
deployed’ (ibid., 170). 
This conception of the state is one that complements, and adds to, the views of 
the Pakistani state advanced by both Jalal and Alavi. Particularly when making use of 
path dependence to explain the persistence of the landlord-state bargain in Punjab, it 
 73
is possible to see how repeated interactions between an autonomous, colonial state 
and landed collaborators at the local level could, over time, alter the ‘strategic 
context’ within which subsequent political developments would take place. As will be 
shown throughout this thesis, the initial circumstances that gave rise to the bargain 
between the colonial state and the Punjabi landed elite would be reproduced and 
reinforced incrementally, giving rise to a situation where, post-independence, the 
Pakistani military and bureaucracy would continue to rely on these actors to provide 
them with political support precisely because the autonomous power of the colonial 
state had developed alongside a structural dependence on local elites to ensure order 
and accumulation. Even though the post-colonial state did possess institutional 
capacity that was greater than that of any organisation of class interests in the 
immediate aftermath of partition, this did not include the capacity to engage in the 
direct management of society at the margins of state authority. Like the British before 
them, military-bureaucratic state elites in Pakistan, when choosing between either co-
opting and co-operating with pliant agrarian elites, or incurring the costs of 
organisation and confrontation at the local level, were constrained by institutional 
inertia to choose the former, and perpetuate the cycle of mutual reinforcement that 
underpinned the state-landlord bargain.  
Following this logic, the factors preventing the state from being transformed 
into an ‘executive committee’ of a single, dominant class also become clear. Here, 
Alavi’s emphasis on the conflict between the different elements of the propertied 
classes assumes greater importance; as the process of capitalist development 
proceeded in Pakistan, reducing the importance of the agrarian economy relative to 
urban industry and services, it would have been reasonable to assume that an 
ascendant bourgeoisie would gradually curtail the power of the state and its landed 
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allies, eventually eroding their capacity to function as autonomous and politically 
significant actors. However, in the Pakistani case, these economic changes were not 
accompanied by a corresponding transformation of the political and social order in the 
countryside. Indeed, landed power in Pakistan, particularly in Punjab and Sindh, has 
never been perpetuated on a purely economic basis. While the initial power of the 
landed elite was undoubtedly rooted in its control over property and labour, 
supplemented by its status within the rural social hierarchy, the mechanisms that 
reproduced this power, particularly with the advent of electoral politics in the late 
19th Century, would become entrenched within formal political institutions. In 
Pakistan, the failure of the capitalist classes to seriously challenge the power and 
authority of the landed elite, despite the declining economic importance of the latter, 
is rooted in the path dependent processes through which the landed classes have used 
their institutional position to adapt to changing economic circumstances and, more 
importantly, dominate bureaucratic and electoral politics in an enduringly rural polity. 
The perpetuation of the institutionalised political authority of the landed elite, 
facilitated by their propitious position at the time of independence, has allowed them 
to remain in a position where they can enter into bargains with the state, while 
simultaneously limiting the ability of rival classes to assume greater political power. 
At the same time, as shown in Chapter 5, the landed elite themselves failed to 
subordinate the state to their authority after independence due to their own factional, 
intra-class conflict over power and resources, itself institutionalised over time as part 
of Pakistan’s political process.  
. 
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CHAPTER THREE: The Foundations of Colonial Rule 
in Punjab 
 
 The great mass of the population between the Jumna and the Ravee, and from 
which the Sikh army is supplied, is “Jat”… they habitually as much excel in the arts 
of peace as they occasionally do in those of war. They make good soldiers but equally 
good subjects. With the exception of the castes of the Bunniah genus and small loose 
populations of the towns, and the artificers and people of servile race in the villages, 
the remainder of the population is Mussulman – not turbulent pattans, but 
agriculturalists of converted Hindu castes – good cultivators and quiet subjects – with 
all the industry of Hindoos without their religious bigotry, and at the same time 
without the pride, nationality, and fanaticism of the Mussulman; in fact, a people who 
have politically ceased to be Hindoos without politically becoming Mussulmen – just 
the sort of subjects we want. 
‘Economist’9  
 
Introduction  
 
In his letters to the Viceroy on the annexation of Punjab, the officer quoted 
above spoke at length on the administrative system he felt should be introduced to the 
province. Remarking on how, ‘but a few years after the establishment of British rule, 
it is impossible by the minutest search to discover or imagine what has become of the 
component parts of a Native Government which was at one time dazzling and 
formidable’,10 ‘Economist’ expressed what he felt should be one of the core principles 
                                                 
9
 The Punjab Series Vol. III: The Annexation of the Punjab, 1895, Lahore: Sun Printing Press, pp. 6-7. 
‘Economist, An Officer of Practical Experience in the Punjab’ was the title used by an anonymous 
British officer, in letters he sent to the Viceroy following the conquest of Multan in January 1849. 
10
 Ibid., 16. 
 76
of British policy in Punjab, namely the elimination of the traditional aristocracy, a 
class that had, ‘become separated from the population’ and which, when left in place, 
‘deprives the “suseraia” of his rightful revenue but to retain the power of doing 
mischief when the opportunity offers’.11 ‘Economist’ cautioned against any attempt, 
‘to make concurrent two incompatible systems’,12 suggesting instead that the 
administrative system be one entirely run by British political officers untrammelled by 
treaty obligations or the need to accommodate established elites.13 
At the time, the views expressed by the ‘Economist’ were reflective of a 
Utilitarian orthodoxy in the official colonial mind that equated effective 
administration with the creation of ‘modern’ markets, bureaucracies and courts 
(Stokes, 1959). However, while this way of thinking informed the initial British 
approach to ruling Punjab, it would take less than twenty years for these views to be 
reversed, with the colonial state embracing traditional institutions and entering into a 
relationship of mutual benefit with the landed elites it had previously sought to 
displace (Dewey, 1991b). Focusing in particular on the formative years from 1849-
1868, this chapter will discuss the emergence of the state-landlord bargain in Punjab, 
outlining the causal mechanisms that underpinned the production and reproduction of 
the bargain by sequentially analysing the key events and political outcomes that 
shaped the institutional regime of colonial rule.  
The first section in this chapter describes the environment in which the British 
began to erect their administrative apparatus, highlighting the ideological debates that 
informed the policy decisions of early colonial administrators in Punjab, as well as 
identifying the different class actors that were present during the time period 
discussed in this chapter. The second section then treats the British annexation of 
                                                 
11
 The Punjab Series Vol. III: The Annexation of the Punjab, 17. 
12
 Ibid., 23 
13
 Ibid., 36-46. 
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Punjab as a cleavage that initiated the foundational juncture within which the 
subsequent trajectory of colonial institutional development was determined. In the two 
decades following annexation, it will be argued that the need to ensure order and 
extract revenue under conditions of initial uncertainty led the British to co-opt 
Punjab’s rich peasant proprietors and landed aristocracy, collectively the province’s 
landed elite, resulting in the emergence of a bargain between the two actors, with the 
former offering support in exchange for patronage. This bargain constituted the 
mechanism of production that underpinned the developments leading to the 
emergence of a stable institutional outcome by 1868. To illustrate this, it will be 
shown that British policy in Punjab initially underwent two significant phases of 
development; the first, from 1849-1857, saw an attempt to introduce a regime of 
peasant proprietorship in the province, not dissimilar to the one implemented in the 
North-Western Provinces (NWP) at the expense of the traditional aristocracy, while 
the second, triggered by the Revolt of 1857, resulted in the inclusion of the landed 
elite within the ambit colonial power. These two paths were incorporated within the 
institutional framework of colonial rule by 1868 through the passage of the Punjab 
Tenancy Act which, while guaranteeing the rights of those peasant proprietors already 
settled by the regime, also ensured that the landed aristocracy would receive 
preferential treatment in the future.  
Expanding upon how the formal institutions of the colonial state developed, 
the chapter also discusses the Canal Colonies in Punjab, which provide an example of 
how the state-landlord bargain informed colonial policy with regards to ensuring order 
and accumulation, and the ways in which the landed elite themselves made use of 
their power to strengthen their own position and effectively pursue their interests. The 
final section of the chapter deals with the period leading up to the promulgation of the 
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Land Alienation Act of 1900, introduced in order to protect the landed elite from the 
predations of the province’s moneylenders. This law was implemented at the end of a 
contestational juncture during which urban capitalists, taking advantage of the new 
property regime in land, threatened the rural order by acquiring land through 
mortgage. Understanding why this episode failed to result in a substantive 
institutional shift away from the established pattern of state-landlord interaction 
provides important insights into the mechanisms responsible for facilitating the 
persistence of landed power in Punjab. 
The Institutional Development of Colonial Rule in India 
 
Upon annexing Punjab in 1849, the first question the British faced was the 
problem of setting up an administrative system suited to the successful pursuit of their 
interests. At the time, at least one observer (Smith, 1897), described the province as a 
‘tabula rasa’ upon which colonial administrators had the freedom to inscribe anew 
sets of institutions that embodied the knowledge and experience the British had 
gained in other parts of India. After the experience of the early years of Company rule 
in Bengal, when  rampant mismanagement, corruption, and the abuse of power had 
led Edmund Burke to accuse Warren Hastings of presiding over an administration in 
India that, ‘was one whole system of oppression, of robbery of individuals, of 
spoliation of the public, and of supersession of the whole system of the English 
government’ (Burke, 1788), it was believed that a system of government lacking 
institutionalized checks and balances could impede colonial interests in India, and 
could also potentially have a corrupting influence on government in Britain itself. 
Towards this end, it was widely believed that more formalised bureaucratic and 
judicial institutions could ensure more effective governance while simultaneously 
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reducing the risk of corruption becoming even more widespread and endemic to 
British government in the colonies and at home. 
Amongst the first administrative reforms implemented by the East India 
Company was the creation of a revenue system based upon the introduction and 
enforcement of property rights in Bengal. Using liberal ideology as a justification for 
this measure, colonial administrators argued that property rights were essential to 
individual freedom and long-term economic prosperity. It was assumed that an 
investigation of land and tenure systems in Bengal would allow for the identification 
of individuals who possessed land and could therefore be taxed. What the British 
found, however, was that pre-colonial India had been characterized by an agrarian 
order in which multiple actors, ranging from local level cultivators to chieftains and 
regional governors, were entitled to a share of the agricultural surplus (Fuller, 1989). 
Clearly delineated and enforced property rights, as understood by the British, simply 
did not exist. 
Faced with this dilemma, the colonial government in Bengal set about the task 
of allocating property rights to individuals based on its understanding of Indian 
society. As part of the Permanent Settlement of 1793, proprietary rights were largely 
conferred upon Bengal’s large zamindars at the expense of the cultivators and smaller 
zamindars who had previously possessed some claim on the land (Marshall, 1987). 
The issue of determining exactly who owned the land in India was one that would 
repeatedly be confronted by colonial officials as British control expanded, and would 
come to inform the way in which the colonial state was structured. For example, in 
contrast with the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, the system of revenue assessment 
in Madras conferred proprietary rights on occupancy tenants, rather than revenue-
collecting zamindar elites. The ryotwari system that was pioneered in this province 
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was premised upon the assumption that village-level communities of peasants, bound 
together by caste, constituted local agrarian communities that enjoyed co-parcenary 
rights to the land and formed the basis of a stable, traditional agrarian order that had to 
be protected from the predations of a parasitic class of non-cultivating elites. It was 
believed that village-level political and social institutions were key to establishing 
political order amidst the creation of a colonial state apparatus designed to meet the 
objectives of the colonial project. Thus, while private property rights were 
established, for the purposes of revenue assessment and collection, the revenue system 
in Madras was designed to actively protect the structure of rural society in order to 
minimise the disruptive influence of British rule (Stokes, 1959; Cohn, 1987, 213-
214). 
The differences between the revenue systems of Bengal and Madras are 
interesting for two main reasons. Firstly, these separate approaches to revenue 
collection embodied very different conceptions of how British interests in India were 
to be pursued. The Permanent Settlement of Bengal had been premised upon the 
notion that large landlords, paying a fixed amount of revenue to the state, would be 
able to form the backbone of a new economic order that would allow for greater 
accumulation and political stability. Linked to this was the belief of many colonial 
administrators, as well as their superiors in London, that an effective government was 
one whose role in society was kept to a minimum. The system set up in Madras 
encapsulated a different view. It located stability in the cultivating peasantry, rather 
than large landlords, and promoted a paternalist view of the governance that promoted 
state intervention in society to prop up traditional institutions that could be used to 
rule India more effectively. Although both approaches agreed on the need to strike a 
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balance between order and accumulation, they differed on the exact institutional 
framework through which these two interests could be achieved. 
Secondly, colonial administrators on both sides of this debate justified their 
policy choices with reference to contemporary ideologies. Those supporting the 
Bengali administrative system couched their arguments in terms of liberalism, 
suggesting that free markets, property rights, and limited state intervention were 
essential for the effective pursuit of colonial interests. The rival viewpoint drew on the 
utilitarian tradition, arguing that the presence of parasitic landlords and a non-
interventionist state would result in the creation of a fundamentally unjust and 
inefficient system of governance. What needs to be borne in mind, however, is that 
while this debate was framed in ideological terms, ideology itself simply served as a 
means through which to express pragmatic solutions to the problems of governance. 
As argued by Stokes (1980) colonial administrative reform in India paralleled 
institutional developments in England, and was driven by the need to reduce the cost 
of government, maximize revenue, and ensure political stability. Ideology was not a 
force for institutional change in and of itself. At most, it was employed as a means 
through which colonial administrators framed the policy decisions that they took. 
Disagreements over administrative issues were not so much a clash of ideologies as 
much as they were conflicting viewpoints on how to best resolve pressing problems 
within society.  
In reality, therefore, British institutions tended to be ‘janus-faced’, 
representing a mix of both the old and the new (Washbrook, 1981). The 
implementation of private property rights and the creation of a modern bureaucracy 
proceeded alongside the maintenance of traditional institutions such as caste-based 
co-parcenary village proprietary bodies. Ideology notwithstanding, it was episodes of 
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peasant revolt in Bengal prior to the introduction of the Permanent Settlement that 
played an important role in shaping the colonial policies aimed at creating powerful 
landed allies who could contribute to ensuring stability in the countryside (Wilson, 
2005). A similar process was be at work in Madras and, later, the NWP where 
ryotwari revenue settlements privileging local level cultivating castes and 
communities were nonetheless occasionally subject to revision in order to win over 
traditional elites willing to support the colonial government (Roselli, 1971; Metcalf, 
1979).  When it came to questions of institutional reform or development, ideology 
played a secondary role to the realities of political expediency. 
Nonetheless, by the time the British finally annexed Punjab, certain 
institutional regularities had been established which provided the template for the new 
administrative system that was to be set up in the province. Firstly, British rule 
brought with it modern courts and bureaucracies, governed by codified law and rules 
that, while often subject to redefinition and change, nonetheless represented a 
departure from the more informal systems of administration that had characterized 
pre-colonial India. Secondly, by the mid-19th century it had become clear that while 
economic orthodoxy recommended the establishment of property rights and a market 
in land, as had been the case in Bengal, the maintenance of order and the pursuit of 
long-term economic benefit rested upon the creation of revenue systems that were 
based on peasant proprietorship and village-level, caste-based groups of co-parcenary 
cultivators (Metcalf, 1962). The disastrous economic impact of the Permanent 
Settlement in Bengal provided much of the impetus for this coalescing of official 
opinion, and this development was supported by an increasingly large body of 
colonial knowledge that ostensibly produced a better understanding of Indian society 
than had existed during the initial years of British rule in Bengal. Finally, particularly 
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in the NWP, colonial administrators known as Commissioners came to constitute the 
focal unit of colonial control in India at the district level. Possessing the power to 
investigate and allocate property rights, resolve disputes, and exercise magisterial 
functions, Commissioners represented a fusion of judicial and executive power at the 
local level that was considered by the colonial state to be the most efficient form of 
administration possible. 
The class structure of Punjabi society at the time of the annexation played an 
important role in shaping colonial policy, particularly in the initial phase of 
institutional consolidation. The landed classes of the province were comprised of the 
remnants of the Mughal and Sikh aristocracies. Many of these elites had survived the 
transition to colonial rule, and some had even supported the British in the Anglo-Sikh 
wars. In the absence of clearly defined property rights, class distinctions in Punjab at 
this point in time were determined by the different tenurial arrangements that 
governed the cultivation of land.  Occupancy tenants were members of landowning 
biraderis who had de facto possession of the land at the local level, were protected 
against arbitrary eviction, and were part of village-level co-parcenary cultivating 
bodies. Occupancy tenants would be transformed into relatively well-off peasant 
proprietors in the British period, and would prove to be an intrinsic part of the 
colonial order. The aristocracy and the rich proprietors would constitute the landed 
elite under colonialism. 
In addition to the landowning and cultivating classes, other strata of agrarian 
society included the artisanal biraderis engaged in petty commodity production and 
service provision at the local level, tenants-at-will who did not enjoy a hereditary right 
to own or cultivate land, and a small but steadily increasing growing class of landless 
wage workers. These landless elements of the agrarian order were directly dependent 
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on the landed classes for their economic well-being, and were accordingly subordinate 
to them in the agrarian social and political hierarchy (Banerjee, 2005). As far as the 
British were concerned, the non-cultivating and landholding strata of agrarian Punjab 
could be effectively controlled through by strengthening the social and political 
institutions that locked them into relationships of dependence on the landed classes. 
Given the overwhelmingly agrarian structure of the Punjabi economy, and the 
relatively low level of urbanization in the mid-19th century, Punjab did not really 
possess a class of capitalists during the colonial period. While there did exist a mostly 
urban class of moneylenders who provided credit to the agrarian classes, their lack of 
mooring in the countryside itself and subsequent lack of political or social power 
caused the British to view them as being marginal to the interests of the colonial state 
(Banga, 2005). It was only when this class of moneylenders began to expand into the 
countryside towards the end of the 20th Century, threatening the balance of class 
power in Punjab, that the colonial state began to include them within the calculus of 
its institutional decision-making. 
Colonial Rule in Punjab: The Founding Years, 1849-1857 
 
Upon annexation in 1849, Punjab was placed under the control of a Board of 
Administration (BoA) staffed by a mix of officials recruited from the bureaucracy and 
the military in the neighbouring NWP. Imbued with the belief that the administrative 
experiences of the NWP would allow for the creation of a government in Punjab that 
would be comprised of colonial institutions in their most perfected form, Lord 
Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India, freed the Board of Administration from the 
constraining influence of the central government by declaring Punjab to be a Non-
Regulation province. It was argued that by introducing this measure, the new 
administrators of the province would be able to operate independently of the centrally 
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enforced rules that had effectively limited the extent to which innovation could be 
introduced in the administrative setups operating in the other provinces. Faced with 
the challenge of managing what was seen by the British to be a relatively untamed, 
‘backward’ province, and enticed by the prospect of rapid advancement within the 
government, many of the colonial state’s brightest officers and personnel sought to be 
assigned to Punjab, and applied themselves to the task of establishing an effective 
government in the province. It was this spirit of innovation and relative freedom of 
action that would come to characterise what would later be known as the ‘Punjab 
Tradition’ of colonial administration (van den Dungen, 1972; Penner, 1986). 
Non-regulation status notwithstanding, the different approaches that had 
characterized colonial institutional development prior to 1849 acted as constraints on 
the autonomy of British administrators in Punjab. The institutional form to be taken 
by the colonial state in Punjab was the subject of considerable debate in the years 
immediately following annexation, echoing the same themes that had been raised in 
Bengal, Madras, and other parts of British India. This debate revolved around the 
construction of the province’s revenue administration, and was expressed primarily 
through the actions and opinions of Henry and John Lawrence, two brothers who 
formed the core of the BoA. Henry, who was placed in charge of the province’s 
political affairs, had been the British resident at Lahore from 1846-49, and had played 
a crucial role in winning the support of different Muslim and Sikh chiefs during the 
Anglo-Sikh wars. John, at the head of the revenue administration, had served as 
Commissioner of the Jullundur Doab following the first Anglo-Sikh war. Both 
brothers had been part of the colonial state apparatus for years, and also possessed a 
relatively broad knowledge of the province that they had now been charged with 
administering. Despite having spent a similar amount of time in Punjab, however, the 
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two brothers disagreed violently and acrimoniously on the question of land rights in 
the province. While John adhered to the mainstream view that recommended the 
granting of property rights occupancy tenants who would become peasant proprietors, 
Henry believed that it was necessary to retain and cultivate the support of Punjab’s 
landed aristocracy.  
At one level, the disagreement between John and Henry stemmed from their 
different professional backgrounds. John, having been trained in administration by the 
bureaucrats of the NWP, had come to embody the same logic that had governed the 
revenue settlements that had taken place there. Henry, on the other hand, had been a 
part of the military, and had formulated his views on Punjab’s landed elites following 
his stint as Resident in Lahore, a position that had required him to interact regularly 
with the province’s traditional aristocracy (Lee, 2002).  Additionally, however, the 
disagreements between the Lawrence brothers also represented the tension between 
order and accumulation that had informed colonial policy in India. John’s support for 
a model based on peasant proprietorship was fundamentally rooted in the desire to 
create a financially sound administration that would be able to extract as much 
revenue as possible, directly from the cultivator without the costs associated with 
maintaining an intermediate tier of oppressive jagirdars and other elites (Smith, 1897, 
60) John’s hostility towards the landed elite in Punjab was made evident during his 
time as commissioner in East Punjab, prior to the conquest of Lahore, where he was, 
‘bent upon depriving the Jagirdars of their Baronial powers… and resuming as many 
Jagirs as it was possible’ (Sethi, 2003 [1931], 27).  This was a view compounded by 
the fact that the Sikh landed aristocracy had constituted the core source of opposition 
to the British colonial hegemony in the province. Henry, on the other hand, perceived 
the Punjabi landed elite to be a potentially powerful source of social and political 
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support, and felt that they could provide the means through which the British could 
establish indirect control over the province. Indeed, Henry had at one time argued 
against the need for British intervention in the province, claiming that effective power 
could be exercised in Punjab through the co-optation of the aristocracy (Trevaskis, 
1928, 213-215).  For Henry, considerations of political stability outweighed the need 
to collect as much revenue as possible. 
Ultimately, however, it was John Lawrence’s view that prevailed, largely due 
to the support he received from the Governor-General and other elements of the 
bureaucracy. By 1853, failing health and an increasingly fraught relationship with 
John forced Henry to leave Punjab, allowing John to finally be appointed as the first 
Commissioner of the province following the elimination of the BoA. Having 
concluded that proprietary rights were to be vested in occupancy tenants who were 
members of village level co-parcenary bodies, the Punjab government undertook the 
task of erecting the revenue administration of the province. The assessment of land 
revenue and the recording of proprietary rights were tasks that were undertaken by 
Deputy Commissioners in each district, with these administrators using their judicial 
and executive powers to expeditiously resolve the many disputes that subsequently 
arose out of the decisions they took with regards to the ownership of land at the local 
level.  
Although the enthusiasm shown by the Punjab government for peasant 
proprietorship was justified in terms of economic efficacy and justice it was also true 
that the creation and co-optation of a tier of local level landholders made a 
considerable amount of political sense. While the British had been able to conquer 
Punjab militarily, the effective management of the province would have been 
extremely difficult in circumstances where the countryside was in revolt. This was a 
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particularly clear and present danger in a province like Punjab, with a long history of 
peasant resistance to oppressive and exploitative rule, and the danger was 
compounded by the colonial government’s inability to create a legitimating ideology 
for its rule that was accepted by the local populace (Metcalf, 1995). In the immediate 
aftermath of annexation, this problem manifested itself in the form of the disbanded 
Sikh army, whose thousands of members were largely drawn from the province’s 
cultivating biraderis, and who represented a potential source of discontent in the 
province. Mindful of how a contented peasantry was the key to stability in Punjab, the 
colonial state’s provision of ownership rights to hereditary cultivators constituted a 
means through which the government could forge a strong link with the peasantry in 
Punjab. It was in this context that the British actively introduced measures to ensure 
that the former soldiers of the Sikh army were able to return to their traditional 
position within the agrarian order, albeit as landowners rather than occupancy tenants 
(Khilnani, 1972).  
Despite the fact that his viewpoint was the one that eventually prevailed, John 
Lawrence and his administration were nonetheless forced to make some concessions 
to the Punjabi landed elite, for the reasons that had been highlighted by Henry. It was 
yet another demonstration of how the need to acquire support and maintain order was 
one of the driving forces of British policy in the province, tempering the extent to 
which ideological conviction could influence institutional outcomes. One of the first 
issues that confronted the nascent colonial government in Punjab dealt with the 
rewarding those landed elites, most of whom were Muslim chiefs, who had aided the 
British during the Anglo-Sikh wars. The support of these chiefs had been of vital 
importance to the British war effort in Punjab, and as argued by Major (1991), many 
of these chiefs deliberately aligned themselves with the British in order to maximize 
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the benefit they would receive for what they perceived to be an imminent regime 
change in the province. At a fundamental level, the exchange of military and political 
support for state patronage that characterized this relationship was reminiscent of the 
mode of administration that had prevailed under the Mughals and Sikhs, and was 
indicative of the extent to which the new colonial administration, from the very outset, 
was constrained by the institutional legacy of the past. 
The extent to which the colonial state was limited in its ability to move against 
the aristocracy was also highlighted by the approach taken by John Lawrence towards 
the elimination of the jagir grants that had existed under the Sikh government.  
Despite his avowed commitment to the eradication of the traditional landed elite, John 
Lawrence recognized that any move to suddenly deprive the old jagirdars of their 
holdings would be met with considerable resistance, not only from the jagirdars 
themselves but also from their extended biraderi networks. Preferring, instead, to 
engineer a slow social revolution, John Lawrence embarked upon a policy that 
provided limited recognition to extant jagirdars, allowing them to retain their jagirs 
as non-hereditary grants for the duration of their lifetimes while increasing the state’s 
share in the revenue collected.14 While the aim of this exercise remained the abolition 
of Punjab’s chiefs and large landlords, the options available to the colonial state to 
achieve this end remained inherently limited given the power that was still 
commanded at the local level by the landed elite. 
The debate between John and Henry Lawrence was significant primarily 
because of the way in which resulted in the initiation of the bargain between the 
colonial state and the landed classes in Punjab. While the two brothers had disagreed 
on exactly which class to support, they had both recognised that the key to controlling 
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Punjab lay in the cultivation of allies who owned land. By conferring proprietary 
rights upon occupancy tenants in the province, John Lawrence was able to co-opt a 
significant portion of the peasantry whose economic interests were inextricably linked 
with the stability and continued good-will of the colonial state. Simultaneously, by 
choosing to retain some elements of the landed aristocracy within the new 
institutional regime, the Punjab government also entered into a relationship with a 
group of powerful traditional elites who could be relied upon to mobilise support for 
the colonial state. The benefits accruing to the British because of this arrangement 
would have long term effects on colonial policy in Punjab, particularly in the 
aftermath of the revolt of 1857. 
By 1857, the institutional framework of the colonial government had begun to 
solidify, and the configuration of actors that underpinned it had started to crystallize. 
In the eight years since annexation, a modern bureaucracy had been established in 
Punjab, the revenue system had been defined and implemented, and detailed surveys 
of villages across the province had enabled the DCs to allocate ownership rights over 
land to occupancy tenants in their respective districts. Rather than adhering to the 
principles of the free market when making these allocations, British officials simply 
reproduced the structure of local level rural society, providing ownership to the same 
cultivating biraderis that had traditionally been able to claim a hereditary share in the 
agricultural surplus. While the government did sometimes recognise ‘superior’ 
proprietary rights, of the type claimed by the aristocracy, it only tended to do so in the 
absence of occupancy tenants who could claim to be part of the village cultivating 
community (Cust, 1866).  
For all its rules, regulations, and bureaucracy, the British government in 
Punjab retained the ability to back its policies up with force and, as a colonial ruling 
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authority, was able to exist relatively autonomously of the different social groups 
within society. This autonomy, supported by coercive force, was what gave the British 
in Punjab the ability to choose between different social factions when determining 
how to best govern the province. While it certainly was the case that bolstering the 
position of the cultivating class of peasants in Punjab was partly the result of an 
ideological conception of society that sought to maximize agricultural rents through 
the elimination of parasitic intermediaries, the need to ensure stability through 
continuity was one of the primary imperatives that led the colonial state to align its 
interests with the landed classes of Punjab. The threat of revolt arising out of 
discontent with the new order only exacerbated the government’s need for influential 
local allies who, it was believed, possessed the social and economic power necessary 
to establish support for the new regime. 
Protecting the interests of this class of local level proprietors necessitated a 
second set of institutional interventions as well. In addition to providing the 
cultivating peasantry with property rights, the colonial administration also 
incorporated Customary law within the legal framework that was being erected in the 
province. Recognising that importance of biraderi in Punjab, the British actively 
sought to protect and promote customs and traditions based on biraderi, particularly 
with regards to questions relating to land ownership and dispute resolution (Gilmartin, 
1988, 14-18). As had been the case in other parts of India, however, the maintenance 
of the traditional order imposed constraints on the operation of a free market in land, 
privileging certain tribes and communities over others, and ostensibly contradicting 
the economic aims of the colonial government. Once again, the introduction of these 
measures reflected the priorities that guided the colonial state in this formative period. 
Faced with the prospect of instability as a result of the political and economic changes 
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that brought about by the British, the retention of Customary law provided another 
mechanism through which it was believed rural discontent could be contained, and the 
dislocations engendered by the transition to colonial rule. Premising their entire 
administration upon the promotion of biraderi also allowed the colonial government 
to make use of biraderi networks as a means through which to ensure that support for 
the regime was contiguous with the geographical spread of the agricultural biraderis 
across Punjab. Thus, while accumulation continued to remain one of the driving 
principles of the colonial regime, it remained fettered by the state’s need to ensure 
order and stability through the cultivation of landed allies in rural Punjab. 
The period between 1849 and 1868 represents foundational juncture for the 
British in Punjab because of the way in which the institutional structures put in place 
locked colonial governance into a trajectory of path-dependent development. The 
bureaucratic-legal state structure erected by the British in Punjab would provide the 
framework within which policy would be debated and implemented by the British, 
and would also regulate political and economic exchanges and interactions amidst and 
between actors in Punjab attempting to negotiate the distribution of power in society. 
The decades to come would also see an increase in both the reach and the 
infrastructural power of the state as it expanded its role in the economy and society 
(Ali, 1988), making the bureaucracy and courts increasingly indispensable features of 
the colonial regime. More importantly, however, the alliance between the state and 
peasant proprietors that underwrote the new political order under the colonial 
government would continue to form the core of colonial policy in the province, albeit 
with changes and modifications made by the colonial state over time in order to better 
protect and pursue its interests. As the feedback effects from the relationship between 
the state and its landholding allies strengthened both the parties involved, the logic of 
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mutual cooperation at the heart of the compact would continue to be reinforced, 
increasing the costs of adapting alternative political configurations or governance 
mechanisms, while simultaneously raising the stakes for actors at the margins of the 
regime’s political dispensation. 
The Aristocratic Reaction, 1857-1868 
 
Evidence of the deepening of this bargain can be discerned in the debates and 
policy decisions that characterised the period following the Revolt of 1857. A 
combination of mismanagement and elite alienation in Oudh and the NWP had, along 
with other factors, contributed towards creating an air of resentment that culminated 
in a full-scale rebellion against the central colonial government (Trevaskis, 1928; 
Metcalf, 1964). Amidst widespread revolts by members of the colonial army recruited 
from amongst the local populations of Bengal and Northern India, the colonial 
government was, for the first time in India, faced with the prospect of collapse. In 
Punjab, however, the situation remained relatively calm, with the populace remaining 
largely indifferent to events taking place in Northern and Central India. Furthermore, 
when John Lawrence was dispatched from Lahore to fight the rebels who had laid 
siege to Delhi, he was able to recruit a force of mercenaries and soldiers comprised of 
the peasant proprietors that had been the recipients of state patronage over the last 
decade. More significantly, many of the large landholders who had survived the 
transition to colonial rule proved instrumental in mobilizing troops and resources for 
the British, utilizing their positions of power and leadership within the economic and 
social networks of their areas to generate support for the government (Talbot, 1988, 
46-49).   The failure of the Revolt in Punjab, coupled with the support John Lawrence 
was able to muster, served to vindicate the policies that had been implemented in the 
province over the course of the previous decade (Smith, 1897, 81-82). The investment 
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that had been made in the landed classes of Punjab had yielded rich dividends for the 
British, and only served to cement the view that the landed classes were crucial to the 
pursuit of colonial interests in the province.  
Despite all of this, however, the events of 1857 prompted a wider debate 
within the colonial government of India, and the blame for the uprising was laid at the 
door of the same administrators who had advocated the displacement of the traditional 
landed elite in Northern India. In what would come to be known as the ‘Aristocratic 
Reaction’ to the Revolt (Metcalf, 1964; Penner, 1986), elements within the 
government began to suggest that it was necessary to utilise the traditional landed elite 
within the countryside as a means through which to exercise control over the 
peasantry. It was argued that by displacing the landed elite, the British government 
had bred resentment and, more importantly, removed an administrative mechanism 
that, since the time of the Mughals, had been used to ensure order and stability at the 
local level. Even though the support of Punjab’s peasant proprietors had been 
instrumental to the maintenance of the colonial order in the province, the experience 
of the NWP led many colonial administrators to suggest that a more prudent political 
policy in Punjab would focus more explicitly on co-opting the province’s traditional 
aristocracy. As argued by R. H. Davies, secretary to the Governor of Punjab, in a 
report recommending that members of the aristocracy be invested with magisterial 
powers15,  
 
“Political security is not acceptably attained by just laws, equitable 
taxation, and material progress; there must also be a right adjustment of 
forces. In times of disturbance, men will look out for leaders. If there is a 
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body scattered throughout the country considerable by its respect and 
rank it will for certain exercise great influence whether its position be 
hereditary or not. If this body is attached to the state by timely 
concessions and moderate honours – if it attains a share of power and 
importance, it will constitute a strong support to the existing 
government”. 
 
In recommending that local chiefs and traditional landed elites be given 
magisterial powers, R. H. Davies was supported by a rising tide of opinion, in Punjab 
as well as the rest of India, which called for a restoration of the pre-colonial 
aristocracy not only in terms of its economic power, but also as repositories of 
political power (Penner, 1986). While certain elements of the aristocracy had, from 
the very outset, enjoyed the favour of the government, the calls for rethinking revenue 
policy that now emanated from Calcutta, Delhi, and Lahore, asked for nothing less 
than a fundamental reconfiguration of the way in which the colonial government had 
set about dispensing proprietary rights in land.  
A variety of approaches were initially adopted by the Punjab government in 
order to set about the task of reconstructing a rural elite that it had only recently 
attempted to dismantle. In addition to conferring magisterial powers upon select 
landed elites in order to bolster the authority of the colonial government, grants of 
land were also conferred upon officials and local collaborators who aided the British 
government during the Revolt.16 In cases where the British had already been in 
alliance with the traditional elites, such as in the district of Multan, further 
concessions and allowances were made to reward these elites for their loyalty 
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(Roseberry, 1987). In Multan, the British had aligned themselves with the sajjada 
nashins of the local Muslim shrines, making use of their considerable social and 
political power to defeat the Sikhs in the area. Following the Revolt of 1857, the 
British increased their patronage of the shrines, granting large tracts of land to the 
Sajjada Nashins and providing them with economic resources to match the 
ideological power they already possessed. This fusion of religion and economic power 
would later prove to be one of the regime’s most enduring sources of support 
(Gilmartin, 1988). The Tiwanas of Shahpur were another example of a prominent 
landholding family who, because of their military and political support of the colonial 
regime, were able to greatly expand their wealth and influence as a result of the 
preferential treatment meted out to them by the British government (Talbot, 1996). 
However, despite taking some steps towards the reinstatement of Punjab’s 
landed elite, the colonial state faced constraints in its ability to overhaul the 
province’s revenue system. The difficulties faced by the government were illustrated 
most clearly by the debate that raged over tenancy legislation in the 1860s. When 
Punjab had first been annexed, the revenue settlements that had been made were 
designed to be temporary and subject to revision, allowing the colonial state to 
recalculate its revenue demand. This exercise was undertaken in 1863 by Edward 
Prinsep, the new Settlement Commissioner of the province. After conducting a 
thorough investigation into how proprietary rights had been determined in the years 
immediately following annexation, Prinsep concluded that grievous errors of 
judgement had been made by the officials who had drafted the record of property 
rights that underpinned the first revenue settlements. Prinsep basically argued that an 
ignorance of the history of the province and its traditions of control and administration 
had resulted in a large number of superior proprietors being deprived of their right to 
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own land (Metcalf, 1962; Hambly, 1964). In his view, the solution to this problem lay 
in a restructuring of the revenue system that would see many of the new peasant 
proprietors revert back to being occupancy tenants tilling land belonging to the 
traditional Punjabi aristocracy. With regards to the granting of property rights to 
occupancy tenants, Prinsep believed that, ‘the English government had no power to 
confer, or create, such rights if they never existed before’, and that restoration of the 
aristocracy would simply reinstate the agrarian order that had historically 
characterized Punjabi society.17 
Although Prinsep’s suggestions were in line with the principles articulated by 
the Aristocratic Reaction following the events of 1857, they were not well received by 
John Lawrence who by this time had become Governor-General of India. Lawrence 
found support for his position from members of the central government like Richard 
Temple who had built their careers in the revenue administration he had headed 
during the formative phase of British control in Punjab. John Lawrence and his allies 
in government felt that Prinsep’s evaluation of the situation, if not inaccurate, was 
unduly harsh on the peasantry, and they argued that it was impossible to revert to the 
pre-colonial system of land tenures. Indeed, in the Amritsar district alone, the 
implementation of Prinsep’s revised settlement would have reduced 45,000 peasant 
proprietors to the status of cultivating tenants-at-will (Metcalf, 1962). Countering the 
claim that empowering the landed aristocracy would prove to be a source of stability 
for the regime, Lawrence and his allies argued that the dislocations engendered by 
Prinsep’s plan would lead to widespread discontent, undermining the stability of the 
government in Punjab. 
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It was in an attempt to resolve this dilemma that John Lawrence and his allies 
were able to pass the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868 which established that the 
proprietary rights granted during the initial settlement period could not be revised or 
revoked without due cause. However, although the act protected the ownership rights 
of the proprietors who had been granted land during the initial revenue settlements, it 
proscribed the granting of such rights in the future provided the existence of superior 
proprietary rights could be established. Also significant was the fact that the Act 
endowed landlords with a greater amount of freedom and power relative to their 
tenants, allowing the former to evict the latter at will It was, according to W. G. 
Davies (1882), the commissioner of Jullundur, a compromise between a pro-landlord 
faction that sought to provide exclusive rights over land to the aristocracy, and a pro-
peasant faction that felt that individual proprietors were crucial to economic progress 
and stability.  
More importantly, however, the Punjab Tenancy Act is an embodiment of the 
process of path dependent, incremental institutional change that characterized the 
development of the British regime in the province. Examining the dynamics of the 
debate on this legislation provides insights into how the decisions taken by the 
colonial state during the regime-founding juncture of 1849-1857 limited the options 
that were available to it in the 1860s. Having largely created a local level class of 
landed allies in Punjab, the colonial government could not afford to simply sever its 
ties with this tier of the peasantry. On the other hand, as shown by the experience of 
the NWP, the policy of eliminating the traditional landed aristocracy brought with it 
problems of its own, particularly given how these traditional elites possessed the 
social standing necessary to mobilize support against the British regime. Cultivating 
the support of the Punjabi aristocracy also made sense when considering how their 
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allegiance to the colonial state had been fundamental to the British war effort in 1857. 
Yet, extending state patronage to these elites, under Prinsep’s scheme, necessarily 
meant alienating the class of peasant proprietors who had thus far constituted the 
political core of the colonial regime.  
Ironically, it was the debate between John and Henry Lawrence in the 1850s 
that provided the platform for this reconfiguration of British power in Punjab. In 
implementing a policy, under the BoA, that privileged peasant proprietors while 
simultaneously protecting the interests of selected members of the traditional 
aristocracy, John Lawrence’s actions had the unintended consequence of ensuring that 
both elements of the agrarian order would prove to be active supporters of the new 
regime. Given that an institutional framework had been established through which 
both elements of the landed elite could use their power to pursue the interests of the 
colonial state, disturbing the established order in the province would have entailed 
political and economic costs that would have had a detrimental effect on the power of 
the colonial state.  
In this context, the British were forced to choose between paths of action that 
would have potentially destabilized the regime, and the maintenance of a status quo in 
which measured institutional change could strengthen the position of both sets of its 
landed allies. Ideological protestations notwithstanding, the colonial state in Punjab 
never really had the option of enacting anything other than a Tenancy Act which 
catered to both elements of the landed elite. As a result, however, the colonial state 
could now rely on the aristocracy as allies who, by virtue of their social, political, and 
economic strength, could mobilise active political support in favour of the 
government and inhibit the spread of the types of instability that could threaten the 
political order. At the same time, while peasant proprietors were characterized by 
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their ‘passive’ loyalty to the state, it was believed that the landed elites could prove to 
be more useful in actively building and maintaining support for the colonial regime 
(van den Dungen, 1972, 100-105). 
The Canal Colonies 
 
 Between 1885 and 1926, the British government in Punjab embarked upon an 
ambitious programme of agricultural expansion, establishing nine new ‘canal 
colonies’ between the five western rivers of the province. The principal aim of this 
project was to bring under cultivation millions of acres of land that had previously 
been barren and only sparsely inhabited, and this was all made possible through the 
extensive development of Punjab’s irrigation network, and by transferring a large 
body of settlers from the increasingly congested Eastern districts to this new Western 
frontier. Amidst rising revenues and production the British often looked to Punjab and 
the canal colonies in particular, as an example of how the correct balance of 
institutional design, administrative acumen and social management could make 
manifest the benefits of colonial rule India. Indeed, in the words of at least one 
contemporary observer, ‘the administration has introduced improvements of great 
magnitude, resulting in marked and rapid increase of wealth to the people who, to this 
extent, have been relieved of the pressure of their former poverty’ (Calvert, 1922, 68). 
The canal colonies were created in a political context within which the 
colonial state had invested tremendously in Punjab’s agrarian order. As such, the 
entire project of canal colonisation was one that was informed by the same economic 
and political imperatives that had structured the institutions of the colonial state in 
Punjab. In the aftermath of annexation and the end of the Anglo-Sikh Wars, the 
construction of Punjab’s canals provided employment to disbanded Sikh soldiers who 
may have otherwise been a source of discontent and disturbance in the province 
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(Gilmartin, 1994, 1133). Massive irrigation projects and other Public Works also 
represented a means through which the colonial state hoped to increase the surplus it 
could extract from the agrarian economy amidst declining revenues (Babar, 2001, 46). 
Finally, with population levels in East Punjab leading to increased competition for 
scarce agricultural land, creating canal colonies provided a means through which to 
expand agricultural production while simultaneously defusing the potentially 
explosive demographic situation in the rest of the province.18 The scale of the project 
was unprecedented for the colonial government and by 1947, the colonies were spread 
over, spread over 14,000,000 acres of land,  incorporating a dense web of canals, 
roads and small towns that linked the different parts of Western Punjab together. As 
argued by Ali (1988, 9) the extent of the canal network, coupled with the tremendous 
dependence of agriculture on canal water in the absence of reliable rainfall, resulted in 
the creation of a ‘hydraulic’ society in which the colonial state, through its control 
over water, could exercise a tremendous amount of power over those who lived in the 
region. 
Drawing on Lefebvre’s (1991) work on the relationship between space and 
social relations, Ian Kerr has argued that the colonial state used its technological tools 
(particularly roads and railways) to produce, and impose, a space in Punjab that 
reduced the agency of the colonized, limiting the extent to which they could exercise 
power and authority relative to the colonizers (Kerr, 2007). The canal colonies, while 
embodying a similar logic of control and domination, reflected a different approach to 
the production of space in Punjab. As opposed to regulating the circulation of capital 
and labour, the canal colonies project was concerned with creating fixity rather than 
managing fluidity. As envisaged by colonial planners, the spatial and institutional 
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organization of the colonies was designed not only to facilitate maximal economic 
production, but also to fix in perpetuity that specific set of agrarian social relations 
that the British felt was most conducive to strengthening the hold of the colonial state 
in Punjab. Inasmuch as the production and regulation of space was required to ensure 
the maintenance of order and the accumulation of surplus, the twin imperatives of 
managing fluidity and imposing fixity were intrinsically linked, informing the 
institutional basis of colonial rule in Punjab while simultaneously shaping production 
and social relations in the province.  
The implications of this for economic and social life in the new colonies can 
be grasped by examining the two village plans shown in figures 6 and 7 below. What 
is most immediately striking about the comparison between the two villages is the 
way in which space is divided and demarcated. The design of Chak No. 73, defined 
by straight lines and clearly demarcated spaces for economic production and 
habitation, highlighted the colonial need for institutional regularity, and exemplified 
the way in which the power of the colonial state was, ‘tied to a legal structure in 
which the definition of property rights in land was central’ (Gilmartin, 1994, 1133). 
Bhambu Sandila, a village where settlements where scattered across fragmented 
landholdings in a space characterised by organised chaos at best. The contrast is 
particularly relevant when taking into account the different effects of organic and 
artificial settlement; whereas land ownership and settlement in Bhambu Sandila were 
reflective of decades of exchange, contestation, and appropriation between the 
different families living within the village, the spaces available inside Chak No. 73 
were designed to be carefully allocated to different colonists transplanted into the 
village from other parts of Punjab.  
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Having created the physical spaces of the canal colonies, the colonial state was 
faced with the issue of populating them. Here too the state relied upon the idiom of 
science to justify the decisions it took with regards to the type of occupants it sought  
 
Figure 6: Map of Chak No. 73 GB, a canal colony village19 
 
for the new colonies. Drawing upon their knowledge of Punjab’s social structure, as 
well as administrative and political precedent, the British pursued a policy of 
settlement in which agricultural land was predominantly awarded only to members of 
‘agriculturalist tribes’ from Eastern Punjab. These particular biraderis were those that 
had historically possessed and cultivated land in Punjab, and the large landholders and 
peasant proprietors who belonged to these biraderis had hitherto been the colonial 
state’s main indigenous allies in Punjab. While colonial anthropology provided a 
ready social scientific justification for the categorisation of Punjab’s population in 
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Figure 7: Map of Bhambu Sandila, a non-canal colony village20 
 
these terms (Babar, 2001, 46) the identification of the agriculturalist biraderis as the 
segment of the population most suited to the cultivation of the new agrarian frontier 
was simply part of the colonial state’s broader political imperatives. Allowing 
Punjab’s historically landed classes to appropriate the new spaces of production in the 
canal colonies was a means through which to ensure the maintenance and stability of 
a colonial order premised upon the continued co-optation of these elements of the 
rural hierarchy, and also allowed for the incorporation of the newly settled areas 
within the extant administrative framework of colonial rule. 
The exact manner in which the canal colonies were settled provides further 
insights into this process. Rather than selecting individuals from disparate parts of 
Punjab to move into the canal colonies, care was taken by the colonial state to ensure 
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that entire communities were relocated to the new villages.21 What this meant in 
practice was that in addition to the dominant biraderi groups that would be granted 
land in the canal colonies, artisans and landless workers would also be transplanted 
into these new settlements. From the perspective of the colonial state, this made sense 
because it allowed for the retention of the traditional social structures and ties that 
formed the basis for Customary Law in Punjab. Engineering the shift to the canal 
colonies with minimal social disruption was of obvious importance to the colonial 
state, and encouraging settlement in this manner was one of the ways in which 
dislocation was limited. In practice, however, what this meant was that even though 
the new villages ostensibly represented spaces within which ‘new’ communities were 
to be formed, the selective distribution of land and the implementation of the colonial 
state’s vision of Customary Law ensured the perpetuation of an agrarian order in 
which the landless remained subordinate to traditional landed elites (Ali, 1988, 192; 
Gilmartin, 2004). 
When the canal colonies were being set up, changes had begun to take place in 
the economic structure of Punjab that would have an impact on economic life in the 
new settlements. In the last few decades of the 19th Century, Punjab found itself being 
increasingly incorporated within international circuits of capital. Cash cropping and 
relatively input-intensive cultivation for the market had begun to replace traditional 
production patterns in earnest, generating the type of stratification between the richer 
and poorer peasants that was associated with capitalist agriculture (Mishra, 1982). 
Inequality in land ownership was exacerbated by increases in population that were 
not, until the establishment of the canal colonies, matched by a concurrent expansion 
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in the amount of cultivated land in Punjab. To the extent that growth took place, it 
was triggered by sustained increases in food prices amidst relatively static levels of 
taxation, with much of this growth remaining concentrated in the hands of the rich 
landholders (Hamid, 1982). As a result, greater economic output and escalating 
competition for access to increasingly scarce agricultural land saw it become 
transformed into a commodity of considerable value, a development that would also 
slowly begin to emerge in the canal colonies. Even as the landless and poorer sections 
of the peasantry were increasingly forced into wage labour, and as proprietors with 
small holdings were squeezed into the ranks of the landless, the dominant fractions of 
the landholding class in Punjab were able to consolidate and expand their holdings by 
using their resources to acquire more land. In the long run, as argued by Ali (1987) 
and Mukherjee (2005), the trajectory of economic development in the canal colonies 
would lead to the creation of a political economy in which ecological distortions 
combined with inequality, corruption and rent-seeking would lead to rising economic 
inefficiency and productivity, if not declining economic growth. Indeed, the myth of 
prosperity that informed the colonial discourse on Punjab was one that focused almost 
exclusively on the province’s landed peasantry while ignoring the deeper 
contradictions accompanying the transition to capitalist agriculture.  
Nonetheless, the British continually pointed to the example of the canal 
colonies to make its case for Punjabi exceptionalism, arguing that the constant 
economic returns and rising levels of prosperity in the province were evidence of the 
success of the colonisation project. A measure of the extent to which the colonies 
proved to be lucrative can be seen in the way in which, by 1913, the state’s revenue 
demand from canal-irrigated lands stood at Rs. 9,383,797, the vast majority of which 
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was derived from the canal colonies.22 By 1928, after the major colonisation projects 
had been completed, and on the eve of the Great Depression and its subsequent impact 
on Punjab, the revenue demand from canal-irrigated land was Rs. 18,211,230.23 This 
tremendous rise in revenue was partly due to the expansion in the amount of canal-
irrigated land in this period, but was also reflective both of the rising prices for 
agricultural produce, as well as the increasing value of land. The profit the state 
derived from revenue was supplemented by other sources of income as well, most 
notably by charging for the use of canal water. Given the tremendous size of the 
initial capital investment required to construct the canal network, the rate at which the 
British saw a return on their investment varied and some colonies proved to be more 
successful than others24, but by and large the overall picture was one of increasing 
profits over time. The scale of the wealth being generated in the colonies can be 
understood by considering how, in 1917, colonial officials noted that, ‘the crops 
raised on the canals probably represented one-half of the agricultural wealth of the 
province, and it may be said that in 1916-1917 the canals again stood between the 
Province and severe scarcity’.25 By the end of British rule in Punjab, taking into 
account all investment and expenses, Imran Ali (1988, 168) estimates that the canal 
colonies provided the colonial state with almost Rs. 1 billion in total profit. 
 In addition to an interest in profit through the receipt of rents, the state also 
sought to use the canal colonies as a means through which to introduce new patterns 
of agricultural production in Punjab. Towards this end, different categories of land 
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grants were established in the colonies in addition to the standardised squares of land 
that were awarded to the bulk of the cultivating peasantry. These included grants for 
serving and retired military personnel and members of the civilian administration, 
horse and camel breeding grants aimed at raising animals for use by the British 
military, and capitalist ‘yeoman’ grants that, being larger than regular peasant grants, 
were intended to promote enterprising farmers and rich peasants who could invest in 
intensive agriculture. Provisions were also made to make land available for loyal 
members of Punjab’s landed aristocracy in return for their continued support of the 
government, allowing them to enhance not only their economic power, but also their 
political and social standing.  
Therefore, in the context of the tremendous amount of wealth being produced 
in the canal colonies, it needs to be understood that for the most, accumulation and 
appropriation were processes dominated by the state and its landed allies. Rather than 
benefitting the various different strata in rural society, prosperity remained the 
preserve of the richer peasant proprietors and large landlords, with the landless, the 
artisans, and the tenants-at-will continually being squeezed. For both the state and the 
grantees that possessed land, the ability to manipulate and regulate space was of 
crucial importance to this process of surplus extraction, and the spatial arrangements 
put in place at the time of the creation of the canal colonies were of fundamental in 
facilitating and reinforcing this process. By retaining the ability to control access to 
land, water, and other resources, the state and many of the landowning colonists were 
able to bolster their capacity to extract rents from those who were subordinate to them 
in the economic hierarchy. 
The preferential treatment accorded to the landed classes in the canal colonies, 
and the control they were given over land in the villages, proved to be instrumental in 
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allowing this section of the populace to pursue its own economic interests effectively. 
In addition to the prosperity that was engendered through agricultural production, 
grantees of land in the canal colonies also profited tremendously from the sale of both 
occupancy rights and property itself. Under certain conditions, particularly after 1907, 
grantees in the canal colonies could acquire proprietary rights to their land through 
purchase and short of this, nonetheless had the right to sell their occupancy rights to 
other qualifying elements of the rural populace. While the sale of proprietary rights to 
eligible colonists was itself profitable for the state, it was an even greater source of 
lucre for the grantees themselves. Due to its high level of productivity, canal colony 
land, for the most, tended to be higher in value than land in the rest of the province In 
1921, for example, an acre of land in the Shahpur district of the Lower Jhleum Colony 
sold for Rs. 59926, as compared with an average price of Rs. 345 per acre for the 
province as a whole.27 Even horse-breeding grants, which were generally considered 
to be less desirable due to the strict conditionalities attached to them, had a value of 
Rs. 396 per acre in the same year. Indeed, for some grantees it was more profitable to 
sell their canal colony land and purchase land for cultivation in their villages of origin 
instead.  
The manner in which the canal colonies were settled also facilitated extraction 
and accumulation through alternative means. The canal colonies were often plagued 
by corruption at the local level, with powerful local landlords and government 
officials using their authority to receive a variety of different rents from those 
subordinate to them. One of the most widespread practices of this nature was the way 
in which access to irrigation water was controlled and regulated by these actors. 
While dues were paid to the state for the use of canal water, the system of warabandi 
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that was instituted in the colonies to regulate the usage of this water was one that 
relied heavily upon the use of local expertise and authority (Gilmartin, 1994). In the 
interests of maximising efficiency, the colonial government sought to integrate 
indigenous practices into the production process, much as Customary Law had been 
absorbed into the framework of colonial administration. In practice, however, placing 
the levers of irrigation in the hands of influential local landlords provided them with 
the means through which to extract rents from their fellow cultivators and tenants, 
thereby maximising their own economic gain. In determining who could or could not 
receive water, and at what cost, the more powerful elements of the landed class were 
able to regulate the way in which space was used for production in a manner that was 
similar to the interventions often staged by the colonial state. 
The power of the landowning classes in the colonies was also reinforced by 
the opportunities they had to lock the landless classes into ties of even greater 
dependence and subordination. In contrast with the agriculturalist grantees, whose 
homestead land was included in the terms under which agricultural land was awarded, 
the landless in the canal colonies had to continually pay rents to the state in exchange 
for the right to live in the spaces provided to them by the colonial state. Moreover, the 
dominant landlords within the villages were often consulted by colonial officials when 
it came to the allocation of residential land to the landless and were thus placed in a 
position where they could wield tremendous influence over the subordinate elements 
of the village hierarchy.28 While plans for the villages in the canal colonies provided 
for separate spaces within which the landless could reside (see figure 8), many of the 
artisans, wage labourers and hereditary servants who migrated to these villages ended 
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up living in the compounds of the landed families to whom they were attached. In 
such situations, the colonial state allowed for the grantees to charge rents from the  
 
Figure 8: Plan for a village site in the Chenab Colony29 
 
landless occupants of their homestead land30, effectively ensuring that the economic 
power of this class was reinforced by a capacity to control the very spaces within 
which the landless existed. Finally, the state’s strong interest in the micro-
management of the new colonies resulted in a tremendous expansion of the 
bureaucracy at the local level (Ali, 1987, 119), with the result being that landowners 
engaging in regular interactions with, and possessing links to, state institutions 
emerged as intermediaries upon whom the subordinate peasantry relied for any kind 
of access to the state (Raulet, 1971, 297). 
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In the canal colonies, the logic of agrarian paternalism exhibited by the 
colonial state in Punjab existed in an amplified form, with the state playing a direct 
role in the productive process itself to ensure effective accumulation. Towards this 
end, agricultural production and land were more heavily regulated in the colonies than 
in other parts of the province, with strict rules covering a wide range of areas, 
including the planting of trees, the maintenance of roads and waterways, the digging 
of wells, and even the storage of manure in designated areas.31 In a different vein, as 
part of the colonial state’s preoccupation with reforming the character of the colonists, 
efforts were also made to regulate sanitation, with large grants being placed at the 
disposal of the settlers to initiate and maintain sanitation schemes that, it was 
believed, would improve the environment of the villages. Most important of all, 
however, were the regulations governing the inheritance of land and the succession of 
leases. In the interests of preventing the subdivision and fragmentation of holdings, a 
possibility that could lead to economic inefficiency, stringent checks were placed on 
the transfer of land to heirs and relatives (Ali, 1988, 65-66). Paradoxically, even 
though the state’s intervention in the agrarian economy was at least partly responsible 
for the prosperity of the colonies, the bureaucratic weight all of these measures placed 
on the peasantry in the canal colonies was a source of considerable resentment, 
particularly when allegedly corrupt colonial officials resorted to the levying of 
punitive measures such as fines to ensure adherence to the established guidelines.  
However, in a demonstration of the colonial state’s increasing dependence on 
the landed elite, agitation in 1907 against the weight of the regulations imposed on 
cultivators in the Canal colonies, the corruption of the revenue administration, and the 
restrictions on land ownership, led the state to withdraw much of its control over 
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agricultural production in the colonies, and also concede the right of tenants to 
purchase the land they leased (Barrier, 1967; Ali, (1988, 66-68). Faced with the 
prospect of zamindar unrest which could threaten the entire edifice of colonial rule, 
the British had little choice but to accede to the demands of their landed allies, even if 
this meant compromising to an extent on the state’s strategy for economic 
accumulation. In doing so, the British also reduced the possibility of serious unrest in 
the future; when zaminder unrest began to emerge again, as was the case in 1928 
when colonists possessing horse-breeding grants in the Lower Jhelum Colony 
demanded that the state loosen the conditionalities attached with their land, these 
disturbances remained small and relatively inconsequential due to the state’s 
willingness to placate protesting grantees.32   
Setting up the canal colonies allowed the colonial state to expand the ambit of 
its economic activities while simultaneously shoring up the strength of its landed 
allies. In addition to creating a new set of peasant proprietors, beholden to the state for 
granting them property rights, the canal colonies provided existing landed elites with 
the opportunity to increase their own economic and political standing. This was made 
particularly possible by the increased bureaucratic state power that accompanied the 
canal colonies, and the opportunities this afforded to the landed elite to acquire and 
distribute patronage. All of these measures served to reinforce and entrench the 
bargain underpinning colonial governance in Punjab, with the path dependent nature 
of Punjab’s institutional development being further demonstrated by the state’s 
willingness to accommodate the demands of protesting peasant grantees in 1907. 
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The Debt Crisis and the Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1900 
 
Even as the British populated the canal colonies and enacted legislation aimed 
at strengthening the agrarian and political order that had been painstakingly 
constructed since the annexation of Punjab four decades earlier, a crisis emerged that 
seriously threatened the very foundations of colonial rule. Although notice had been 
taken of the phenomenon as early as the 1850s, when John Lawrence had been Chief 
Commissioner of the province, the majority of colonial administrators in Punjab had 
underestimated the extent of rural indebtedness in Punjab (Barrier, 1966). While 
warning signs had been present indicating a steady alienation of land away from the 
landed classes and into the hands of predominantly Hindu, urban moneylenders, 
concerns about the extent of the problem were often dismissed by referring either to 
the relatively small number of instances of civil litigation relating to disputes over 
land, or to the belief that the majority of transactions were taking place between 
agriculturalists alone, and not between moneylenders and cultivators.  
By the late 1870s, however, it became increasingly clear that this was not the 
case. The commercialisation of agriculture, a fixed and rigid revenue demand, the rise 
in the value of land, and the expansion of credit facilities, all contributed towards 
creating a situation where cultivators and owners struggling to meet their revenue 
obligations were forced to mortgage their land in order to acquire credit from the 
moneylenders. More often than not, this ultimately resulted in the landowners being 
forced to give up their land in order to pay off their debt (Nazir, 2000). Additionally, 
the traditional checks exercised by Customary Law on the transfer of land outside of 
the village proprietary body had ceased to be enforced following replacement of the 
DCs by courts that strictly adhered to the letter of colonial law and the laissez faire 
spirit that now infused it (Barrier, 1966, 9). In the early 1880s, Septimus Thornburn, a 
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revenue officer in the Punjab government, attempted once again to bring the matter of 
rural indebtedness to the attention of the authorities, undertaking a detailed analysis of 
the available statistical data to illustrate how a significant amount of land that had 
previously been owned by cultivating Muslims in Punjab was now being transferred 
to non-cultivating moneylenders. In his book on the subject, Thornburn (1983) argued 
that allowing the transfer of land from the cultivators to the moneylenders would 
completely upset the balance upon which the government in Punjab had been forged, 
wreaking havoc with the revenue system while simultaneously generating unrest and 
conflict. While Thornburn’s findings were initially rejected, a sudden spike in 
alienations during the 1880s, coupled with almost unprecedented agitation and 
communal rioting between Muslim cultivators and Hindu moneylenders, forced the 
government to pay closer attention to the issue of indebtedness, and consider the 
different solutions that were available for resolving the problems. 
As shown by Barrier (1966), the ensuing debate over the what had to be done 
to prevent the transfer of land to the moneylenders rehashed many of the  arguments 
that had taken place over the settlement of Bengal and Madras, and the form to be 
taken by the Punjab administration following annexation. Paternalists emphasising the 
need to actively intervene, through legislation, in order to defend the interests of the 
agriculturalists, were pitted against officials who, adhering to the previously 
ascendant orthodoxy of free market economics, believed that state interference in the 
natural operation of markets and property rights would be disastrous for Punjab. The 
debate was also increasingly informed by the ideas of Henry Maine, whose work on 
the village economy in India, and belief in the need to preserve traditional institutions 
in order to ensure stability, had come to eclipse the ideas of the Utilitarians that had 
shaped the earlier phase of British rule (Dewey, 1991b; Mantena, 2010).  Ultimately, 
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those arguing in favour of protecting the landed classes won the day and were able to 
draft and implement what would come to be known as the Punjab Alienation of Land 
Act of 1900. Restricting ownership of land to what the government defined as 
‘agricultural tribes’, the law essentially introduced severe restrictions on the right of 
private property, preventing non-cultivators from possessing agricultural land. It was 
the most decisive step the government could have taken to protect the landed classes 
in Punjab from the threat of losing their land. 
While the debate over the Alienation of Land Act had been contested on 
ideological grounds, the institutional form that had been taken by the colonial 
government in the decades leading up to 1900 had once again limited the options that 
were available to the state. Since 1849, governance in the province had been premised 
upon the support and loyalty of a cultivating peasantry that, in tandem with the landed 
elite, would be able to provide revenue, recruits, bureaucrats, and political support in 
exchange for state patronage and protection. In the fifty years since annexation, as the 
relationship between the state and its landed allies deepened, a number of measures 
were taken that, within the bureaucratic-judicial framework of colonial rule, had 
introduced changes and calibrations that reinforced the bargain struck between the 
state and its landed collaborators. As greater economic, political and legal benefits 
were bestowed upon the landed classes by the state, they were able to use their 
increased standing in society to work with the government in its attempts to 
perpetuate the status quo. This, in turn, generated a process of positive feedback that 
increased the incentive for the colonial state, and the landed class, to continue 
investing in the existing institutional setup. Given how land was crucial not only to 
economic production, but also to the social and political organization of society in 
Punjab, the colonial government could not afford to let the landed classes in Punjab be 
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supplanted by a class of urban capitalists with no basis upon which to command the 
loyalty and support of the Punjabi countryside.  
The irony of the crisis that led to the promulgation of the Land Alienation Act 
was the fact that the moneylenders who acquired land from the cultivators were only 
able to do so because the British introduced a regime of alienable private property in 
land that was enforced with greater stringency from the 1870s onwards. In a very real 
sense, this was an unintended consequence of the British policy in Punjab, and 
represents how measures taken to strengthen the landed elite inadvertently provided a 
rival class with the means through which to challenge the institutional distribution of 
power in society. However, when faced with the prospect of a shift in power in 
Punjab, the British moved swiftly to alter the institutional rules governing the 
interaction between the landed classes and the moneylenders. Interestingly enough, 
the Act was not only opposed by members of the colonial state, but also by elements 
within the landed elite who felt that the law would restrict their ability to acquire 
credit for agricultural and non-agricultural purposes.33 Opposition was also 
understandably voiced by the moneylending capitalists, who felt that the Act unfairly 
infringed upon their right to own land. Government opinion, however, was reflected 
in the words of the Settlement Commissioner of Punjab, who claimed that, ’alienation 
of land has attained such dimensions… as to constitute an evil of the first magnitude 
and a grave political danger… It is incumbent on the Legislature… to lose no time in 
passing some such Act as is now contemplated’34. Despite widespread opposition to 
the Act in society, the government recognized the way in which its previous 
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institutional interventions had provided the moneylenders with the means through 
which to acquire land from the landed classes. From the viewpoint of the government, 
a failure to address that institutional loophole would have resulted in the collapse of 
the landed support upon which the colonial government had been erected, 
As a piece of legislation, the Punjab Alienation of Land Bill was without 
precedent in India35, and was all the more notable because of the way in which it flew 
in the face of the free market ideology that had gripped the colonial and British 
governments at the time. While it could be argued that state intervention has always, 
at some level, been fundamental to the operation of free markets, the Alienation Act 
was an intervention that completely defied the logic of competition that dominated 
contemporary economic discourse. More than a simple calibration of the extant 
institutional framework, it represented an institutional readjustment that all but 
eliminated the possibility of the landed classes being displaced from the position of 
power in the agrarian order.  Yet, in the period leading up to its promulgation, the 
possibility had existed that the institutional regime would be altered in the face of 
opposition to the paternalist form of administration that existed in Punjab. This was 
particularly true given that a similar crisis of indebtedness in Bengal had been allowed 
to proceed unchecked during the same time period (Bhaduri, 1976). The failure of this 
contestational juncture to bring about an institutional shift provides important insights 
into the strength of the relationship between the colonial state and the landed elite in 
Punjab. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, an account has been given of the process of institutional 
development in the first half-century of British rule in Punjab. By focusing on the 
foundational juncture of 1849-1868, as well as the contestational juncture that 
preceded the implementation of the Land Alienation Act of 1900, it has been shown 
that the institutional framework of colonial rule in Punjab was premised upon a 
bargain with the province’s peasant proprietors and traditional rich aristocracy. The 
mechanisms giving rise to the reproduction and reinforcement of this bargain over 
time have been explained, and the way in which this bargain engendered a path 
dependent trajectory of institutional development in Punjab has also been described. 
An attempt has also been made to highlight processes of incremental institutional 
change by focusing on how bureaucratic incorporation, legislation such as the Court 
of Wards Act, and the canal colonies project, all served to deepen the power of the 
landed elite, and strengthen their relationship with the colonial state. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Reproducing the State-Landlord 
Bargain in Colonial Punjab 
You have amongst you an Aristocracy. Why not make what you can 
of it… There can be no doubt than an aristocracy is not only a 
source of strength to the people at large but also to the Government 
of the land, and it is always recognised as such. 
Sirdar Partap Singh, Founder of the Punjab Chiefs’ Association36 
Introduction 
 
In addition to bringing with it the Land Alienation Act, the dawn of the 20th 
Century also saw the introduction of electoral and legislative politics in Punjab. This 
represented an important shift in the way in which landed power was reinforced in the 
province, and the bargain between the state and its landed allies was reproduced. The 
expansion of representative government allowed the landed elite to play a more direct 
role in government, particularly with regards to the receipt and distribution of 
patronage and the creation of laws, and political parties provided a new method 
through which landed interests could be mobilized and articulated.  This chapter is 
divided into four main sections. The first of these provides a brief description of the 
evolution of representative government in Punjab, providing context for the rest of the 
chapter. The second section focuses on the use of bureaucratic power and networks as 
a mechanism through which landed power, and the elite’s bargain with the state, was 
reproduced. The third section expands on this point by highlighting the role of 
electoral politics in this process, emphasizing how the rules of electoral competition, 
as well as political parties,  guaranteed the ability of the landed elite to capture power 
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in the province, and pursue their interests, as well as those of the state, with greater 
efficiency. The final section of the chapter, on legislative politics, looks at how the 
landed elite were able to use their power in government to craft laws favorable to the 
pursuit of their interests, provide support to their allies, and impose sanctions on their 
rivals.  
Punjab in the Early Twentieth Century 
 
 Towards the end of the 19th Century, the paternalist model of colonial 
governance in Punjab, premised on the exercise of executive fiat by a bureaucracy 
relatively insulated from ‘Native’ opinion began to change as tentative steps started to 
be taken towards incorporating Punjabi’s within the bureaucracy, and introducing 
limited forms of representative government in the province. Initial forays into 
representative government were implemented following the Municipal Act of 1862, 
which introduced committees in the province’s towns which oversaw matters relating 
to sanitation and infrastructural development. By 1874, there were 197 Municipal 
Committees in Punjab, with a total membership of 2093 out of which 1692 were 
Indians, a very small minority of whom were elected to their posts on the basis of an 
extremely limited franchise.37 The 1870s also saw the introduction of District 
Committees which functioned like their municipal counterparts at the district level. 
While these committees, for all their indigenous representation, represented little 
more than, ‘official control masquerading under the grab of elections’38, they 
nonetheless provided the basis for the expansion of local government under the 
District Boards Act of 1883.  These boards, again consisting of members that were 
British and Indian, elected and nominated, enjoyed greater control over taxation and 
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expenditure than the committees that preceded them, and existed to effectively 
coordinate and implement the work of different organs of local government in any 
given district. In 1888, there were 1305 District Board members in Punjab (a number 
which would remain mostly constant until 1946), the majority of whom were elected 
to office.39 
 In addition to the creation of these local governance structures, the end of the 
19th Century also saw the introduction of limited legislative representation in Punjab. 
Although many of the other provinces had seen the creation of Governors’ Councils 
following the Indian Councils Act of 1862, it was with the revision of this Act in 
1891 that a similar council was created in Punjab. The first of these new Councils was 
convened in 1897, and consisted of 41 members, all of whom were nominated, and 
out of which 18 were Punjabis.  After the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909, limited 
electoral representation was introduced to the Governor’s Council, with a small 
number of seats being allocated on this basis. The Governor’s Council was replaced 
in 1921 by the first Punjab Legislative Council following the passing of the 
Government of India Act, 1919. Seventy per cent of the members of the new 
Legislative Councils were elected on the basis of a limited franchise, and the body 
also enjoyed a greater amount of power than the councils it succeeded, with 
ministerial portfolios being created and granted to Punjabis for the first time. The 
power of the Council was limited to areas such as agriculture, health and education, 
however, and it was only with the passing of the Government of India Act 1935, and 
the subsequent creation of the first Punjab Legislative Assembly in 1937, that 
complete provincial autonomy was granted to the province. The new Legislative 
Assembly had 175 members, all of whom were elected on a less limited franchise 
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than before, with provincial ministers now having complete control over the 
province’s revenue and expenditure. This arrangement would remain in place until 
partition in 1947. 
As argued by Washbrook (1997), however, the introduction of representative 
government in colonial India was ultimately aimed at reinforcing British authority. In 
practice, this meant the incorporation of the regime’s allies within newly opened 
spaces for representative government while simultaneously maintaining the divide 
between policy formulation and implementation that had hitherto characterised 
colonial governance. In line with its ethos of bureaucratic paternalism, the colonial 
state saw itself as rising above the divisions that fractured Indian society and thus 
sought to strengthen its bureaucratic power even as Indians were elected to 
representative posts within the government. By design, representative government in 
colonial India was subordinated to the colonial bureaucracy, with the Executive 
maintaining tight control over the workings of government. While the power of the 
colonial state was weakened over time, particularly after 1935, the concessions made 
by the British were deliberately incremental in nature, and aimed at maintaining as 
much control in the hands of the state as possible.  
 Concurrent with the expansion of electoral politics in Punjab was the 
emergence of political parties. Elections to Municipal Committees and District 
Boards remained largely localized, defined by torpid competition between competing 
local elites. However, once the terrain shifted to the provincial arena, particularly with 
the granting of ministerial powers to Punjabis, political parties began to coalesce 
around different poles of interest. The Indian National Congress and the All India 
Muslim League, established in 1885 and 1906 respectively, were two India-wide 
parties that were amongst the first to establish branches in Punjab. Based mainly in 
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Punjab’s cities, they would both come to be eclipsed in 1923 with the formation of 
the Unionist Party, a supra-communal association of loyalist landlords from across 
the province who would dominate Punjab’s politics for a quarter of a century. In 
addition to these three main players smaller, mostly communal parties also existed, 
and while these parties had limited electoral weight, they did play a role in shaping 
the province’s political discourse, as well as the positions adopted by the larger 
parties. 
  Throughout the first half of the 20th Century, electoral politics would be the 
arena within which different communal and class interests would compete for power 
and patronage. As argued by Barrier (1968), the process through which the colonial 
state incorporated Punjabis within the state apparatus, particularly in the organs of 
local, district, and provincial government, inadvertently played a key role in 
generating religious antagonism between Muslims, Hindus, and Sikhs, all of whom 
sought to protect their communal interests against the possibility of rule by one single 
community. The threat posed by the politics of representation to communal harmony 
and the stability of the province was one that the British recognized, and it was for 
this reason that separate electorates and representation were guaranteed for each of 
the three major religions in Punjab. While this arguably reinforced the tendency 
towards the communalization of Punjabi politics, it also represented a mechanism 
through which the colonial state hoped to regulate and contain religious conflict. 
 Indeed, rather than being the norm, communal politics proved to be the 
exception in Punjab. Despite the preponderance of religiously charged communal 
sentiment in the cities, where the intellectual and bureaucratic elite were instrumental 
in shaping representative policy in its formative years, electoral politics in Punjab 
remained relatively impervious to religious influence. Instead, an institutionally 
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enforced divide between urban and rural Punjab, between the landed magnates of the 
countryside and the province’s nascent capitalist and middle classes in the cities, 
would come to be the defining political cleavage of this period. As a party of landed 
interests, the Unionists were, from the outset, geared towards collaborating with the 
British, reinforcing the bargain between landlords and the state upon which the 
colonial state in Punjab had been erected. Furthermore, by drawing on the idiom of 
defending the ‘agriculturalists’ of the province, the Unionists were able to cobble 
together an alliance of landed classes that cut across the religious divide. Until their 
implosion in the 1940s due to factional infighting, opposition to the Unionists 
remained fragmented, with rivals like the Muslim League and the Congress meeting 
with limited success in their attempts to cultivate support in the countryside.
 From the introduction of electoral politics at the provincial level in 1909 till 
partition in 1947, British policy was shaped by a number of different forces. On the 
one hand, in Punjab, the established policy of co-opting the landed classes continued 
apace, with colonial officials and landed representatives using their power and 
authority to incrementally strengthen this arrangement over time. The colonial state’s 
interest in a stable, prosperous Punjab was reinforced by the strains imposed by the 
two World Wars, particularly given the province’s role in providing troops and 
supplies to the war effort, as well as its reputation as being a bulwark of loyalist 
sentiment in increasingly nationalist times. On the other hand, the dynamics of All-
India politics, the rise of both the Congress and the Muslim League, and factionalism 
within Punjab itself, also had a hand in influencing colonial policy over time, 
particularly in the areas of constitutional reform and self-government.  
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Bureaucratic Power and Patronage 
 
  
In the years following the foundational decades of British rule, Punjab came to 
occupy greater strategic and economic significance within British India. After 1857, 
Punjab started to supply the British Indian army with over a third of its total recruits 
despite being home to only a tenth of the country’s population, with the vast majority 
of those recruits being from the landed classes. The increasing importance of the 
province as a frontier between British India and Central Asia also made it essential for 
the state to ensure that the province did not undergo any kind of disruption that would 
hamper military recruitment and deployment (Yong, 2005). The increased 
militarization of Punjab was also accompanied by greater bureaucratization and 
centralization of authority, as well as the development of networks of roads and 
railways. The state’s logistical reach and its capacity to implement its decisions both 
grew as the administrative system matured. By the late 19th century, the infrastructural 
power of the Punjab government allowed it to regulate society and micromanage the 
economy in a way that had simply not been previously possible (Ali, 1988, 9; Talbot, 
2007).  
It is important to note here that the infrastructural power of the state was 
premised on the relationship the government had with its landed allies. Throughout 
their time in Punjab, the British themselves formed an extremely small part of the 
actual machinery of the government, with increasing amounts administrative 
responsibility being passed on to Punjabis, most of whom were drawn from the landed 
classes. At an informal, local level, this was accomplished through the empowerment 
of prominent peasant proprietors and clan leaders through a continuation of the 
zaildari system that characterised the Sikh revenue administration. As part of this 
system, villages were grouped into territorial units called zails, with the geographical 
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area covered by each zail being as congruent as possible to the settlement pattern of 
an identifiable agricultural biraderi resident in the area. Each zail was administered by 
a zaildar who was selected by the government from amongst the leading 
agriculturalist families in the area, and who combined his social position as the head 
of a biraderi with his formal role supervising local village headmen. The headman of 
any given village, known as the lambardar, would be selected from the dominant 
agriculturalist biraderi in the village, and was given the responsibility of ensuring that 
all the members of the village proprietary body met their revenue obligations to the 
state. The offices of zaildar and lambardar were hereditary and non-transferable, and 
by virtue of their position within the colonial administrative framework, individuals 
who held these positions were in a position to access a tremendous amount of 
patronage and power, further strengthening their position within the agrarian order. 
This was further reinforced by the fact that zaildars and lumbardars received 5% of 
the revenue generated by the villages under their charge (Trevaskis, 1928; Gilmartin, 
1988, 20-23).   
While the lambardars and zaildars of Punjab were not formally part of any 
government department, their presence was supplemented by the appointment of 
Punjabis to positions within the colonial bureaucracy. Here, it is useful to consider the 
size and scale of the bureaucracy within this period. While it is difficult to accurately 
determine the size of each and every department of the Punjab government, figures on 
the Police and the Revenue Administration provide an indication of just how many 
people were involved with the colonial bureaucracy. In the context of understanding 
the reproduction of landed power, the Police and Revenue Administration are 
important precisely because these two departments were responsible for areas of 
government that were key to the interests of the elite themselves; links to the police 
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allowed landlords to play a more effective role in maintaining order at the local level, 
and control of the revenue administration was fundamental to processes of economic 
accumulation. As such in the year 1900-1901, the total size of the police department 
in Punjab was 20,462 personnel, out of which 20069 were native Punjabis40, with 
these demographics remaining largely unchanged until 1947. A similar picture 
emerges for the Revenue Administration. At the height of its power in the 1930s and 
1940s, following the completion of the Canal Colony projects, the Department of 
Revenue and Agriculture in Punjab employed between 400 and 500 officers who were 
members of the Indian Civil Service.41 Working under these officers, in the Land 
Records Office, were the qanungos and patwaris who did the actual work of mapping 
out lands and assessing land revenue. In 1924-25, there were 9282 patwaris working 
in Punjab under 694 qanungos, with this number remaining constant until Partition. 42  
 While the total number of Punjabis in the Police and Revenue departments 
constituted less than a per cent of the total population of the province, the figures 
given above illustrate the fact that the colonial state apparatus was still large enough 
to have a presence within each and every village in the province, and that each 
government employee at the local level thus represented a direct conduit to the state. 
The implications of this for landed power can be better understood when considering 
how bureaucratic recruitment was deliberately biased towards members of the landed 
classes and the agriculturalist biraderis. This was borne out by the way in which, for 
example, a third of all patwaris and qanungos in 1900 were members of 
agriculturalist biraderis.43 While agriculturalists did not constitute the bulk of the 
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subordinate revenue administration, this figure is significant precisely because 
accountancy and revenue assessment were tasks that had not historically been 
performed by members of these biraderis. Yet, under colonial rule, members of these 
groups were encouraged to apply for these positions precisely because the British 
sought to widen their participation within the apparatuses of the state. Therefore, by 
1917 the agriculturalists constituted nearly half the total number of patwaris, and also 
represented half the total strength of Naib-Tahsildars in the province.44 Similarly, in 
the police force by 1919, a total of 1827 zamindars had ranks equal to Head 
Constable or higher out of a total of 3608 native Punjabis who held such positions.45 
All of this led the chair of the Punjab Legislative Council to approvingly observe that, 
‘there is no province in India which can compare with the Punjab in the extent to 
which zamindars are employed in Government service from the rank of patwari and 
constable upwards’.46 
 One of the reasons why the presence of this many agriculturalists in the 
bureaucracy was disproportionate was that members of the Indian Civil Service in 
Punjab generally tended to be based in the cities that acted as the administrative 
headquarters of each district, and also tended to be recruited from the cities due to the 
higher literacy levels of the urban population. Nonetheless, in a report compiled by a 
committee convened to investigate the representation of zamindars in the 
bureaucracy, it was recommended that every department of the Punjab government 
strive to ensure that 50-66% of its native members belonged to agriculturalist 
biraderis, and that measures such as direct nomination be actively employed to recruit 
zamindars where they were under-represented. When justifying this recommendation, 
the committee pointed to the services rendered by the agriculturalist biraderis as 
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members of the military during the First World War, as well as their contribution to 
the total revenue of the province, as sufficient basis upon which to show them 
preferential treatment.47  
 Direct induction into the colonial bureaucracy gave the landed classes of 
Punjab a direct link to the state, and enhanced their capacity to exercise power over 
the subordinate sections of the peasantry, either through the provision of patronage or 
the imposition of sanctions. This capacity to extend or withdraw patronage through 
the bureaucracy was reinforced by the introduction of District Boards, as these bodies 
had access to funds and resources that could be used on different projects within the 
areas under their remit. Tasked with administering some areas within departments 
such as sanitation, health, education, and public works, the District Boards had at 
their disposal a considerable income, derived from taxes, duties, and government 
funding, that could be used to build roads, drains, hospitals, and schools. Yet, while 
District Board members were elected and nominated representatives, their 
responsibilities were largely advisory, with the task of actually supervising and 
implementing projects falling under the purview of the district and provincial 
bureaucracy, which worked with the District Boards to identify areas where funds 
could be allocated.   
 As shown in Table 5, the income and expenditure of the district boards 
increased tremendously over time as greater responsibilities were conferred upon 
these bodies by the colonial state. The greater resources placed at the disposal of the 
District Boards essentially represented an increase in the amount of state patronage 
that was now available to the members of these bodies to disburse. Whereas 
previously members of the landed elite had been able to command the support of their 
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subordinates through their economic and social position, as well as their access to the 
state through the bureaucracy, they could now direct funding towards particular areas, 
groups and individuals through the District Boards. Furthermore, the separation of 
powers between the District Boards and the bureaucracy also served to enhance the 
power of the landed elite to command the levers of state patronage in Punjab. By 
being made to work together, members of the District Boards and the bureaucracy 
were able to forge close links that were reinforced by ties of kinship and tribal 
solidarity. This, in turn, enhanced the capacity of the landed elite to coordinate its 
actions as a class, and collectively pursue its interests by making use of different tiers 
of the colonial government. 
 Year Income (Rs.) Expenditure (Rs.) 
1892-93 2,777,919 2,921,109 
1902-03 2,982,000 2,829,000 
1912-13 6,447,063 6,261,994 
1922-23 13,474,778 13,987,212 
1930-31 23,639,617 23,639,617 
Table 5: District Board Income and Expenditure in Punjab48  
 
 Concurrent with the increases in agriculturalist recruitment to the bureaucracy, 
and the expansion of the powers of the District Boards, measures were also 
implemented to increase the quasi-bureaucratic space that was available to the landed 
elite by institutionalising some of the informal sources of power that they enjoyed at 
the local level. In particular, the Punjab Village Panchayat Act of 1912 extended 
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official recognition to the panchayats that existed within Punjab’s villages as 
mechanisms of dispute resolution, giving their decisions legal sanction and laying 
down procedures for the selection of panchayat members. Justified in terms of how 
these were, ‘appreciated by the persons who had recourse to these village tribunals, as 
a cheaper and more expeditious manner of obtaining justice’49, the panchayats that 
were established by the colonial state had the power to arbitrate both minor civil suits 
and criminal cases. The panchayats were also granted funds through which to engage 
in village-level development work, ranging from the construction of roads, paths, and 
public buildings, to the maintenance of burial grounds, the hosting of festivals, and 
the development of cottage industries. The amount of work done by panchayats in 
Punjab can be gleaned from the figures given in Table 6, which lists the number of 
these bodies that existed in Punjab, and the number of cases that were resolved by 
them over time.  
Year Number of Panchayats Criminal Cases Civil Suits 
1925-26 300 1176 5292 
1928-29 455 2543 7993 
1939-40 1690 5279 14220 
1942-43 6978 23616 25135 
Table 6: Number of Panchayats in Punjab and cases adjudicated50 
 
 As had been the case with other organs of local government, the panchayats 
were also extremely susceptible to elite capture. To an even greater extent than the 
higher tiers of government, where rival landed factions often competed for the 
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relatively small number of seats available, elections at the village-level tended to be 
characterised by an extreme lack of participation, with most panchayat members 
being elected unopposed. In the year 1928-29, for example, there were only 663 
candidates for 551 panchayat seats in the province, with 437 seats of these seats being 
uncontested.51 The tendency for panchayats to be dominated by zamindars was 
reinforced by the ‘official’ panchayat system, not least of all because, as was the case 
with other elections in the province, candidates seeking to become panchayat 
members had to own property. For the colonial state, however, the lack of electoral 
competition at the village level was not a problem and was considered, instead, to be, 
‘a good omen for the successful working of the panchayats… [as] keen contests of 
elections are not the only criteria of popular interest in the panchayat system, and that 
it is to be hoped that in communities already accustomed to the traditional panchayat 
system the natural leaders will be elected as a matter of course’.52 Given the state’s 
belief in the ability of the landed classes to promote order and stability in the 
countryside, the domination of panchayats by members of these classes was 
considered to be desirable. 
  For the landed elite, incorporation within the state facilitated the creation of 
networks of authority, patronage, and influence at different levels of government, 
with the use of these networks of power and patronage being an important mechanism 
through which landed power was reinforced, and the landed elite’s bargain with the 
state was reproduced. Working within different departments of the government, and 
at different levels in varying capacities, enabled members of the landed elite who 
were bound together by kinship and common interest to collectively pursue their 
agenda as a class across the province, linked as they were through the different organs 
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of the colonial state. Being at the head of a panchayat would certainly reinforce the 
power of a landlord within a village, but it also provided that landlord with the means 
through which to interact with members of the bureaucracy and District Boards who 
could look to such a landlord for support in exchange for increased funding or 
backing from the government. Similarly, a patwari seeking advancement could call 
upon the services of a kinsman employed as an officer within the Revenue 
Administration to forward an application or recommendation, or could even petition a 
powerful local landlord to intervene with the government towards this end. In return, 
the patwari could potentially perform services for his patrons by altering revenue 
records or adjudicating boundary disputes in their favour. Instances of rent-seeking of 
this kind were certainly not rare during the colonial period and were, in fact, endemic, 
illustrating the extent to which the colonial bureaucracy served not just as a source of 
patronage, but also a means through which to distribute it. The vertical chains of 
intermediaries that had historically linked central authority to the local level in Punjab 
were thus reproduced in an institutionalised, rationalised bureaucratic form under the 
Raj, entrenching the landed elite within networks of authority that allowed them to 
share resources and engage in a coordinated pursuit of class interests.  
For the British, the inclusion of zamindars in the apparatuses of the state 
served an important political purpose in that it strengthened a set of allies who could 
guarantee stability in the province, continue to facilitate the process of economic 
accumulation, and participate in the Indian Army. While officially committed to the 
elimination of corruption and the creation of an efficient, rule-based administration, 
the overlapping interests of the state and the landed elite meant that the British were 
often content to overlook the rent-seeking that characterised the colonial 
administration, recognising that the status quo reinforced landed power and aided in 
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the pursuit of colonial interests.  It was only when corruption actually threatened to 
trigger instability in the province, or impede the process of accumulation, as was the 
case in the Canal Colonies in 1907, that the British felt it necessary to intervene and 
impose corrective measures. 
 
Electoral Competition, the State, and the Landed Elite  
 
Electoral competition was an important mechanism through which the state-
landlord bargain was reproduced and reinforced in Punjab. Electoral engineering on 
the part of the state ensured that elections in Punjab would always display a pro-
landlord bias, producing loyalist governments, and political parties during this period 
emerged as powerful platforms for the mobilisation and articulation of landed 
interests. Between 1897 and the late 1930s, these two factors combined to produce 
several decades of stable rule in Punjab, with both the landed elite and the state 
benefitting tremendously from their ability to manipulate and control the electoral 
process. Indeed, as will be discussed in the next two chapters, even when colonial 
power began to splinter in Punjab in the 1940s, the landed elite were able to use their 
entrenched position within the province’s electoral politics to guarantee their political 
survival post-Partition, and once again initiate a bargain with the state under the new, 
post-colonial dispensation. 
 
 
 
Electoral Rules 
 
 In 1882 Lord Ripon, the Governor-General of India, stated that the expansion 
of self-government in Punjab would, ‘advance and promote the political and practical 
education of the people… [and] induce the best and the most intelligent of the 
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community to come forward and take a share in the management of their own local 
affairs’.53 For the British in Punjab, the ‘best and most intelligent’ of the community 
were the landlords that were aligned with them, with this framing the rules of 
electoral competition. Far from representing an open, pluralistic field in which a 
variety of people representing a plethora of interests, elections in Punjab were 
designed, from the outset, to be an exercise in perpetuating the power of the rural 
elite.54  
 From 1883 onwards, right until partition, the British sought to engineer 
governments that were amenable to their interests by maintaining property 
qualifications on the right to vote and stand for election. For the District Boards, for 
example, voting rights were only granted to those who paid Rs. 28 per annum to the 
state in revenue. Similar conditions applied to the Municipal Committees, where only 
the landed aristocracy and rich urban businessmen had any hope of gaining a seat 
(Barrier, 1968, 535). Following the reforms of 1919 which expanded the franchise in 
Punjab, voters were still expected to pay Rs. 25 per annum in revenue, and only 
members of the agriculturalist tribes, as defined by the state, could stand for elections 
in rural constituencies.55 The only exception to the revenue qualification for voting 
was in the case of ex-military servicemen, zaildars, lambardars, and biraderi chiefs. 
Altogether, the electorate comprised no more than half a million voters or less than 
five per cent of the total population of the province Even when the franchise was 
extended further in 1935, only eleven per cent of the total population of the province 
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received the right to vote, with the bulk of the electorate located in the countryside 
(Jalal and Seal, 1981, 425). 
 Property qualifications on the right to vote and stand for election were only a 
part of the mechanism through which the government ensured the return of 
conservative, loyalist, and landed representatives. Significantly, the government also 
drew up constituencies that aligned, to as great a degree as possible, with existing 
revenue circles and patterns of tribal settlement. For the District Board and Municipal 
elections, constituencies were marked that corresponded exactly to zails within each 
district56 and when the introduction of provincial elections necessitated the creation of 
larger constituencies, efforts were made to ensure that their boundaries overlapped 
with the areas of influence of particular tribal chiefs (Talbot, 1996, 58). This was a 
strategy that lent itself particularly well to implementation in Punjab’s canal colonies, 
where tribal affiliation had informed settlement operations (Ali, 1988, 108). The 
reasons for designing constituencies in this way were clear; zaildars and lambardars 
were selected on the basis of their ability to use their preeminent position within 
networks of tribal kinship, as well as their economic power, to collect revenue and 
generate support for the government. By imbricating political boundaries with 
existing circles of social and economic power, it was felt that these leaders would be 
able to draw on the existing sources of power to dominate electoral contests as well.  
 The drawing up of constituencies on this basis was supplemented after 1919 
by the requirement that electoral candidates be resident in their constituencies. This 
had the effect of impeding the election of persons who owned property in the 
countryside but were resident in a city or town, such as moneylenders and members 
of the nascent capitalist class, thereby excluding them from the reformed legislative 
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councils that were now being constituted. The fact that these measures were directly 
aimed at curtailing the power of rival classes can be gauged from the vociferous 
reaction of urban leaders and politicians to the proposed rules. Some legislators 
opposed to the measures argued that the perceived conflict between rural and urban 
interests was an artificial one, that urban and non-residential landowners had the 
capacity to understand and represent the needs of rural constituents better than their 
uneducated counterparts from the countryside, and that regulations such as these, 
‘might be depriving the new Councils of the services of men of experience and 
impairing the success of the reforms now being inaugurated’.57 The position of the 
government on the question, however, was articulated by the Commissioner of the 
Jullunder Division, when he stated that, ‘rural opinion is not yet sufficiently organised 
to make itself heard, but… when it does make itself heard, it… will heartily endorse 
the conclusion that those interests can best be represented by men of its own class. I 
do not believe that the qualities necessary for a member can be found only in the 
million and a half townsmen of our urban constituencies’.58 As had been the case with 
the Land Alienation Act, British intervention in electoral politics was thus justified in 
terms of paternalistic concern for the well-being of Punjabi landlords who, it was felt, 
were particularly susceptible to the machinations of capitalists from the towns and 
cities. Whatever the justification, the practical implications of this intervention were 
clear; by limiting electoral competition in the countryside to those who were directly 
tied to it, the government ensured that there would be no real impediment to the 
election of landed politicians. 
 One final set of regulations that cemented the rural electoral bias in Punjab, 
again implemented after 1919 and revised in 1935, was the creation of separate 
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constituencies for special interest groups including labour and universities, with the 
highest number of such seats being allocated to landholders from different communal 
platforms. The creation of seats for landholders, without a commensurate number of 
counterbalancing seats for urban industrialists or capitalists, exacerbated an extant 
trend in which landowning biraderis, being the only elements of the rural populace 
entitled to vote and stand for election, had been granted representation far in excess of 
their actual demographic strength. This was a continuous source of frustration for 
many urban and non-landed politicians who, working within a body overwhelmingly 
dominated by landlords, could only bemoan the fact that agriculturalist biraderis 
constituting only 44% of the total population had 80% of the representation in the 
legislative assembly.59 The success of these electoral rules in delivering outcomes that 
fit in with the interests of the colonial state can be gauged from an analysis of 
electoral returns in the period between 1919 and 1947. As has been shown by Baxter 
(1974), elections to the legislative councils/assemblies during this period, in the 
districts that would become part of Pakistan, were completely monopolised by a small 
number of dominant landed families. Indeed, the majority of the seats that were 
available in this period were traded between members of just 32 of the province’s 
most prominent landed families, with the remainder also being claimed by powerful 
landowners.  
Shaping the electoral arena was a mechanism through which the British 
sought to reinforce the power of the landed classes. Working within the context of the 
bargain upon which British rule in Punjab had been founded, creating space for the 
landed classes within the new framework of representative politics was a means 
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through which the British ensured that their allies would be able to strengthen their 
position while simultaneously gaining greater access to state patronage. In return, 
representatives of this class continued to prove their loyalty to the colonial state, 
effectively preventing the emergence of any real opposition to the British, both 
communal and class-based, until the 1940s.  
Political Parties 
 
 While political parties in Punjab first emerged in the cities, coalescing around 
urban professionals and politicians associated with the educated intelligentsia and the 
dynamics of Municipal elections, the situation in the province changed radically after 
1923 and the formation of the Unionist Party. Unabashedly pro-landlord, the 
Unionists acted as the guardians of the landed classes in the period following the 
creation of the first Legislative Council. The dynamics underpinning the formation of 
the Unionists have been the subject of considerable historical research (Baxter, 1974; 
Gilmartin, 1988; Talbot, 1988a; 1996; Malik, 1995), with it generally being accepted 
that the devolution of powers from the Centre to the Provinces caused by the 
Government of India Act 1919 created the context within which the party was setup, 
with the decision to form the Unionist party being taken as part of a deliberate 
strategy to maximize the gain that could be accrued by the landed elite within the 
framework of provincial governance. The initiative to form the party was taken by 
Fazl-i-Hussain, a man whose political career had begun with his membership in the 
Punjab branch of the Muslim League, and who recognised that in an era of provincial 
politics, Punjab would inevitably be controlled by the landed elite and their allies. It 
was ironic that the body most committed to the defence of landed interests in Punjab 
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would be formed, and led, by a politician from Lahore with no aristocratic 
antecedents or support in the countryside.60 
 When attempting to create a party premised on the defence of rural landed 
interests, the leaders of the Unionist Party had to confront a reality in which the 
politics of Punjab’s landed classes was ridden with factionalism from the local level 
upwards. While some areas of the province, particularly those in the West that would 
become a part of Pakistan, were home to landlords of tremendous power and prestige 
who could use their influence to effectively neutralise any challenges to their 
influence, the mobilisation of support was always dependent on the ability of different 
members of the landed elite to call upon their sources of social power, as well as their 
access to state patronage, to co-opt their subordinates. In situations where multiple 
landlords or even agriculturalist kin groups existed within a single geographical area, 
it was often the case that rival factions would engage in contestation over political 
power despite the existence of common class interests. This was a tendency that was 
exacerbated by the introduction of elections and representative government in Punjab, 
as rival landed networks campaigned against each other in an attempt to acquire 
positions within the state. Whereas previously such induction within the institutional 
framework of the state had primarily taken place through the direct appointment by 
the colonial state, either through bureaucratic incorporation or the granting of lands 
and privilege, the possibility of competing for state power opened up the political 
space to powerful landed challengers who had hitherto been unable to entrench 
themselves within the apparatuses of the state.  
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 In the broader scheme of things, however, the factional infighting of the 
Punjabi landed classes was not particularly detrimental to the pursuit of colonial 
interests, particularly in the phase of electoral politics prior to the 1940s. While there 
was some evidence to suggest that it could have a deleterious effect on the 
functioning of local government, as was the case with many panchayats61, the fact 
remained that in spite of their internal differences, the landed classes were tied to the 
colonial state in a relationship that ensured their continued support, as a group, for the 
regime. By treating the landed classes of Punjab as single entity united by an interest 
in agrarian prosperity, and by using the Land Alienation Act to provide a clear 
definition of exactly what constituted an ‘agriculturalist tribe’ in Punjab, the state was 
able to provide conceptual cover to the coalition of class fractions that constituted that 
segment of the rural population most closely linked to the colonial quest for order and 
accumulation. When the colonial state intervened to support its allies, it did so by 
invoking an interest in the collective welfare of the zamindars and the agriculturalists, 
with this approach quickly being adopted by the landed classes themselves with the 
advent of electoral politics.  As much was stated in a pamphlet published by the 
Unionist Government in 1942, when it claimed that, ‘the Alienation of Land Act has 
helped to determine party alignments for purposes of party politics… all 
agriculturalists, whether proprietors or non-proprietors… have tended to range 
themselves on one side against what they regard as the money-lending classes’.62 
Therefore, whatever differences might have existed between different landed 
factions within Punjab, triggered by competition over the limited opportunities 
opened up by representative politics, the notion that they all belonged to a single 
‘agriculturalist’ bloc, coupled with an awareness of how and why they were looked 
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upon with favour by the colonial state, ensured that competition for state patronage 
did not translate into sentiment directed against the state. This also played a role in 
staving off the communalisation of politics, with the supra-communal alignment of 
landowners under the Unionist banner providing evidence of secular co-operation 
between Punjab’s different religious groups (Jalal and Seal, 1981).63 As long as the 
British were able to provide preferential treatment to the landed elite, and maintain a 
monopoly on the ability to provide their supporters with state patronage, opposition to 
the colonial state by any single landed faction was simply self-defeating, especially 
given the presence of rival groups willing to work with the state instead. As will be 
explained in the next chapter, it was only when the British were no longer able to 
guarantee continued support for the landed classes that factionalism led to the 
defection of landed politicians to rival political forces, as well as the rise of more 
overtly communal politics.  
 Another important source of power for the Unionist Party was the support it 
enjoyed from Punjab’s Muslim religious leaders. Islamic authority and religious 
organisation in Punjab, like much of the subcontinent, revolved around the influence 
of the sajjada nashins and pirs descended from India’s Sufi saints. Historically 
enjoying a tremendous amount of prestige, and commanding the support of hundreds 
of thousands of followers, the pirs in Punjab presided over a network of religious 
authority whose significance had been recognised by successive regimes in the 
province; the Sikh government of Ranjit Singh had made grants of land to many of 
the Sufi shrines, and the British had continued this practice. The preferential 
treatment accorded to them by the state had also, however, transformed Punjab’s 
religious leaders into large landowners in their own right, with the province’s most 
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powerful pirs and sajjada nashins possessing holdings that could rival those of the 
traditional landed aristocracy. 
 As such, rather than representing purely religious forms of authority, Punjab’s 
pirs were also arguably an important part of the province’s landed elite. This can be 
seen in the close links they had to the landed aristocracy, as well as their relationship 
with the landless peasantry. Many of the province’s largest landlords were disciples 
of the pirs, and some were even related to them through marriage or kinship. 
Significantly, the power of the pirs had also been institutionalised in much the same 
way as that of the landed classes. Particularly in the South-West of the province, 
where their influence was greatest, sajjada nashins and pirs were incorporated within 
the British administration, and were given state patronage in exchange for their 
continued support of the colonial government (Roseberry, 1987).  
 Most significantly of all, however, the link between the pirs and the landed 
elite was exemplified by the way in which their interests as a class overlapped. In the 
late 19th Century, as reformist religious movements began to emerge across India in 
response to the changes being wrought by colonial rule, organisations were formed in 
Punjab that directly opposed the traditional structure of religious authority in the 
province. Primarily urban in character, and led by religious scholars trained in Delhi, 
groups like the Khaksars and the Ahrars opposed both the colonial government and 
the feudal order that propped it up, arguing that the pirs and sajjada nashins of the 
province represented a thoroughly compromised system of religious authority that 
had to be replaced in the interests of reinvigorating Islam in India and gaining 
freedom from British rule. In articulating this position, these movements found 
support from urban political parties like the Muslim League, which also sought to 
bring an end to the landed foundations of colonial power in Punjab. Given their close 
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links to the landed elite, as well as their interests in the maintenance of the traditional 
agrarian order, the pirs of Punjab had no choice but to support the Unionists despite 
the party’s formal commitment to secular politics (Gilmartin, 1988). Once again, 
class interests trumped religion in Punjab. 
 Having successfully recruited the support of Punjab’s major landowners, 
particularly in the West of the province, the ability of the Unionist Party to mobilise 
electoral support ultimately depended on the capacity of its members to organise 
voting blocs at the local level. This, in turn, largely depended on the same traditional 
sources of power that had historically been deployed towards this end: economic 
strength, kinship networks, social status, and access to state patronage. Much like the 
vertical chains of bureaucratic patronage that tied the landed elite to the local level 
and bound the landed classes across space, the Unionist party apparatus helped create 
organisational links between the different fractions of the landed classes. These links 
were reinforced by the way in which extant networks of landed power allowed 
individual politicians to draw upon the resources of their allies to mobilise support.64 
The leading families and politicians of the Unionist party were connected through ties 
of marriage and economic cooperation, and also had extensive family and kin-based 
connections to the state (Baxter, 1974). When campaigning for votes, these linkages 
bolstered the already considerable local power of landed politicians and would, over 
time, constitute a formidable barrier to entry for political parties or politicians seeking 
to challenge the power of the Unionists in the countryside. In addition to overcoming 
the social position and economic power of the landlords, challengers would also have 
to be able to match the organisational strength of the Unionist party, not just in terms 
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of its party machine, but also in terms of the complex chains of patronage and kinship 
underpinning landed power in Punjab. 
 While the Unionist Party was not the only party in Punjab, it was certainly the 
most significant one in the colonial period. Geared towards the defence of landed 
interests, the party benefitted tremendously from state patronage, as well as from 
electoral rules that ensured it would dominate the arena of representative government. 
The party provided a means through which the landed elite could maintain their 
stranglehold on electoral politics in Punjab, with this being an important mechanism 
through which they reinforced reinforced their power. For the British, the electoral 
concessions made to Punjab’s landed politicians facilitated a quarter century of 
relatively stable, loyalist government, strengthening the bargain at the heart of 
colonial power in Punjab.  
Legislative Power and the Landed Elite 
 
 After the introduction of an elected legislature in Punjab the landed elite, who 
had previously largely been the recipients of preferential treatment from a 
paternalistic state, now gained the capacity to shape policy in a much more direct 
fashion. The very rules underpinning the institutional framework of politics and 
governance in Punjab could now be directly altered by the province’s most powerful 
class, placing it in a position where it could pursue its interests much more 
effectively. Once the decision to introduce representative government in Punjab was 
taken, ensuring the pre-eminence of the landed classes was a principle that had, from 
the very outset, informed the colonial state’s actions and interventions in this regard. 
However, the amount of power that the state delegated to its landed allies as a part of 
this process increased slowly and incrementally. The first Governor’s Councils 
established at the turn of the century were very different from the legislative 
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assemblies of the 1940s, with the former consisting of nominated members acting in 
an advisory capacity, and the latter being comprised of an entirely elected 
membership enjoying complete autonomy over the creation and implementation of 
policy. While the devolution of power in Punjab from the state to elected 
representatives was largely the result of constitutional negotiations at the All-India 
level that led to greater self-rule in the face of demands from the indigenous 
population65, the graduated approach adopted by the British in Punjab allowed them 
to supervise the maturation of a body of moderate, loyalist opinion filled with 
members whose support for the state was assured. Nominating members to the 
Legislative Councils was one of the mechanisms through which this was done, and 
this practice remained in place until 1938. Until then, these hand-picked members, 
particularly those who were British, played an effective role in guaranteeing colonial 
interests in the province, providing guidance to their elected colleagues and 
exercising a check on the rare few whose agenda conflicted with that of the state. 
Post-1938, many of these formerly nominated members would occupy key positions 
in the provincial cabinet, and would continue to play a pro-government role in the 
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Legislative Assembly. Finally, in order to safeguard against the remote possibility of 
laws or policies being enacted that were antithetical to the interests of the colonial 
state, the provincial governor was provided with the power of veto, with all 
legislation coming out of the Councils and Assemblies requiring his assent to be 
enacted even after the granting of complete provincial autonomy.66  
While the nominated members of the council and the governor ensured that 
Punjab’s elected representatives did not deviate from the script of colonial 
governance in the province, a more subtle institutional mechanism was also at work 
in Punjab when it came to the introduction of legislation. Throughout the 19th 
Century, Punjab had been administered by means of laws that had been formulated 
and implemented by British bureaucrats seeking to strengthen their rule in the 
province. It was through these laws that the British created the basis for co-opting the 
landed classes, extracting revenue, and maintaining order, and it was inevitable that 
Punjab’s new legislators would have to work within the framework of these laws 
when attempting to make their own policy interventions. This is borne out by the way 
in which many of the most significant legislative changes that were made between 
1897 and 1947 were amendments to existing laws like the Punjab Tenancy Act of 
1868, the Land Revenue Act of 1887, and the Alienation of Land Act of 1900, all of 
which had a direct impact on the power and position of the landed elite, and all of 
which were contested vociferously by rival groups in the Councils and Assemblies. 
By building on the legacy of their bureaucratic predecessors, the landed elite in the 
Punjabi legislature were able to adjust the existing institutional rules further in their 
favour, and were also able to challenge their urban and rural rivals on a terrain that 
had already been laid out and fashioned to their advantage. This did not, of course, 
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mean that new legislation was not introduced as and when required, but it did mean 
that when it came to adjusting, changing, or challenging that fundamental basis upon 
which landed power had been strengthened and entrenched in Punjab, it was difficult 
to do so outside of the confines of the existing institutional framework. In this regard, 
the remarks by the Lieutenant-Governor in his inaugural address to the first 
Legislative Council were quite prescient when he took the opportunity to remind his 
audience that because Punjab had a ‘pretty full statute’ book that had been filled by, 
‘administrators… [meeting] the special circumstances of its growth by proposing 
legislation suited to those circumstances’67, the task of legislation could now safely be 
delegated to Punjabi representatives who would build upon the work of those that had 
come before them.   
Within this broader context, legislative politics was an important mechanism 
through which landed power was reinforced, with two distinct processes through 
which this was done; the acquisition and distribution of patronage, and the 
formulation and implementation of pro-landlord legislation. The ability to employ in 
the first of these mechanisms was rooted in how the legislature existed as a body at 
the apex of Punjab’s patronage politics. Comprised of members who were almost 
exclusively drawn from the most dominant elements of the landed aristocracy, the 
legislature was home to politicians and representatives who were able to draw upon 
their resources to mobilise large swathes of support across villages and districts 
within the province. As illustrated by the workings of the Unionist Party, MLAs 
tended to possess the capacity to organise and command chains of intermediaries 
from the legislature all the way down to the local village level. As the most powerful 
politicians in the province, members of the legislative bodies had close links to the 
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local, district, and provincial bureaucracies, as well as the District Boards and other 
organs of local government.  Membership within the legislature also provided landed 
politicians with a platform through which to articulate the needs of their constituents 
and support bases, and lobby for the provision of resources and preferential treatment 
to them. The networks of organisation and mobilisation commanded by Punjab’s 
legislators were thus also used to disburse the tremendous amounts of patronage that 
these politicians had at their disposal, which in itself strengthened their networks and 
further consolidated their power. 
 A survey of Punjab’s legislative proceedings throughout the first half of the 
Twentieth Century provides ample evidence for this. For example, in their annual 
report on the administration of the province for the year 1923-24, the British noted 
that the new Legislative Council had devoted a considerable amount of its time 
towards ensuring that zaildars, lambardars, and members of the subordinate revenue 
administration, like patwaris and qanungos, were given higher emoluments in return 
for their services.68 Similarly, when it came to the question of recruitment within the 
bureaucracy, the landed elite constantly strove to ensure that as many zamindars as 
possible be incorporated within the administration. Individual members also used the 
Question and Answers time allotted to them at the start of each legislative session to 
inquire into the exact number of zamindars employed in different departments, both 
across the province as a whole as well within the districts they represented. This was 
a practice that remained in place throughout the life of the legislature and although it 
was sometimes coloured by communal concerns, particularly after 1909 when quotas 
were established for the different religious groups in Punjab, the dominant trend 
displayed by the landed elite was to use the space provided by the legislature to 
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safeguard the interests of their zamindar clients.69 Focusing on the question of 
recruitment to the bureaucracy effectively killed two birds with one stone; it allowed 
legislators to dispense patronage to the clients within their networks, and it also 
enabled the cultivation of even stronger links, over time, between these politicians, 
the bureaucracy, and their landed supporters as a whole.  
The direct provision of patronage through the legislature was not limited to 
facilitating bureaucratic recruitment. Many legislators also used their position to 
highlight the developmental needs of their constituents and districts, and actively 
sought to divert state funding and resources towards them. While this was arguably 
part of the job description for many legislators, what is important to note is that for 
many representatives, this form of lobbying was often conducted exclusively in terms 
of the needs of zamindars and agriculturalists, to the exclusion of sections of the rural 
populace. This was exemplified by the case of Mushtaq Gurmani, a nominated 
member from the district of Muzaffargarh, who repeatedly used the tactic of 
demanding reductions of Rs. 1 to government grants worth hundreds of thousands of 
rupees just so that he could use his position, as someone proposing an amendment to 
a parliamentary resolution, to press for additional funding and resources for his 
district’s landowners.70 The concern legislators had for the ‘plight’ of the 
agriculturalists was also starkly illustrated by the attempt made by Chaudhri Baldeo 
Singh, a member from Rohtak, to acquire Rs. 2 million in loans from the government, 
with extremely lenient terms for repayment, to be used for the uplift of indebted 
zamindars in his own district as well as Hissar, Gurgaon and Karnal. For Singh, it 
was necessary for the government to extend such loans because the credit extended by 
moneylenders often had exorbitantly high interest rates, and the conditionalities 
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attached to loans provided by government banks and organisations were too 
stringent.71 Furthermore, according to Singh, the services extended by his fellow 
zamindars in the First World War justified preferential treatment from the 
government. Other members in the Council agreed with Singh’s demand for money as 
well as his depiction of the poor economic condition of the zamindars, and joined in 
the debate by suggesting that such loans also be made available for zamindars in their 
own districts.  
Ultimately, despite this support, Singh’s demand for these loans failed, with 
the nominated members of the government, some of whom occupied cabinet 
positions, almost unanimously rejecting the proposed resolution. Significantly, no one 
actually disagreed with the need to help the zamindars, with opposition to the 
resolution being based in purely logistical and practical terms. Thus Fazl-i-Hussain, at 
that time the member for Revenue, reluctantly voiced his opposition by saying that he 
could not support, ‘a general, vague, loosely-worded resolution whose intentions are 
noble, whose object Government is prepared to appreciate and applaud, and whose 
aim Government will try its best to serve’.72 Instead, Fazl-i-Hussain and his British 
colleagues repeatedly stressed that the government had already extended a 
tremendous amount of assistance to the zamindars through its banks, grants, and co-
operative societies, and that these existing mechanisms arguably represented a more 
effective means through which to address the problems that had been raised by 
Chaudhri Baldeo Singh. The final vote on the issue saw a neat split between the 
elected and nominated members of the Council; 25 of the 30 votes cast against the 
resolution were from nominated members, while nearly all 15 in favour were by 
members elected from rural seats. In addition to showing just how nominated 
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members exercised a check on the elected representatives in the Council, who in this 
instance had suggested a scheme that was unworkable on purely practical grounds, 
this particular event highlights exactly how members sought to divert patronage 
towards their support base and how, even when opposing such measures, the 
government could not but agree that any efforts aimed at aiding the landed classes 
were to be lauded.  Other attempts at acquiring such grants would prove to be 
successful over the years, particularly after 1938 and the start of provincial autonomy. 
 Although dispensing patronage through their position within the legislature 
was an important means through which the landed elite were able to strengthen their 
position over time, it was by altering the institutional framework of colonial rule itself 
that they were most able to guarantee the maintenance of conditions within which 
they would be able to effectively pursue their interests. Building on the legislative 
legacy of the administrators that preceded them, the landed elite, under the guidance 
of nominated colonial officials and autonomously in the assemblies of the late 1930s 
and 1940s, created new laws and amended old ones to impose sanctions on their 
rivals and subordinates while broadening the institutional terrain upon which to 
further their agenda. Within the first five years of its existence, the Council had 
passed the Land Alienation Act (finalised and all but implemented before going 
before the Council) and the Punjab Pre-Emption Act, a law aimed at ensuring that the 
land of deceased agriculturalists would be inherited or sold to members of the same 
tribe within any given village. In both cases, it was clear how both the colonial state 
and its landed allies worked to protect their mutual interests. The Alienation Act and 
the Pre-Emption Act were both designed to keep land in the hands of the landed 
classes and ‘statutory’ agriculturalists, and acted as an effective check on the ability 
of capitalists to acquire land in the countryside. In later years, legislation was passed 
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that, among other things, created credit facilities for agriculturalists, and established 
panchayats in Punjab’s villages. One of the most significant legislative interventions 
was made in 1928, however, when Punjab’s Revenue Act was amended, reducing the 
total revenue demand by half at considerable cost to the provincial exchequer. 
Reducing the revenue paid to the state had been a longstanding demand of the 
province’s landowners and while the exact timing of the amendment was partly due to 
rising discontent within some sections of the landed classes, representatives within 
the Council played a key role in articulating the need for such an intervention to be 
made. Placing their arguments within the context of the loyalty the landed classes had 
to the state, as well as the services they rendered during the First World War, the 
landed legislators in the Council urged the colonial state to reduce the revenue 
demand in order to strengthen the landed classes and ensure their continued loyalty 
and support. Faced with the prospect of increasing dissent and dissatisfaction from the 
very class upon whose support the framework of colonial rule was based, the 
nominated element of the council had little choice but to join the elected members in 
passing the proposed Bill.  
As argued by Yong (2005, 270-72), the debate over the Land Revenue Act 
illustrated just how the relationship between the landed elite and the state had evolved 
due to the introduction of representative government. Rather than simply being 
puppets of a regime upon which they were wholly dependent for their political 
position, Punjab’s politicians could now claim to have the support of their 
constituents and, as such, could engage in bargaining with the state on a more equal 
footing. What this meant was that the landed elite could now directly challenge the 
state in areas where their interests did not coincide, as was the case with the payment 
of revenue, and dictate the terms under which the landed classes would cooperate 
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with the government. There were, however, limits to the capacity of the landed elite 
to engage in this kind of negotiation. The threat of vetoes and direct British 
intervention in legislative politics was always present, and engineering a significant 
rupture with a state that was largely sympathetic to the landed classes ran the risk of 
impairing the ability of the landed elite to acquire state patronage. Like the British, 
the landed elite were also constrained by the terms of their bargain with the state. 
However, while instances of outright disagreement between the landed elite and the 
colonial state thus remained relatively rare in the legislature, even when provincial 
autonomy granted the former even more control over legislation, it is interesting to 
speculate on how the balance of power may have shifted over time had it not been for 
the Second World War and the concurrent drive towards Independence. 
By passing legislation like the amendments to the Land Revenue Act the 
landed elite were able to modify the rules governing their ability to engage in further 
economic accumulation, but it was by changing the law to target other groups in 
society that they protected their position from potential challengers. The attitude of 
Punjab’s legislators towards the subordinate peasantry, for example, could be seen in 
the debates that periodically took place over the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868. 
Following the amendment of the Land Revenue Act, it was necessary to change 
certain clauses in the Tenancy Act in order to bring them in line with the new revenue 
system. In particular, one set of amendments was subjected to considerable debate 
when they were finally considered by the Legislative Council in 1933, a full five 
years after the passage of the new Land Revenue Act (during which time tenants in 
the province had been forced to continue paying rents according to the old 
arrangements). The contested amendments pertained to the compensation given to 
tenants who were evicted from previously barren lands that they had made cultivable. 
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Under the original Punjab Tenancy Act, a maximum level of compensation had been 
set based on the rent due from the land in question, and the new proposals simply 
sought to update this figure in light of the revision of the Land Revenue Act. 
Uncontroversial as the amendment was, particularly given that the proposed figure 
was only marginally higher than before, it was nonetheless challenged by a number of 
landed politicians who employed a variety of mathematical formulae and other 
justifications to oppose the change. In this instance, in addition to the urban 
politicians who chided the opposition for, ‘not [being] prepared to tolerate the remote 
chance and a remote contingency of a tenant getting something a fractional share 
more’73, even Sikander Hayat Khan, one of the leading Unionist politicians and a 
minster in the government, stated that, ‘it ill-behoves this house or the zamindar 
members of this house who represent the landlord class that they should not allow the 
tenants that little margin’.74 Facing the opprobrium of their own party, the landed 
politicians opposing the amendment withdrew their objections and allowed the 
legislation to pass. 
 While this represented a moment in which the party of the ‘agriculturalists’ 
stood for the rights of the peasantry as a whole, despite some internal opposition, the 
truth was that for the most part, Punjab’s landed legislators used their power to 
achieve the opposite. Indeed, this was made evident on the very same day the incident 
mentioned above took place, when a second amendment to the Tenancy Act was 
proposed that would have upped the compensation given to evicted tenants by about 
twenty per cent. This time, condemnation for the measure was voiced by virtually 
every landholder in the Council, with at least one member clarifying that, ‘the object 
of the Bill is not to liberalise the provisions for the tenants, but to keep the degree of 
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liberalism and consideration for the work of the tenants to the extent to which the 
previous law allowed’.75 This sentiment was shared by the vast majority of members 
in the House, and was reiterated twelve years later in 1945 when yet another proposed 
amendment to the Punjab Tenancy Act was struck down by concerted opposition from 
the landed politicians in the Legislative Assembly. The amendment had been 
proposed by a Sikh member and had been aimed at reducing the revenue demand on 
tenants, as well as granting them proprietary rights, in order to address the ‘hardships 
caused to them by the ruthless landlords’.76 The Revenue Minister responded by 
saying that tenants were lucky to have been given land to cultivate in the first place, 
and that the proposed changes were akin to, ‘punishing the landowners for all the co-
operation and good treatment meted out by them to the tenants’. The minister went on 
to claim that the proposed amendment would damage the fraternal relations that 
existed between landlords and tenants, and that, ‘if an amendment to the Punjab 
Tenancy Act was really useful for the poor I would have been the first man to 
welcome it’.77  
Far from championing the cause of the landless in Punjab, the Unionists and 
their landed colleagues in the legislature actively worked to develop legal and 
institutional mechanisms through which to increase their power over the subordinate 
peasantry. Nonetheless, the landed elite employed the idiom of the greater agrarian 
interest when justifying their legislative proclivities, emphasising that as the 
representative of Punjab’s zamindars they were intimately connected to the Punjabi 
countryside, and that they sought the welfare of the peasantry as a whole. That only 
the zamindars benefitted from the landed presence in the Legislative Councils and 
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Assemblies was a fact conveniently ignored amidst all the rhetoric that characterised 
the legislature’s debates and pronouncements. 
Patronage and the law constituted the carrot and stick employed by the landed 
elite when it came to reinforcing their control over the peasantry in the era of 
representative government. These tactics, however, could not work against urban 
classes that were impervious to the traditional sources of power from which the 
landed elite derived their strength in the countryside, and who had their own networks 
of influence and authority within the colonial state (Daechsel, 2006). However, 
despite possessing superior education and greater exposure to electoral politics, urban 
politicians remained unable to effectively mobilise against the colonial state’s landed 
allies. This was rooted, to a very large degree, in the inability of these actors to 
leverage any support in the countryside. The very same insularity that allowed these 
actors to act autonomously of the landed classes also prevented them from forging 
any meaningful links with the peasantry, which in turn limited their capacity to 
pressurise the colonial state into imposing sanctions on the landed elite.  For example, 
when the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1937 was passed by the 
Central Government in response to demands from urban Muslim opinion across India, 
Punjab’s urban politicians were unable to prevent the province’s landed elite from 
securing an exemption from the provisions of the law relating to the inheritance of 
agricultural land by females (Agarwal, 1994, 233-234).  
This lack of political capacity was compounded by the way in which the 
landed elite made use of their power to directly strike at their urban counterparts. In 
1907, just six years after its introduction, the Land Alienation Act was amended for 
the first time in order to tighten the definition of ‘agriculturalist tribe’ contained 
within it. This initiative was taken to prevent moneylenders who owned land from 
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getting themselves registered as agriculturalists, and was simply the first step in a long 
legislative to-and-fro that saw the landed elite continually work towards preventing 
non-agriculturalists from gaining ownership of land in the countryside. Matters came 
to a head in 1938 when the first Punjab Assembly, dominated almost entirely by the 
Unionists, was finally able to work independently of the colonial constraints that had 
hitherto exercised a check on the power of the landed elite. In a stark reflection of the 
priorities of the landowning classes, the first sessions of the new Assembly were 
devoted almost entirely to passing four new amendments to the Land Alienation Act. 
Each of these amendments addressed particular loopholes in the law but what was 
significant was that, unlike previous amendments of this kind, the proposed changes 
constituted a direct attack on a significant number of capitalists rather than being pre-
emptive measures aimed at preventing the abuse of the law. In particular, the second 
amendment, which dealt with benami78 transactions, was seen as nothing less than an 
attempt to forcibly deprive legitimate property owners of their rights in order to 
strengthen the landed classes. At first, the urban, mostly Hindu members of the 
Assembly attempted to prevent the proposed changes from being enacted 
retrospectively, arguing that moneylenders who had applied for agriculturalist status 
over the years needed to be granted enough time to have their suits settled in court.79 
This attempt at delaying the implementation of the revised Act was defeated easily, 
and gave way instead to arguments couched in the language of property rights, with 
another urban member contending that the proposed changes violated the right to 
acquire property that had been granted under Article 298 of the Government of India 
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Act 1935. Punjab’s Attorney General, responded by saying that the opposition’s 
argument had no legal basis, and that benami transactions were not entitled to the 
constitutional protections afforded by the Government of India Act.80 Finally, the 
longest and most acrimonious portion of the debate focused on the rights of those who 
had, over the course of the previous four decades, unwittingly acquired land from the 
agriculturalists selling land gained through benami transactions. This position was 
forcefully put forward by a member of the Congress, who stated that eliminating 
benami would constitute a monumental injustice towards the thousands who would be 
deprived of property, and that, ‘these benami transactions are being set aside on the 
sole ground that people who have been deriving benefit… are members of a particular 
tribe who are under the Alienation of Land Act not entitled to secure property by sale 
or mortgage from a person who belongs to a particular tribe by right of descent… is 
there any other reason given in the Bill?’.81 
The response of the government to the opposition’s arguments was clear. In 
the words of Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, ‘as long as the [Alienation of Land] Act is 
there and has not been repealed and it remains the law of the land we must respect it 
and unite in punishing anybody… who tries to evade the provisions of the Act’82. For 
all the fire and fury of the opposition’s speeches in this particular session of the 
assembly, the end result was a clear indication of where the balance of legislative 
power lay in Punjab. The final vote on the amendment was carried by the government 
with 81 members voting in favour of the Bill and only ten against. Interestingly, when 
the Opposition asked the government why they had felt it necessary to introduce an 
amendment to the Alienation Act when the British themselves had failed to do so in 
the preceding decades, Khan reiterated the Unionist commitment to Punjab’s 
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zamindars, saying that if they could not even do this much with their power then, 
‘what was the use of clamouring for provincial autonomy?’.83 Barely a week later, the 
passage of the Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Bill deprived the province’s 
moneylenders of even more property which, when combined with the Moneylender’s 
Registration Act requiring moneylenders to register with the government, ensured that 
July 1938, the first month of provincial autonomy in Punjab, was also arguably the 
worst in history for Punjab’s capitalist classes in legislative terms. 
 It is interesting to note that the British themselves entertained some 
reservations regarding the Unionist legislative agenda. The Governor, for example, 
believed the ban on benami transactions would add to the work of the revenue 
administration and open the door for increased corruption.84 However, while the 
Governor assented to the law, largely due to the support it enjoyed from the landed 
classes, the same was not true of the Secretary of State for India, who had been 
approached by some of the Bill’s opponents and asked to prevent its passage. In 
response to this, the Unionists, led by Sikander Hayat, threatened to resign from 
government, prompting the Governor to inform the Viceroy that, ‘[this would] 
exacerbate the conflict between rural and urban interests, quite apart from the political 
difficulties with which it would confront us and the exultation which it would create 
in Congress circles all over India’.85 Ultimately, and not unexpectedly, the British 
desire to keep the landed elite on board trumped other considerations, and the Bills 
were passed.86 
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The presence of a vocal, albeit small, opposition in the Punjab Assembly had 
meant that, in a departure from previous years, criticism of the government and its 
policies became the norm. The Punjab Governor noted that, during the debates on the 
amendments to the Alienation Act, ‘the tone of Assembly strikes me as having lost 
greatly in dignity and decorum… when controversy flares up, the place degenerates 
into a bear-garden’.87 The province’s capitalists were also not entirely quiescent 
outside the Assembly either; in response to the Bills mentioned above, the ‘Non-
Agriculturalists Association’ threatened the government with civil disobedience88, and 
actually delivered on this promise following the passage of the Agricultural Produce 
Markets Act of 1939, and the General Sales Tax Act of 1941, both of which imposed 
taxes and levies on the province’s traders.  Following two years of sporadic agitation 
which led to the observation that Punjab’s ‘industrial and commercial classes’ were 
not as supportive of the War effort as the government would like89, the Governor 
informed the Viceroy in 1941 that although it was ‘laudable’ that the Unionists 
wished to ‘improv[e] the lot of the agricultural classes and distribut[e] the burden of 
taxation more evenly between the rural and urban communities’, the speed with which 
this had been done had led the, ‘trading classes to express the belief that their interests 
were being consistently sacrificed and that the time had come for them to mobilise 
their forces’.90 Realising the danger of increased strike action by the traders in a time 
of war, the Governor sought to appease them by promising them that the government 
would give them ‘a fair hearing and fair treatment’ with regard to the protection of 
their interests, and would also investigate the possibility of amending the Markets 
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Act.91  Apparently mollified by these assurances, Punjab’s traders called off their 
strikes in June 1941. However, as the events of the war and the drive towards 
Partition consumed greater amounts of governmental attention, the stridency of the 
capitalists’ demands faded away, and the legislation that had prompted their agitation 
remained unchanged. Whether this issue would have eventually led to a more 
pronounced clash between land and capital, triggering a re-negotiation of the 
relationship between the state and the different classes in society, is a point that 
remains open to speculation. 
 In Punjab, the colonial state conferred legislative powers upon its landed allies 
through a graduated, incremental process aimed at ensuring that the new Councils and 
Assemblies that were created acted as bodies that would defend the interests of the 
state. As greater amounts of power were placed in the hands of the landed politicians 
who dominated these bodies, this power was used to reinforce the position of the 
landed classes in Punjab both through the dispensation of patronage, and through the 
use of legislation to further landed interests and impose sanctions on rival and 
subordinate classes. The landed elite’s rivals in Punjab already had to contend with 
the constraints imposed by the state-landlord bargain and the different mechanisms 
that reproduced it. Legislative politics in Punjab, tailored as it was towards the 
reinforcement of landed power, added to the tremendous institutional barriers that 
would have to be overcome by those seeking to challenge the status quo. 
Conclusion 
 
The dawn of the Twentieth Century brought with it representative government 
in Punjab. Rolled out incrementally, in a fashion designed to ensure that the Punjabis 
who entered the provincial government were loyalist landlords, the expansion of 
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representative government was accompanied by a deepening of the involvement of 
the landed classes within the apparatuses of the state. This period also saw the 
emergence of Punjab’s first political parties, with the most powerful of these again 
being the party of landed interests. These processes all represented a deepening of the 
bargain between the colonial state and its landed allies, with the former providing the 
latter with increasing amounts of patronage in exchange for their continued support in 
ensuring order and accumulation in the province. These developments also further 
entrenched the power of the landed elite within the institutional framework of politics 
in Punjab; their increased incorporation within the state, as well as their entry into 
electoral politics and representative government, allowed for the landed classes to 
consolidate and expand the linkages between themselves, increasing their capacity to 
engage in the pursuit of their interests as a class. This also provided the landed classes 
with greater avenues through which to impose sanctions on their rivals and 
subordinates by directly shaping policy through legislation, as well as by increasing 
barriers to entry into the state and politics.  
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CHAPTER 5: Factionalism, Elections, and the State-
Landlord Bargain 
Odd that these big Punjab landlords should be so dominated by a 
down-country lawyer like Jinnah. 
Lord Wavell, Viceroy of India92 
 
Introduction 
 
In a letter briefing the new Viceroy on the political situation in Punjab, the 
Governor, Sir Herbert Emerson, noted that, ‘there are two main causes of instability; 
first, the ambitions and jealousies of younger members regarding office; and second, 
personal animosities and partisan factions’.93 The Governor was stating a fundamental 
truth about landed politics in Punjab; feuds and rivalries spanning generations, 
buttressed by tribal affiliations and personal animosities, and exacerbated by 
competition for political office, meant that the unity of the Unionist landlords was 
much more fragile than it appeared to be on the surface. Indeed, recognising that 
when it came to elections, ‘the usual position will be two or more Muslim candidates 
fighting the same constituency, all of whom are prepared to support the Unionist Party 
if elected’, the Governor went on to inform the Viceroy that, ‘whoever wins or loses, 
there is going to be strong resentment’.94 
Emerson’s words would prove to be prescient. The rivalries that he had 
identified as being endemic to Punjabi politics played a large part in bringing Unionist 
rule to an end in the province, and also shaped its political trajectory in post-
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Independence Pakistan. Indeed, to the extent that this period represented a 
contestational juncture, in that it was defined by a certain degree of contingency as 
well as the emergence of new actors challenging the status quo, understanding the role 
played by factionalism in fracturing and re-constituting landed power helps to explain 
the failure of this moment to fundamentally alter the political status quo in Punjab. 
The primary aim of this chapter is to show that while being symptomatic of intra-class 
competition for power, the factionalism of the landed elite actually had the counter-
intuitive effect of protecting the interests of the class as a whole. Through an account 
of the events leading up to the collapse of the British rule in Punjab, it will be argued 
that the defection of landlords to the Muslim League, while rooted in traditional 
rivalries and triggered by the increasingly evident weakness of the colonial state, 
enabled these politicians to retain their position of political pre-eminence post-
independence, thus ensuring that landed interests would dominate Pakistani Punjab. 
Then, by examining the rise and fall of the four provincial governments that were 
formed in Punjab during the first decade of independence, it will be shown that while 
the presence of rival political groupings prevented the emergence of a unified landed 
elite possessing the capacity to effectively dominate the state, it also lent itself to 
manipulation by Pakistan’s powerful military-bureaucratic ‘Establishment’.95 The 
Establishment’s ability to co-opt powerful landed politicians in the pursuit of its own 
interests represented a continuation of the state-landlord bargain that had 
characterised the colonial era, setting the stage for the explicit re-entrenchment of this 
institutional framework during the Pakistan’s first military dictatorship under Ayub 
Khan. 
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 Party Politics, Partition, and the Perpetuation of Landed Power 
 
 In 1936, the Unionists and the British had little to fear from the rival parties in 
Punjab. Despite the factionalism of Punjab’s landlords, parties like the Muslim 
League, the Congress, and the Akali Dal, had all failed to build the kind of 
momentum necessary for challenging the status quo. Lacking the patronage of the 
colonial state, possessing mostly urban support, and employing communal platforms, 
these parties, while enjoying some limited electoral success, lacked the capacity to 
both compete against the landed elite in their rural strongholds, and co-opt them to 
their own causes.96 While some smaller Communist parties did attempt to make 
inroads into the countryside, particularly in the Eastern districts, state repression and 
the entrenched nature of landed power prevented their ideological appeals from 
gaining any real traction (Sharma, 2008).97 The same was true for the different 
communal organisations, like the Arya Samaj, the Majlis-i-Ahrar, and the Khaksars 
which, while possessing some support in the cities, were not able to establish roots in 
rural Punjab. 
In this context, the erosion of Unionist power to the point where the party 
commanded only a handful of seats in the Legislature in 1946 is surprising, and 
understanding how this happened provides important insights into the way in which 
the landed elite were able to adapt to the changing political terrain of the 1940s. As 
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has been argued by Talbot (1988a; 1988b; 1996) and Chowdhry (1991), at least part 
of the reason for the shift in the Unionist Party’s fortunes was the impact the Second 
World War had on Punjab. The 1940s witnessed declining prices for agricultural 
goods, as well as shortages of different commodities, both of which placed a 
tremendous burden on the peasantry and stymied the modest economic recovery that 
had begun to take place in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Even as the 
Unionists continually tried to justify the demands being placed on the Punjabi 
peasantry in the name of the war effort, the Congress and Muslim League attempted 
to use the War to mobilise the peasantry against the state, highlighting how the 
Unionist government, in its attempts to prove its loyalty to the British, had now 
presided over a period of unprecedented economic hardship.  
Garnering the support of the peasantry through the idiom of economic 
hardship was a strategy that met with greater success in Eastern and Central Punjab, 
where the more fragmented landholding structure and relative absence of a hereditary 
aristocracy meant that landholders there were both hit harder by the war and also not 
as strongly constrained by the structures of power that underpinned stability in the 
West. In these parts of the province, also lacking a Muslim majority, the Congress and 
the Akalis were able to make the most inroads, creating for themselves an 
independent support base amongst the peasant proprietors who formed the bulk of the 
population in those districts.98 The situation was different in the West, however, 
where despite the dislocations that took place due to the war, the Unionists continued 
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to win local and District Board elections in their West Punjabi strongholds until 1944. 
While the League continued to dominate urban politics, its appeal within the Muslim-
majority parts of the Punjabi countryside remained limited. 
 One explanation for the League’s failure to make any headway in the 
countryside lies in the effect the ‘Sikandar-Jinnah Pact’99 had on constraining the 
party’s activities. Even though the Unionist Muslims were technically members of the 
Muslim League as well, there is considerable evidence to suggest that on matters of 
provincial politics, membership in the former trumped any loyalty to the latter. After 
signing the Pact, Sikandar informed the Punjab Governor that all he had done was, 
‘agree to support Jinnah in all-India politics’ while instructing his Unionist colleagues 
that, despite their membership of the League, ‘in provincial concerns the position of 
the Unionist Party would remain unchanged’.100 How this worked in practice was 
demonstrated after the outbreak of the Second World War; when Jinnah directed all 
Muslim League members to resign from the Provincial and District War Boards in 
June 1940 in line with the League’s broader All-India policy, his orders were ignored 
by 37 of the 38 Unionists who occupied those positions101, prompting the Governor to 
observe that, ‘Jinnah’s writ does not run in the Punjab’.102  
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 The notion that Jinnah had little or no power in Punjab was belied, however, 
by Sikandar‘s resignation from the Viceroy’s National Defence Council in August 
1941. While Sikandar’s decision was reflective of his reluctance to be portrayed as 
representing purely Muslim, rather than Punjabi, interests at the Centre103, it 
nonetheless played into the notion that Jinnah did have some influence over Punjabi 
politics. While the landed politicians of Punjab continued to back Sikandar, Jinnah’s 
stature had increased outside the province as he successfully managed to manoeuvre 
himself into being the ‘Sole Spokesman’ for Muslim interests in India (Jalal, 1999b). 
Thus, when the Muslim League’s Lahore Resolution of 1940 explicitly stated the 
Party’s demand for Pakistan, Sikandar was alive to the potential the former’s 
communal appeal for splitting Muslim unity within the Unionist Party.  According to 
the Governor, the response to the Lahore Resolution showed that, ‘Muslim opinion is 
now… unanimous in favour of the partition of India. Only a very courageous Muslim 
leader would now come forward openly to oppose or even criticise it. Such opposition 
on Sikandar’s part… [would mean] possibly serious dissension among his own 
supporters in Punjab’.104 Indeed, many of Sikandar’s non-Muslim Unionist colleagues 
had already expressed their unease with his implicit accommodation of the League’s 
communal politics through the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact, and had started to gravitate 
towards the Congress instead in 1938 (Oren, 1974, 402-403). The Punjab Governor’s 
observation that the, ‘more intelligent amongst the Muslims are doubtful as to 
whether the Unionist Party can remain indefinitely in the ascendant if it is tied to the 
wheels of the Muslim League chariot’105 showed that even some of the Unionist 
Muslims feared the political implications for the Party of the kind of communal 
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politics it seemed to be veering towards. It was slowly becoming evident that even 
though Sikandar insisted that, ‘the mass of rural Muslim members would stand by 
him’ in the event of any split with the League, his power had started to wane relative 
to Jinnah. 106 
 Nonetheless, despite, ‘the difficulties created by the War, the increasing 
communal tension in the Province, and the roarings of Jinnah outside the gates’107, 
Sikandar managed to keep the Unionists relatively united and in power.108 After his 
untimely death in December 1942, however, things began to change drastically, and it 
is here that the role of factionalism in both splitting and reinforcing landed power 
becomes clear. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Unionist party had been 
beset with factional rivalries from the very beginning.  Initially, these were managed 
by Fazl-i-Husain who, while decrying the ‘selfish and personal’ nature of the 
province’s politics109, was nonetheless able to use his position to mediate between 
competing landed politicians, as evinced by his resolution of the dispute between 
Firoze Khan Noon, Ahmad Yar Daultana, and Sikandar Hayat over the appointment 
of one of them as a Minister in 1930 (Ahmad, 1970, 463). Sikandar’s own ascension 
to the Unionist Party’s leadership had been made possible through the creation, and 
utilisation, Fazl-i-Husain’s factional alliances (Malik, 1995, 314-318). Following 
Sikandar’s death, the conflicts of the 1930s were resuscitated. On the one hand, a 
powerful bloc of landed families led by the Noon-Tiwana kin group vied for control 
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of the party while, on the other, the Hayat-Daultana nexus sought to keep power in its 
own hands. Not coincidentally, the rivalry between these two groups was, at least 
partially, rooted in the competition between the Noon-Tiwanas and the Daultanas in 
the local politics of the Shahpur district. Eventually, Khizr Hayat Tiwana prevailed in 
his bid for leadership of the Unionist party, but not before the unity of the Unionist 
party had been severely compromised. 
 The impact this would have on politics in Punjab became clear very quickly. 
When Khizr became the head of the Unionist government in 1943, his ‘reconstruction 
of the Cabinet… gave rise to not a little disappointment and heartburning among 
certain members of the Unionist Party who aspired to a post in the Ministry’.110 
Khizr’s position in the government was not helped by the conduct of Shaukat Hayat 
who, despite having been appointed as a Minister in the new Cabinet, marshalled his 
resources impede the working of the government and engineer the downfall of the 
Khizr ministry. The principal means through Shaukat set about destabilising Khizr’s 
position was by voicing support for the Muslim League and its programme. For the 
British, this simply showed how Shaukat had, ‘concluded that complete subservience 
to Jinnah [gave] him the best chance of a successful career’111, and as Shaukat 
continued to rally allies to his side, it was agreed that, ‘one step… [that] would steady 
things down and frighten away further waverers from desertion [was] the early 
removal of Shaukat’.112 This aim was accomplished in April 1944 after Shaukat was 
dismissed from his ministerial post due to allegations of corruption. At the time, the 
Governor assured the Viceroy that the fear of a ‘general’ stampede of Unionist 
                                                 
110
 Brander to Laithwaite, 21 July 1943, PP-2, 382. 
111
 Ibid., 384. 
112
 Glancy to Wavell, 24 April 1944, Punjab Politics, 1 January 1944 – 3 March 1947: Last Years of 
the Ministries – Governors’ Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents (PP-3), 68. 
 173
landlords to the Muslim League had become ‘less acute’.113 He would, as subsequent 
events showed, be proved completely wrong.   
Conflict over the distribution  of patronage, and access to state power, had 
long underpinned Punjab’s factional rivalries, and this situation was exacerbated as 
the economic strains of the Second World War began to be felt  (Talbot, 1996, 123). 
In this context, Shaukat’s differences with Khizr were no different, rooted as they 
were in their conflict over heading the Unionist Government and when the former 
resigned from the Party following his dismissal, he took with him a group of 20 
Unionist politicians to sit on the Opposition benches. Amongst their number were the 
sons of two of Punjab’s most powerful landed families; Iftikhar Mamdot, the son of 
Shah Nawaz Mamdot, who had succeeded his father as head of the Muslim League in 
Punjab, and Mumtaz Daultana, the son of Allah Yar Daultana, one of Sikander’s 
oldest allies. These politicians, together with Shaukat would form the core of the 
Muslim League’s political power in the years leading up to Partition (Ahmad, 1985, 
169). 
Mamdot and Daultana supported Shaukat primarily due to the influence of 
their fathers and the links their families had with the Hayats.114 For other politicians, 
however, Shaukat’s defection signalled the emergence of the Muslim League as a 
credible rival to the Unionist Party. This perception was cemented by the collapse of 
the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact one day after Shaukat’s dismissal from the government. For 
several weeks, cognisant of the splits within the Unionist party and aware of his own 
strengthened bargaining position, Jinnah had demanded that Khizr submit to the 
directives of the Muslim League in line with the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact. When Khizr 
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predictably refused, Jinnah abrogated the agreement and actively began campaigning 
against the Unionist Party.  Prior to this point, Unionist politicians with pro-League 
sympathies had been able to support the latter by maintaining the fiction that they 
were members of both parties. Once this was no longer possible, the question of 
whether or not to remain in the Unionist Party became one of strategic calculation; 
given that the next round of provincial elections was scheduled to take place 
following the end of the War, and given the increase in the League’s strength due to 
the inclusion of Shaukat and his powerful landed allies, politicians seeking to 
maximise their own potential return from the next round of electoral politics had to 
choose between two potentially viable parties. Indeed, the General Secretary of the 
Lahore District Muslim League wrote to congratulate Jinnah on the change in the 
Party’s fortunes following the Khizr-Shaukat dispute, saying that the, ‘rifts among the 
biggies [sic] of this province… [resulted in] rival groups [starting] their efforts in 
right earnest to enlist backing from League quarters’.115 
 For its own part, the Muslim League was more than happy to accommodate 
the very same landlords is had opposed at the behest of its urban supporters during the 
1930s.116 By its very design, the electoral system in Punjab was geared towards 
employing the use of landed power to gain votes, and the landed politicians who 
joined the League brought with them the resources necessary to campaign effectively. 
Soon after their defection to the Muslim League, Daultana, Mamdot, and Shaukat 
undertook a successful tour of the Province in which they claimed to generate 
unprecedented support for the League, as well as acquire the backing of notable 
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politicians from across Punjab.117 A few months later in Montgomery (now Sahiwal), 
a member of the League’s District Working Committee reported the presence of large 
numbers of zamindars, zaildars, and lambardars at Party meetings, all members of a 
class who were otherwise, ‘under the Unionist thumb’ but were now enthusiastically 
supporting the League, not least of all due to the encouragement of the local pir, Syed 
Ashiq Hussain.118 During this same set of meetings, Mumtaz Daultana, ‘made a 
personal appeal to Malik Fateh Sher Ali M.L.A. to join the League’, a proposal to 
which the latter agreed.119  Similarly, when Firoz Khan Noon informed Jinnah of his 
intention to join the League a few months before the election, he promised him that he 
would be telling, ‘all my Unionist friends to change over to the League’.120  
The landlords who switched their loyalties to the League in this period were 
joined by the majority of West Punjab’s pirs. Prior to this period, the League had 
relied upon the religious support of the urban reformist organisations which, with 
their opposition to both landlords and the structure of traditional religious authority in 
Punjab, had meshed well with the general strategy of League politics in the province. 
With landlords gravitating towards the League en masse, however, it became 
increasingly difficult for the party to portray itself as being opposed to Punjab’s 
agrarian order. Significantly, the creation of links between these landlords and the 
League created a context within which traditional religious leaders could also declare 
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their support for the party. According to Gilmartin (1988), the relationship between 
pirs and the Unionists had always been one based on convenience and expediency, 
rather than principle. Once the League embraced landlords within its fold, thus 
dropping its opposition to the power of the zamindar classes and alienating the 
reformist religious organisations that had supported it in the cities, the pirs could 
safely support the party much as they had the Unionists. More importantly, unlike the 
Unionists, the League offered a purely communal platform through which the pirs 
could engage in more overtly religious politics.  
Here it is important to note that, as argued by Talbot (1988b) and Jalal 
(1990c), the suggestion that, for the pirs, religious imperatives had primacy over a 
more strategic calculation of potential material costs and benefits is misleading. Much 
like their non-spiritual counterparts, the pirs of West Punjab were motivated in their 
political choices by a recognition of the increasing weakness of colonial rule in India.  
Developments at the All-India level, in which the Muslim League was a key player, 
had made it abundantly clear that British control over India would soon be coming to 
an end, and that the League would be a major player in any post-colonial 
dispensation. This only accentuated the fact that increasingly, the Unionist 
government could no longer rely solely on its past record of agrarian legislation to 
guarantee the support of zamindars hit hard by the economic strains imposed by the 
War.121 The ability of the state to provide its landed allies with patronage and power 
had been at the heart of the bargain that formed the cornerstone of colonial rule in 
Punjab, and the declining capacity of the British, and their dwindling supporters in the 
Unionist government, to deliver on this promise played no small role in engineering 
the defection of landlords to the Muslim League. 
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One counter-argument that can be made against this point is that the League’s 
appeal to religious identity was primarily responsible for this political shift. Certainly, 
in the eyes of the Government, the Muslim League’s campaign was leading the 
average Muslim voters to choose between being, ‘a true believer or an infidel and a 
traitor’122, and the increasingly ‘fanatical’ tone of the League’s propaganda would, 
‘considerably increase’ the number of seats they would win relative to the 
Unionists.123 However, even though it was the case that elements of the Muslim 
electorate were influenced by the League’s ideological appeals, the landed politicians 
who formed the core of the party’s political power maintained a more pragmatic 
approach. As Firoz Khan Noon himself admitted in a private conversation with 
Governor Glancy, ‘he did not believe in Pakistan as preached by the Muslim League’, 
and that the aim was simply to, ‘secure as many seats as possible for the League on 
the Pakistan issue’124, with this view apparently being shared by other members of the 
Muslim League who, despite being, ‘much more liberal in private conversation… 
realis[ing] the difficulties inherent in their official policy’, adhered to the demand for 
Pakistan anyway because it was the platform upon which they had fought the 
elections of 1946.125  
If the appeal to religious identity represented little more than a tool to acquire 
power for many of Punjab’s Muslim landlords, it is also clear that the acquisition of 
power through these means was aimed at ensuring continued access to state 
patronage.  In 1938 and 1939, the Governor of Punjab reported a number of incidents 
in which disgruntled Muslim landowning politicians expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the Unionists by leaving the Party. Zaman Mehdi Khan of Rohtak, for example, 
                                                 
122
 Glancy to Wavell, 16 August 1945, PP-3, 141. 
123
 Glancy to Wavell, 2 February 1946, PP-3, 171. 
124
 Glancy to Wavell, 27 October 1945, PP-3, 152-153. 
125
 Jenkins to Wavell, 15 February 1947, PP-3, 345. 
 178
had allegedly joined the Muslim League because he had not been appointed the head 
of the Unionist Party following Fazl-i-Hussain’s death.126 Mian Nurullah from 
Lyallpur chose to resign and sit in the Assembly as an independent because Sikander 
refused to support his demands regarding the reduction of taxes on canal water in his 
district127 and finally in Multan, the powerful Gilani pirs left the Unionist Party 
following an electoral defeat in the District Board Elections to their political rivals 
and fellow pirs, the Quraishis.128 The trend which these incidents were symptomatic 
of, namely the pursuit of patronage through alternative political channels, accelerated 
after 1943. Murid Hussain Quraishi of Multan, for example, informed Jinnah that if 
the plans for Pakistan came to fruition, it would be important to ensure that the 
interests of the agrarian sector continued to be safeguarded in both Punjab and 
Sindh.129 Similarly, Pir Nazar Hussain Shah, who owned 4000 acres of land in Multan 
and Lyallpur, expressed his desire to contest the forthcoming elections on a Muslim 
League ticket in order to stand against his Unionist step-brother with whom he 
coincidentally had a property a dispute.130 Other leaders who defected to the League 
similarly did so from ‘personal motives’131, either due to rivalries with fellow 
Unionists, or due to an inability to advance the pursuit of their individual interests. 
After the League’s victory in the elections of 1946, in which it won 75 out of 86 
Muslim seats in the province, thus proving its political supremacy relative to the 
Unionists, the few Muslim landlords who had continued to support the colonial 
government also switched their allegiance to the Muslim League. The Unionists were, 
                                                 
126
 Emerson to Linlithgow, 19 October 1936, PP-1, 56. 
127
 Craik to Linlithgow, 27 January 1939, PP-1, 306-307. Two other members of Nurullah’s ‘tribe’ 
followed his lead in resigning from the party. 
128
 Craik to Linlithgow, 23 July 1939, PP-1, 366. 
129
 Makhdoom Murid Hussain Quraishi to M. A. Jinnah, 25 March 1944, QAP Vol. IX, 234-236. 
130
 Petition for Pir Nazar Hussain Shah, in Punjab Story, National Documentation Centre, Islamabad 
(NDC). 
131
 Brander to Laithwaite, 21 July 1943, PP-2, 382. 
 179
for example, ‘severely shaken by the desertion of two ex-Ministers’, at least one of 
whom, Jamal Khan Laghari, allegedly left the Party because he had been rebuffed in 
his attempts to head the new Coalition government in Punjab132, confirming Governor 
Glancy’s observation that the shifting loyalties of the remaining Unionists were the 
result of motives that were, ‘obvious enough’.133  
By exploiting the factional rivalries that existed within the Unionist Party, and 
in the context of declining state capacity to maintain the bargain that had underpinned 
colonial rule in the province, the Muslim League was able to displace the Unionist 
Party as the most powerful political force in Punjab. In doing so, however, the League 
also ensured that the landed elite would continue to play a powerful political role 
following the end of colonialism. Rather than engaging in a campaign of ‘mass 
contact’ that circumvented the role played by the landlords in the political process and 
would strengthen the League’s organisation, as had been suggested by at least one of 
the League’s urban Punjab members134, the course chosen was one of political 
expediency; given the institutional bias towards the landed elite the Muslim League, 
like the British and the Unionists, necessarily had to rely on landed politicians to 
ensure the success of its political project. Nonetheless, buttressed by a century of 
institutional interventions that had strengthened them, the sources of social power that 
made the Punjabi landlords such a potent electoral asset also meant that they 
dominated the League’s party apparatus, with the full implications of this becoming 
clear after Partition when Punjabi landlords would come to dominate the new 
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government in the province. Ultimately, the very same factionalism that had crippled 
the Unionist government, shattering the basis upon which it had been formed, also 
facilitated the continued survival of the landed elite as a class capable of pursuing its 
interests by capturing political power through the use of the Muslim League.  
Landed Factionalism, Intra-Class Conflict, and Authoritarianism 
in Pakistan 
 
The bloodbath that accompanied Partition had been brewing throughout the 
1940s as religion and nationalism became increasingly intertwined in Punjab, coming 
to a head following the elections of 1946 and the denial of government to the Muslim 
League (Hansen, 2003). The final and unexpected contours of the borders between 
the two states as determined by the Radcliffe Commission, hasty planning and 
mismanagement by the provincial administration, and the execution of a genocidal 
agenda by groups at the local level implicitly encouraged by, and aligned with the 
major political parties and factions in the province, created the context in which 
violence could be wreaked across Punjab on such a scale (Hansen, 2003; Khan, 2007; 
Talbot, 2008, Tinker, 1977). Once unleashed, the violence assumed a self-reinforcing, 
‘retributive’ dimension, as actors at multiple tiers, from the central state to the local 
level, increasingly employed violence as a means through which to enforce, and 
fulfill, the logic of communal separation that had underpinned the entire process of 
partition (Brass, 2003). As the chaos of Partition subsided, estimates of the total 
number who died during the transition ranged from 300,000 to over a million (the 
vast majority of whom were Punjabi), while the total number who crossed the borders 
between India and Pakistan numbered between ten to twelve million (Brass, 2003; 
Wright Jr., 1974, 191). In Punjab alone, between five and seven million Muslim 
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entered Pakistan from India, with roughly five million Hindus and Sikhs emigrating 
to India. 
 Despite the bloodshed that marked Partition, the manner of the transition from 
colonial rule, namely through elections and constitutional negotiations, arguably gives 
credence to the argument that British rule, as opposed to other forms of European 
colonialism, fostered the conditions under which democracy could flourish by putting 
in place political frameworks conducive to such an outcome (Bernhard, Reenock and 
Nordstrom, 2004; Olsson, 2009). However, given that representative government in 
India was introduced with a view towards reinforcing British power, it could also be 
argued instead that the growth of the nationalist movements in India was an 
unintended consequence of colonial interventions in politics. Moreover, as the 
divergent political trajectories of India and Pakistan have shown, the presence of a 
framework for democracy was not sufficient to ensure successful democratization, 
nor did the transfer of power away from the British necessarily imply its 
redistribution away from traditional elites to the hitherto disenfranchised masses 
(Ahmad, 1981; Jalal, 1995b). 
Indeed, even as Lahore burned, and entire villages were depopulated, the 
landed political elite in West Punjab could rest assured that they, at the very least, 
would emerge from the transition relatively unscathed. They had little to fear from a 
Muslim League which was largely beholden to them for its electoral success. The 
security afforded to the landed elite was reinforced by the fact that, until fresh 
elections were held and a new constitution was drafted in the post-Partition 
dispensation, the pro-landlord legislative and administrative framework of colonial 
rule would continue to form the basis of governance in Punjab. Notwithstanding 
populist noises about reform, welfare, and equality, there was little chance that the 
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Muslim League would be able to dislodge the landed classes from their deeply 
entrenched position of privilege in Punjab. 
Nonetheless, even though the transition to independence was characterized 
more by continuity than change in terms of both the authoritarian nature of state 
power and the oligopolistic concentration of authority in the hands of a small political 
elite, the birth of Pakistan brought with it, at least in theory, the promise of greater 
inclusion and participation within a democratic dispensation. The leaders of the 
Muslim League, most notably Jinnah himself and his urban allies, were committed to 
the notion of creating a democratic system in Pakistan. In subsequent years, as hopes 
for a democratic Pakistan faded amidst military coups and political machinations 
aimed at limiting popular political participation, the ideal of democracy was one that 
continued to be invoked as a means through which the state could gain legitimacy. 
Even the most repressive of Pakistan’s dictatorships would hold ‘elections’ during 
their tenures and, as had been the case under colonialism, democracy in Pakistan 
would be employed to maintain the political status quo. However, in a context where 
universal suffrage and the quest for legitimacy imposed constraints on the ability of 
the military-bureaucratic establishment to limit the radical potential of democracy, the 
means through which the system would be manipulated would go on to have 
important implications for the connection between the state and groups like the 
landlords of Punjab, and would also shape the relationship between the latter and the 
subordinate classes over whom they had historically exercised power. 
 The continuing importance and political relevance of the Punjabi landed elite 
was demonstrated during the 1951 elections to the provincial legislature. Even though 
these were the first elections to be held in Pakistan on the basis of universal adult 
franchise, the results of the election provided scant evidence of any kind of change in 
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the structure of political power in the province. Despite the presence of some 
opposition parties on both the left and the right, the superior organization of the 
Muslim League, coupled with its stature as the party of independence, enabled it to 
emerge victorious with an overwhelming majority (Afzal, 1998, 97-100). Predictably 
enough, around 80 per cent of the legislators returned to the Provincial Assembly 
were members of the landed aristocracy (Maniruzzaman, 1966). As had been the case 
prior to independence, even absent the colonial rules limiting the right to vote, 
electoral outcomes were determined by the ability of powerful individuals to use ties 
of economic dependence, kinship, and patronage in order to mobilize political support 
(Aziz, 1976).  
However, the League’s electoral success in 1951 masked the presence of deep 
rifts within its ranks. Soon after its victory in the elections of 1946, cracks had already 
begun to emerge in the Punjab Muslim League as Firoze Khan Noon, Mumtaz 
Daultana, and Iftikhar Mamdot began to compete for positions of power within the 
party.135 While Jinnah was able to effectively mediate between their competing 
interests (Ahmad, 1985, 283-286), the unity thrust upon the League under his 
leadership began to crumble after his death in 1948. The situation was exacerbated by 
the assassination in 1951 of Liaqat Ali Khan, Jinnah’s deputy and the country’s first 
Prime Minister, whose death meant that there no longer remained any politician of 
national stature who could command the respect and allegiance of the Muslim 
League’s disparate factions, resulting in Pakistani politics becoming increasingly 
shaped by contestation between the different provincial governments and the political 
groupings within them (Taylor, 1992, 101). 
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 The ensuing decade of parliamentary rule in Punjab was an object lesson in 
the extent to which the province’s factional politics could result in intra-class conflict 
between the landed elite which, in turn, prevented the province’s landlords from 
exercising the kind of concerted class power that might have allowed them to 
establish their dominance over the state. Indeed, before the outbreak of the Second 
World War, signs had already begun to emerge indicating the capacity of a unified 
Unionist Party to dictate terms to the colonial state, and this may have led to the 
emergence of the landed elite as senior partners in the arrangement that underpinned 
British rule. While there were particular moments in which class solidarity of this 
kind was displayed in the years immediately following Partition, as will be discussed 
below, the administrative corruption and opportunism fostered by Punjab’s deep-
rooted factionalism ultimately undermined the emergence of a single vehicle for the 
articulation of the interests of the landed elite. As had been the case in the last years of 
colonial rule, factionalism inevitably led to the creation of rival parties and groups, 
each of which actively attempted to curry favour with the Establishment, ultimately 
setting the stage for the formal reproduction of the state-landlord bargain during Ayub 
Khan’s military regime.   
Soon after Partition, Punjab was plunged into political instability as the 
Mamdot136 government was challenged from within the Muslim League by Daultana. 
In a repeat of the events of the previous decade, when groups of landlords now began 
to coalesce around Mamdot and Daultana, the decision to align with either the former 
or the latter was informed not just by ties of loyalty and kinship, but also by 
calculations of the potential benefit that could be accrued by picking one side or the 
other. Therefore when the two rivals appealed to Liaqat Ali Khan to resolve Punjab’s 
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political impasse by presenting him with lists of their supporters in the Provincial 
Assembly, both claimed to have the backing of 43 and 42 members of the Punjab 
Assembly respectively, even though several members had signed their names to both 
lists (Aziz, 1976, 3). The fact that there was an overlap between the two lists served to 
highlight the opportunism that characterised party politics at the time; rather than 
choosing between the two leaders on ideological or policy grounds, the decision 
ultimately boiled down the question of who could provide the most patronage. Under 
those circumstances, the members who pledged allegiance to both factions had simply 
been hedging their bets, attempting to ensure that they were part of any political 
dispensation that emerged once the political situation in the province stabilised. 
As two of the largest and most powerful landholders in Punjab, both Mamdot 
and Daultana presided over large networks of power and patronage. Once in 
government, the two could use their position to strengthen their networks and bolster 
the loyalty and cohesion of their factions. The logic of rent-seeking and patronage 
dispensation at the core of Punjab’s factional party politics is clearly illustrated by the 
way in which Mamdot and Daultana proceeded to manipulate the bureaucracy to 
ensure the appointment of personnel who would be sympathetic to their pursuit of 
their interests and those of their subordinates (Ahmad, 1985, 299-300). In fact, it was 
the level of corruption under the Mamdot administration that gave credence to the 
campaign against the government, and formed the basis of the decision to impose 
Governor’s Rule in 1949. When subsequently investigating the allegations against 
Mamdot, Francis Mudie, a British official who had stayed on in Pakistan as the first 
Governor of Punjab, noted that,  
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‘The [administrative] services are thoroughly demoralised and 
disheartened. Discipline is bad owing to the factions among the 
political leaders. Interference in all branches of the administration 
by Ministers and M.L.As has been a greater scandal than even it 
was before. With the close balance between Mamdot’s and 
Daultana’s groups in the League, M.L.As have been encouraged to 
be more and more rapacious’.137  
 
The manipulation of bureaucratic office was not the only means through which 
Mamdot, Daultana, and their allies sought ensure control. As part of his investigations 
into the Mamdot government, Mudie also drew attention to the role played by the 
provincial police as a tool of political persecution. As argued by Mudie, ‘he [Mamdot] 
has got into the habit, as have his officers, of making enquiries into the conduct of, 
and even arresting or starting criminal cases against, magistrates and high government 
officials without reference to their superiors… add to this a thoroughly corrupt and 
unscrupulous ministry which… instigates enquiries against those offices that they 
considered their political opponents, and which protects the most notorious offenders 
either because they did their dirty work for them or had allowed them to share in their 
loot’.138 For Mudie, it was clear that the police formed part of the strategy through 
which Mamdot and the government maintained power, with attacks on political 
opponents and recalcitrant bureaucrats being a key mechanism through which the 
political elite eliminated resistance to the pursuit of their agenda.  
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In the end, Mudie’s attempts to hold the Mamdot government accountable 
failed for two main reasons. Firstly, even though the political instability that preceded 
the imposition of Governor’s Rule provided a perfect illustration of the mechanics of 
intra-class conflict in Punjab, with different factions of the landed elite deploying their 
resources to capture as much power as possible relative to each other, Mudie’s 
investigations represented a potential threat to the dominant mode of politics, with 
implications for the landed elite as a whole. Indeed, despite the claim that, ‘Mamdot’s 
treatment of Firoz and Daultana when the last change in the Ministry took place 
[made] it certain that they would refuse to serve under Mamdot’139, the different 
factions competing for power in Punjab temporarily put aside their animosity in order 
to reshape the broader political environment into one that was more conducive to the 
collective pursuit of their interests as a class. That Mudie did actually represent a 
danger to all, and not any single Punjabi faction, was evinced by the fact that while 
attempting to prosecute Mamdot and his allies, Mudie made no secret of his 
scepticism in the ability of Daultana and other established politicians to work any 
differently, claiming that, ‘even though the leaders of the opposition were not 
personally discredited as Mamdot is, the feeling is that they might in the end have to 
adopt his tactics to remain in power’.140 Similarly, in his discussions with the Prime 
Minister, Mudie also voiced the belief that the Muslim League be barred from issuing 
parliamentary tickets in the forthcoming legislative elections, as the factionalism, 
nepotism and corruption inherent to the party would simply result in the election of 
candidates no different from the ones being replaced.141 Mudie’s pursuit of 
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accountability, coupled with his lack of faith in Punjab’s most powerful politicians, 
made him a target against whom the established political elite could unify. As such, 
soon after the dismissal of the Mamdot government, a campaign was started against 
the Governor, with protests on the street and articles in the press calling for his 
dismissal on the grounds of his being a corrupt, anti-Muslim League agent of British 
interests.142 
Secondly, Mudie’s efforts to eliminate corruption in Punjab were stymied by 
the logic of electoral politics in the province. In Mudie’s view, the campaign against 
him was only to be expected given the hostility that he believed Daultana, Mamdot, 
and other League leaders had felt towards him from the very beginning of his tenure, 
and which had been exacerbated by his attempts to hold them accountable for their 
corruption.143 However, as explained in a letter to the Prime Minister, Mudie 
expressed his surprise at a telegram he had received in which Liaqat Ali Khan had 
said that, ‘while the law must take its course, this case should not be used to throw 
mud at Mamdot… it is absolutely necessary in the interest of Pakistan that no feeling 
should be created among the public that what it being done is… for the victimisation 
of a particular set of people’.144 Mudie’s suspicions that the Prime Minister might be 
involved in trying to protect Mamdot and his allies would later be confirmed by a 
telephone call intercepted by his staff in which Khwaja Abdur Rahim, one of 
Mamdot’s key supporters, was assured of the Prime Minister’s support by the 
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Ambassador to Burma, and was told that, ‘if Mudie were to depart, everything would 
be settled’.145  
Liaqat Ali Khan’s reluctance to fully back Mudie’s investigations can be 
traced back to the dilemma that had been at the heart of governance in Punjab since 
the colonial period. Given the centrality of Punjab to the strength of the government at 
the Centre, and the reliance of the Muslim League on powerful, established 
landowning politicians to ensure electoral support in the province, the Prime Minister 
had to choose between alienating his erstwhile allies and thus risking the collapse of 
his party’s government, or glossing over their record in office in order to ensure their 
continued alignment with the ruling bloc.146 The problem was exacerbated by how 
Punjab’s most powerful landed factions appeared to be united in their opposition to 
the Governor and were entirely unwilling to support his quest for accountability. As 
such, even though the Prime Minister had initially supported the imposition of 
Governor’s Rule, he would subsequently endorse attempts by the Punjab Muslim 
League to impose constraints on the Governor’s power until fresh elections could be 
held. Following the advice of the president of the Muslim League and its Working 
Committee, Khan recommended that Mudie constitute an interim government in 
which five advisors, appointed by the Muslim League and approved by the Prime 
Minister, would be given ministerial powers and be put at the head of different 
administrative departments.147 This proposal was in direct contradiction to one that 
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had been put forward by the Governor himself, in which he had suggested the 
appointment of seven advisors out of which three would be officials drawn from the 
bureaucracy, and four would be nominated from amongst the different factions and 
parties in Punjab.148 Recognising that the Prime Minister’s proposals would allow the 
same old politicians to once again run the Punjab government, despite Liaqat Ali 
Khan’s assurances to the contrary149, Mudie resigned from his post, claiming that he 
could not work as part of a government in which he, ‘would have to deal with 
Advisers who would be committed to make [his] position impossible… [and would] 
start the old game of vicitimizing subordinate government servants who would not use 
their power to get them and their supporters elected’.150  
The events leading up to Mudie’s resignation are significant because they 
demonstrate how the landed elite, as a unified force rallying against a common foe, 
possessed the capacity to effectively challenge the power of the state. Nonetheless, 
once the threat to the collective class interests of the landed elite passed, the 
underlying factionalism that defined Punjabi landed politics resurfaced immediately.  
The appointment of Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, a League stalwart, as Governor 
signified that business could once again proceed as usual and, having secured control 
over the provincial Muslim League after Mamdot’s departure from the party to form 
the Jinnah Awami League, Daultana had himself elected as Chief Minister in 1951. 
Daultana’s government was, however, plagued by opposition from the Centre151, as 
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 Liaqat Ali Khan’s assassination in 1951 deprived Daultana of a very powerful supporter in the 
Muslim League. Khan’s successor, the former Governor-General Khwaja Nazimuddin, disagreed with 
Daultana over the Basic Principles Committee Report which had been prepared by the Constituent 
Assembly. This report suggested a plan of regional representation in which East Pakistan would have 
had greater power in the federal government than the individual provinces of the Western wing. While 
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well as the same kind of factional conflict that had characterised Mamdot’s152, and 
was dismissed in early 1953. This was followed in 1955 by the premature end of the 
Noon government, partly due to in-fighting within the Muslim League over the One 
Unit scheme153 and the question of nominating representatives to the second 
Constituent Assembly (Ahmad, 1985; Syed, 1989, 62), but also due to allegations of 
corruption and nepotism.154 Predictably enough, Noon was replaced by Abd-al Hamid 
Dasti, a large landowner from Southern Punjab aligned with Daultana. In each of 
these cases, the collapse of these governments was orchestrated not only by an 
Establishment that sought to advance its own agenda, but also by disgruntled 
landlords and politicians who mobilised factions in support of their own political and 
economic aspirations. 
Another key consequence of the factionalism that characterised Punjabi 
politics post-independence was the emergence of the Republican Party which, though 
short-lived, would illustrate the confluence between the interests of the landed elite, 
and those of the military-bureaucratic establishment. In 1954, Nishtar resigned from 
his position as Governor of Punjab in protest against the dismissal of Prime Minister 
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Nazimuddin and the first Constituent Assembly.155 Despite his opposition to the 
Governor-General and the Establishment, however, Nishtar was able to have himself 
elected as President of the Muslim League in 1956, a position which allowed him to 
exercise a tremendous amount of control over the party’s legislators. After the 
introduction of the One Unit plan in October 1955, Governor-General Iskandar Mirza 
had appointed Dr. Khan Sahib, a prominent ex-Congress member from the NWFP, as 
Chief Minister of West Pakistan. Opposed to the idea of having the West Pakistan 
government headed by someone who was not a member of the Muslim League, and 
who was widely seen as an instrument of the Establishment, Nishtar began to initiate 
proceedings to have Dr. Khan Sahib removed from his post. 
Given that Nishtar’s actions could have potentially disrupted the indirect hold 
the military and bureaucracy had over the legislature, the Governor-General 
responded to the threat by authorising Dr. Khan Sahib to set up a new parliamentary 
party to wrest control of the government away from the Muslim League. With the 
help of Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, a prominent landlord who had been the Governor 
of Punjab (and then West Pakistan) since Nishtar’s resignation from the post, Dr. 
Khan Sahib was able to lure a significant number of West Pakistani legislators to the 
banner of the Republican Party (Sayeed, 1959; Afzal, 1998). Chief amongst the 
defectors to the party were those Punjabi landholders and politicians who had been 
opposed to Daultana; for them, the Republican Party provided a means through which 
to retake control of the government, curry favour with the Establishment, and once 
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again be placed in a position where patronage could be received and dispensed in 
pursuit of their own factional and class interests. 
What is interesting to note here is that many of the players involved in the 
creation of the Republican Party had themselves been previously involved in opposing 
the designs of the military and bureaucracy. Noon, for example, had been forced to 
resign in 1955 precisely because he had not been willing to follow the directives 
issued to him with regards to the One Unit Plan and the Second Constituent 
Assembly. Conversely Daultana’s faction, which pitted itself against the Republicans 
in 1956, had been brought into power because it had assured the Governor-General of 
its support in 1955.156 However, in a clear illustration of the opportunistic calculation 
of interest at the heart of the relationship between the state and the Punjabi landed 
elite, those who joined the Republican Party jettisoned questions of principle for the 
opportunity to acquire state patronage. While personal rivalries and animosity 
provided the pretext for much of this political manoeuvring, it was the blandishments 
of the state that ultimately determined political alliances.  
 The creation, conduct and role of the Republican Party also raises another 
important point, namely the way in which factionalism amongst the Punjabi landed 
elite served to provide the Establishment with the opportunity to effectively pursue its 
agenda in the face of politicians attempting to assert their own authority relative to the 
state. The defection of leaders like Noon and Mamdot from the Muslim League in 
1956 did not, by any means, result in the transformation of the League into a party not 
dependent on landlords for its power. Indeed, Daultana and his faction remained in 
control of the Muslim League in Punjab, with their position as large landholders 
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forming the basis for their continued power. Instead, the League in 1956 found itself 
in a position akin to that of the Unionists a decade earlier; in pursuit of their own 
interests, a significant section of the Punjabi landed elite had defected from the 
incumbent party to support a challenger offering a greater degree of patronage and 
political security. Lacking the support of these defectors, it would have been much 
more difficult for the military-bureaucratic establishment to manipulate the organs of 
representative government to suit its needs.  
 Given the support the establishment found for itself amongst the landed 
politicians of Punjab, as well as traditionally powerful political actors in the other 
provinces, a question could be raised about precisely why Ayub Khan still chose to 
formally assume power in 1958. What is important to note here is that the pretext for 
the coup was the belief that the constant conflict between the different civilian 
political groups had generated an unsustainable level of instability in Pakistan. Given 
that the institutional and organizational strength and capacity of the Establishment 
allowed it to effectively displace relatively weaker civilian politicians who were seen 
as being incapable of effectively governing the country, the coup did little more than 
formalize the already considerable power of the military and bureaucracy (Sayeed, 
1959; Newman, 1959; Wilcox, 1965). The coup also had the effect of staving off any 
potential threat to the Establishment from the new era of democratic politics that was 
ostensibly initiated by the 1956 Constitution (Jalal, 1995b).  In a sense, therefore, the 
coup of 1958 represented an attempt by the Establishment to assert its authority freed 
from the restrictions imposed by partnership with civilian politicians. However, as 
will be shown in the next chapter, the constraints faced by Ayub Khan rendered it 
difficult to operate independently of civilian political forces, eventually leading to a 
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rapprochement with the landed elite that saw a re-introduction of the bargain that had 
underpinned the governance of Punjab for over a hundred years.  
 Conclusion 
 
 Despite the strengthening of colonial and landed power in the first half of the 
Twentieth Century, it would take less than ten years for the political order in Punjab 
to unravel. This was made possible by a number of factors which, when combined, 
created the circumstances under which the regime could be effectively challenged. 
Firstly, the onset of the Second World War imposed serious constraints on the 
colonial state and its allies by triggering a tremendous amount of economic 
dislocation within the province. Secondly, the debilitating effect of the War was 
compounded by the general trajectory of All-India Nationalist politics, due to which 
an already weakened colonial state was forced to negotiate away its power to an 
increasingly mobilised and vocal nationalist movement. In Punjab, this translated into 
greater legitimacy for the Muslim League and Congress, both of which could use their 
power at the centre to oppose the colonial order in the province. Thirdly, within this 
broader context of instability, factional conflict amongst the landed elite became a 
problem of more serious proportions. Rooted in competition for power and patronage, 
the rivalries of Punjab’s landed politicians became more difficult to constrain amidst 
general insecurity about the future of the province. 
 For the landed elite, the factors contributing to the breakdown of colonial rule 
and stability in the Punjab, and the spectre of independence from the British, 
necessitated an evaluation of the mechanisms through which to guarantee the 
protection of their interests in the new political dispensation. Given that dissident 
factions of the Unionist party had already forged links with an invigorated Muslim 
League, the dissolution of the Sikandar-Jinnah Pact in 1944 opened the floodgates for 
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defection to the League, with many landed politicians and pirs recognising that the 
defence of the traditional agrarian order would only be possible by supporting the 
party most likely to preside over the transition to independence. While factional 
conflict between the landed elite pre-dated the events of the 1940s, its presence 
facilitated the splitting of the Unionist party in the context of weakening colonial rule. 
The Muslim League, for its part, welcomed these landed elites into its fold despite its 
previous opposition to them. Overcoming landed power in Punjab was a task that the 
League had been unable to perform for decades, and the barriers to entry into electoral 
politics erected by the landed elite, as well as the various mechanisms through which 
they exercised control over the countryside, meant that co-opting them represented the 
most expeditious means through which to ensure electoral victory in Punjab. When 
the League’s strategy paid off in the elections of 1946, it also illustrated how the very 
same factionalism that split the Unionists had the effect of ensuring the maintenance 
of landed power in the new political dispensation. Moreover, this also meant that 
although the events of this period opened up the possibility of institutional change 
triggered by a contestational juncture, landed factionalism ensured that this did not 
happen. 
 Post-Partition, Punjab’s landed elite found themselves in a position where they 
exercised virtually unrivalled power in the province, as evinced by their domination 
of the legislative elections held in 1951. However, despite the fact that this could have 
potentially placed the elite in a situation where they could effectively constrain the 
power of the state through the concerted use of their class power, as shown by the 
events leading to the resignation of Governor Mudie, the factionalism endemic to 
Punjab’s politics prevented the emergence of this kind of class solidarity. Instead, 
competition for power and patronage once again became a source of instability, 
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leaving different factions of the landed elite open to manipulation by an Establishment 
seeking to safeguard and pursue its own interests.  
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Chapter 6: Military Authoritarianism and the Landed 
Elite in Punjab 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
When Ayub Khan came to power in 1958, the stated aim of the new regime 
was to usher in a new phase of politics untainted by the influence of the venal 
politicians it had replaced. However, despite undertaking an attempt to dislodge the 
landed elites who had hitherto dominated West Pakistan’s politics, Ayub Khan found 
himself reaching an accommodation with the same politicians he had sought to 
eliminate from the political arena.  A similar pattern was followed by the military 
regimes of Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007), both of whom 
relied on the landed elite to play an important role in providing their governments 
with support, echoing the arrangement that had underpinned the stability of the 
colonial state in Punjab. State patronage and power were exchanged for the ability of 
landed politicians to provide votes and control at the local level, with the latter 
drawing on their traditional sources of authority, as well as their economic strength 
and links to the state, to maintain their hold on the countryside.  
The aims of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, after providing a brief account of 
some of the factors that have underpinned the military’s dominance of Pakistan’s 
politics since independence, an analysis of the Ayub Khan regime will be presented to 
demonstrate the conditions under which the state-landlord bargain was re-entrenched 
as key mechanism through which military rule was strengthened. It will be shown 
that, despite attempting to govern Pakistan without the support of Punjab’s landed 
politicians, Ayub Khan faced the same kinds of constraints that characterized British 
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rule in the province, leading to a rapprochement with the landed elite despite the 
regime’s initial commitment to eliminating the traditional political order. Secondly, 
through a brief account of the Zia and Musharraf regimes, it will be shown that the 
electoral mechanisms used by the Ayub government to reproduce the state-landlord 
bargain were also deployed during subsequent episodes of overtly military rule, 
illustrating both the path dependent nature of Punjab’s political trajectory, and the 
intrinsic connection between authoritarianism and landed power in Pakistan. 
The Enduring Roots of Military Power in Pakistan 
 
As will be explained throughout the course of this chapter, the close 
relationship between the military and the Punjabi landed elite has been instrumental 
to the ability of the former to dominate politics in Pakistan. This, however, has 
historically been supplemented by additional sources of power that have allowed the 
military establishment to maintain its position of autonomy relative to the different 
actors it has confronted in society. For example, very soon after independence, the 
imperatives of Cold War geopolitics, coupled with the country’s insecurity vis-à-vis 
India and the need for armaments, allowed the military to cultivate a close 
relationship with the United States that would, at the time of the first coup, provide 
the former with a powerful source of external support (Jalal, 1990b). US support for 
the military in power in Pakistan would continue throughout the Cold War, peaking 
with the whole-hearted American backing for the Zia-ul-Haq regime in the 1980s, 
deemed necessary in order to counter the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (Alavi, 
1998a; Kux, 2001), and re-emerging with the Musharraf regime under the pretext of 
fighting the War on Terror. Although the relationship between the military and the 
United States would often be marred by distrust and suspicion, particularly from the 
1990s onwards as a result of the close links between the Pakistan military and militant 
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Islamist groups, American strategic concerns would trump the strengthening of 
Pakistani democracy (Shah, 2006; Gregory and Revil, 2008). 
Domestically, the military was also able to perpetuate its dominant position in 
Pakistani politics by developing the economic resources at its disposal. The threat 
posed by India and the conflict in Kashmir, repeatedly invoked to justify greater 
defence spending, enabled the military to claim an inordinately large share of 
Pakistan’s budget throughout its existence (Jalal, 1990a). Over time, the military’s 
continued involvement in the administration of Pakistan allowed it to build a multi-
billion dollar corporate empire of its own, with interests ranging from construction 
and breakfast cereals to land ownership and agriculture (Siddiqa, 2007). This 
combination of high levels of public spending and near-monopolistic private 
enterprise would enrich the military tremendously and, more importantly, make it an 
important source of economic patronage in its own right, catering not only to its own 
members but also to its allies when in power. The fact that retired and serving 
military personnel were often placed in charge of purely civilian government 
departments, economic units, and even educational institutions, both in times of 
dictatorship and democracy, only served to cement the military’s links with the 
different sectors of Pakistan’s political economy, and enhance their capacity to 
function as an organisation capable of accessing, and distributing, state patronage 
(Jalal, 1999a; Wilke, 2001). 
Both Zia and Musharraf also tried to use Islam to acquire support and 
legitimacy, and defuse opposition to their governments. Unlike Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-
Haq made extensive use of Islam and right-wing Islamist parties to acquire 
ideological support for his government through the deployment of a programme of 
‘Islamization’ (Ziring, 1984; Nasr, 2001). This conflation of Islam and national 
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identity was a key mechanism through which the Pakistani state had historically 
attempted to garner legitimacy for itself in the face of tremendous ethnic and class 
cleavages (Jalal, 1995a). However, much more so than Ayub Khan, whose appeals to 
Islam for electoral purposes had always reflected an opportunistic use of religion as a 
political tool, Zia’s Islamization was a reflection of the changed political situation 
following the fall of the Bhutto government; in a context where the mass mobilisation 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s had shown the limits of authoritarian control in 
Pakistan, explicitly linking the military to Islam, and the latter to politics, provided an 
alternative means through which to shape the democratic arena (Ahmad, 1996; 
Daechsel, 1997). Indeed, by the late 1970s, the urban middle and lower middle classes 
that formed the core constituency for the Islamist parties would become part of the 
military establishment’s sources of support, with appeals to Islam being used to 
mobilise them against rival political forces (Jalal, 1994; Akhtar, 2010a). This pattern 
would be repeated under Musharraf who, while lacking Zia’s apparent personal 
religiosity and belief in the Islamization of society, nonetheless relied heavily on the 
support of the religious right to maintain his control over electoral politics.  
 The persistence of military power in Pakistan would also be made possible, as 
pointed out by Aziz (2008), by the path dependent nature of military intervention 
itself. Having involved itself in government early on, the military was able to shape its 
own political orientation, as well as the institutional framework of politics, to suit 
repeated rounds of entry in to the political system. With every successive coup, the 
capacity of the military to entrench itself in power increased, both in terms of being 
able to impose sanctions on recalcitrant political rivals, as well as providing patronage 
to allies. This was a process facilitated by the endurance of de facto military power 
even during periods of civilian rule, as evinced by the continued control wielded by 
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the military over questions related to foreign policy, internal security, and even the 
economy, with the threat of overt intervention exerting an ever-present constraint on 
the autonomy of democratic administrations (Samad, 1994; Rizvi, 2000). Through the 
cooperation of puppet parliaments and pliant courts, the military also ensured that it 
received the legislative and legal cover needed to pursue its political agenda, and 
ensure the legitimation of its authority (Newburg, 2002; Kennedy, 2005; Siddique 
2008). 
 
Ayub Khan and the Re-entrenchment of the State-Landlord 
Bargain 
 
When the military formally took power following the coup of 1958, the 
political instability that had provided the pretext for the takeover was primarily 
attributed to the politicians who had governed Pakistan in the first decade of its 
existence. In particular, the constant factionalism within the Punjab Muslim League, 
as well as the reputation for corruption that had accrued to the province’s politicians, 
were seen as sufficient grounds upon which to force the landed aristocracy out of 
power. Indeed, after assuming power, one of the first acts undertaken by General 
Ayub Khan was to announce land reforms, and to use the Electoral Bodies 
Disqualification Order (EBDO) of 1959 to bar approximately 6500 politicians and 
bureaucrats in both wings of the country from politics until 1966 (Sayeed, 1961, 
255).157 Both of these measures, which were to be applied throughout Pakistan, 
represented the first real challenge to the established political order in Punjab. 
 Amidst all the blame and opprobrium being directed towards the political class 
by the Ayub Khan government, the role played by military and bureaucracy 
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themselves in contributing to Pakistan’s malaise was deliberately ignored, with the 
coup itself simply signifying the fact that, with the creation of a constitution in 1956, 
it had no longer been possible for the oligarchy to exercise power through indirectly 
elected and appointed representatives (Jalal, 1995b, 54). However, the very same 
features that placed the army in a position where it could take formal control of the 
state, namely its institutional coherence and autonomy, would also limit its ability to 
effectively manage it (Rizvi, 1984, 536). Early on in his reign, Ayub Khan ushered in 
a system of ‘Basic Democracies’ (BD) in an attempt to reintroduce representative 
government to Pakistan. The BD system was essentially a form of controlled, limited 
democracy, in which the electorate would vote in 80,000 ‘Basic Democrats’ who 
would, in turn, constitute an electoral college that would select the country’s 
president. Furthermore, the system was touted to bring participation down to the local 
level, with the establishment of successive tiers of government, from the village level 
upwards, in which elected representatives, together with nominees from the 
bureaucracy, would be able to participate in policy and decision-making. For the 
government, this new system was ideal for Pakistan where, ‘democracy of the western 
type is not suited to the circumstances… where the percentage of literacy is low; 
economic conditions are below normal; distances are great; civic consciousness is not 
developed; and the nation is underdeveloped’.158 
 In reality, however, rather than being a system tailor-made for Pakistan’s 
unique political circumstances, the BD system was similar to the colonial electoral 
system in that it strengthened the power of a central, authoritarian state while 
providing a veneer of representative legitimacy. With political parties banned, the BD 
system was designed to function on a non-party basis, with voters electing leaders on 
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individual platforms rather than as part of any formal political organization. 
Implemented in order to prevent the re-grouping of the same actors who had been part 
of the government in past, in practice this measure served to create a tier of local level 
political collaborators directly beholden to the state for their office and powers, with 
increasing coordination and cooperation between the elected BD members and the 
state strengthening the links between the two (Rahman, 1968, 803; Kizilbash, 1973). 
This was best demonstrated by the way in which Ayub Khan could famously claim to 
have won 95.6% of the 80000 votes cast by the BD members to elect him president at 
the end of 1960. Furthermore, the multi-tiered system of local government that was 
introduced actually involved an extremely limited amount of power devolution; at 
each successive level of government, the ratio of elected members to those nominated 
remained extremely low, and the range of actual powers devolved to these local 
bodies was negligible, ensuring that the actual levers of governance remained firmly 
in the hands of the bureaucracy (Sayeed, 1961; Rahman, 1968). Particularly after the 
promulgation of a new constitution in 1962, which formally declared that Pakistan 
would have a presidential system of government, power remained concentrated in the 
hands of Ayub Khan and his coterie of advisers from the Establishment who exercised 
almost complete control over the government (LaPorte, 1977, 56-57). 
A further insight into the kind of thinking that formed the basis for the BD 
system can be gleaned from the official response to the Report of the Franchise 
Commission of 1963. The report had been commissioned as a means through which to 
evaluate the success of BD after two rounds of elections, and ultimately produced a 
set of recommendations which suggested that the indirect system of representative 
democracy introduced by the Ayub regime was not particularly representative or 
democratic. Allegedly due to differences of opinion within the Franchise Commission 
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itself, a Special Committee was convened by the Law Ministry to examine the 
Commission’s report, and provide a final set of conclusions to the government. In the 
document that emerged from this process, the regime’s view of democracy and 
elections was made clear. On voting, the Committee questioned, ‘whether the right [to 
vote] is a natural right which cannot be circumscribed by any legal or constitutional 
limitation or is it a legal right… which is conferred by the State upon such persons as 
are believed to be most capable of exercising it for the public good’159, and the 
Franchise Commission’s claim that direct elections would lead to the creation and 
maturation of the country’s political parties was simply dismissed due to there being, 
‘little evidence to justify such a belief’160. In response to the Commission’s argument 
that direct elections were necessary for participatory democracy, the Committee 
disagreed, using the example of the 1950s to argue that the sense of participation 
through direct voting, ‘can be purely illusory when there is little understanding of the 
issues involved in election’161, and that illiteracy and a lack of political awareness on 
the part of the electorate in Pakistan meant that the, ‘direct vote… has been subject to 
far greater corruption of the mind and emotions than under an indirect system’.162 
Instead, the Committee suggested the continued use of indirect elections through the 
BD system, stating that the smaller size of BD constituencies would essentially allow 
for the electorate to make better electoral choices at the local level.163 However, the 
Committee also approvingly noted the tendency of, ‘members of on electoral college 
to be less likely to be swept away by a gust of passion… [and be] more likely to be 
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amenable to party discipline’164, which was important given how, ‘if the President is 
elected on an indirect basis and the Assemblies are elected on the basis of direct 
election, the latter will claim more representative character and this may weaken the 
position of the Chief Executive’.165 For all the Committee’s talk of bringing 
democracy to the people of Pakistan, its rejection of the proposals of the Franchise 
Commission revealed the Ayub regime’s desire to exercise as much control as 
possible over the political process. While the notions of democracy and representative 
government had been institutionalised, and the principle of adult franchise 
established, the regime nonetheless sought to shape the political framework in a way 
that would allow it to safeguard its power.  
 Nonetheless, despite the ability of the regime to force through its legislative 
and institutional agenda, the situation had begun to change by the end of 1962, when 
two important developments would lead to a rapprochement between the regime and 
the landed elite. Firstly, the constitution of 1962 had provided the basis from which 
the regime could call for fresh elections within a political framework that had been 
tailored towards bolstering the Ayub Khan government. Secondly, Ayub Khan 
himself now sought to formally join politics at the head of a political party in order to 
be elected president of Pakistan in elections to be held in 1965. Both these 
developments pointed towards the same basic issue; amidst increasing opposition to 
Ayub Khan and his government, coercion alone was not sufficient to hold on to 
power, and a certain amount of support was required from the populace both in order 
to govern more effectively, and for the regime to acquire an air political legitimacy. 
Like the British before him, Ayub Khan had realised that the landed politicians of 
Punjab were an important asset, rather than a liability, precisely because they 
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possessed the means through which to mobilise support for the government and 
ensure the maintenance of order at the local level. That the regime needed such allies 
was acknowledged in a Cabinet discussion on the subject in 1967, in which it was 
stated that, ‘thought and philosophy are usually communicated to the hearts and heads 
of the people through political parties. It can’t be through official machinery alone… 
the propagation of ideas can be done only by the workers of a political organization 
having conviction and faith in them’.166  
 Given Ayub Khan’s earlier hostility towards Punjab’s landlords, as well as his 
ability to remain in power without their assistance for almost four years, it is 
important to examine the conditions that gave rise to this change of course at this 
particular juncture in time. Of particular importance was the fact that, despite being 
moderately successful in dislodging Punjab’s established political leaders from 
government through the EBDO and the BD system, the fact remained that these actors 
continued to wield a tremendous amount of economic and social clout in the 
countryside. Indeed, even though the regime trumpeted the fact that the majority of 
the candidates elected in 1960 were from the ‘middle’ class and lower income groups, 
the reality of the situation was very different. According to data released by the 
government at the time, 4311 Basic Democrats in West Pakistan belonged to the 
‘upper income group’, while only 1061 were landlords. 21,387 BD members were 
said to belong to the ‘middle class’, while a further 11,028 were persons belonging to 
the ‘lower income group’.167 Similarly, according to the government, ‘persons 
belonging to the lower middle class with income above Rs. 100 but less than Rs. 500 
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[per month] predominate’.168 However, given that average per capita income in West 
Pakistan in 1959-1960 was only Rs. 366 per year169, persons earning between Rs.100 
and Rs. 500 per month were clearly in a much better financial situation than the vast 
majority of the population, rendering the label of ‘lower middle class’ deeply 
misleading. Furthermore, the category of ‘landlord’ was not defined in the 
government’s report, making it difficult to establish if the statistics referred to 
members of the old aristocracy, or to rich and middle peasants owning smaller 
amounts of land.170 It is also worth bearing in mind that these figures all referred to 
those BD members who were elected. The profile of nominated members, who tended 
to be drawn from the bureaucracy, military and pool of established politicians, would 
have reflected an even greater elite bias. It was also the case that while members 
elected at the lower tiers of the BD system did tend to be drawn from the middle or 
rich peasantry, positions of authority at the head of local Union Councils tended to 
remain in the hands of large landlords (Alam, 1974, 17). Indeed, according to one 
study at the time, 62% of West Pakistan’s Basic Democrats were affluent landlords 
(Inayetullah, 1964, 51-61). Therefore, while it was certainly true that the new BD 
members did not always possess the same level of wealth as the representatives they 
displaced, they still represented a very small, propertied section of the populace 
whose interests were much more aligned with the political elite than with any broadly 
participatory agenda. 
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 Consequently, rather than providing political space to the dispossessed and 
disenfranchised, the BD system served as a vehicle through which members of the 
rich peasantry could assume a more formal role in the institutional framework of 
politics. After all, even though the EBDO prevented some of the most powerful and 
prominent elements of the landed classes from participating in politics, many, 
particularly those who had been part of the lower tiers of government, were able to 
avoid these restrictions. Firstly, the fact that the constituencies drawn up for the BD 
elections reflected a clear rural bias, coupled with the tendency for politicians to enter 
the system through nomination as well as election, meant that these elections 
remained extremely open to capture by the landed classes (Sayeed, 1961, 250-51). 
This was a fact reinforced by how, even in the absence of large landlords themselves, 
the election of those who had historically been their subordinates meant that chains of 
patronage and support remained intact. Secondly, despite the restrictions imposed on 
political parties, many of the candidates who were elected under the BD system had 
nevertheless been associated with parties like the Muslim League in the past. Indeed, 
while the government itself could not obtain accurate figures on this question, it was 
estimated that 2751 BD members in West Pakistan had been affiliated with political 
parties prior to their election, out of which the vast majority had been in the Muslim 
League.171 Thirdly, even where the absence of formal political parties could have 
arguably weakened the ability of political actors to mobilise support for election, the 
non-party based nature of the election process lent itself readily to elite capture as 
only those possessing significant stocks of economic and social capital could marshal 
the resources required to gather votes. As such, the same chaudhris who had presided 
over panchayats, collected revenue, and formed the lynchpin of control at the local 
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level under the British would, under Ayub Khan, make an entry into formal electoral 
politics. In the absence of any real opposition or resistance from amongst the landless 
and smaller landowners in the countryside, who comprised the overwhelmingly 
majority of the population, and benefitting from decades of benevolent colonial rule 
that had firmly ensconced them within the organs and apparatuses of the state, the 
landowning peasantry were perfectly placed to fill the void left by their more 
powerful class allies. Rather than representing a radical new force in politics, the 
candidates elected by the BD system demonstrated the robustness of the institutional 
framework for politics that had been created under colonial rule, and its ability to 
endure post-independence. Ayub Khan, like the British before him, had essentially 
ushered in a political order premised upon the support of a coalition of landed class 
actors comprising the rich peasantry and the landed aristocracy. 
  The relationship between the authoritarian state and the landed classes in 
post-independence Pakistan would thus be cemented before the next elections, due to 
be held in 1964. The first round of BD elections had made clear the persistence of 
landed power at the local level, and had underlined the fact that measures such as the 
EBDO had proved to be incapable of displacing the landed classes from the political 
arena. Their resilience was also displayed by the trajectory taken by Ayub Khan’s 
Rural Works Programme, which aimed to bring development to countryside and 
instead ended up reinforcing the colonial model of patronage politics, transferring 
resources from the state to the landlords, and from them to the subordinate agrarian 
classes (Burki, 1969; Waseem, 1982). With the Constitution of 1962 providing Ayub 
Khan with a ‘legitimate’ mechanism through which to retain power by getting elected 
as president, the utility of the landed elite as mobilisers of political support became 
abundantly clear. The process through which the regime began to formally align itself 
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with this class began with holding of elections to the national and provincial 
assemblies in April and May 1962. The elections were held on a non-party basis, the 
franchise was restricted to the country’s 80,000 BD members, and the regime took the 
additional measure of issuing the Political Organisations (Prohibition of Unregulated 
Activity) Ordinance to ensure that any opposition generated by the election results 
was curtailed (Ziring, 1971, 29). Nonetheless, despite the presence of these 
restrictions on political parties, groups began to form within the new assemblies, as 
politicians with prior political affiliations began to coalesce around rival candidates 
for the positions of speaker and deputy-speaker. Additionally, the public meetings 
convened by elected representatives after the elections started to provide a platform 
for politicians who had been barred by the EBDO (Qureshi, 1966, 457-458). In this 
context, both pro and anti-government groups, within and outside the formal organs of 
representative government began to clamour for the legalization of political parties, an 
effort which culminated with the passing of Pakistan’s first Political Parties Bill on 
July 14, 1962.  
 The Political Parties Bill, while legalizing political parties, was designed to 
prevent the re-emergence of the old political elite. This was evinced by a clause 
within the Bill that precluded the participation in political parties of persons who had 
been disqualified by EBDO, or who had been jailed by the government for violating 
the Security of Pakistan Act, a piece of legislation used to target dissidents and 
opposition activists (Qureshi, 1966). These measures were ultimately discarded as the 
regime itself began to engineer its rapprochement with the established, landed 
politicians it had thus far remained estranged from. Following the passage of the 
Political Parties Bill, several dormant organisations immediately moved to have 
themselves re-registered including the Muslim League. This was a development that 
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was, yet again, fraught with factional in-fighting that ultimately resulted in the 
emergence of two different parties that both laid claim to the Muslim League name. 
The CoML and the CML would become anti and pro-government parties respectively, 
with Ayub Khan being elected to head the former in December 1963.  
While the EBDO continued to bar much of the political old guard from 
membership within the new parties, both the CoML and CML did nonetheless consist 
of leaders and politicians who were mainly drawn from those sections of the 
traditional political elite that had not been charged under EBDO. This can be seen in 
the composition of the National Assembly elected in 1962, in which 70 of the total 
156 members were landlords, out of which 58 were from West Pakistan and thus 
constituted the overwhelming majority of legislators from that area (Sayeed, 1963, 
373). More importantly, many disqualified politicians joined the CML and other 
opposition groups informally. Thus, when the EBDO expired in 1966 and was not 
renewed by the government, many of these politicians were left free to join with the 
government or the opposition, effectively bringing to end Ayub Khan’s attempts to 
restructure the political arena by purging it of its most entrenched participants. Indeed, 
as can be seen in some declassified memos from the American State Department, 
many politicians who had been barred under EBDO expressed confidence in the fact 
that they would be brought back in to the fold of politics. For example, Makhdumzada 
Syed Hassan Mahmud Shah, a former minister in West Pakistan, ‘was buoyant about 
the prospect of some of them [EBDOnians] being brought into political office, either 
in the government or in the PML’.172  Syed Hadi Ali Shah Bokhari, a close associate 
of Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash, the former Chief Minister of West Pakistan, was similarly 
sanguine about the political prospects of the old political elite, and felt that many who 
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were still opposed to Ayub and in opposition parties would nonetheless join the 
government since, ‘Ayub now needed qualified politicians and that the politicians 
were willing to work for Ayub but would want the authority of a party or official 
position from which to work’.173 For its own part, cognisant of the fact that many 
elements of the old political elite had preferred to remain opposed to the government, 
the state itself chose to pursue a strategy of co-opting EBDOnians and opponents on 
an individual basis, confident that that the Opposition would be incapable of 
maintaining a united front in the face of the state’s blandishments.174  
 When it was first constituted, the CoML could claim to have the support of 78 
members of the existing National Assembly, a majority that gave credence to the 
notion that Ayub Khan’s primary motivation in heading the CoML was to be able to 
more effectively, and indirectly, influence parliamentary politics (Dobell, 1971, 70). 
For their part, the landed politicians now in parliament could count on patronage from 
the Establishment in exchange for continued political support. The maturation of this 
bargain between the Ayub Khan regime and the landed elites of West Pakistan was 
evinced both by the BD elections results of 1964, which demonstrated an even clearer 
bias towards the landed aristocracy than before (Burki, 1969, 333; Anjum, 1992, 66-
70), as well as the results of the presidential and legislative elections of 1965, in 
which Ayub Khan was able to claim the presidency, and in which the CoML 
consolidated its position as the single largest party in the National Assembly. In fact, 
in this round of elections, the vast majority of candidates put forward by the CoML 
were drawn from the most powerful sections of the propertied classes, including the 
landed religious elites of Punjab and Sindh, and many of these actors who were 
unable to get party tickets initially were able to secure election as independents and 
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join the CoML once in parliament (Al-Mujahid, 1965, 543-548; Mayer, 1967; Afzal, 
2000).  
 Thus, by the mid-1960s, the Ayub regime had come full circle; the regime’s 
initial attempts at dislodging and displacing the traditional political class had failed, 
and had given way instead to an accommodation with these actors that served to 
buttress the authority of the military and its allies in the bureaucracy, while also 
reinforcing the influence and control of Punjab’s landed politicians. To the extent that 
the Ayub Khan government was able to effect any lasting structural change in the 
country’s electoral politics, it was in the expansion of formal, representative 
government to include elements of the landowning classes that had hitherto occupied 
relatively subordinate, quasi-official positions within the networks of power and 
patronage that underpinned party politics and governance in Punjab. By re-enacting 
the bargain that had existed between the Punjabi landowning classes and the colonial 
state, Ayub Khan demonstrated both the path dependent nature of Pakistan’s political 
trajectory, and the resilience of the mechanisms underpinning the reproduction of its 
institutional framework; as an authoritarian government having come to power due to 
a civil-military imbalance inherited from colonial rule, the Ayub regime nonetheless 
required allies within society to be able to govern effectively. Even though efforts to 
empower alternative political actors at the local level were undertaken by the 
government through a combination of land reform, the EBDO, and the BD system, the 
necessarily restrictive nature of democracy under conditions of military rule, coupled 
with the tremendous, historically rooted capacity of the traditional elite to adapt to this 
changed political environment, meant that the government would ultimately fail in its 
objectives. Faced with the prospect of opposition from politicians and leaders 
possessing support that the regime itself lacked, Ayub Khan had little choice but to 
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embrace the same actors he had so vociferously criticized in the past. It was not 
surprising, therefore, that when opposition to the regime really began to gather some 
momentum in 1967, all pretence of reforming the political system was abandoned, as 
the government decided that in order to increase its popularity, ‘estranged politicians 
should be brought back to its [CoML] fold and influential personalities should be 
persuaded to join the organization’.175 Furthermore, in a clear reversal of the regime’s 
initial emphasis on opening the democratic arena up to non-elite actors, it was also 
conceded that, ‘political leaders must of necessity be men of reasonable means… 
[who could] secure patronage for their workers’176. That, ‘many leaders of the party… 
were also distributing favours to the enemies of the party’177 was simply an 
unavoidable reality of Punjabi politics, the direct result of attempts by the Punjabi 
landed elite to maintain links with rival groups should the political situation change.  
Dictatorship, Democracy, and the Punjabi Landed Elite 
 
 The Ayub Khan period was significant not only because of the way in which it 
renewed the bargain between the state and Punjab’s landed politicians, but also 
because of the mechanisms it put in place to strengthen this relationship. Electoral 
engineering and the manipulation of party politics were used by the colonial state to 
reproduce the state-landlord bargain, and the military in Pakistan came to employ the 
same means to reinforce its own position and that of its allies. Key to this process was 
the effect factionalism had on generating support the Establishment. As mentioned 
previously, the factionalism of Punjab’s landed politicians in the first two decades of 
independence allowed the Establishment to co-opt parties like the Republicans and the 
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CML with the promise of patronage. Indeed, the ‘divisive tendencies’ of Pakistan’s 
civilian politicians were actively encouraged by a military establishment keen to 
cultivate political support for itself (Shafqat, 2009, 92). As had been the case with the 
Unionists and the Muslim League, factionalism, ensured that the interests of the 
landed elite as a class would continue to be safeguarded by providing the 
Establishment with allies willing to enter into a bargain for power with it. 
 In this context, the template of local and national governance used by Ayub 
Khan to bolster his regime was one that would be replicated by the military dictators 
who succeeded him, confirming LaPorte Jr.’s (1969, 860) prediction that the military, 
as an inherently conservative institution resistant to systemic change, would continue 
to rely on the same model of politics when in power. Thus, while both General Zia-ul-
Haq and General Musharraf used the coercive capacity of the military to suppress 
civil liberties and cow the judiciary into submission when they seized power, elections 
and referendums remained a key part of their strategy to acquire legitimacy, both 
domestically and abroad, and to defuse opposition. In 1979, for example, General Zia 
oversaw the creation of a local government system that, like BD, provided a façade of 
electoral representation while retaining the actual levers of decision-making and 
governance in the hands of the bureaucracy and military. This pattern was repeated by 
Musharraf, whose Local Government Ordinance of 2000 and subsequent elections in 
2001, despite allowing for greater direct ‘democratic’ representation at the local level, 
resulted in the empowerment of non-party based local level leaders who remained 
directly beholden to the regime for their position, and who could also be effectively 
employed to weaken opposition parties that functioned at the provincial and national 
levels (Akhtar et al., 2007; Talbot, 2002b). 
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 In addition to manipulating the institutions of local government, the Zia and 
Musharraf regimes also attempted to acquire legitimacy and strength by controlling 
‘democratic’ politics at the provincial and national levels. Like Ayub Khan, both Zia 
and Musharraf made use of referendums of dubious legitimacy to have themselves 
‘elected’ as presidents of Pakistan, thereby placing themselves in positions where they 
could more directly influence electoral politics. In 1981, the Zia-ul-Haq regime 
introduced the Majlis-i-Shura to Pakistan, an advisory council at the federal level 
comprised of nominated members whose job was to legislate and essentially perform 
the role of the National Assembly. Consisting of 288 members, the Majlis-i-Shura 
represented the regime’s attempts to lure sections of the established political elite to 
its side with the offer of patronage; the fact that most of those who joined were 
members of the landed classes, and even included a contingent from the PPP, simply 
reflected the way in which the bargain between the military and the landed elite had 
been renewed (Laporte Jr., 1985; Jalal, 1994, 176). That these groups would support 
the Zia-ul-Haq regime was also not surprising given the overt hostility that had 
existed between Bhutto and many of the more powerful landed factions in Punjab 
(Kennedy, 1985). When assembly elections were finally held in 1985, albeit on a non-
party basis, the representatives who were elected were overwhelmingly drawn from 
the propertied classes, with the vast majority of these being landlords from Punjab and 
Sindh (Rizvi, 1986; Noman, 1989).  
After the death of General Zia in 1988 and the end of formal military rule, 
many of the politicians nurtured by the regime re-emerged under the banner of the IJI, 
a grouping of landed interests, capitalists, and right-wing religious parties that would 
come to constitute the main source of opposition to a resurgent PPP, itself host to 
elements drawn from the traditional political elite. The decade of democratization that 
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ensued bore witness to the rise and fall of four national governments (as well as three 
caretaker regimes), felled not only by behind-the-scenes interventions from the 
military in the areas of national security and foreign policy (Shafqat, 1997; Jalal, 
1999a; Hossain, 2000), but also by factional in-fighting and opportunistic political 
manoeuvring, with floor-crossing and defections by politicians at the provincial and 
national levels facilitating the covert machinations of the Establishment (Waseem, 
1992; Rais, 1997; Syed, 1997; Waseem, 2006).178  
The coup that brought General Musharraf to power was followed by assembly 
elections in 2002. In a departure from the pattern adopted by his predecessors, 
Musharraf lifted the traditional post-coup ban on political parties relatively quickly, 
allowing them to compete in the parliamentary elections. Similarly, even though the 
first round of local government elections under Musharraf was contested on the 
traditional non-party basis, the second round in 2005 was not. Despite its greater 
tolerance for political parties, however, the Musharraf regime engaged in the same 
kinds of manipulation that had characterised previous military governments. After 
unleashing a wave of repression that resulted in the arrest or exile of politicians 
opposed to the regime, the government set about creating a new, pro-Musharraf party 
comprised of defectors from the PML-N and the PPP, both of which were the largest 
political parties at the time. The party that was subsequently formed was called the 
PML-Q which, in association with a grouping of religious parties known as the 
MMA, formed the bulk of Musharraf’s support within and outside parliament. Once 
again, the combination of repression and state patronage yielded organs of 
representative government that were filled with members of the old political elite, 
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chief amongst which were the landed classes of Punjab (Zaidi, 2003; Ansari and 
Moten, 2003; Waseem, 2005).  
 Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, and Pervez Musharraf, all presided over roughly 
decade-long military regimes. While their initial ascents to power were rooted in the 
historically institutionalised dominance of the military over civilian political actors in 
Pakistan, all three dictators realised early on in their regimes that governance, and the 
containment of opposition, were activities that necessarily required support from 
society. In each case, the very same autonomy that provided the military with the 
capacity and insularity necessary to take control also constrained its ability to do so 
legitimately, resulting in an inevitable rapprochement with the very same political 
actors that it replaced. In an era of electoral politics and universal franchise, where 
repression entailed high costs and engendered domestic resistance along with 
international opprobrium, Pakistan’s military rulers sought to bend democratic 
mechanisms towards the purpose of strengthening their regimes. In doing so, they 
found willing partners in the shape of the traditional political elite, foremost amongst 
whom the landed elite of Punjab provided the social and economic resources needed 
to effectively ensure order in at the local, provincial and national levels. Even though 
other groups, such as the industrial capitalists and the religious right, would also 
become part of the military’s ruling coalition over time, the primarily urban roots of 
these actors would relegate them to a secondary electoral position relative to the 
landed politicians who could manage the predominantly rural populace.  
Through coercion and the provision of patronage, the military consequently 
aligned itself with various factions of the landed elite at different points in time, 
playing individual leaders and parties off against each other while simultaneously 
ensuring that the foundations of support for military rule, rooted in the co-optation of 
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the propertied classes, were maintained. By putting in place rules to govern the 
democratic arena that enabled the continued return of representatives from the landed 
elite, the military ensured that, despite the factionalism amongst the landed elite, the 
state retained a clear, propertied class character. The mechanisms that had 
underpinned the reproduction of landed power in Punjab under colonialism were thus 
reinforced by repeated rounds of military intervention, and provided the landed 
classes with the opportunity to further entrench themselves within the framework of 
politics.  
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to provide an explanation for the 
circumstances under which the bargain between the state and the landlord was re-
established during the regime of Ayub Khan. When he came to power, General Ayub 
Khan attempted to challenge the traditional order of politics, seeking to dislodge the 
agrarian elite in an attempt to initiate a more efficient, if not more participatory, 
model of politics. However, hamstrung by the same constraints that had characterised 
British attempts at governing Punjab, Ayub had no choice but to co-opt the support of 
landed elites who, drawing on their institutional position, were able to adapt to survive 
the regime’s attempts to dismantle their power. Furthermore, the very same 
factionalism which prevented the landed elite from effectively exerting their influence 
autonomously of the state served to provide the military establishment with a means 
through which to ensure the continued support of at least parts of the traditional elite 
even in periods of antagonistic political activity. Ultimately, this would have the 
effect of both facilitating authoritarianism over the decades, and ensuring the 
protection of the interests of the landed elite as a class. 
 221
CHAPTER 7: Reproducing Landed Power in Post-
colonial Punjab 
Introduction 
 
 In the last chapter, the re-entrenchment of the state-landlord bargain was 
explained in terms how authoritarian regimes seeking legitimacy turned to the landed 
elite for support. This chapter continues to focus on the mechanisms underpinning the 
reproduction of the state-landlord bargain over time, emphasising how the landed elite 
in Punjab have been able to use their position as recipients of state patronage to 
reinforce their position and pursue their interests, thereby increasing their utility to the 
state and further entrenching themselves within the broader framework of politics. 
The chapter focuses in particular on three main mechanisms of reproduction. Firstly, 
it examines how electoral and party politics in post-colonial Pakistan has contributed 
to reinforcing landed power, explaining how the enduring power of the landed elite 
and the constraints imposed by a predominantly rural electorate have resulted in the 
landed elite establishing their position as indispensable electoral assets. This will be 
followed by an analysis of the ways in which the landed elite have continued to use 
networks of bureaucratic power as a mechanism for ensuring their continued access to 
state patronage, and to dispense it at the local level. Finally, the chapter concludes 
with a detailed examination of the landed elite’s use of legislative power to protect 
and pursue their interests; in particular, attention will be paid to how the landed elite 
have successfully circumvent successive attempts at land reform, thus maintaining 
their control over the source of their social and economic power, and at imposing an 
agricultural income tax that would have hurt the pursuit of their economic interests. 
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The Electoral Race to the Bottom and the Class Composition of 
Pakistan’s Political Parties 
 
 By successfully aligning themselves with Pakistan’s different military 
regimes, landed politicians in Punjab were able to sustain their political power and 
influence in periods of authoritarian rule over long stretches of time characterised by a 
lack of elections, representative government, and party politics. The ability of the 
landed classes to do this was rooted in their enduring economic and social power at 
the local level, as well as their ability to manipulate their networks of patronage in 
pursuit of their interests. However, the very same attributes that made landed 
politicians such a vital asset for military regimes would also hold true for civilian 
parties and governments seeking to win elections, gain legitimacy, and stave off 
potential challengers.  
When Ayub Khan banned political parties and temporarily excised these 
landed politicians from formal politics at the start of his tenure, his measures had the 
effect of dismantling extant party apparatuses without really impinging on the power 
of the politicians he ostensibly opposed. This can be seen by the fate of the Muslim 
League, whose funds were first frozen by the federal government in 1958, and again 
in 1970 when the CoML was forced to forfeit its own funds after the re-imposition of 
martial law under General Yahya Khan. Almost twenty years later, in response to a 
letter from Shaukat Hayat Khan, now president of a re-constituted Muslim League, 
the Interior Ministry confirmed that the funds could not be returned because any party 
now formed, regardless of the name it took, would be treated as if it were an entirely 
new entity.179 The Muslim League was not the only party to be deprived of its 
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funding, with the same fate befalling all the other parties as well when martial law 
was imposed and parties were banned. Additionally, many political leaders and 
workers were also incarcerated and persecuted, particularly when they refused to 
acquiesce to the new political dispensation. The result of this was that when parties 
were re-allowed by Ayub Khan, they lacked established organizational apparatuses 
and identities. While this was arguably not true for parties like the Jamaat-i-Islami, 
whose clearly defined ideology and politically committed cadre allowed it to emerge 
relatively unscathed as an organised body, the larger, national-level parties in West 
Pakistan were necessarily cobbled together on the basis of factional loyalties; 
membership with the CML and the CoML was defined primarily by pro- or anti-Ayub 
sentiment, rather than any broader party programme, and was in any case subject to 
change depending on the regime’s willingness to include previously disqualified or 
marginalised politicians.  
 More important, however, were the electoral calculations that went into the 
selection and recruitment of members for these parties. The necessity of recruiting 
landed elites was not simply linked to their proven capacity to mobilize support at the 
local level; it was also a reflection of nature of the Pakistani (and Punjabi) electorate. 
Indeed, in 1951, only 17.8% of the population of West Pakistan lived in urban areas, 
with this percentage increasing only slightly to 22.5% in 1961 (Philips Jr., 1964, 37). 
The demographic reality of Pakistan’s rural electorate was accentuated by the way in 
which both rounds of BD elections under Ayub Khan were designed to exploit this 
rural bias, exemplified by how nearly all of the otherwise urban parts of Punjab were 
lumped together with large swathes of countryside when electoral constituencies were 
                                                                                                                                            
were made by the PPP against the IJI in the late 1980s and early 1990s. At the time of writing this 
thesis in early 2012, these accusations were being confirmed by a Supreme Court hearing into alleged 
electoral misconduct during this time period. 
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delimited.180 Gerrymandering in this fashion was not something that was new to 
Punjab; in addition to the state, many of these landowners themselves used the local 
level machinery of the state to shape the electoral environment in a way that would be 
of benefit to them. An example of this can be found in the 1952 elections to the 
District Boards in Sargodha, which were the subject of a rare official enquiry due to 
allegations of electoral misconduct on the part of the incumbents. As noted in the 
report, there was ‘little room for doubt that the Daultana Ministry had drawn up a plan 
of winning the Local Bodies’ elections by hook or by crook’ (Leghari, 1954, 3), with 
the mechanisms adopted for doing so being the amendment of electoral rules, and the 
re-drawing of electoral constituencies to favour particular candidates. Much more 
recently, the transition to democracy following the end of the Zia regime was 
accompanied by the creation of new districts ‘under political influence’ to ensure that 
local level politicians could have easier access to state patronage and more direct 
control over the administrative apparatus in their areas (Shafqat, 2002, 218). 
Ultimately, shaping electoral constituencies to favour rural politicians had the effect 
of diluting an urban vote not as amenable to control as the rural one.  
 The Ayub regime’s success in co-opting landowning politicians to its side in a 
predominantly rural electorate posed a dilemma for opposition parties seeking to 
challenge the regime. Given the regime’s demonstrated commitment to the pursuit of 
the interests of the propertied classes, and it willingness to work with politicians that it 
itself had expended considerable energy on discrediting, one possible route to 
electoral success would have been to rely on new candidates, potentially drawn from 
the subordinate classes, to campaign on a relatively progressive platform of socio-
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many of Punjab’s cities were joined with villages located around them. In fact, with the exception of a 
few constituencies in Lahore, there were no purely ‘urban’ constituencies in Punjab. Election 
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economic change. In some respects, as will be discussed in the next chapter, this is 
precisely what Bhutto was able to do in the 1970 elections, albeit under very specific 
historical circumstances. By and large, though, opposition parties under Ayub chose 
instead to rely on traditional politics to establish their political power. The reasons for 
this were twofold; firstly, the regime’s opponents were, for the most part, drawn from 
the same class background as the regime’s supporters. The CoML, for example, was 
mainly a party of landed interests, with its opposition to the regime being dictated 
more by the factionalism of Punjab’s politics than any principled opposition to 
dictatorship.  
Secondly, however, was the fact that at the local level, even in the 
contemporary period, kinship and economic power (Alavi, 1974), as well as the 
historically reinforced role played by landlords in resolving disputes, mediating 
interactions with courts and the police, providing credit and economic support, and 
delivering access to the state and public services, continues to form basis for landed 
power (Chaudhry, 1999; Lyon, 2004; Cheema and Mohmand, 2007, Nelson, 2011). 
Not choosing an elite platform for politics brought with it the risk of political 
marginalisation. The established capacity of landed politicians to monopolize votes at 
multiple levels of representative government through the use of their historically 
reinforced position and resources meant that the chances of a non-landed candidate 
prevailing in the rural electoral arena were slim at best. This was a problem 
compounded by the nature of the parties themselves; lacking a strong organizational 
apparatus as well as a defining ideology or policy programme, both as a result of the 
Ayub regime’s attempt to dismantle the party system, new parties were inevitably 
forced to rely on the localized power of individual politicians to capture votes. 
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 In a real sense, therefore, political parties in Pakistan found themselves 
engaged in an electoral race of the bottom, continually seeking to co-opt landed 
factions in an attempt to strengthen their electoral chances. Repeated episodes of 
military rule would only serve to strengthen this tendency, as these governments 
would inevitably ban or curtail the activities of established parties, thereby preventing 
them from maturing as organizations even as pliant landed elites aligned themselves 
with the military in order to strengthen themselves. The ability of landed politicians to 
adapt to, and even strengthen their power under, military governments, even as parties 
as organizations suffered tremendously, only reinforced the electoral indispensability 
of these traditional elites in periods of ‘democratic’ government. Attempts by 
successive governments to preserve, and even enhance, the enduringly rural nature of 
the electorate confirm this fact. For example, in the run-up to the elections of 1977, 
there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Bhutto government, having by then 
thrown in its lot with landed politicians, actively sought to manipulate the delineation 
of electoral constituencies in a way that would favour rural politicians in league with 
the regime.181 Even in the contemporary period, the constituencies drawn up for the 
elections of 2008 reflected the same kind of rural bias that had existed in 1962, with 
only 25% of constituencies for the National Assembly being purely urban, even 
though approximately 36% of the population was now estimated to live in cities. Of 
the remaining constituencies, approximately 49% were purely rural, while the 
remaining 25% were semi-urban constituencies in which urban centres, both small 
and large, were paired with surrounding villages that, more often than not, contained a 
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larger number of voters than the cities, towns, and fragments of both that they were 
linked to.182 
 The utility of the landed elite to Pakistan’s parties is also demonstrated by an 
examination of their class composition. As show by Maniruzzaman (1966), nearly 
80% of legislators in Punjab in 1952 were members of the traditional landed 
aristocracy. Between 1985 and 1997, there was little evidence to suggest that this 
situation had changed in any significant fashion, as shown by the evidence presented 
by Shafqat (1998) on the class composition of the National Assembly, reproduced in 
Table 7 below. 
 1985 1988 1990 1993 1997 
Landlords and Tribal 
Leaders 
157 156 106 129 126 
Businessmen/Industrialists 54 20 38 37 39 
Urban Professionals 18 9 46 26 32 
Religious Leaders 6 15 11 8 3 
Retired Military Officers 0 7 3 5 2 
Other 3 0 3 3 2 
Total 238 207 207 207 207 
Table 7: Socio-Economic characteristics of National Assembly Members, 1985-1997 
 
 Unfortunately, Shafqat does not cite the source of his data, which makes it 
difficult to ascertain whether or not there were any cases of overlap in this period 
between the categories of landlord and industrialist. Nonetheless the fact remains that 
throughout this period, including a decade of purely democratic rule, leadership of 
Pakistan’s most powerful political parties remained firmly in the hands of the 
propertied classes, with the landed elite being the single largest group within this 
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maps provided on the website of the Election Commission of Pakistan 
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‘rural’ and ‘urban’ in Pakistan means that over 50% of the population might now qualify as urban. 
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category. At the provincial level, comparable data on the class composition of the 
Provincial Assemblies during this period is not readily available. However, using data 
provided on the website of the Punjab Provincial Assembly, it is possible to see that 
the legislators elected to office in 2008 displayed economic and social backgrounds 
that are not dissimilar to those presented above, and which do not represent a 
significant departure from the claims that 80% and 63.3% of Punjab’s legislators were 
drawn from the landed elite in 1951 and 1972 respectively (Maniruzzaman, 1966; 
Jones, 2003, 488). This data is given in Table 8. 
  
Profession  
Agriculturalist 82 
Businessmen/Industrialists 59 
Urban Professionals 51 
Others 23 
Total 219 
Table 8: Profession of members of the Punjab Assembly, 2008183 
 
 It is worth noting that these statistics do not present a complete picture of the 
class composition of the Punjab Assembly for two reasons. First, the information is 
incomplete, as details have not been provided for 150 members of the assembly. 
Second, as noted in some of the profiles of individual members, the categories of 
‘businessman’ and ‘agriculturalist’ often overlap. The net result of this is that despite 
decades of economic change in Punjab, with the growth of both cities and industry, 
traditional landed elites have been able to retain their control over political parties and 
the representative organs of government. This finding is one that is not restricted to 
the national and provincial legislatures, as confirmed by Akhtar et al. (2007) in their 
research on the socio-economic profile of elected representatives at the local level. 
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 One final factor that can help to explain the continued dominance of landed 
politicians in the party system deals with the institutional design of electoral politics 
in Punjab. Having inherited a first past the post electoral system from the colonial 
government, Punjabi party politics remained a two-party system as predicted by 
Duverger’s Law (Duverger, 1954). While national level politics has proven to be 
much more fragmented, largely due to the emergence of strong ethnic parties like the 
ANP and MQM in the smaller provinces (not to mention Bengal’s Awami League 
prior to 1971), Punjab itself has rarely had more than two major parties competing in 
elections. Even in situations where opposition parties have coalesced together against 
incumbents, as was the case with the Muslim League governments of the 1950s, or 
the Bhutto regime, more often than not these opposition coalitions haved remained 
dominated by single formations of landed interests, with smaller parties from the 
religious right and the Left remaining largely marginal to actual electoral politics. 
This was also true in the 1990s, when the PPP and the IJI/PML-N were the only two 
parties capable of winning sufficient seats to form provincial governments, albeit 
sometimes with the support of much smaller parties and factions of independents. The 
tendency of Punjabi politics to gravitate towards two-partyism has had the effect of 
erecting barriers to entry for new parties seeking to challenge the status quo, and the 
winner-takes-all nature of the voting system has reinforced the need to field 
candidates possessing the potential to actually win in their constituencies. Once again, 
given the rural nature of the electorate, the voting system itself has served to 
incentivize political parties to recruit landlords to their fold.  
 The electoral race to the bottom that has been described above has extremely 
important implications for democratization in Pakistan. Although their electoral 
importance derives from their continuing ability to mobilize support at the local level, 
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the entrenchment of the landed elite in party politics has provided them with a 
mechanism through which to reinforce their formal political power and, consequently, 
their capacity to more effectively pursue their interests as individual politicians, and 
as a class. Over time, reliance on the landed elite for electoral support has only 
deepened as the costs of selecting alternative candidates in the countryside have 
increased. In turn, these landed politicians have used their position within the party 
system to further develop the very same attributes that have made them so essential to 
the electoral process, thereby setting up a cycle of dependence from which parties 
have largely been unable to escape. Just as the path dependent nature of institutional 
development put in motion by the colonial government solidified the position of 
landed politicians within Punjab’s politics, similar mechanisms of entrenchment and 
reinforcement have underpinned the capture of Pakistan’s political parties by the 
Punjabi landed elite. 
 
Networks of Power and Patronage 
 
“By way of gift, something is to be given by the ruling party to its 
friends. There is my friend, the embodiment of generosity, Kazi 
Fazlullah Sahib. He has appointed his friend Jatoi Sahib as President 
of the Local Board of Dadu. Now everybody knows that Jatoi Sahib 
will be re-elected as a member of the Assembly; he had just to give 
him a gift. If the cousin of Abdul Hamid Jatoi is appointed as 
President of the Municipality, where is the harm; it is a gift to a friend. 
If another friend of Kazi Sahib, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, is appointed 
President of the Local Board, Nawabshah, where is the harm. It is also 
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a gift and a friend will be elected… if gifts are distributed, we should 
not grudge the Government this distribution of gifts. That is after all 
what they have got in their hands”.184 
 
 During the colonial period, the vertical chains of patronage that linked the 
local to provincial and national politics were buttressed by linkages between the 
landed elite and the colonial state apparatus. As shown in previous chapters, a 
significant portion of the Punjabi bureaucracy was drawn from the agriculturalist 
biraderis, and military recruitment from the province also disproportionately favoured 
these groups. The net result of this was to create a situation in which landed 
politicians seeking to mobilise support or pursue their own interests could call upon 
their networks within both the military and bureaucracy to do so. Following 
independence in 1947, it was this very fact that was at least partially responsible for 
the dominance of landed politicians in the West Pakistani government; the military-
bureaucratic establishment was overwhelmingly Punjabi, and remained sympathetic to 
the very same Punjabi landlords that it had worked with so closely under the 
British.185 
 While this situation has changed to an extent, most notably after the 1970s 
following administrative reforms by the Bhutto government that opened the 
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(Jaffrelot, 2002; Adeney and Wyatt, 2004).   
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bureaucracy up to increased recruitment from the smaller provinces, as well as the 
middle classes (Kennedy, 1982; Islam, 1989), the fundamental nature of the 
bureaucracy as a source of patronage to be accessed and distributed by the political 
elite has remained constant. Personal ties of loyalty and kinship continue to provide 
the basis for rent-seeking and preferential access to the state (Nadvi, 2002; Islam, 
2004), with the bureaucracy’s broader recruitment base making it less insular and 
more open to clientelism (Cheema and Sayeed, 2006), thus increasing the capacity of 
the state to dispense patronage to different social groups, and for the urban middle 
classes to exercise greater amounts of political power (Jalal, 1994; Akhtar, 2010a). In 
the countryside, however, local landed influentials have largely retained their role as 
the primary sources of access to the state, and have continued to use their power to 
reinforce this position by providing services and negotiating with the state on behalf 
of their subordinates (Cheema and Mohmand, 2007). The link between landed power 
and the state in Punjab also continues to be influenced by the nature of recruitment 
into the military. Even though the military, like the bureaucracy, has widened access 
to include groups outside of the traditional landed elite, it remains an institution with 
roots in the Punjabi countryside (Dewey, 1991a). 
 In order to understand the precise mechanisms through which the relationship 
between the Punjabi landed elite and the state has reinforced and reproduced the 
power of both actors over time, it is useful to begin by noting how, even in the 
contemporary period, the landed elite remain bound to the state by family ties. In his 
analysis of Punjabi politics in the years leading up to Bhutto’s electoral victory in 
1970, Baxter (1974) made the observation that, in addition to having a significant 
number of family members who had previously or currently been involved in politics, 
many of the landed politicians of Punjab had family members who occupied top 
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positions in the bureaucracy, military, and industry. Where these ties did not involve 
direct family, marriage was used as a strategy through which different landed 
politicians and factions could maximize the size and geographical spread of their 
networks. This point is also made by Sayeed (1972, 391), Alam (1974), and LaFrance 
(2002), who all argue that that the alliance between urban bureaucrats, military elites, 
and dominant economic groups is one cemented not only through the exchange of 
patronage, but also through marriage. These findings broadly hold true for the current 
crop of Punjabi legislators as well.186 The vast majority Assembly members have 
relatives who have held elected office, and many also have direct familial links to the 
bureaucracy and military. Significantly, these links are not always restricted to the 
upper echelons of government, nor are they necessarily restricted to the constituencies 
of the legislators themselves; many of the relatives of these legislators have been 
involved in local government, and these ties have often been spread out over 
significant parts of Punjab, if not Pakistan. 
 The implications of this for the exercise of landed power are clear. In his work 
on class in Punjab, Ahmad (1973) noted that part of the power the traditional 
aristocracy held over the subordinate classes was linked to the size and cohesion of 
their networks; tenants or workers seeking to leave one village for another would 
often find themselves receiving unsympathetic treatment from neighbouring landlords 
with ties to those in their original village. By cultivating direct links with 
functionaries in the bureaucracy and military, the landed elite are able to ensure that 
their control is maintained not only through the exercise of their power within their 
own domains, but also through proxies performing different roles within and outside 
of the state.  
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bureaucracy. See  http://www.pap.gov.pk/index.php/members/stats/en/19. 
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 Marriage and family are not the only factors that have allowed Punjab’s 
landed politicians to maintain their networks of influence within the bureaucracy. The 
receipt and provision of patronage have also been key to this process, with the landed 
elite using their position as elected representatives to repay the military and 
bureaucracy for their services.  As was the case under colonialism, this has most often 
taken the form of land grants to different government and military personnel. 
Following Partition, the various bureaucratic committees and boards tasked with 
managing the evacuee property and allocating it to refugees were constantly criticised 
for cronyism as successive administrations used them as a tool through which to 
reward their subordinates (Niaz, 2010, 245-249). Similarly, when the Noon 
government was dissolved in 1955, one of the reasons cited for its dismissal was the 
corrupt way in which it, ‘had decided to allot land to all Major-Generals in the army, 
all Deputy Commissioners in the Punjab or their relatives and most members of the 
legislature. In addition, it was proposed to allot land to certain members of the High 
Court and Federal Court’.187 However, the fact that the Noon government had 
engaged in these activities was hardly a surprise. Indeed, as negotiations were being 
undertaken to finalise the One Unit scheme, a dispute arose between the Federal 
Government and Punjab over the right of the provincial government to allocate land 
which was to be brought under cultivation following the imminent expansion of the 
irrigation network.188 Given that the provincial governments of West Pakistan were to 
be merged into a single entity, the Governor-General had ordered all land allocations 
to be put on hold until the new government could take final decisions on them. In 
addition to the financial difficulties imposed on the provincial government by this 
decision, relating largely to how it impeded the government’s ability to lease out land 
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for short-term cultivation189, a number of objections to this were raised by the Punjab 
government, ranging from the, ‘categorical commitment to earmark an area of 
hundred thousand acres for men and officers of the armed forces’190, to the need to 
confer, ‘proprietary rights on holders of certain categories of grants… including 
lambardari grants’.191  
Conferring grants of land to select groups, particularly in the army and 
bureaucracy, was not something that was restricted to any one government or landed 
faction. Rather, it was a vital part of the process through which the landed elite used 
their position to strengthen their networks and reproduce their power, and represented 
the continuation of a practice that had been in place since the colonial era. Despite 
their acrimonious conflicts of interest with each other, the use of land as patronage by 
rival groups was something that was arguably seen by landed politicians as being 
inherent to the process of government in Punjab, and necessary for the perpetuation of 
their interests as a class. This was illustrated in a letter written by Firoz Khan Noon to 
the Finance Minister in response to the fear that many of the grants his government 
had already made would be reversed. Noon argued that, ‘whatever land was granted 
by Malik Khizar Hayat Tiwana at the time of elections and to which objection could 
have been taken, the Daultana ministry did not cancel any of these grants. Similarly, 
this ministry has not cancelled a single grant made by the Daultana ministry. 
Therefore… whatever land… has been allotted to people, the Central Government is 
honour bound not to cancel this192.’ 
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Using land as patronage would become common practice under both civilian 
and military governments, with a variety of different schemes being set up to award 
land to bureaucrats, army officials, and other groups whose support the regime in 
power would want to cultivate. For example, in the first five years of its rule, the 
Ayub Khan government conferred several thousand acres of land to some of the 
province’s highest ranking civil servants from departments including Health, 
Electricity and, ironically, Anti-Corruption.193 In 1968, in a village in Sialkot where 
many inhabitants had been displaced by a flood, it was revealed that during the 
process of resettlement, half of the land had now been allocated to military personnel, 
with the displaced persons being resettled elsewhere.194 In the same session of the 
Punjab Assembly, legislators were also informed that although the government had no 
plans to award any land to the province’s landless cultivators195, 37914 acres of land 
had been awarded to provincial-level bureaucrats, a further 10417 acres had been 
granted to national-level bureaucrats, and 56191 acres had been allocated to members 
of the three branches of the armed forces since 1960.196 At the start of the Bhutto 
government, a question asked in the Punjab Assembly showed that the practice of 
granting land to the military continued unabated, with a significant amount of prime 
agricultural land being allotted to serving and retired soldiers in the district of 
Sargodha.197 Furthermore, by 1975 the government had moved beyond just cultivating 
links with the military and bureaucracy, and had also started to award land to groups 
like lawyers and journalists.198  
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The landed elite have also cultivated their networks within the state by using 
their legislative power to directly reward a very particular set of government officials. 
The proceedings of the different Punjab Assemblies are replete with instances of 
landed politicians actively seeking to address the concerns of striking patwaris199, 
resolve disputes between the local revenue administration and the police200, increase 
patwari wages201, challenge the transferral and removal of patwaris202, and facilitate 
recruitment into local-level administrations on the basis of favouritism rather than 
merit.203 That legislators place such an emphasis on looking after the needs of 
members of the local revenue administration is not surprising; patwaris maintain 
exclusive access to records of land ownership and, therefore, play a fundamental role 
in determining the revenue landowners have to ultimately pay. Furthermore, in 
disputes over land, patwari records are key to any kind of adjudication or litigation. 
Without patwari support, it would not be possible for landlords to work with district 
and provincial administrations to manipulate the receipt and disbursement of funds 
and patronage (Nelson, 2011, 178). The power of Pakistan’s estimated 14000 
patwaris can be gauged not only by their ability to successfully block attempts at 
reforming an archaic revenue system (Qazi, 2006), but also by examining a revenue 
case from 1968 involving no less a personage than Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. In a case 
brought against Bhutto alleging that he had illegally acquired 500 acres of land, the 
entire matter was dropped once it was discovered that the single existing copy of the 
local patwari’s record of land rights could not be used as evidence because the entry 
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for Bhutto was not legible, making it impossible to determine if he owned 5 or 500 
acres of land in that particular area!204 
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 5, the institution that best embodied the nexus 
between the bureaucracy and the landed elite was that of the District Boards, which 
oversaw public works projects and development at the local level, and which would 
be replaced post-Partition by a variety of similar institutions. The first of these was the 
Village Industrial Development Programme, which was initiated in 1952 and 
envisaged a process of rural uplift that would be spearheaded by the bureaucracy at 
the local level. However, the plan would prove to be short-lived, partly due to tensions 
within the bureaucracy itself but also due to a lack of political commitment from the 
Muslim League (Burki, 1969, 327-329). This situation would change in 1959 with the 
initiation of the Rural Works Programme (RWP), a project that was envisaged by the 
Ayub Khan government as being a means through which to link the elected BD 
members to the bureaucracy at the local level in order to ensure the effective 
implementation of developmental policies. In the words of Burki (1969), who was the 
Director of the West Pakistan RWP, the plan ultimately led to the, ‘forging of an 
alliance between the Civil Service of Pakistan, West Pakistan’s landed aristocracy, 
and a group of foreign advisors working in the country’ (331). Essentially, when the 
Ayub Khan regime began its rapprochement with the landed elite in the early 1960s, 
the involvement of landed politicians with the RWP illustrated enduring capacity to 
shape local level politics while also allowing them to use the programme as a means 
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through which to distribute patronage, with the help of the bureaucracy, and claim 
credit for any developmental progress that took place. Like the District Boards, very 
large amounts of funding were placed at the disposal of the RWP, with Rs. 
232,655,000 being spent on social welfare, agriculture, education, health, sanitation, 
communication, irrigation, and other areas between 1963 and 1966 (Burki, 1969, 
337). For Burki, the ability to influence the way in which these resources were used 
played a very important role in reinforcing the power of the landed elite during the 
Ayub years.  
Although the RWP came to an end with the Ayub regime, its successor, the 
People’s Works Programme (PWP) would perform a similar role under Bhutto, as 
would the Integrated Rural Development (IRD) Programme under Zia, with provincial 
and national-level legislators being given a direct role in the management of the local 
organisations charged with rural development (Waseem, 1982, 230). Indeed, by 1985, 
legislators had been provided with annual grants worth Rs. 5 million, channelled 
through the district administration, for use on ‘local development’. More often than 
not, these funds were either appropriated by politicians themselves, or used to 
cultivate support through the disbursement of patronage (Shafqat, 2002, 216). More 
recent experiments with local government and rural development have yielded similar 
results. Under Musharraf, the Local Government Plan’s provisions for the creation of 
associations for participatory development in individual villages remained hamstrung 
by bureaucratic control and elite influence (Cheema and Mohmand, 2007; Akhtar et 
al., 2007). As such, while the exact specifications of each of these schemes would 
differ, their fundamental character remained unchanged; rather than facilitating 
community-based, participatory development, these organizations would remain 
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under bureaucratic control, and would essentially be, ‘communication channels 
between the local bureaucracy and the landlord factions’ (Waseem, 1982, 233).  
Where political parties and the organs of representative government have 
provided the landed elite with an important means through which to acquire access to 
state patronage, their links with the bureaucracy and the military have allowed for the 
perpetuation of the mechanisms that have underpinned the reproduction of their power 
at the local level. Since independence, Punjab’s landed politicians have remained tied 
to the state by blood and treasure, deploying their own power and influence to curry 
favour with state functionaries in exchange for services related to the protection of 
their economic interests, the persecution of their rivals, and the pursuit of their 
political goals. That this relationship between the state and the landed elite bears 
considerable resemblance to that which existed under colonialism is yet another 
illustration of the path dependent nature of landed power in Punjab; the nexus 
between local bureaucrats and landlords, and the use of state institutions for the 
pursuit of their common goals, was a system put in place by the colonial government 
and subsequently reproduced in a post-colonial context in which the state did not 
experience a significant rupture with the previous model of administration. The 
reciprocal nature of the relationship between the state and the landed elite has only 
deepened over time. 
Legislative Power 
 
“There are days when I hear capitalists speak the language of Socialists 
and there are days when I hear Socialists speak the language of 
capitalists. If there is anything which touches the pocket of the rich, then 
party discipline is thrown to the winds, and adequate time is given for 
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discussion on the floor of the House. If there is any matter that affects the 
interests of the poor, then party discipline is invoked, and graveyard 
silence prevails in this House”.205  
 
 After independence, Pakistan was governed using the Government of India 
Act of 1935, with many of the laws enshrined in this document either being retained 
in their entirety, or used as a template for subsequent legislation, even after the 
promulgation of the Constitution of 1956.  The institutional implications of this for 
Punjab can be seen in how modified versions of the Punjab Revenue and Tenancy 
Acts remained in place until the late 1990s, and the Alienation of Land Act, while not 
always enforced, remained on the statue books in an essentially unchanged form. 
While there were some significant legal changes, most notably with the introduction 
of laws aimed at bringing rules of female inheritance in line with Islamic teachings, 
the landed elite possessed the capacity to exploit loopholes in these laws, or even 
evade them altogether, thus ultimately lessening their impact (Nelson, 2011). The 
same was true for questions of land reform and taxation; in both cases, landed 
legislators used their influence to circumvent or dilute measures that directly 
impinged upon their economic power. By focusing on the laws related to Land 
Reform, as well on the failure to impose an Agricultural Income Tax in Punjab, this 
section will show precisely how legislative power was used by the landed elite to 
shape the environment in which they could pursue their economic interests, thereby 
reinforcing their power as a class.  
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Land Reforms 
 Despite the fact that it was a party of pre-dominantly landed interests, the 
Muslim League, and its urban leadership in particular, understood the political capital 
to be gained from the idea of agrarian reform. The League’s 1944 ‘Memorandum on 
Economic Development’206 openly attacked zamindars and while stopping short of 
calling for the expropriation of their land, nonetheless outlined a commitment to a 
more equitable rural economy. Following independence, the Agrarian Committee of 
the Muslim league produced a report on Land Reform in Pakistan in 1949 which 
declared that, ‘Landlordism in Pakistan is a historical accident which has already 
conferred vast advantages and profits on generations of its beneficiaries’207, and 
claimed that, ‘no time could be more ripe or propitious for the introduction of 
substantial agrarian reforms’.208 This document, whose authors included Mian 
Mumtaz Daultana209, made a number of recommendations for agrarian reform, 
ranging from the abolition of jagirs and a reduction in size of the holdings of large 
landowners, to measures aimed at providing tenants with increased security of tenure 
and routes through which to eventually claim ownership of land. To this day, the 
report of the Muslim League’s agrarian committee remains, ‘one of the most 
progressive documents on the subject of land reforms in Pakistan’ (Chaudhry et al., 
1987, 18).  
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 It is interesting to note that Daultana, particularly in his early years as a member of the Muslim 
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during his time in government. In office, however, he would go on to prove Governor Mudie correct in 
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Minister, File No. 2(2)/PMS/49, ‘Correspondence with the Governor West Punjab’, Prime Minister’s 
Secretariat, 10 January 1949, NDC. 
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Despite the report’s emphasis on the need for action, spurred on by the 
imperatives of acquiring legitimacy in the Pakistani countryside, it would be ten years 
before Pakistan would undertake its first attempt at land reforms. In the interim, the 
Pakistani government was faced with the task of distributing about 7 million acres 
worth of evacuee property amongst the refugees streaming in from India. This land, 
which amounted to almost 18% of the total cropped area at the time, presented the 
state with the opportunity to effect the kind of redistribution of land that would go 
towards addressing the historical inequalities that had thus far characterized agrarian 
social relations. As part of this process, Punjab saw the allocation of 2,444,681 acres 
of land to 2,281,881 refugees by March 1949, with an additional 1.5 million acres 
being allocated by 1950 (Andrus and Mohammad, 1958, 469). However, rather than 
resulting in alteration of the established agrarian power structure, the process of 
resettlement was one riven with corruption and the old model of patronage politics; 
landowners, of both the refugee and settled variety, were able to appropriate much of 
this land, with the eventual patterns of ownership established mirroring those that had 
existed prior to partition (Waseem, 2004; Gazdar, 2009).  
This pattern was repeated in future attempts at agrarian reform. When Ayub 
Khan assumed power, one of his first actions was to introduce land reforms by using 
his martial law powers to bypass the political process and act on recommendations 
made by the Land Reforms Commission of 1959. Nonetheless, Ayub’s reforms failed 
to make a significant change to patterns of landownership and control in Pakistan. A 
similar fate would befall the next attempt at land reform as well, with these being 
implemented in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who, not coincidentally, was able to go 
ahead with the project by using powers that had been given to him as Pakistan’s first, 
and only, Civilian Martial Law Administrator. A third set of reforms, which the 
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Bhutto government initiated in 1977, would only be partially implemented before 
Zia-ul-Haq’s military coup brought an end to the process. At this point, much of the 
limited change that had been accomplished would be brought to a halt, as a raft of 
legal challenges led to previous attempts at land reform being declared un-Islamic 
and, hence, illegal in Pakistan (Kennedy, 1993; Lau, 2006, 189-193; Nelson, 2011). 
As has been comprehensively established by the literature on Pakistan’s land reforms, 
the reasons for their lack of success are manifold, but can ultimately be traced to the 
nature of the reforms themselves, the ability of landowners to circumvent the 
measures introduced, and the political importance of the landed elite to the 
governments of Ayub Khan and the PPP. 
According to Herring (1979; 1983), the entire model of land reform in 
Pakistan was one that sought to limit individual ownership and push landowners 
towards capitalist, entrepreneurial farming, rather than effecting the redistribution of 
land itself. This was largely a result of the approach taken by the different reports that 
preceded the implementation of these reforms; while acknowledging the need to 
correct the economic and social imbalance created by the inequitable distribution of 
land, the state’s firm commitment to protecting private property and promoting 
capitalist development precluded the implementation of more radical measures. By 
the mid-1950s, planners had begun to differentiate between the stagnant, parasitic 
landlordism that was often referred to as ‘feudalism’, and the more progressive 
process of capital accumulation and reinvestment associated with modern capitalist 
farming (Herring, 1979). To the extent that tenancy reform was on the agenda, 
inasmuch as traditional landlord-tenant relations were seen as being outmoded from 
an economic perspective as well as unjust, the assumption that underpinned planning 
was that incremental attempts at introducing pro-tenant regulations, when coupled 
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with limits to landownership, would slowly rectify the imbalance of power in the 
countryside. When Ayub Khan introduced his reforms under Martial Law Regulation 
64 (MLR 64), this was the logic that informed the law. The same was largely true in 
1972 of MLR 115, the instrument through which Bhutto introduced his first set of 
reforms. Land reform in Pakistan was always seen as an economic project rather than 
a political one, with the need to boost productivity trumping any desire to ensure the 
reduction of landed power (Gazdar, 2009). 
The exact details of the reform programmes show the extent to which their 
impact would have remained limited even if they had been implemented properly 
which, as will be discussed below, was not the case. Under MLR 64, the limits to 
landownership imposed were individual holdings of either 500 acres of irrigated land, 
or 1000 acres of non-irrigated land (or a total of 36,000 PIUs). 210 These ceilings were 
many times greater than the average landholding size in Pakistan and, indeed, above 
the official subsistence level of 12.5 acres per household, but were nonetheless 
viewed as being optimal for capitalist agriculture. Additionally, many caveats and 
loopholes were included in the regulations, including exceptions being made for the 
ownership of large orchards and mechanisms being included through which large 
gifts of land could be made to family members. All of this meant that despite the 
existence of an official ceiling, it was not uncommon for individual landowners to 
have holdings of up to 80,000 PIUs, and for entire landed estates to be maintained 
intact through their redistribution within landholding families (Rashid, 1985). Most 
importantly of all, MLR 64 provided for the payment of compensation to landlords 
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 PIU, or Production Index Unit, was a measure used by the government to gauge the productivity of 
land based on crop yields. The variable character of PIUs, in addition to the number of inputs that went 
into calculating them, meant that these figures were often distorted by landlords seeking to mask the 
true size and worth of their holdings. For this reason, landlords using PIU calculations would often be 
able to hold on to land far in excess of the ceiling as defined in acres. See Hussain (1989). 
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from whom land was acquired, and also required that tenants who were allotted land 
would have to pay for it.  
When MLR 115 was introduced in 1972, it appeared on paper to be more 
radical than its predecessor in a number of important ways. While the ceilings of 150 
acres of irrigated, or 300 acres of non-irrigated, land still reflected the logic of 
creating individual farms of a size suitable for effective capitalist farming, these limits 
were much smaller than the ones Ayub Khan attempted to enforce.211 Also, unlike 
MLR 64, the land resumed under these reforms was simply appropriated by the state 
without compensation, was allotted to tenants without any payment, and was coupled 
with tenancy regulations that sought to prevent the eviction of cultivating tenants 
without good reason. Perhaps most significant was the role played by the Federal 
Land Commission (FLC) in this process; aware of the way in which landed families 
had evaded MLR 64 by transferring land amongst themselves, Bhutto appointed the 
FLC to investigate all transfers of land between 1967 and 1971 in an attempt to 
reverse transactions that had been designed to avoid the impact of the reforms. The 
reforms of 1977 would have gone even further, setting a ceiling of 100 acres of 
irrigated and 200 acres of non-irrigated land, albeit with the provision of 
compensation to affected landlords. However, the figures on the actual amounts of 
land resumed under MLR 64 and MLR 115 indicate the redistributive impact of the 
measures remained incredibly limited. The statistics on the amount of land resumed 
and awarded in Pakistan are given in Table 9 below. 
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 For a detailed overview of the as yet un-resolved debate over ‘optimal’ farm size for agriculture in 
Pakistan, see Herring (1983) and Hussain (1988).  
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Table 9: Land Resumed and Distributed in Pakistan under MLR 64 and MLR 115212 
 
A number of points need to be borne in mind when considering these figures. 
Firstly, the existence of strong links between the landed elite and local level revenue 
officials meant that many landowners were able to evade the reforms altogether. 
Through the exploitation of legal loopholes and the outright falsification of 
documents and measurements, the landed elite were often able to minimize the impact 
of the reforms, with the process being facilitated by the bureaucracy (Chaudhry and 
Herring, 1974, 110-115). Therefore, while there certainly were instances where land 
was appropriated from large landowners, the ability to manipulate the implementation 
of the reforms was a key mechanism through which the landed elite ensured that the 
agrarian structure remained fundamentally unchanged. Secondly, as can be seen from 
the number of beneficiaries, the average amount of land given to individual recipients 
was very small; under MLR 64, this amounted to barely 4 acres per head, while MLR 
115 gave approximately 10 acres. Given that these sizes were still below the 
subsistence level for an average household, the ties of economic dependence that 
linked the landless and cultivating peasantry to the landed elite remained in place 
(Joshi, 1974; Herring, 1983, 99). Thirdly, the fact that land resumed under both sets 
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 Data for this table is taken from Herring (1983) and Rashid (1985).  
 MLR 64 (Ayub) MLR 115 (PPP) 
Total Land Resumed (acres) 1,902,788  2,826,400  
Total Land Distributed (acres) 622,199 1,223,000 
Number of Tenant Beneficiaries 150,000 119,182 
Distributed Land as %age of Farmed Area 3.9% 2.5% 
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of reforms could only be awarded to landless tenants already occupying the land213 
meant that landless non-cultivators and tenants with marginal holdings of their own 
were automatically excluded from the process.  
In addition to this, a number of other discrepancies hampered the progress of 
the land reforms.  Under both Ayub and Bhutto, a significant amount of the land 
acquired in both rounds of reform was barren or otherwise uncultivable. With MLR 
64, 56.8% of the land resumed was not cultivated and had been deliberately given to 
the state by landlords seeking to hold on to their most productive land. This was in 
part a result of the uneven impact of the reforms; in Punjab, over 56% of the land 
resumed under MLR 64 was from the district of Dera Ghazi Khan, while a further 
11.4% was from Mianwalli (Jones, 2003, 32-33). Both these districts were home to 
powerful Baloch landholders owning very large estates, but also had some of the least 
developed agriculture in the province. By contrast, the more productive districts of 
Punjab, which at any rate had higher levels of peasant proprietorship and smaller 
estates on average, were lightly affected by the reforms. Given that the state still had 
to pay compensation for this land214, the effect was to actually benefit many landlords 
who no longer had to pay revenue on land that was of marginal economic value to 
them, and for which they received payment through sale that may not have otherwise 
been possible (Herring, 1983, 99).  
Similarly, in many instances the state simply could not allot land, even if it 
was cultivable, simply due to the cost it imposed on its beneficiaries. For example, in 
1968, legislators were informed that the failure to allot 365,274 acres of land in 
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 This problem was compounded in Punjab by the continued operation of the Land Alienation Act, as 
well as the Law of Pre-Emption, which precluded the granting of land to non-agriculturalists in the 
presence of agriculturalist tenants. 
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 According to Jones (2003, 33), the total amount of compensation paid out by the government came 
to Rs. 89.2 million, plus an annual interest of Rs. 3.3 million. All of this money went into the hands of 
the 902 individuals who gave up land under MLR 64. 
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Punjab was due to the high price per PIU of the land in many of these districts215 and 
that a further 20,800 acres had been resumed from tenants unable to keep up with 
their payments.216 When later asked if the reason for this was the poor quality of the 
land and the resulting low level of profit to be had from it, the Parliamentary 
Secretary disagreed, stating that, ‘it was already under their [tenants’] cultivating 
possession when it was allotted… they could refuse its allotment to them at the very 
out-set rather than default in the payment of its price after reaping a number of 
harvest and committing breach of the conditions of sale’.217 
For the Ayub government, the fact that several hundred thousand acres of land 
had been resumed was a sufficient indicator of success, even though abundant 
evidence existed to suggest that little had been done to actually achieve the goals of 
the reform programme. Evidence for this can be found in parliamentary debates from 
May 1968218, in which the government admitted that while tenants had received only 
4 acres each, that much of this land was barren or otherwise uncultivable, and that 
large swathes of resumed land remained unused because the government had been 
unable to find buyers for it, ‘the purpose of the Land Reforms Scheme was not 
punitive in character. It was to remove social imbalance’ and that, in the eyes of the 
government, balance was maintained by letting landlords choose which land to parcel 
out, and by ensuring that tenants received land that they had been cultivating.219  
Failure to distribute appropriated land was something that also characterized 
MLR 115, as seen in figures provided in the Punjab Assembly in 1975. By that point 
in time, 265,093 acres of land had been acquired by the state in the province, out of 
which 69,686 acres had been distributed to tenants. Of the remainder, 60,692 acres, 
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nearly 30% of the total, could not be allotted to anyone because it was barren and 
could not be cultivated.220 Echoing arguments from almost a decade earlier, a member 
of the Punjab Assembly asked if it would be possible to have barren, unallocated land 
returned to its original owners. The argument given for this was that by doing this, the 
government would at least receive revenue payments from it. While the government 
categorically ruled out the idea of returning resumed land to its original owners, it 
also admitted that it had no plans for investing in the development of such land so that 
it could be brought under cultivation.221  
Land that was not allotted under the reforms, or which was confiscated from 
tenants in the case of MLR 64, reverted to becoming the property of the state, which 
could dispose of it as it saw fit. Although the official position was that such land 
would be retained for future redistribution, in reality much of this land would find its 
way back in the hands of the landed elite. An interesting example of this can be seen 
in Punjab, where Ayub Khan allegedly provided over 200,000 acres of resumed land 
to Punjabi landlords, bureaucrats, and their family members, who had supported him 
in the elections (Anjum, 1992, 66-70). Similarly, a considerable amount of land 
actually ended up being leased back to members of the landed aristocracy for use as 
stud and livestock farms, or as orchards, all of which were exempted from the 
provisions of MLR 64 (Jones, 2003, 33).  
A more direct method through which this was done, particularly after MLR 
115, was to mount legal challenges against the confiscation of land by the 
government. Examples of the precise mechanisms employed by the landed classes to 
use the legal system to undo the effects of land reform can be seen in two cases, from 
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the district of Attock, which were discussed by the Punjab Council in 1982.222 The 
first case dealt with the transfer of land from the two daughters of a large landowner 
to a number of persons between 1967 and 1969. When MLR 115 was imposed and 
implemented, these transfers were examined by the Chief land Commissioner of 
Punjab and declared to be legal. However, when the tenants residing on the land in 
question petitioned the FLC to re-open the case, this was done and the initial decision 
in favour of the landowner was reversed. In response to this, the landowners and his 
daughters took the case to the Lahore High Court in 1976 and upon losing the case, 
appealed to the Supreme Court. In 1982, the case was still under consideration by the 
Court which had, at any rate, issued an injunction preventing the implementation of 
the FLC’s decision. As can be seen, through the manipulation of the legal system, the 
landlord in question was initially able to evade the land reforms of 1972 and even 
though the FLC ruled against him in 1976, he was able to prevent the appropriation of 
his land by involving his tenants in a lengthy legal battle that would ultimately be 
decided in his favour.  
 The second case involved the Pir of Makhad, whose extensive landholdings 
in 1972 were spread between the districts of Attock, Multan, Faisalabad, and Sanghar 
(in Sindh). Between 1967 and 1971, the Pir had managed to transfer a significant 
amount of land to different corporations and individuals and upon reviewing these 
transfers in 1976, the FLC declared two to be illegal and sought to take control of the 
land in question. However, the Pir was given the right to choose which land could be 
appropriated by the state, which led to him selecting land that had been transferred to 
a corporation founded by himself and some of his relatives. Between the imposition 
of MLR 115 and the decision taken by the FLC in 1976, this corporation had sold 
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some of its land to a number of additional individuals, all of whom collectively took 
the FLC to court when faced with the potential confiscation of their land. Like the 
first case discussed above, this ultimately resulted in a legal back-and-forth which 
ended with the case being taken to the Supreme Court. In the interim, the land 
remained in the hands of the Pir, his relatives, and those who the land had been 
transferred to by them. 
The case involving the Pir of Makhad is also interesting because it helps to 
highlight the way in which religion would also come to play a role in undermining the 
land reforms. Early on in the reform process, both Ayub Khan and Bhutto had sought 
to take control of much of the land that had been owned by the pirs and sajjada 
nashins of Punjab. This was a move that was met with resistance by these landed 
religious leaders, and the subsequent inability of the governments to actually 
implement the redistributive agenda that had been the justification for these moves 
was arguably part of the reason why the religious right mobilized against them in 
1968 and the mid-1970s respectively (Nasr, 1996). The religious antipathy towards 
land reform was something that would assume much greater significance after the end 
of the Bhutto government; upon assuming power, General Zia-ul-Haq setup Islamic 
courts as part of his attempts to ‘Islamize’ Pakistan, beginning with Shariat Bench of 
the provincial high courts, and culminating finally with the creation of a Federal 
Shariat Court in 1980, and the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court in 1982. 
As has been documented at length by Kennedy (1993), Lau (2006, 189-193) and 
Nelson (2011), these courts entertained appeals against the land reforms which 
contested them on the grounds that they were un-Islamic for depriving individuals of 
their property. While there was considerable debate over the extent to which this 
claim was correct, with the courts noting that there was an Islamic argument to be 
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made for redistribution as well, there would ultimately be a series of judgments that 
would categorically bring an end to the process of Land Reform. In particular, there 
were specific rulings that eliminated the Pre-Emption rights of tenants, as enshrined 
in the Punjab Pre-Emption Act of 1913, and the principle of establishing individual 
ceilings on land ownership. Although these judgments did not apply retrospectively, 
they did have a bearing on the thousands of cases that were in the courts at the time, 
blunting already limited impact of the land reforms. More importantly, these 
judgments also ensured that future attempts at land reform would be doomed unless 
they could be justified in Islamic terms that were compatible with those enshrined in 
the decisions of the Shariat Courts.  
The limited redistributive impact of the reforms was compounded by the 
state’s lack of political willingness to actively move against landlords who sought to 
subvert the reforms. By 1963, Ayub Khan’s government had embraced the support of 
the landed politicians it had previously displaced, and the same was true for the PPP 
government of the 1970s, which had always relied to some degree on landlords from 
Punjab and Sindh, and which by 1972 had purged itself of its more progressive 
elements and had begun to deepen its partnership with the landed elite (Ahmed, 1973; 
Burki, 1988). While the assumptions underpinning the reforms were arguably 
inadequate for providing a basis from which to transform the agrarian structure, and 
the nature of the relationship between the bureaucracy and landowners made 
implementation difficult, the fact that the landed elite were a vital source of support 
for both Ayub Khan and Bhutto was a fundamental reason why, once initiated, the 
reforms were not implemented with the fervor that would have been necessary to 
realize their radical potential. 
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An illustration of the mechanisms through which land reform was used to 
cultivate the support of the landed elite can be seen in how the Bhutto government in 
particular used land reform as a tool through which to persecute political rivals. As 
argued by Herring (1983, 113-114), the provisions and implementation of MLR 115 
disproportionately targeted political elites from the NWFP and Balochistan, the two 
provinces in which Bhutto’s government faced the most opposition and resistance. 
Indeed, while the reforms as a whole affected only 2.5% of the total farm area of 
Pakistan, this figure changed to 12% for the NWFP and 10% in Balochistan (ibid.). 
Evidence for the provincial bias in the implementation of the reforms is also borne 
out the figures provided in Table 10 on the amount of land resumed in Punjab under 
the different rounds of land reform, corroborating the idea that the Bhutto government 
was less eager to implement its agenda for agrarian reform in Punjab and Sindh, 
where significant sections of the landowning political elite had joined with the PPP. 
 MLR 64 MLR 115 1977 
Total Land Distributed (acres) 441,663 163,448 39,735 
Table 10: Land Resumed and Distributed in Punjab under MLR 64, MLR 115, and the Reforms 
of 1977223 
 
In order to understand the rationale behind the selective implementation of the 
MLR 115 reforms, it is necessary to examine the political context in which the Bhutto 
government operated. In addition to being introduced as a Martial Law Regulation, 
Bhutto’s land reforms were also interesting because, for the first and only time in 
Punjab (and Pakistan’s) history, questions pertaining to land became national, rather 
than provincial, legislative subjects. This was only possible due to the unique political 
circumstances that allowed Bhutto to become Civilian Martial Law Administrator, 
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and President, in the period of transition from martial law to democracy in 1971-
1972.224 Using powers conferred on him by the Interim Constitution that had been 
introduced when the PPP came to power, Bhutto made the land reforms a national 
legislative subject ensuring that any discussion of the reforms would take place in the 
National, and not the Provincial, assemblies. Secondly, and arguably more 
importantly, Bhutto also used his authority to set up the FLC, which was tasked with 
investigating cases in which individuals had tried to evade the land reforms, and 
which supervised the operation of the provincial and district-level Land 
Commissions. Notably, Bhutto also reserved the right for himself, and for the FLC, to 
take unilateral action on individual cases pertaining to the land reforms.  
For the NAP225, these measures represented an unacceptable intrusion of the 
federal government in a domain that had historically always been within the purview 
of the Provincial Governments. Genuine as these grievances were, however, they 
were co-opted by opposition landed elites from Punjab and Sindh who sought to 
wrest control over the agrarian reform agenda back from the federal government.226 
This can be seen from the debate over the Land Reforms Amendment Bill of 1973.  
This bill sought to extend the powers, relating to the land reforms, that had been 
granted to Bhutto under the Interim Constitution, and which would otherwise expire 
with the introduction of the country’s new constitution on 14th August 1973. In the 
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the initiation of a military operation against Baloch ethno-nationalists. See Malik (1974) and Swidler 
and Titus (2000). 
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view of the government, opposition to the bill was rooted in a desire on the part of 
entrenched elites to reverse the land reforms, as seen in the Law Minister Abdul 
Hafeez Pirzada’s statement that, ‘the objection that is coming to the land reform [is] 
because they want to undo the land reform’227, and that given the reforms themselves 
had been provided with permanent protection in the forthcoming Constitution, the 
PPP was, ‘not going to allow the Provincial Legislatures to destroy these reforms’.228 
This was also acknowledged a decade later by Shaikh Rashid, the PPP’s minister for 
Land Reforms, who felt the provincial governments and courts, dominated as they 
had been by the traditional elite, had been determined to impede the progress of the 
reforms (Rashid, 1985).  
Amidst the NAP’s allegations that the Bhutto government was seeking to 
infringe on the rights of the provinces, landowning Opposition politicians from Sindh 
and Punjab also joined in this particular criticism of the government. The historical 
irony of a Punjabi politician speaking in favour of autonomy for the smaller provinces 
was lost on Chaudhry Zahoor Elahi, a textile magnate from Gujrat in Punjab, as he 
argued that the PPP’s continued infringement on the rights of the provincial 
governments, despite claims to the contrary, would only serve to fuel the same kind 
of anti-Centre sentiment that had infused the Bengali independence movement, and 
that it was necessary that the entire programme of land reform be reviewed.229 The 
same position was adopted by Ali Ahmed Talpur, one of the largest landowners in 
Sindh, who claimed the government arbitrarily abused its power when determining 
which subjects were provincial and which were national.230 In this case, however, 
even though the government’s constitutional defence of its position was technically 
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correct, the NAP’s opposition, and that of non-NAP landowners from Punjab and 
Sindh, demonstrated both the importance of the provincial assemblies to the 
landowning elite, and the way in which opposition to the land reforms dovetailed with 
resistance to the centralizing tendencies of the Bhutto regime, providing a platform 
through which the traditional elite could unite to mobilise against the government. 
In addition to attacking the government for encroaching on the powers of the 
provinces, the landowners of Punjab and Sindh also criticized the provisions of MLR 
115 on the grounds that they had a negative effect on agriculture and agriculturalists. 
For Elahi, the land reforms represented nothing less than a deliberate attempt to 
eliminate the zamindars of Pakistan, as opposed to the country’s major industrialists 
whose assets allegedly remained largely intact despite the government’s programme 
of nationalization in the name of socialism.231 Abdul Hameed Khan Jatoi, a member 
of one of Sindh’s most powerful landowning families and a member of the NAP, 
echoed these concerns, suggesting that the government failed to appreciate the extent 
to which agriculture, like industry, required investment, and that the insecurity 
generated by the expropriation of land from its rightful owners served to discourage 
farmers who worked hard to cultivate their land.232 Since Pakistan had been 
experiencing a period of food shortages and rising commodity prices at the time, both 
Elahi and Jatoi were able to make the argument that adding to the strain experienced 
by landowners would only serve to further weaken the agrarian economic sector. This 
argument was repeated a speech by Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Kasuri, a member of a 
landowning family from Kasur, who attacked the Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill of 
1975 by saying,  
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‘He [Bhutto] is taking the initiative out of the hands of the 
agriculturalists… who give the shoulder to the economic edifice of 
Pakistan… Why are you bringing this lethargy in the agricultural sector 
because, when people are uncertain about their future, you cannot 
expect them to work hard… For God’s sake, do not take initiative out of 
this powerful class, that of agriculturalists who are the be-all and end-all 
of this country. Do not destroy them. Do not destroy them because you 
have to establish that you are socialist…. This is a very burdened class, 
this is a very powerful class… Majority of the honorable Members who 
represent the people in this House come from that class. Let us not 
prosecute them’.233 
 
Kasuri’s speech was surprising because it provided a rare, direct statement of how the 
land reforms affected not only an abstract class of ‘agriculturalists’ – the bulk of 
whom would not be affected by the reforms anyway – but also the members of the 
landed elite sitting within the Assembly itself.  
The speech quoted above is also interesting because it highlighted one of the 
paradoxes at the heart of the Bhutto government; for all its talk of Socialism and 
agrarian reform, the PPP was actually quite close to elements of the traditional landed 
elite. While a number of landowning politicians sat on the Opposition benches in the 
National Assembly, the fact remained that a significant number from Punjab and 
Sindh were with the Government, and actually voted for the land reforms. This can be 
explained by examining the government’s record on the implementation of the 
reforms, and the questions raised by the Opposition regarding their persecution 
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through the use of MLR 115 and the FLC. When MLR 115 was imposed in 1972, it 
did not really come as a surprise to the powerful landholding elites in the different 
provinces of Pakistan. The PPP had been campaigning on a platform of agrarian 
reform since the late 1960s, and there was considerable evidence to believe that many 
landholders had taken pre-emptive measures, such as the transfer of land to family 
members, to circumvent the impact of any future reforms before the PPP even came 
to power (Herring, 1983). The FLC’s primary purpose was to address this problem, 
and the powers it had been given were instrumental in initiating legal action against 
individual landholders who would otherwise be able to evade the reforms through the 
use of their links with the bureaucracy and the courts. Indeed, the constant extension 
of these powers between 1972 and 1976 was justified by how, as argued by a PPP 
legislator, ‘landlords and feudal lords, in league with the revenue administration, 
doctored land records to transfer holdings to their friends and relatives, thereby 
maintaining control of their land despite the reforms’.234 According to Rashid (1985, 
46), the fact that the FLC had, by 1977, succeeded in resuming 568,835 acres of land 
through the prosecution of 2712 individual cases, an amount nearly half as much as 
the land resumed by the rest of the land reform bureaucracy, was a testament to its 
effectiveness as a tool through which to detect and prevent attempts at evading MLR 
115.  
Although the impact of the FLC was undeniable, it was also the case that it 
was incredibly selective in its pursuit of recalcitrant landowners. Of all the land 
confiscated by the FLC, 37% was from Balochistan and 23% was from the NWFP, 
while only 7% was from Punjab (Herring, 1983, 114). This was reflected in the 
debate on the Land Reforms Amendment Bill of 1973, where the most trenchant 
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criticism of the FLC came from Mahmud Ali Kasuri, one of the earliest converts to 
the PPP, the government’s first law minister, and one of the architects of the 
Constitution of 1973. Kasuri, who had left the PPP to join the leftist Tehrik-i-Istiqlal 
in late 1972, first accused the government of not going far enough with the land 
reforms, saying that the ceilings imposed by the government, and the loopholes 
regarding family ownership that continued to exist, ensured that the project could not 
succeed in breaking up the estates of Pakistan’s largest landowners.235 Kasuri then 
argued that the land reforms were being used to victimize the PPP’s political 
opponents, and that the Bill would allow Bhutto and the FLC to use their 
discretionary powers to initiate cases against individual. Kasuri also said that the 
government was using the land reform to make Opposition politicians, ‘murder their 
own integrity while having a sword hanging over their heads’, even as those sitting on 
the treasury benches could rest assured that no proceedings would be initiated against 
them.236 Three years later, Kasuri would repeat this criticism when the Land Reforms 
(Baluchistan Pat Feeder Canal) Regulation (Amendment) Bill was brought before the 
National Assembly in 1976. This Bill, which applied to the implementation of the 
land reforms in a specific part of Baluchistan, also included measures that would once 
again extend the powers of the FLC and the President, with this being the fourth time 
that such an extension was requested. Claiming that the federal government’s 
repeated extension requests were motivated by ‘political’ concerns, Kasuri said that 
these powers were dangerous because they granted the government the means through 
which to deprive its opponents, within and outside of parliament, of their rights237, 
and that, ‘the only reasons these powers exist… is so that the federal government can 
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take suo moto notice every time it develops differences with a zamindar or 
agriculturalist group’.238  
Evidence for the selective implementation of the land reforms also came from 
Ali Ahmed Talpur when he repeated allegations that had appeared in the press 
suggesting that prominent PPP leaders, including Bhutto himself, had been able to 
evade the reforms and hold on to more than 20,000 acres of land each.239 When 
making his remarks on the same Bill, Zahoor Elahi also implied that the reforms had 
seemed to skip the PPP leadership, claiming that not an inch of land had been taken 
from the large estates of Larkana district in Sindh, Bhutto’s own constituency.240 
Elahi would repeat these claims two years later, accusing the Sindhi landlords in 
government of continuing to own thousands of acres of land, even as martial law era 
powers were used to victimize the regime’s opponents and landowners throughout the 
country.241 
Talpur and Elahi, being the PPP’s opponents, had every incentive to 
exaggerate or fabricate the claims they were making. Mahmud Kasuri’s criticism of 
the government, on the other hand, was important because unlike many of the NAP 
members and Punjabi politicians who opposed the PPP government, he was a 
committed leftist with an urban background who had absolutely no stake in 
preserving the power of the landed elite.242 Kasuri’s opposition was also interesting 
because, as pointed out by Shaikh Rashid, Kasuri had helped draft the laws that the 
government now sought to extend.243 That he would now accuse the PPP of lacking 
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the political will to implement the reforms properly, and of using the reforms to attack 
its opponents while ignoring the obvious transgressions of its own members, provided 
considerable reason to be sceptical of the PPP’s commitment to seeing through the 
reforms in an impartial way.  
Criticism of the FLC also began to emerge from within the ranks of the PPP 
itself in 1975, when the Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill was passed. For example, 
Begum Nasim Jahan, a female member from a landed Punjabi family, questioned the 
need to expand the FLC’s powers, saying that, ‘any landlord today… has got an 
ownership right… other Constitutions of the world have guaranteed ownership… do 
not keep this uncertainty… It keeps everybody hanging. Stop this thing we have 
suffered through’.244 Speaking on the same bill Rao Khursheed Ali Khan, a 
landowning PPP member from Sahiwal, claimed that the FLC infringed on both 
provincial and individual rights, and that, ‘just because someone is a landlord does 
not mean that their rights can be ignored’.245 Disquiet over the FLC from within the 
PPP became even more visible when the Land Reforms (Second Amendment) Bill of 
1976 was debated in the National Assembly. Rao Khursheed once again opposed the 
government’s stance, arguing that the continuing power of the FLC to take notice of 
individual cases created unnecessary tension for landowners who had to live with the 
constant fear of prosecution.246 Syed Abbas Gardezi, a landlord from Faisalabad in 
Punjab, argued that the continued prospect of further reforms, as well as the legal 
costs associated with contesting the state’s programme of expropriation, was driving 
landowners throughout Pakistan to sell their holdings to capitalists who had little 
interest in agriculture.247 Replying to these accusations, Shaikh Rashid argued that 
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there was nothing wrong with powers used by the FLC since these had allowed the 
Commission to resume over 400,000 acres of land, and that the only people who had 
anything to fear from this were those who continued to try and evade the land 
reforms.248 Rao Khursheed’s response to this was interesting, since it provided an 
illustration of precisely how the Punjabi landed elite viewed their position within the 
agrarian economy; regretting the fact that a person like Shaikh Rashid who had spent 
his life fighting for the rights of workers and peasants would now be making life 
difficult for them, Khurshid said that even though land had been granted to 
cultivators, those who worked for large landowners were also ‘cultivators’, and that 
any uncertainty felt by landlords would also be felt by their tenants.249 
Like the Land Reforms Bill of 1973, the Bills of 1975 and 1976 were passed 
by the National Assembly despite opposition from within the party itself. Part of the 
reason for this undoubtedly lay in the success with which large landholders, 
particularly those associated with the PPP, had been able to circumvent the reforms. 
Moreover, the fact that the Bill of 1976 was met with more opposition from within 
the PPP also indicated the changed nature of the party’s powerbase; by 1976, large 
landowners were a tremendous source of support for the party, and arguably felt they 
could use their position to be more vocal about their concerns regarding the PPP’s 
actions. At the same time, however, 1977 was due to be an election year in Pakistan 
and despite increasing opposition to the government, the PPP was expected to win 
another term in office. As such, many of the landlords within the PPP probably felt it 
was best to continue supporting the party in its attempts at ‘reform’, particularly when 
considering how they had received sympathetic treatment from the government thus 
far (Herring, 1983, 124). This also provides an explanation for the passage in the 
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National Assembly and Senate of the legislation that sought to initiate another round 
of land reforms in 1977. Initially announced by Bhutto in January when declaring that 
elections would be held in March, these reforms were arguably little more than an 
attempt at shoring up the regime’s battered populist credentials on the eve of the 
elections (Weinbaum, 1977, 603-604). The legislation itself passed through the 
National Assembly and Senate in just two days, and included measures allowing for 
the provision of compensation to those from whom land was appropriated, and for the 
transfer of land to family members (ibid.).  
While it was not possible to access the National Assembly debates that took 
place at this time250, a look at the proceedings of the Senate shows the type of 
discussion that informed the passage of these reforms. In his comments on the 
proposed reforms, the leader of the Opposition, a member of the NDP251, supported 
the principle of land reform but questioned the government’s commitment to 
implementing the programme. In particular, the senator raised the question of the 
potentially political motivation underlying the reforms, saying that, ‘since there is an 
election coming there is a fear that the ruling party will acquire more land from its 
political opponents, and will then distribute it amongst its own members… there is 
also a fear that the government is trying to pull people towards itself and gain votes 
by bribing individuals with land that they might otherwise not be entitled to’.252 
Given the government’s extremely poor track record when it came to the impartial 
implementation of the land reforms, particularly in Punjab and Sindh, this was not an 
entirely unfounded accusation. Therefore, when the Sindhi PPP senator Afzal Khoso 
said that landlords like himself had joined the PPP because they, ‘also wanted such 
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reforms even at our own cost’253, he was being a bit disingenuous given that pro-PPP 
landlords had been quite successful in evading the reforms of 1972.  That the senator 
would go on to commend the government for its decision to award compensation to 
affected landlords who gave up land, and for the provision of mechanisms through 
which to ensure that joint family holdings would be saved from fragmentation to as 
great an extent as possible, simply illustrated the price the PPP continued to pay for 
the support of its landowning allies. 
Other NDP senators also expressed their concerns with the new law, invoking 
once again the uncertainty generated by the specter of expropriation254, as well as the 
potentially ruinous economic implications of smaller landholding sizes255, and the 
illegality of depriving an individual of their property.256 However, while NDP 
lawmakers did speak against the reforms, they did so in language that suggested they 
supported the spirit, if not the letter, of the law, reflecting the two imperatives that 
traditional elites in the opposition had to contend with when it came to the agrarian 
reform agenda; firstly, in an election year, it was difficult for any opposition party to 
oppose land reform outright, since doing so ran the risk of losing the battle for votes 
to the PPP. Secondly, however, there continued to be tremendous unease amongst the 
landed elite with regards to land reform particularly when being in opposition to the 
government meant being disproportionately targeted. In the end, the bill was passed 
by the Senate unanimously; the potential political cost of opposing the bill was one 
that the NDP and other anti-PPP parties could not bear, particularly when they 
themselves had included plans for land reform in their electoral manifestos.  
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Pakistan’s three rounds of land reform initially represented a significant threat 
to the power of traditional landed elites not just from Punjab, but from the rest of the 
country as well. After coming to power on explicitly anti-landlord platforms, and by 
using martial law powers rather than legislation to initiate their programmes, both 
Ayub and Bhutto could have potentially altered the structure of power in the 
countryside. However, these efforts would ultimately fail for two key reasons; firstly, 
by drawing on their long-cultivated links with the bureaucracy, as well as their own 
economic, political, and judicial resources, landed elites were able to repeatedly 
evade land reform regulations and, in some cases, even profit from them or acquire 
more land than they had originally possessed. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, the central political role played by the landed elite, particularly in Punjab 
and Sindh, made it difficult for both Ayub and Bhutto to move against them in any 
meaningful way. The BD elections and RWP had made it clear to Ayub Khan that the 
landed elite would be an important source of support for the realization of his own 
political ambitions, and the PPP, which had always included landed politicians from 
Punjab and Sindh, only grew more accommodating of landed interests as opposition 
to Bhutto grew.  
Agricultural Income Tax in Punjab 
 
  Unlike MLR 64 and MLR 115, which were essentially measures over 
which the landed elite had no direct control, laws governing revenue and taxation 
largely remained the sole domain of the Punjab Legislative Assembly, allowing 
landed politicians to design them in a way that would allow them to pursue and 
protect their interests more effectively. This was not entirely dissimilar to the way in 
which legislation had been created and used under the British, although there were a 
few important differences. The more formally democratic and competitive nature of 
 267
post-independence politics, even during periods of military rule, meant that elected 
representatives had to, at some level, respond to the needs of the electorate, and thus 
limit the extent to which legislation had an explicit pro-elite bias. This was also a 
function of the presence of more rival groups in the Assembly; the ever-present threat 
of landed factionalism, coupled with the increasing number of capitalists, urban 
professionals, and even smaller landholders involved in lawmaking, particularly after 
the 1970s, added to the obstacles the landed elite had to overcome. More often than 
not, however, conflict was avoided due to the overlap between these different 
categories, as well as the clear demarcation of spheres of interest, such as land 
revenue, that did not necessarily involve a clash of interest between different groups. 
Lawmaking in the post-independence period was also reflective of the strong fiscal 
constraints experienced by both the federal and provincial governments which, as will 
be explained below, sometimes had a bearing on the shape of legislation relating to 
taxation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there remained the fact that formal 
laws and rules did not necessarily matter at the local level. As argued by Nelson 
(2011), one of the keys to the enduring power of the landed elite at the local level has 
been their enduring capacity to evade the law in circumstances where it could work 
against them. Alternatively, given that evasion necessarily entailed costs of its own, 
formally shaping the institutional arena through legislation remained an important 
means through which the landed elite reinforced their power. 
 Before examining the debates that surrounded the passage of laws regarding 
agricultural taxation, it is useful to first briefly review the history of such legislation 
in post-colonial Punjab. As has been pointed out by Qureshi (1987, 169-184), Qureshi 
(1989, 45-66), Khan and Khan (1998), and Husain (1999, 43-126), one of the most 
striking features of Pakistan’s taxation regime is that agriculture, despite contributing 
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to over a quarter of Pakistan’s GDP even in the 1990s257, and employing over half of 
the total labour force, accounts for a negligible amount of government revenue. In 
Punjab, where agriculture contributes to almost 30% of total economic output and 
employs nearly half the workforce, Table 11 below provides an indication of the 
revenue derived from the agricultural sector.  
 
 1961-
62 
1967-
68 
1971-
72 
1977-
78 
1987-
88 
1991-
92 
Land Revenue 
(millions of Rs.) 
144 163 120.748 100.10 239.5 501.2 
Agricultural Income 
Tax (millions of Rs.) 
3 5 n/a 12.0 0.5 n/a 
Total Revenue 
(millions of Rs.) 
534 1165 742.683 700.15 2314.5 4649.6 
Agricultural Taxation 
as a %age of Total 
Revenue 
27.5% 20.3% 16.25% 16.01% 10.3% 10.78% 
Table 11: Land Revenue and Agricultural Income Tax Receipts and Total Revenue in Punjab258 
 
The relatively marginal contribution of the agricultural sector to government 
revenue is doubly surprising because agricultural incomes and productivity have 
grown tremendously since independence, not least due to a relatively high level of 
government investment in the sector (Hamid, 1970; Azhar, 1973; Khan and Khan, 
1998). For Qureshi (1987), the explanation for this lies in the failure of rural voters to 
establish the link between government taxation and expenditure, with the argument 
being that a tax system designed to highlight private returns from public expenditure 
might incentivize politically dominant agrarian elites to contribute more to the public 
exchequer. However, as Alavi (1976), Hussain (1988) and Husain (2000) point out, it 
is precisely the exercise of landed political power that allows the elite to benefit from 
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government expenditure while profiting from a very low tax burden. Rather than 
being the result of a flawed tax system, the low levels of revenue generated by 
agriculture are largely due to the ability of the landed elite to prevent the imposition 
of higher taxes, and their ability to impede the effective implementation of the 
taxation regime that does exist. 
 Part of an explanation for the low level of agricultural taxation lies in the 
legacy of colonialism; under the All India Income Tax Act of 1925, the right to levy a 
tax on agriculture was granted to the provinces rather than the federal government, 
with this particular provision being bequeathed to both India and Pakistan following 
independence. Concurrently, the amount of revenue generated from agriculture 
continued to be determined by the various Provincial Revenue Acts which, in the 
Pakistani case, remained in place unchanged until 1967 at which point the West 
Pakistan Land Revenue Act essentially reproduced and imposed the Punjab Revenue 
Act in the rest of the country (Azhar, 1973). Although the Revenue Act included 
provisions for the payment of certain dues in addition to land revenue itself, such as 
the local rate, the development cess, and the water rate, the cumulative effect of these 
measures remained small. Similarly, while an agricultural income tax was imposed in 
Punjab relatively early on in 1948 it was, as will be discussed below, extremely 
marginal, and justified only by the government’s precarious financial position. While 
there was an abortive attempt to impose a more stringent tax regime by the Bhutto 
government in 1977, which abolished land revenue entirely in favour of an 
agricultural income tax, these measures were reversed by the Zia-ul-Haq government 
soon after it came to power. The situation would remain unchanged until the mid-
1990s, when the dictates of international financial institutions, as well as Pakistan’s 
worsening economic condition, provided the conditions under which the question of 
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agricultural income tax could be raised once more. Again, however, the strength of 
Punjab’s landed lobby prevented the new taxation system from becoming any more 
severe than the one it replaced.  
 Starting with the debate over the imposition of an agricultural income tax in 
1948, it is possible to see precisely how the landed politicians in the Assembly 
maneuvered to dilute the impact of the proposed law. When the law was first put to 
the Punjab Assembly, it was referred to a Select Committee comprised almost entirely 
of landed politicians including Mumtaz Daultana, Firoz Khan Noon, and Jamal 
Laghari.259 As an initial response to the bill, Noon argued that the provisions 
contained within it imposed an unfair burden on individuals by taxing them on the 
basis of their revenue demand, rather than their actual income.260 During the 
subsequent debate, Nurullah Ahmad repeated Noon’s claim that the level of taxation 
outlined in the bill was too high, particularly for landowners like himself who paid 
between Rs. 1000 and Rs. 5000 in revenue and would thus have to pay twice this 
amount as tax.261 Ahmad followed this up with the assertion that the Income Tax 
would lead zamindars to lose all interest in agriculture, and that it would ultimately 
be self-defeating as it would lead to a drop in food production.262 Taking a slightly 
different approach, another legislator argued that it would make more sense for the 
government to generate income from the urban sector by taxing capitalists and their 
industries.263 This point was also made by Muzaffar Ali Qizilbash, who felt that as the 
‘backbone’ of the country, zamindars were willing to make this sacrifice, but that it 
only made sense to also tax capitalists and the urban sector at the same level, if not 
                                                 
259
 West Punjab Legislative Assembly Debates (WPLAD), 2 April 1948, 429, PAL. 
260
 Ibid., 429-430. 
261
 WPLAD, 6 April 1948, 467-469, PAL. Given that average per capita income in Pakistan at this 
point in time was barely Rs. 200/year, and that the land revenue per acre was roughly Rs. 4 in 1959-60, 
Nurullah Ahmad was clearly speaking on behalf of the richest elements of the landed elite. 
262
 Ibid., 470-471. 
263
 Ibid., 472-473. 
 271
higher, since all were now equal citizens of Pakistan bearing the responsibility to help 
the nation progress.264 Finally, in a particularly impassioned speech littered with 
couplets bemoaning the tragic circumstances of the province’s landlords, Chaudhry 
Asghar Ali declared that the ‘zamindar’ government of Punjab had managed to 
accomplish that which even the Congress had been unable to do with regards to 
victimizing landowners. Bitterly criticizing the government for turning its back on the 
province’s agriculturalists, Asghar Ali claimed that the government had reneged on 
its promise to create an Islamic state by attempting to impose a tax that had no basis 
in Islam and, indeed, no parallel in the rest of the world.265 
 These members were not alone in raising these objections, which were echoed 
by the majority of the legislators present during the passage of this Bill. However, 
while these opinions were representative of the widespread and deep-seated 
opposition the landed elite had to any revision of the economic status quo, it is 
important to note that the Bill of 1948 was only to be applied for a year, as clarified 
by the Revenue Minister during the debate. Moreover, it was also clarified that the 
Bill was only being introduced on this temporary basis because of the precarious 
financial situation the Punjab government found itself in post-Partition, particularly 
given the need to support the millions of refugees streaming across the border with 
India.266 This point had also been made a month earlier, with it being stated that the 
cost of rehabilitating the refugees from India was extremely high, and that while there 
was, ‘concern at the continual subjection of the resources of a small and mutilated 
province, which has barely recovered from the cruel wounds inflicted by the sword of 
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partition, to the incidence of such a vast unproductive expenditure’267, it was 
nonetheless necessary to impose an agricultural income tax on large landowners who 
could afford to pay it in light of the profits they had been able to make in recent years 
due to rising agricultural commodity prices.268 It was only in the face of this clear 
financial imperative that Punjab’s legislators acquiesced, albeit reluctantly, to the 
passage of the Bill.   
Mild as the Bill was, it would eventually only be passed following 
amendments that guaranteed the temporary nature of the Tax, ensured that transfers of 
land would not be rendered invalid, and allowed the Government to exempt 
individuals and groups from the payment of the Tax.269 After a year the Bill of 1948 
lapsed, only to be replaced in by the Punjab Agricultural Income Tax Act of 1951. 
This Tax, which like the Bill of 1948 was really just a surcharge on the land revenue 
rather than a tax on actual income, represented an extremely marginal increase in the 
total amount of agricultural taxation (see Table 11 above). However, as can be seen in 
the debate on amendments to the Act that were proposed just a year later, the landed 
elites in the Punjab Assembly made effective use of their legislative power to further 
reduce the impact of this new law. As mentioned in the aims and objectives of the 
proposed amendments, the government sought to change the existing Income Tax Act 
to bring it in line with the changes that had been made to the terms of tenancy under 
the Punjab Protection and Restoration of Tenancy Rights (Amendment) Bill passed 
earlier in the year. Under the terms of this new legislation, the government argued 
that the incomes of landowners had been reduced by 10% and, as such, it was only 
fair that the income tax burden on the province’s landlords also undergo a reduction. 
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 As always, when the Amendments were presented before the Assembly, much 
of the criticism took the form of allegations that the government was trying to destroy 
the livelihoods of the province’s agriculturalists. This tendency was epitomized by 
Mian Abdul Bari, a member of the Opposition from Lyallpur, who claimed that big 
and small landowners were being robbed by the government in the name of the 
refugees, and that he could not understand why, ‘the Chief Minister [Daultana] has 
gotten it into his head that landowners are rolling in money’.270 Bari then claimed that 
as a result of the tax, agriculturalists could no longer afford food, medicine, and 
education, and that even those owning 250 acres of land now found themselves in dire 
financial straits, with the gravity of the situation also being reflected in the way that 
most of the province’s landlords could not even think of buying a car.271 Instead, Bari 
suggested that the proposed law be amended to apply to individual harvests, rather 
than financial years, saying that this would reduce the burden of taxation to a level 
that would be more bearable for smaller and medium landowners272. In response, the 
government said that this simply was not possible since the tax only applied to big 
landowners who could afford it, and that even those owning 50 acres of land had 
average incomes of Rs. 4-5000 a year which was more than enough to bear the weight 
of an income tax. More importantly, the government argued, that implementing Bari’s 
proposals would lead to the total yield from the income tax being reduced by half.273 
 The government’s response to Bari’s proposed changes illustrated the way in 
which the fiscal constraints faced by the Punjab government limited the extent to 
which the economic demands of the landed elite could be accommodated. Even then, 
however, there is evidence to suggest that the government’s own amendments to the 
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law had already diluted its impact tremendously. This can be in seen in the arguably 
more cogent criticisms of the Bill by the Assembly’s urban members. Mian Amin, an 
Opposition lawyer from Lahore, accused the government of amending the law to 
protect the province’s biggest landowners at the expense of smaller ones. As proof of 
this, he pointed to the fact that the biggest beneficiaries of the changes to the law 
would be the 14 largest estates in the province, including those of Khizr Hayat 
Tiwana and the Nawab of Mamdot.274 Amin argued that Khizr Hayat, a former 
Unionist, would reap a profit of Rs. 150000 due to the proposed amendments, and 
that the total amount of revenue yielded from the tax would drop from Rs. 7 million 
to Rs. 3 million per year, with the difference going back into the pockets of the same 
landowners the government claimed to be targeting.275 Furthermore, according to 
Amin, loopholes in the law regarding the transfer of land would facilitate tax evasion 
by the landed elite and that even if that did not happen, the basis of the tax on 
outmoded and extremely low revenue assessments, rather than on actual income, 
would ensure that its financial impact would remain limited.276 Urban frustration with 
the government was also voiced by Sheikh Hussain Qadri, another lawyer from 
Lahore who, when faced with opposition to an amendment he proposed seeking to 
base the tax on  income rather than land revenue, asked the government, ‘why are you 
afraid of big landowners?’.277 Not unexpectedly, the proposed amendment was 
rejected. 
 On a different note, Qadri also accused the government of trying to curry 
favour with Punjab’s landowning politicians. Referring to the factional conflict 
between Mamdot and Daultana, he said that the, ‘Government is legislating to keep a 
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few big landowners happy for fear that they might defect’, and that this also explained 
why the government was now willing to tax settled refugees while providing relief to 
people like Khizr Hayat.278 This point was expanded upon by Chaudhry M. Shafiq, a 
lawyer from Sahiwal, who criticized a part of the Bill that gave the government 
authority to exclude any individual or group from the payment of income tax as an 
escape clause for the landed elite. Arguing that no such provision had been kept when 
it came to taxing refugees, Shafiq claimed that the government was simply interested 
in ‘class war’, and that retaining the power to waive taxation arbitrarily would lead to 
widespread corruption, bribery, nepotism and tax evasion.279  Furthermore, the clause 
allowing the government to waive the tax was deemed to be necessary in case of 
unforeseen circumstances that rendered particular individuals or groups incapable of 
paying the tax.280 When the suggestion was then made that the clause be re-written to 
prevent its abuse, the government declined to do so. 
 The debates over Income Tax in the late 1940s and early 1950s would set the 
tone for this particular aspect of agrarian revenue generation till the end of the Bhutto 
years, after which Bhutto’s abortive attempt at imposing a more stringent tax would 
lead to the elimination of the income tax altogether until the late 1990s.281 It was not 
coincidental that the Agricultural Income Tax Act of 1997 was prompted by IMF 
dictates instructing the imposition of the tax as a condition for the granting of loans to 
the federal government (Khan and Khan, 1998). Once again, it was only under 
conditions of financial duress that the government was able to pass taxation 
legislation that impinged upon the economic interests of the landed elite. All was not 
lost however; the legislation that was passed was not very dissimilar from the one that 
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had existed decades earlier, and essentially reproduced the same kinds of safeguards 
that had existed then, allowing the government at the time to claim it had successfully 
imposed the tax even though it made little difference on the ground.282 More 
importantly, the imposition of the Tax was accompanied by the repeal of the 
venerable Land Revenue Act, a law that had shaped the agrarian economy for over a 
century, and which, even at this stage, found defenders who argued it was preferable 
to the new and unknown system of taxation being introduced to the province.283  
However, fears that the new Income Tax would burden the landed elite in any way 
would soon prove to be unfounded. Agitation by landlords throughout the province 
led to the introduction of amendments that diluted the law even further, and evidence 
from across Punjab also suggested that the rate of tax collection had been very low.284  
Having failed to prevent the passage of the law, the landed elite simply exercised their 
capacity to evade it. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, an attempt has been made to show how Punjab’s landed elite 
have used their relationship with the state to reinforce their power and entrench 
themselves further within the institutional framework of Pakistan’s politics. Three 
mechanisms have been identified through which this has been done. Firstly, the 
landed elite in Punjab have been successful in maintaining a stranglehold on the 
province’s electoral politics. Partly due to the impact of military rule and partly due to 
the rural bias in the electorate, landed politicians have been able to maintain their 
position as the pre-eminent source of rural support by using their historically evolved 
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sources of power to mobilize votes for rival political parties. This has had the effect 
of setting up an electoral race to the bottom in which political parties, in an attempt to 
win elections by the most expedient means possible, have continued to curry favour 
with the landed elite at the expense of developing their organizational and ideological 
apparatuses. Like the Unionists and the Muslim League, the political parties of 
contemporary Punjab remain beholden to landed interests, increasingly incapable of 
re-orienting themselves towards a more programmatic, participatory form of politics. 
 The capture of the party system by the landed elite has been supplemented by 
their use of bureaucratic power and networks as a mechanism through which to 
reinforce their power. The ties of kinship, family, and politics, that bound the Punjabi 
landed elite to the colonial military and bureaucracy have persisted throughout 
Pakistan’s history, providing the former with ready access to state patronage, 
particularly through the organs of local government. The landed elite have returned 
the favour by using their own influence to further the interests of their allies in 
government, perpetuating a system of mutually beneficial, self-reinforcing nepotism 
and rent-seeking that has strengthened the relationship between the state and the 
landed elite over time.   
 Finally, reference has also been made to legislation, and the way in which the 
capacity to shape and evade it has been crucial to the maintenance of landed power in 
Punjab. In particular, it has been shown that the landed elite were able to use their 
position within the different branches of the legislature to blunt the impact of the land 
reforms introduced by the Ayub and Bhutto regimes,  with this being supplemented 
by the reluctance of the two regimes to actively move against the interests of their 
landowning allies. This has also been illustrated with reference to the case of 
Agricultural Income Tax in Punjab which, despite the economic arguments in favour 
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of such a tax, was only successfully imposed in periods of economic stress, and even 
then in a form that rendered it relatively marginal to the economic interests of the 
landed elite. 
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Chapter 8 Movements, Elections, and Institutional 
Change in Pakistan 
 
I am not a rootless phenomenon. 
     Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto285 
Introduction 
 
 In the preceding chapters, the mechanisms through which the Punjabi landed 
elite have been able to reinforce their political, economic and social power have been 
discussed, with an emphasis on how landed politicians have been able to do this as a 
result of their historically evolved entrenchment within political parties and networks 
of bureaucratic power, as well the institutions of legislative policy-making. Following 
the logic of path dependence, the previous chapters have also attempted to illustrate 
the difficulties associated with dislodging the landed elite from their position within 
the institutional framework of politics; time and again, the Establishment has chosen 
to continue providing patronage to these actors in exchange for their support, and 
even the factionalism that characterises landed politics in Punjab has only 
strengthened the capacity of the state, and indeed of democratic political parties, to 
enter into bargains with landed politicians for reasons of political expediency. 
 While the enduring power of the landed elite continues to persist in 
contemporary Punjab, and indeed in Pakistan, there have nonetheless been moments 
in time at which the institutional status quo was challenged, opening up the possibility 
of a departure from the path set in place by colonialism and the political developments 
of the first two decades after independence. One such contestational juncture occurred 
between 1968 and 1971, when a popular movement against the military dictatorship 
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of Ayub Khan forced his resignation from office, creating the context in which 
Pakistan could hold its first national-level elections based on universal adult suffrage. 
This movement would give birth to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s PPP, with this party’s 
socialist rhetoric and slogan of ‘roti, kapra, aur makaan’286 capturing the imagination 
of a Pakistani public that had increasingly begun to question a political and economic 
system in which a few elites prospered at the expense of the majority (Sheikh, 1972). 
The PPP government that came to power in Pakistan following the secession of 
Bangladesh in 1971 claimed to represent the country’s workers and peasants, and set 
about implementing a programme of nationalisation, land reform, and bureaucratic 
restructuring that arguably constituted the greatest threat that had, till then, been faced 
by the Pakistani state establishment and its allies. 
 In addition to the anti-Ayub movement, another juncture at which the potential 
for radical change arguably opened up in Pakistan was in 2007, when General 
Musharraf, Pakistan’s latest military dictator, was removed from power. The anti-
Musharraf movement was triggered by the unconstitutional dismissal of Chief Justice 
Iftikhar Chaudhry of the Supreme Court. Initially spearheaded by lawyers in 
Pakistan’s major cities, the movement quickly grew to include students, intellectuals, 
and urban professionals, and was also bolstered by the support of Pakistan’s 
mainstream political parties.  Amidst a worsening economic and internal security 
situation, the anti-Musharraf movement came to encapsulate a general dissatisfaction 
with the regime, and Musharraf’s resignation would lead to an election in 2008 that 
brought the PPP back into power at the head of a coalition government. While it is too 
early to assess the historical significance of this government’s decidedly mixed record 
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in office, it can nonetheless be claimed that like the PPP of 1970, it came to power 
riding the support of a movement possessing a desire for change. 
 In this chapter, a comparison will be made between the two junctures 
described above with a view towards understanding the circumstances under which 
the otherwise robust institutional framework of Punjabi and Pakistani politics could be 
challenged. The chapter will begin by providing a brief account of the types of 
resistance that have historically taken place in Pakistan, and the reasons for their 
failure to initiate significant structural change. The focus will then shift to 1968-69 
and 2007, with a short account of the events leading up to the two movements, as well 
as a description of the movements themselves and their aftermath. This will be 
followed by an analysis of the similarities between the two movements, and the 
insights to be gleaned from these with regards to understanding institutional change in 
Pakistan. Based on this, an explanation will then be provided for the inability of the 
movement of 1968-69 to generate any long-term change in the face of the path 
dependent institutional inertia of Punjabi and Pakistani politics, with the experiences 
of the first PPP government being used to illustrate the challenges faced by the current 
one. The chapter will then conclude with an overview of the lessons from the two 
movements, as well as their failure, and the implications of this for landed power and 
authoritarianism in Punjab and Pakistan. 
 
A (Very) Brief History of Protest and Resistance in Pakistan 
 
 From the very beginning, Pakistan has struggled to define its identity, and 
structure its institutions, in a way that could address the often genuine grievances of 
provinces that have historically seen themselves as being marginalized by a pre-
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dominantly Punjabi state (Khan, 2005). As a result, and in addition to the movement 
that led to the secession of East Pakistan, ethno-nationalism in Sindh, the NWFP, and 
particularly in Balochistan, has constantly represented a potent threat to the largely 
Punjabi establishment’s ability to rule over Pakistan (Akhtar, 2010a, 109). However, 
the presence of ethno-national movements in Pakistan, while limiting control over the 
smaller provinces in Pakistan, has largely failed to have an impact on the structure of 
politics within Punjab itself.  Even the Bengali freedom movement was proof of this, 
with events in East Pakistan having little bearing on politics in the West. Indeed, in 
the long run, the secession of Bangladesh only served to strengthen the position of the 
military establishment, and Punjab, relative to the other provinces. To the extent that 
ethno-nationalist movements in the non-Punjabi provinces did constitute a threat to 
the institutional status quo in Punjab, it was only in tandem with the other 
developments that gave rise to the movements of 1968-69 and 2007. Evidence for this 
is perhaps best seen in how, despite repeated rounds of militant activity and military 
intervention in Sindh (Ahmad, 1984), Karachi, and Balochistan (Swidler and Titus, 
2000; Akhtar, 2007), the impact of these events has remained geographically limited 
and external to political developments in Punjab. 
 Other than the threat of ethno-nationalism, the Pakistani state has also had to 
confront resistance from the Left and the religious Right. In the case of the former, 
Pakistan inherited a tradition of progressive politics from undivided India, and did 
have organisations like the Communist Party of Pakistan, the Mazdoor Kissan Party, 
and the NAP, but the impact of these organisations remained limited. To a very large 
extent, this can be attributed to state repression. As has been shown by Malik (1967), 
Ahmed (2008), Ahmed (2010) and Ali (2011), the vagaries of Cold War politics, and 
the potential threat of these parties, led the state to actively, and effectively, persecute 
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and repress those individuals and groups involved with progressive politics. This was 
exacerbated by ideological splits within the main parties that compounded their 
already weak organisational capacities; they remained predominantly urban, and 
centred around a relatively small number of activists and intellectuals. Finally, much 
of the strength of the Left in Pakistan was derived from East Pakistan, from where 
parties like the NAP originally emerged (Franda, 1970; Rashiduzzaman, 1970). For an 
already fractured Left in West Pakistan, the secession of East Pakistan only 
compounded the challenge of mobilizing as an effective political force. To the extent 
that the West Pakistani Left was able to make any noticeable impact on mainstream 
electoral politics, it was through the PPP which, in its formative years, did contain 
within it elements of the Left who arguably played a tremendous role in shaping its 
identity as a party. However, the PPP’s Left was quickly disenchanted by the party’s 
lurch to the Right once in power, and many of the most vocal and prominent Leftists 
in the PPP either abandoned the party or were expelled. Particularly in Punjab, this 
meant that the Left would, over time, become even more marginal than it had been 
before (Ahmad, 1984).  
 Another factor underpinning the failure of the Leftist alternative in Pakistan 
was the rise of the religious Right as a political force. However, unlike Leftist and 
Ethno-national political forces, the religious Right, while often in apparent 
confrontation with the state, largely remained in partnership with the military 
establishment, initially providing it with ideological support and then, from the 1980s 
onwards, also assuming the form of militant assets to be deployed in Afghanistan and 
Kashmir (Haqqani, 2005). While this dynamic would start to change under the 
Musharraf government, as militant Islamists in the regions bordering Afghanistan, 
with networks and affiliates spread throughout Pakistan, engaged in armed conflict 
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with the state, the role the religious Right played in mainstream politics would remain 
unchanged. Having taken their cues from an increasingly marginal Left, organising 
themselves as vanguard parties with committed cadres (Nasr, 1994; Iqtidar, 2011), the 
religious Right has exercised disproportionate street power and influence over 
questions of public morality, law and, increasingly from the 2000s onwards, support 
for American military operations in Afghanistan, but has largely left unquestioned the 
role of the military and its allies in the politics of Pakistan.  
 Finally, it is also important to mention peasant movements in Pakistan, and 
their failure to challenge the political status quo in the country. Again, what is 
interesting to note about peasant movements is that, especially in Punjab, they have 
been notable for their absence. In contrast with Karachi and Lahore, as well as the 
other cities of Pakistan, which were the focal points of the movements of 1968-69 and 
2007, and where protests against the government remain routine, the countryside has 
remained relatively quiescent. Other than sporadic outbursts of protest, the only 
notable instance of significant peasant mobilisation in Punjab remains that of the 
landless tenants on the military farms of Okara in the early 2000s, where farmers and 
cultivators who had been on the land for over a century rose up to resist eviction by 
the military (Akhtar, 2006; 2010b). This movement, however, emerged under very 
specific circumstances that are unlikely to be replicated elsewhere in the province.287 
While the claim has been made that Bhutto’s PPP was able to successfully mobilize 
the peasantry in Punjab against the dominant landed elite (LaPorte, 1977; Burki, 
1988), this argument rests on the assumption that the rural ‘middle’ classes 
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represented a radically new fraction of the peasantry whose interests were 
diametrically opposed to those of the landed aristocracy. As has been explained in 
Chapter 2, this is an assumption that does not bear up to critical scrutiny but even if 
the argument were correct, the fact would remain that the PPP failed to activate the 
rural majority, namely the smallest landowners and rural landless, as a political force, 
with these elements of the peasantry remaining as marginal as ever to electoral 
politics. As will be discussed below, the general absence of the non-propertied 
peasantry from politics in Punjab illustrates both the extent of the power of the landed 
elite, and what is perhaps the most significant reason for the inability of largely urban-
based protest movements to initiate radical institutional change. 
 From the brief descriptions of protest and mobilization given above, it is 
possible to see that although social movements and resistance in Pakistan have 
assumed a variety of forms at multiple points in its history, none have really been able 
to initiate the kind of transformation that would be necessary to challenge the 
landlord-state nexus at the heart of Punjabi and, indeed, Pakistani politics. Even where 
movements have had tremendous effects on Pakistan’s politics, most notably in the 
case of ethno-national movements, the bargain between the state and the landed elite 
has remained insulated from their impact. It is precisely for this reason that 1968-69 
and 2007 represent such important junctures in Pakistan’s history; unlike other 
moments of contestation, these two junctures fundamentally questioned the military’s 
role in politics. Furthermore, these particular junctures represented a union of the 
different tendencies and factors that could create the conditions in which the 
institutional status quo could be challenged; understanding the combination of causes 
that generated these movements, as well as the reasons behind their eventual failure, is 
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vital to explaining potential routes to overcoming the institutional inertia of Punjab’s 
path dependent landed politics. 
The Movement of 1968 and the Rise of the PPP 
 
 On the 7th of November 1968, a demonstration by students of Gordon College 
in Rawalpindi was brought to an end by police firing that left one student dead and 
five others injured. The demonstration had been called to protest the arrests of some 
of the College’s students following a trip they had made to Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) to purchase illegal smuggled goods (Ali, 1970, 156-157). 
During a period of economic hardship and scarcity, the incarceration of their 
colleagues for the crime of buying otherwise hard to obtain necessities inflamed the 
sentiments of the college’s students, who were already in a restive mood following the 
imposition of the University Ordinance which proscribed student participation in 
politics (Sayeed, 1979). In response to the death of the student on November 7th, 
dissatisfaction with the Ayub regime exploded on to the streets of West Pakistan’s 
cities, with 132 days of non-stop protests, marches, and processions only coming to an 
end with Ayub Khan’s resignation in March 1969. Although this resignation was 
accompanied by the re-imposition of Martial Law under General Yahya Khan, it was 
clear that military rule would not be acceptable, or sustainable, for long; given the 
strength of the PPP in West Pakistan, and the Awami League in the East, both of 
which had been bolstered by the popular movement against Ayub, the military had 
little choice but to announce elections to be held on the basis of universal adult 
suffrage in 1970.  
 In the literature on the movement of 1968-69, there is considerable consensus 
on the broad structural causes that underpinned the collapse of a government that had, 
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until 1965, showed little sign of weakness or instability. Fresh from his presidential 
victory, Ayub Khan and his military commanders sought to force the Kashmir issue 
by provoking India in to a conflict. The war with India in 1965, which ended in a 
stalemate at best, marked the beginning of the end of the Ayub government not only 
because of its abortive nature, but also because it began the process of exposing the 
economic contradictions at the heart of the government’s economic programme. 
Immediately after the war, prices of essential foodstuffs, like flour and sugar, 
skyrocketed and as shortages became increasingly common, the government was 
forced to impose a strict regime of rationing (Ali, 1970, 145). These economic 
hardships only served to reinforce a reality that would become crystal clear by 1967; 
for all its talk of ushering in a ‘decade of development’ during which growth in both 
agriculture and industry had given Pakistan annual growth rates in excess of 5%, the 
Ayub Khan government had actually presided over a period in which real wages had 
decreased, rural and urban poverty had increased, and inequality had grown 
(Maniruzzaman, 1971b; Guisinger and Irfan, 1974; Jones, 2003, 142-145). The 
economic injustice of Ayub Khan’s Pakistan was best exemplified by the infamous 
‘22 families’ who, through the patronage of the business-friendly government, had 
arrived at a position where they collectively controlled the majority of Pakistan’s 
industrial and commercial assets (Maniruzzaman, 1971b).  
 Pakistan’s dismal economic situation in the latter half of the 1960s was 
compounded by the boiling over of the ethno-national tensions that had plagued 
relations between the country’s Eastern and Western wings since independence 
(Tepper, 1972). The consensus over the institutional arrangements for sharing power 
between East and West Pakistan was overturned after Ayub Khan assumed power and 
abrogated the 1956 Constitution. The BD system, coupled with the centralisation of 
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power in the hands of Ayub Khan himself and his core group of military and 
bureaucratic advisors, compounded the sense of marginalisation felt in East Pakistan 
which, in turn, strengthened the support for parties like the NAP and Awami League 
that clamoured for greater provincial autonomy (Maniruzzaman, 1971b; Sayeed, 
1972). These demands found even greater resonance in Bengal as it became clear that 
in addition to presiding over a period of widening inequality between the rich and the 
poor, Ayub Khan had also overseen a growing economic disparity between West and 
East Pakistan, with the latter receiving less governmental development spending and 
investment despite providing the bulk of the country’s exports and foreign exchange. 
 In the context of these economic and ethno-national challenges to the stability 
of the Ayub regime, it was the small towns of Punjab that began to show the first 
signs of discontent in West Pakistan. According to Burki (1971), the anti-Ayub 
movement first began to gather steam in 1967, when a drought-induced economic 
depression in the agricultural sector began to generate economic hardship in the small 
towns linked to Punjab’s agrarian economy. As the economic crisis worsened, the 
malaise spread to the cities, where decreases in the per capita availability of food were 
exacerbated by a declining rate of industrial growth. Having already been excluded 
from the institutions of decision-making and power under the Ayub government, 
urban professionals and students, hit hard by the economic downturn, represented a 
politically and economically marginalised constituency that would form the vanguard 
of the anti-Ayub protests. 
   While students and professionals played an important role in mobilising 
against the regime, they did so at different points in time and in tandem with other 
urban actors. At the very beginning, the movement was largely dominated by 
students, who coalesced under the banners of the different provincial-level student 
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unions in East and West Pakistan to launch daily protests against the government 
(Maniruzzaman, 1971c). This was followed by the entry of trade unions into the 
movement, particularly in Karachi and Lahore, as industrial workers gradually 
displaced students as the most numerically significant force in the movement 
(Shaheed, 1979; Sayeed, 1979, 117-118; Khan, 2009, 137-142). Finally, following 
Ayub Khan’s offer in February 1969 to not contest the forthcoming elections, urban 
professionals, particularly lawyers, and government employees also joined the 
Opposition movement. Amidst the coming together of these disparate urban groups, 
the major Opposition parties also attempted to capitalise on the general anti-Ayub 
sentiment with varying degrees of success.  
 Based on the preceding analysis, the argument could be made that cities were 
the focal point of anti-Ayub resistance because they were the sites at which the 
economic contradictions of the regime were most acutely felt. However, when looking 
at the different urban groups involved in the agitation, it is also possible to see that the 
presence of extant organisational and associational platforms was key to facilitating 
their mobilisation. The East and West Pakistani student unions, the trade unions of 
Karachi and Lahore, the Bar Associations of the legal community, and the unions of 
white-collar government employees, all provided a basis upon which these groups 
could organise independently of the influence of the political parties and the 
government. Indeed, the fact that the trade unions in particular had managed to 
survive the repression unleashed against them over the course of the decade was a 
testament to their organisational depth (Sayeed, 1979, 118). Given that they had a 
negligible role to play in the earliest days of the agitation, the rapid and relatively 
autonomous emergence of the popular movement was something that took West 
Pakistan’s political parties by surprise (Ali, 1970, 188).  
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 In East Pakistan, the two major political parties, namely the NAP with its 
peasant leader Maulana Bhashani, and the Awami League under Mujib-ur-Rehman, 
were more attuned to the public mood and extended their support to the anti-Ayub 
protests very early on. In West Pakistan, the only party was that was able to claim a 
similar level of prescience was the newly-formed PPP under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 
Ayub Khan’s former Foreign Minister. A Sindhi politician from one of the province’s 
largest and most powerful landowning families, Bhutto had fallen out with the Ayub 
government over the handling of the 1965 War and the subsequent ceasefire 
negotiations at Tashkent. Outside of government, Bhutto became one of the regime’s 
most implacable foes. As has been documented at length by Ali (1970), Jones (2003) 
and Khan (2009), Bhutto was faced with the choice of finding allies within the regime 
to support him in his endeavours, joining an existing party to oppose Ayub Khan, or 
creating a new one altogether. Ultimately, Bhutto would explore all three of these 
options. While there were elements within the military that were sympathetic to 
Bhutto, he remained unwilling to enter into an agreement that would see him become 
subordinate to the dictates of the military (Jones, 2003, 151). This left the option of 
joining either the CoML or the West Pakistani chapter of the NAP. Given his own 
Social Democratic inclinations (Ali, 1970, 148), as well as the tremendous political 
acumen that allowed him to correctly read the rising public disaffection with the Ayub 
government (Khan, 2009, 269), Bhutto found he had a greater affinity for the NAP’s 
brand of leftist politics than that of the discredited CoML members who had presided 
over the first chaotic decade of Pakistan’s existence. However, in what would prove to 
be a historic mistake on the part of the NAP’s Punjab leadership, Bhutto’s desire to 
join the NAP was met with indifference due to a belief that he lacked the level of 
ideological conviction that was expected of party members (Jones, 2003, 104-105). 
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 The NAP’s rejection of Bhutto was accompanied by splits within the party 
itself. As documented by Rashiduzzaman (1970), Ali (1970), Khan (2009), and 
Ahmed (2010), the NAP had long been plagued by internal factionalism, particularly 
over the question of supporting either the USSR or China following the Sino-Soviet 
Split. The effects of this would be most acutely felt in Punjab, where the leadership of 
the Punjab NAP remained aligned with the pro-China Bhashani, opposing the position 
taken by the rest of the West Pakistani NAP. Furthermore unlike Bhashani who, had a 
tremendous amount of support in the East Pakistani countryside, the strength of the 
NAP in West Pakistan was largely restricted to the NWFP and Balochistan, where 
tribal and ethno-national loyalties formed the core of the party’s support, appeal, and 
identity. The split with Bhashani only reinforced the provincial, conservative strain 
within the West Pakistani NAP’s politics, and this situation was not helped by the fact 
that the arguably more radical activists and leaders in Punjab had an extremely limited 
support base restricted almost entirely to Lahore (Khan, 2009, 265-268). 
 As such, when Bhutto formed the PPP and assumed the mantle of West 
Pakistani progressive politics in December 1967, his ability to do so stemmed not so 
much from the promise of the new party as it did from the NAP’s state of disarray in 
West Pakistan (Ali, 1970, 148). The idea of forming the PPP had originally come 
from J. A. Rahim, a former bureaucrat and Marxist who felt that the time was ripe for 
the creation of a new progressive party, and that Bhutto had both the recognition and 
force of personality around which the new party could be organised (Jones, 2003, 
107-109). Bhutto was receptive to Rahim’s proposals, and spent much of the latter 
half of 1967 meeting with different progressive groups and intellectuals, building up 
support for the idea of a new party. Additionally, Bhutto also drew on his own 
networks of power and influence to recruit members for the party, facilitating the 
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entry of members of the traditional elite like Ghulam Mustafa Khar, many of whom 
had either not been involved in politics before or had not been linked to the Ayub 
government. As will be discussed below, the entry of these elements into the PPP 
would become a source of tension in later years but during the formative phase from 
1967-1970, it was the Leftist tendency within the PPP that was in ascendancy (ibid., 
228-237).  
 The PPP was not the only party that attempted to capitalise on the movement 
in West Pakistan. The CoML, while initially slow to respond to anti-Ayub sentiment, 
quickly produced its own programme of radical reform which would prove to be 
nothing more than mere propaganda as the majority of the party’s members rebelled 
against their leadership and refused to endorse the proposals (Ali, 1970, 188-189). 
Other elements of the opposition would also join together to form a platform for right-
wing opposition to the Ayub regime. Called the Pakistan Democratic Movement 
(PDM), this formation would consist of parts of the CoML, an anti-Mujib faction of 
the Awami League, the National Democratic Front and, significantly, the JI and the 
Nizam-i-Mustafa, West Pakistan’s two main religious parties. In the PDM, only the JI 
and the CoML could claim to have any kind of electoral support base, with the former 
drawing on elements of the middle classes and petty bourgeoisie in the cities, and the 
latter relying on its character as a party of landed interests. The JI in particular would 
go on to play a significant role between 1969 and 1970, first mobilising religious 
sentiment against the Ayub regime288, and then engaging in battles with the ‘secular’ 
PPP in the streets of Pakistan during the short-lived Yahya Khan government (Jones, 
2003, 231-233). 
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 Religious opposition to the ‘secular’ Ayub Khan regime was principally rooted in the government’s 
introduction of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance in 1961 and the creation of the Auqaf Department in 
1960. The former introduced laws that many orthodox religious scholars believed to be un-Islamic, and 
the latter attempted to regulate the various religious endowments and charities run by the ulama. See 
Jones (2003, 147-149) and Nasr (1994, 147-169). 
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 Once formed, the PPP grew very quickly, particularly in Punjab, as a variety 
of different social groups, ranging from urban professionals and students to 
zamindars, expressed interest in joining the party. In the first year of its existence, the 
PPP’s appeal was largely urban (Jones, 2003, 123), but this began to change partly as 
a result of the entry of landed politicians, but also because of Bhutto’s relentless 
campaigning. More than any other leader in Pakistan’s history, Bhutto was able to 
bring a tremendous amount of oratorical skill and charisma to bear during the frequent 
public meetings he held, using the rhetoric of progressive politics to generate support 
for his party platform amongst the masses of West Pakistan, and to generate 
opposition to the Ayub regime. When the anti-Ayub protests erupted in Rawalpindi 
and the other cities of West Pakistan, Bhutto had already been touring the country for 
a year, holding rallies with mass attendance as the PPP geared up to contest the 
forthcoming presidential elections. Bhutto’s obvious influence led to his arrest on 13th 
November 1968, along with other opposition leaders, but this did not prevent the PPP 
machinery from capitalising on the groundwork that had been laid by their leader. By 
effectively deploying a message in which the party pledged to support Pakistan’s 
workers and peasants, and to fight the economic injustice that had characterised the 
Ayub years, the PPP was able to increase its support exponentially, using the ant-
Ayub movement to build itself as a party (Ali, 1970; Jones, 2003; Khan, 2009). Thus, 
by the time Ayub Khan resigned in March 1969 and handed over power to General 
Yahya Khan, it had become clear that the PPP would have to be part of any post-
martial law dispensation. A year later, after elections were finally held in 1970 the 
results were testament to the truly meteoric rise of the party. While it was unable to 
make much headway in the NWFP and Balochistan, where the NAP was dominant, 
the PPP swept aside the other Opposition parties in Punjab and Sindh, gaining enough 
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seats in what would become the National Assembly of Pakistan to form a government 
at the centre following the secession of Bangladesh. At the time, the PPP’s victory 
brought with it the hope that the election of a truly progressive party following 
Pakistan’s first real parliamentary election would finally allow the country to break 
the pattern of instability, authoritarianism, and elite politics that had characterised its 
first two decades of independence.  
The Anti-Musharraf Movement of 2007 
 
 On the 9th of March 2007, Chief Justice Iftikhar Hussain Chaudhry of the 
Supreme Court of Pakistan was sacked by General Pervez Musharraf. Prior to this 
dismissal, the court had been actively pursuing cases concerning public interest 
litigation in the areas of urban development, the privatization of state assets, and the 
disappearance of individuals from the NWFP and Balochistan, allegedly as a result of 
the regime’s on-going counter-insurgency operations. In a departure from the 
traditional relationship between the courts and military governments in Pakistan, the 
Chaudhry-led Supreme Court made use of its judicial power to gradually push for 
political liberalisation, banking on the notion that the increasingly beleaguered 
Musharraf government’s need for legal legitimacy provided the Court with the 
freedom to expand beyond its traditional role (Ghias, 2010). Faced with the prospect 
of additional inquiries into government corruption, as well as his own eligibility to 
remain president, Musharraf’s intervention represented an attempt to stave off an 
increasingly problematic raft of legal challenges. 
 Following Chaudhry’s dismissal, lawyers from across the country began a 
programme of protest and agitation, demanding the re-instatement of the Chief Justice 
who, they believed, had been removed from office for transparently political reasons. 
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Instead, using his powers as President, Musharraf filed a reference against Chaudhry 
with Pakistan’s Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), the body tasked with investigating 
the conduct of judges. Amidst rising opposition to the government from the legal 
fraternity, and a non-stop campaign of marches and protests in the streets of 
Pakistan’s cities, the SJC cleared Chaudhry of all charges on July 20, allowing him to 
resume his responsibilities as Chief Justice. Tensions between the Court and the 
Musharraf government continued to build over the summer, culminating in a clash in 
November later that year. 
 In 2007, elections were due to be held as the terms of both parliaments and the 
President were due to end. Elections for the presidency were scheduled for the 6th of 
October, with Musharraf ensuring that the parliamentary elections would take place 
afterwards in January 2008. The purpose of this was clear; by having the presidential 
election precede the parliamentary one, Musharraf could ensure that the puppet 
parliament he had seen elected in 2002 would re-elect him as President. However, 
mindful of the regime’s plummeting popularity, Musharraf also set about securing his 
position and thus entered into negotiations with Benazir Bhutto, then in exile from 
Pakistan, pledging to provide her and the PPP with immunity from corruption 
prosecution in exchange for their support for his presidential candidacy.  The 
agreement between the two was finalised in Abu Dhabi on the 27th of July, and led to 
the promulgation of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) on the 7th of 
October, the day after Musharraf was elected President. Under the terms of the NRO, 
Bhutto and the PPP were allowed to contest the forthcoming elections. In response to 
this, the Supreme Court entertained a petition questioning the validity of the NRO and 
on 12rh of October, declared the Ordinance to be illegal. Just a month earlier, the 
Court had also entertained a petition from Nawaz Sharif, the head of the PML-N, 
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deeming his forced exile from Pakistan to be illegal, and giving him permission to 
return to Pakistan and lead his party in the elections. 
 When Sharif returned to Pakistan on the 10th of September 2007, he was 
arrested and re-exiled by the Musharraf government. This resulted in the Supreme 
Court initiating contempt proceedings against the government which, in tandem with 
the NRO judgment, led Musharraf to impose a state of ‘Emergency’ on the 3rd of 
November, dismissing recalcitrant Supreme Court judges, and unleashing a wave of 
repression against the lawyers and other actors that continued to oppose him. What 
had initially started out as a movement restricted to the legal community now assumed 
a more popular dimension, with NGOs, civil society groups, and students coming out 
onto the streets en masse to protest the regime’s reversion to overt authoritarianism 
(Bolognani, 2010; Ahmed and Stephan, 2010). Having been prevented from assuming 
the presidency due to legal challenges mounted against his candidacy Musharraf, still 
seeking to claim legal legitimacy, was forced to wait until the 22nd of November 
before the reconstituted Supreme Court could validate his election. By this point in 
time, in the face of non-stop protests, Musharraf bowed in the face of pressure to 
relinquish his position as army chief, and did so a day before assuming the 
presidency.  
In the absence of any moves to re-instate the dismissed judges, or to lift the 
state of emergency, the movement against the regime continued unabated. When the 
government did lift the state of emergency on 15th December, opposition political 
parties also joined the fray. While the PPP continued to walk a ‘political tightrope’, 
seeking to continue working with Musharraf under the NRO while not alienating the 
Lawyers’ Movement (Ghias, 2010), the death of Benazir Bhutto in a suicide attack 
later that month triggered a groundswell of support for the party, and intensified 
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opposition to the government. The movement only abated in February 2008, when 
elections to parliament saw the PPP and PML emerge as the two major parties at the 
centre, and agree to form a coalition government pledged to removing Musharraf from 
the presidency and restoring the dismissed judges. The PML-Q, MMA, and other 
political forces that had been created by Musharraf were completely routed, 
illustrating the extent to which this election represented popular discontent with the 
military government (Adeney, 2008; Akhtar, 2010a, 117-118). Musharraf himself was 
eventually forced to resign in August 2008, but his unhurried exit, coupled with the 
relative timidity of the main political parties involved, gave credence to the belief that 
the transition from military rule in 2008 was not particularly transformative, with the 
Establishment retaining a considerable amount of power behind the scenes. This 
assessment would be borne out over the next few years as questions regarding foreign 
policy and internal security continued to remain within the purview of the military 
(Akhtar, 2010a; Fair, 2010). 
 The fact that opposition to the Musharraf regime would come to a head in 
2007 was not solely due to the government’s tensions with the judiciary. Like Ayub 
Khan, Musharraf had presided over a period of rapid economic growth, particularly 
after the events of September 11, 2001, when American cultivation of Pakistani 
support for the War on Terror, coupled with increased remittances of foreign 
exchange from expatriate workers in the Middle East, provided the basis for an 
economic boom (Burki, 2007; Zaidi, 2011). This external economic assistance was 
supplemented by a programme of economic liberalisation and privatization, all of 
which contributed to a booming market for real estate, and tremendous growth in the 
services sector. However, by 2005-06, much of this economic progress was beginning 
to be exposed as illusory; as a result of the international oil shock of 2005, newly 
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deregulated oil prices skyrocketed, resulting in inflationary pressures on other 
commodities as well. This was accompanied most noticeably by a steep rise in the 
price of sugar, a development that was almost entirely due to the inability of the 
government to reign in Pakistan’s powerful sugar producing cartel (Malik, 2009). The 
year 2007 also brought with it the start of Pakistan’s energy crisis as increasing 
demand, as well as a ballooning deficit, left the government increasingly unable to 
purchase electricity from the country’s network of private power producers. 
 The economic crises that engulfed the Musharraf government took place 
amidst two major sources of opposition to the regime that preceded the lawyers’ 
movement. Firstly, many of the religious parties that had thus far enjoyed an 
ambivalent relationship with the regime, working with it in exchange for concessions 
on issues of social policy, began to more openly oppose Musharraf in reaction to two 
developments; the government’s response to the Red Mosque crisis of 2007, and the 
military’s support for the American War on Terror in Afghanistan and FATA in 
Pakistan. In 2006, the Danish Cartoons controversy had already demonstrated the 
ability of the religious parties to mobilise large protests in the cities of Pakistan 
(Blom, 2008), and the willingness of the mainstream Islamist parties to confront the 
state only increased following the siege and storming of Islamabad’s Red Mosque in 
July 2007 (Blom, 2011).289 This coincided with opposition to the War on Terror and 
the role played by the Musharraf government in its prosecution. Already at odds with 
the government over the decision to stop overtly supporting the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, the mainstream religious parties also opposed the government’s decision 
to deploy military force in the FATA to reign in Islamist militants believed to have 
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 In early 2007, the clerics in charge of the Red Mosque, as well as students of their seminary, began 
to engage in religious vigilantism in the surrounding environs, attempting to impose their own vision of 
Islamic law. Initially reluctant to act against the mosque administration, for fear of the fallout from 
doing so, the Musharraf government eventually ended up laying siege to, and storming, the Mosque, 
resulting in the deaths of 173 people. 
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links to the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. These operations, which were initiated in 
2004-5, were extremely unpopular in Pakistan and fuelled the belief that the 
Musharraf government had compromised on the sovereignty of Pakistan by selling 
itself out to the USA. Capitalising on this the JI, which was the single largest Islamist 
party in Pakistan, put its full weight behind the lawyers’ movement and chose to 
boycott the elections of 2007 (Ali and Iqtidar, 2008; Akhtar, 2010a, 111). 
 The second major pre-2007 source of opposition to the government was ethno-
national in nature. After almost two decades of relative calm, Baloch nationalists once 
again rose up in arms against the state over its continued refusal to devolve greater 
economic power to the province, and to include ethnic Balochis within developmental 
plans for the province (Akhtar, 2007). The conflict between the state and Baloch 
nationalists saw the deployment of the Pakistan army in the province on a scale 
unseen since the 1970s, and culminated with the assassination of the Baloch 
nationalist leader Akbar Bugti in August 2006. The Pakistan army’s assaults on 
nationalists in Balochistan, as well as Islamist militants in the NWFP, and the 
indiscriminate use of force in both provinces, only reinforced the notion that a 
Punjabi, rather than Pakistani, military was actively engaged in subjugating the people 
of the smaller provinces (Ali and Iqtidar, 2008). It was also not coincidental that the 
vast majority of people who went ‘missing’ during the Musharraf years were from 
these two provinces, and the broader sense of ethno-national resentment that was 
growing in Balochistan and the NWFP infused the proceedings of the Supreme Court 
with regards to the recovery of the missing persons.  
 In this context, it is interesting to note the types of actors that took to the 
streets against the government in 2007. Like the anti-Ayub movement, the protests 
had a distinctly urban bias, albeit one that was also on display in the smaller cities of 
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Punjab and Sindh. The lawyers who formed the core of the movement were once 
again able to mobilise on the basis of their Bar associations, and the NGOs and civil 
society groups that joined them also drew on existing organisational forms and 
linkages (Ahmed and Stephan, 2010; Ghias, 2010). What was exceptional about the 
movement of 2007 was the involvement of university students; given that student 
politics, except for that of the religious Right, had been banned since the beginning of 
the Zia regime, the mobilisation of students against Musharraf was unexpected. To a 
very large extent, their ability to come together as an organised entity stemmed from 
their skilful use of social media and the internet. As Bolognani (2010) and Shaheen 
(2010) have shown, students from elite universities like the Lahore University of 
Management Sciences, and Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, were able to use 
the internet to communicate, circumventing controls on the flow of information 
imposed by the government, and effectively drawing international attention to the 
situation in Pakistan. Student-led efforts to disseminate information where matched by 
a sympathetic and relatively independent media; upon coming to power, Musharraf 
had liberalised the Pakistani media, allowing for the mushrooming of private 
television channels and radio stations that were allowed to operate free of state 
interference. That the media could turn on him was something that Musharraf clearly 
viewed as an unintended consequence of his earlier actions, as evinced by his attempts 
to muzzle the media when the Emergency was imposed in November 2007. These 
efforts would largely prove to be fruitless, as the de-centred nature of the media 
infrastructure and the internet ensured that the state was unable to maintain a 
monopoly on information. 
 What was also notable, however, about the anti-Musharraf movement was the 
lack of participation from the ‘subordinate’ classes (Akhtar, 2010a). This was rooted 
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in two main reasons; firstly, according to Bolognani (2010), the use of the internet and 
social media as the primary means through which to organise resistance, outside of 
the professional associations, necessarily meant that the movement would be 
restricted to ‘elite’ segments of society. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the 
two decades since the end of the first PPP government had seen the Establishment 
actively work towards dismantling and co-opting the organisations that had formed 
the basis for working class agitation against Ayub Khan (Akhtar, 2010a). Lacking the 
kind of organisational resources they had possessed in the late 1960s, the working 
classes in Pakistan’s cities could not effectively mobilise against Musharraf.  
This was compounded by the changed nature of the political parties 
themselves, as well as their demands. Rather than representing the type of progressive 
forces that the PPP and East Pakistani parties had been in the 1960s, the PPP, PML-N 
and other mainstream parties were creatures of the 1980s and 1990s, vying with each 
other for the favour of the military establishment, and committed to the protection of 
narrow, propertied class interests due to the inescapable logic of Pakistan’s elite and 
patronage based electoral politics (Ahmed, 2001). This lack of a connection with the 
subordinate classes was matched by the indifference shown by the PPP and PML-N 
towards linking the anti-Musharraf movement to broader questions of economic and 
social justice (Akhtar, 2010a). As will be discussed below, the absence in 2007 of 
meaningful of resistance from below, and from the mainstream parties, demonstrated 
both the difficulty of overcoming the institutional inertia of politics in Pakistan, and of 
the way in which the mechanisms of path dependent elite power reproduction had 
deprived potential sources of opposition of their capacity to initiate radical change. 
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The Movements of 1968-69 and 2007 Compared 
 
 When comparing the anti-Ayub and anti-Musharraf movements, it is 
immediately possible to identity some common trends that arguably hold the key to 
explaining the emergence of the junctures in which they took place. Both movements 
occurred in conditions of economic crisis following periods of relatively high 
economic growth, although the political implications of this were only really 
expressed in 1968-69. The second obvious commonality between the two movements 
is the presence of serious ethno-national opposition to the military establishment. This 
assumed more serious proportions under Ayub Khan, as the Bengali movement for 
provincial autonomy gathered steam during the last years of his government. For 
Musharraf, the enduring problem of ethno-national mobilisation in Balochistan, 
represented serious challenges to the stability of the regime. While not directly 
bearing on the structure of Punjab’s internal politics, or on the military’s alliance with 
the province’s traditional elite, resistance in the other provinces strained the capacity 
of the state to function effectively, and brought into question the legitimacy of the 
military’s role in politics.  
The third point of commonality between 1968-69 and 2007 lies in the presence 
of urban organisations possessing the capacity to effectively mobilise against the 
state. Under both Ayub and Musharraf, it was students, lawyers, and other urban 
groups who drew on their associational networks to generate resistance to the regime. 
Where the two movements differ, however, is in the role played by organised labour 
and the mainstream political parties. The anti-Ayub movement in West Pakistan was 
heavily supported by trade unions and leftist political parties that articulated 
opposition to the regime in predominantly economic terms. This arguably formed the 
basis for the PPP’s reliance on socialist and progressive rhetoric to generate support 
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for itself. By contrast, the anti-Musharraf movement did not feature the subordinate 
classes in any meaningful way, and the mainstream political parties refrained from 
challenging the regime in the same terms that had been employed four decades earlier.  
One final point of commonality between the two movements is the effect the 
international context had on the state when these movements took place. The 1968-69 
movement took place soon after an abortive war with India which, in addition to 
adding to the state’s financial strain, also led to the Tashkent Declaration in 1966 
which was seen by many, including Bhutto, to be a humiliating capitulation to India. 
The War had also soured ties between the United States and Pakistan, leading to the 
temporary withdrawal of American support for the military. Finally, it is perhaps not 
coincidental that the students who took to the streets against Ayub Khan in 1968 did 
so at the same time as many of their contemporaries in Europe and North America. 
While there is no readily available evidence of any links between the two waves of 
protest, it is reasonable to assume that an international ‘demonstration’ effect may 
have been at work.  
For Musharraf, the international context presented a similar, yet different, set 
of circumstances. The War on Terror, in which Pakistan was aligned with the United 
States, had led to greater Islamist militancy in FATA, presenting serious challenges to 
the stability of the regime, particularly with the influx of fighters from neighbouring 
Afghanistan and the initiation of US drone strikes against targets within Pakistan.  
The difficult international situation was compounded by increasing US suspicion of 
the Musharraf government’s conduct in the War, with the former suspecting the latter 
of harbouring anti-American militants. Having enjoyed several years of unquestioning 
US support and aid, the Musharraf government was more internationally isolated in 
2007 than it had ever been since 2002. 
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 Based on this comparison of the similarities between Pakistan’s two most 
significant anti-military movements, it is possible to arrive at some tentative 
conclusions which, while not exhaustive, may be able to provide some insight into the 
conditions under which the state-landlord bargain could be challenged. First of all, it 
appears clear that economic crisis has a role to play in weakening the capacity of the 
state to effectively constrain challengers seeking to change the status quo. This, 
coupled with the impact of ethno-national resistance, as well as the international 
context, lends credence to Skocpol’s (1979) theory that successful revolutions can 
only take place under conditions of state weakness of the sort described above. 
 It is here, however, that it becomes necessary to examine exactly what the 
outcomes were of both movements. Despite the similar conditions that gave rise to 
them, the anti-Ayub movement differed greatly from the anti-Musharraf one in a key 
respect; the former emphasised the need for socio-economic transformation to 
accompany the end of military rule, while the latter never aimed for more than a 
transition to democracy. Despite the similarities between the two movements in terms 
of their urban base, one key differentiating factor was the class actors that were 
involved. While both movements featured lawyers, students, and professionals, only 
the anti-Ayub movement featured the urban working class performing any kind of 
substantive role. It was in response to this worker mobilisation. 
 From this, it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that any movement aimed at 
challenging the historically entrenched power of the landed elite can only take place 
during a contingent ‘contestational’ juncture in which state weakness is 
complemented by the emergence of ‘new’ political actors, like the working class, 
seeking to change the status quo. While the anti-Musharraf movement met the 
contingency condition, in that the crises precipitating the movement, and their 
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outcome, could not have been foreseen, the absence of any mobilisation from below 
to claim political space meant that the radical potential of the movement remained 
limited. Nonetheless, subsequent events would go on to show that the promise of the 
PPP itself was also illusory and that despite the presence of working class 
mobilisation, the PPP was unable to constrain both the military establishment and its 
landed allies. The following section attempts to provide an explanation for this turn of 
events. 
  
Path Dependence, the Land Elite, and the Failed Promise of 1968-
69 and 2007 
 
 As has been explained in the preceding analysis, the anti-Ayub and anti-
Musharraf movements took place at junctures that had radical potential. While the 
former was able to deliver on this promise in the short-term, it ultimately failed to 
radically alter the institutional status quo. This promise was even more short-lived 
with the anti-Musharraf movement, as the PPP and the PML-N both chose a path of 
transition, rather than transformation, after February 2008. In this section of the thesis, 
it will be argued that the failure of the PPP to capitalise on anti-Ayub movement in a 
radical way was rooted partly in the circumstances that it found itself in, but also in 
the role played by the Punjabi landed elite in the post-1971 dispensation. It will also 
be argued that this had long-term implications of transformative politics in Pakistan, 
and that the same mechanisms that underpinned the reassertion of landed power under 
Bhutto prevented the anti-Musharraf movement from assuming more radical 
proportions. 
  When discussing Land Reform in the previous chapter, the process through 
which the landed elite became part of the PPP was briefly alluded to. At the time of 
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the 1970 elections, the PPP’s Left was arguably at the height of its power, buoyed by 
the support for its programme that it found in the popular mobilisation against Ayub 
Khan. Even at this point, however, elements of the traditional landed elite from Sindh 
and Punjab had begun to make their way into the PPP, partly due to personal links 
they had with Bhutto, but also for more nakedly strategic reasons; some sought to 
hedge their bets against the impending collapse of the Ayub government, and Bhutto 
recognised the electoral value of landed politicians (Jones, 2003, 218-222). At the 
time, the entry of these individuals into the PPP was met with some alarm by the 
Party’s Left, but the decision to include them was ultimately justified by the argument 
that their presence in the party did not necessarily have to mean placing the levers of 
policy and decision-making in their hands.  
 Despite these early assurances, it was only two years before the PPP’s 
character had begun to fundamentally change. According to Baxter (1974), Ahmed 
(1973) and Khan (2009, 292), some of Pakistan’s most powerful landowning families 
had become part of the PPP by 1972, including the Tiwanas, Legharis, Daultanas, 
Gillanis, and Qureshis, to name just a few from Punjab. By 1974-75, these elements 
had begun to monopolise authority within the structure of the party at the local and 
district levels, and were also able to become increasingly close to Bhutto himself. By 
this time, much of the PPP’s progressive wing had either left the party, or become 
increasingly marginal within it. In 1977, when the PPP began its electoral campaign, 
the transformation of the party into a vehicle for landed Punjabi and Sindhi interests 
had been completed; the vast majority of the party’s candidates were drawn from the 
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traditional landed elite, and its local party machinery had become a vehicle for the 
mobilisation of support for this particular class (Rashid, 1978).290 
 In the literature on this period, there are three main sets of arguments that are 
advanced to explain the PPP’s transformation once in power. The first is the widely 
accepted argument provided by Burki (1974; 1988), who claimed that Bhutto’s 
economic policies ran the risk of alienating Pakistan’s powerful propertied classes and 
that, as opposition to the regime grew, the PPP had little choice but to begin co-opting 
elements of the traditional elite that could be used to shore up its support base. A 
second, influential strand of thought has focused on Bhutto’s personality; for Syed 
(1978), Bhutto’s success lay in his ability to characterise and portray himself in a 
variety of different ways depending on the context and audience, with this masking a 
tremendous tendency towards the centralisation of authority and indulgence in 
autocratic behaviour. In the view of Ahmad (1978) and Kaushik (1985), Bhutto was 
an inherently contradictory man given his feudal background and progressive 
aspirations. Following this line of analysis, Bhutto’s accommodation of the landed 
elite was partly rooted in his own class background, and willingness to rely on 
traditional sources of power as a means for support. Finally, Heeger (1977), Lodhi 
(1982), and Jones (2003) navigate a midway point between these two approaches. 
Recognizing the Bhutto was faced with tremendous opposition due to his economic 
and political programme, these authors attribute the decline of the PPP as a 
progressive force to the inability to the party to become institutionalised as an 
organisation tied to a social base rooted in the subordinate classes. As the propertied 
classes, the ethno-national NDP, and the military, ramped up their opposition to the 
                                                 
290
 Interestingly, it is also important to note that the PPP’s relationship with organised labour had also 
begun to change by this point. While the party remained committed, at least symbolically, to working 
with workers and unions, the PPP’s more authoritarian tendencies led it to clash with, and suppress, 
labour on several occasions (Ali, 2005; Shaheed, 1983; 2007). 
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PPP, Bhutto increasingly relied on a centralised network of landed politicians in 
Punjab and Sindh to buttress his government. 
 For the purposes of the argument presented in this thesis, it is simply 
important to note that, for whatever reason, the PPP’s reliance on the Punjabi landed 
elite was rooted in a need to acquire support in the face of tremendous opposition. 
Even in the period immediately preceding the elections of 1970, it became clear that 
the support of the landed elite was a tremendous electoral asset and while the PPP did 
lay some of the groundwork for creating a rural party machine that could circumvent 
the traditional elite, its efforts to do so remained insufficient and limited.  To the 
extent that the PPP introduced new blood to the agrarian political arena in Punjab, it 
was in the form of rich peasants who had come to power as BD members during the 
Ayub years, and who could be used to form factions rivalling those of the CML and 
CoML.291 Following the logic of path dependent institutional development, the PPP’s 
reliance on these forces was only to be expected; colonial rule, and the first two 
decades of independence, had deeply entrenched the power of the different fractions 
of the landed elite at different levels of politics in Punjab, and the factionalism of the 
landed elite ensured that even if certain segments were excluded from the political 
arena, the interests of the class as a whole would continue to be safeguarded. 
 It is in the PPP’s inability to mobilise the rural poor in Punjab that we can 
begin to find an explanation for the ultimate failure of the party to engage in a long-
term transformation of the institutional basis of politics in Pakistan. Just as the direct 
participation of urban labour in the anti-Ayub movement provided Bhutto with a 
ready constituency that he could lean on for support against the industrialists in the 
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 The fact that Bhutto introduced new politicians to the political arena has been well established by 
Burki (1988) and Jones (2003). Both acknowledge, however, that these new politicians were hardly 
members of the subordinate classes; while they may not have been members of the traditional 
aristocracy, they still represented a very privileged, propertied section of the peasantry. 
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cities, a concurrent mobilisation of the rural poor would have arguably provided the 
PPP with a very large pool of members, activists, and supporters who could have been 
relied upon to support the party in its campaign against entrenched landed interests. 
However, while the unions in the cities provided the organisational basis for labour to 
become part of the PPP’s class coalition, no corresponding organisations existed in 
the countryside that could have been used to capitalise on rural discontent with the 
Ayub regime. Even the traditional West Pakistani Left, which could draw upon a 
stronger history and tradition of progressive politics than the PPP, had failed to make 
inroads into rural Punjab in the two decades since independence. The villages of 
Punjab remained the political domain of landed elites who, through the 
monopolisation of local government and the bureaucracy, could ensure that their 
positions as rural patrons remained unchallenged. Strategically important as labour 
were as a support base for the PPP, their geographical insularity within the big cities, 
coupled with their limited demographic strength, meant that long term support for 
democratic change had to be rooted in the countryside.  
It could be argued that while the PPP should have attempted to generate 
support in the villages of Punjab independently of already entrenched elites, it simply 
did not have the time to do so in the period from 1968-1970. Furthermore, even 
though Bhutto did engage in extensive tours of every district in Punjab and Sindh, and 
did set up local PPP offices, the fact remained that directly challenging the power of 
the landed elite at the local level involved costs that the PPP could arguably not afford 
at that point in its history. Particularly in its initial, formative phase, the PPP’s support 
was largely urban in nature, and a confrontation with the Punjabi landed elite would 
have diverted resources and attention away from the broader struggle against Ayub 
Khan and, indeed, the NAP in Balochistan, Sindh and the NWFP. 
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 Thus, when faced with the challenge of winning an election in a 
predominantly rural electorate against a military regime in the face of tremendous 
opposition from the religious right and ethno-national parties, the PPP ultimately 
chose the path of least resistance, wagering that its accommodation of the landed elite 
for strategic purposes would not necessarily alter its identity as a progressive party. 
However, as the previous chapter’s discussion of land reform shows, the presence of 
the landed elite within the PPP severely diluted the power of the party to move against 
rural propertied interests. Having established their electoral indispensability, 
especially in the face of continued opposition to the Bhutto government, the landed 
elite were able to use their position to reinforce the underlying mechanisms that had 
facilitated their entry into the PPP in the first place. As Rashid (1978) correctly points 
out, the Bhutto period was actually quite profitable for the landed elite, who actually 
prospered relative to the class of big capitalists and industrialists that the PPP 
government remained implacably opposed to. Far from being constrained by the 
PPP’s Left, or by the Bhutto himself, the landed elite who joined the PPP emerged 
from the 1970s as a more powerful force than they had been before the end of the 
Ayub Khan era; they retained much of their economic strength and, more importantly, 
were more firmly established within the fabric of electoral politics than before.  
 The capture of the PPP by landed interests, and the subsequent dilution of its 
radical programme, can help us understand the reasons why the anti-Musharraf 
movement lacked the radical potential of the anti-Ayub juncture. In addition to the 
lack of participation by labour, which itself was representative of a less radical 
movement, the response of the PML-N and the PPP, the two biggest parties in 
Pakistan, to the movement exhibited none of the radical promise that the PPP had 
displayed. According to Akhtar (2010a), this was entirely due to the fact that both 
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parties had, by this point in time, been entirely captured by the propertied classes, and 
habituated to the idea of competing with each other for access to state patronage. In 
this sense, the decision by both parties to contest the 2008 elections with Musharraf as 
president, rather than boycotting them like several smaller parties, was seen by some 
segments of the 2007 movement as being a betrayal of everything that had thus far 
been fought for (Ali and Iqtidar, 2010). Even under Bhutto, the military and the PPP 
had started to initiate a rapprochement that limited the extent to which the former 
would move against the latter (Hashmi, 1983), and it would have been unrealistic to 
expect Pakistan’s contemporary political parties to act any differently. Purged of any 
truly progressive elements they may have once had, and beholden to the support of 
politicians willing to defect to an opposing side for the right price, the PPP and PML-
N had little choice but to once again compete against each other for the spoils of 
government.  
  
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, it has been argued that the anti-Ayub and anti-Musharraf 
movements presented the only real opportunities in which the path dependent 
institutional status quo could have been challenged, and a more progressive, and 
radical, political project could have been initiated to dismantle the political power of 
the military and the propertied classes. Due to a unique combination of ethno-national 
resistance, economic crisis, and urban unrest, 1968-71 and 2007 represented junctures 
at which the military establishment and its allies were sufficiently weakened to be 
removed from government as a result of popular protest and mobilisation. In 
particular, the emergence of the PPP during the anti-Ayub movement as an explicitly, 
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progressive, mass-based party raised the hope that Pakistan would finally be able to 
escape the cycle of authoritarianism and elite control that had characterised its first 
two decades of independence. 
 In reality, the promise of the PPP, and indeed of the anti-Musharraf 
movement, would prove to be short-lived. This was due in part to the urban nature of 
both movements; the groups that mobilised against Ayub and Musharraf were able to 
do so by drawing on existing associational and organisational resources that could be 
deployed against the two regimes. This was in contrast with the countryside, where 
the continued hold of elites over local politics ensured that similar kinds of 
mobilisation could not take place, and also led to the capture of the PPP by the 
traditional Punjabi landed elite. Contesting the elections of 1970, and subsequently 
governing Pakistan, in an atmosphere where it faced continual opposition from 
capitalists, the military, and ethno-nationalists in the smaller provinces, the PPP 
turned to landed elites as a means through which to bolster its electoral and popular 
support. This process began slowly, but would accelerate throughout the 1970s, 
culminating in the emergence of the PPP in the 1977 elections as a party almost 
entirely dominated by landed interests. This resulted in a dilution of the PPP’s 
progressive programme as the landed elite made use of their position within the party 
to pursue and protect their own interests. 
 The PPP that was removed from office by Zia-ul-Haq was very different from 
the one that had prevailed against Ayub Khan and, over the next two decades, the 
party would increasingly become part of the institutional framework of the military 
establishment’s politics, competing with rival parties for state patronage and the 
pursuit of elite interest. Thus, when circumstances gave rise to the anti-Musharraf 
movement of 2007, the PPP and other parties were simply unable to capitalise on the 
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opportunity the way they had in the late 1960s. Instead, the PPP chose to go the way 
of transition, agreeing to work with the military dispensation in exchange for amnesty 
from prosecution, and the continued support of the state. While the radical potential of 
2007 was always going to be limited when compared with 1968-69, largely due to the 
almost complete absence of the subordinate classes from the movement, the presence 
of the PPP as a ‘progressive’ party also impeded the ability of alternative radical 
organisations to emerge. By investing in the PPP in the 1970s, and subverting it to 
reinforce their own power, the landed elite of Punjab were thus able to ensure that 
even in periods of potentially transformative importance, they would be able to 
emerge relatively unscathed. 
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CHAPTER 9: Conclusion 
 
Bholia! Tu jag da andaata 
Tairi baandi dharti maata 
Tu jag da palan haar 
Jarnal, karnal, subedar dipti, DC, thanedar 
Saray taira ditta khawan 
Tu jay naan beejain tu jay naan gaahain 
Bhukay bhaanay subh mar jawan 
Aih chaakar tu sarkar 
 
Faiz Ahmad Faiz292 
 
  
Throughout this thesis, it has been argued that the path dependent trajectory of 
institutional development in Punjab has resulted in the creation and perpetuation of a 
political framework within which the traditional landed elite have been able to 
maintain their positions of power and influence, providing the colonial state, and then 
the post-colonial military establishment, with support in exchange for patronage. Over 
time, this has allowed the landed elite to firmly entrench itself within Punjab’s 
political parties, legislatures, and bureaucracy, using these institutions to reinforce 
their power at the local level and impose constraints on their rivals while 
simultaneously deepening their relationship of inter-dependence with the state. At the 
same time, the factionalism and opportunism that took the landed elite from the 
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 Faiz Ahmad Faiz was one of Pakistan’s most renowned Urdu poets. A member of the Progressive 
Writer’s Movement and one of the founders of the Communist Party of Pakistan, he was an implacable 
opponent of Pakistan’s military establishment and political elite. This excerpt is from Uth Utaanh Nu 
Jatta, which was written about the peasantry, and was one of Faiz’s rare forays into Punjabi poetry. It’s 
translation is as follows: 
 
O simpleton, you feed the whole word 
The whole earth is your slave 
You are rearing the whole world 
Generals, Colonels, Subedars, Deputies, DCs and Police officers 
Everyone eats what you give them 
If you won't plough, if you won't sow 
All of them would die of starvation 
They are servants, you are the master 
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Unionists to the Muslim League, through to the Republicans, the CML, the PPP, and 
all of Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, has ensured their inclusion within both 
pro and anti-government formations over time, guaranteeing their place within any 
new political dispensation.  
 This chapter is divided into four main sections. The first summarizes the 
approach taken by the thesis with regards to path dependence, critical junctures, and 
the mechanisms underpinning institutional development and reproduction. The second 
section shows how these concepts were deployed to describe the emergence of the 
state-landlord bargain in the period from 1849-1868, and how this put in motion a 
self-reinforcing sequence of institutional development that would shape Punjabi 
politics in the future. Here, reference will be made not only to the use of legislative, 
bureaucratic, and electoral power, but also to the role played by factionalism in 
perpetuating the power of the landed class, if not landowning individuals. The third 
section examines the contestational junctures that led to the passage of the Land 
Alienation Act of 1900, and the election of Zufiqar Ali Bhutto’s PPP in 1970, as well 
as the events leading up to the collapse of the Unionist government in 1946. The 
implications of these events, both in terms of how they arose as challenges to the 
status quo, and why they failed, will be considered with a view towards understanding 
precisely how institutional change can be initiated in Punjab. The thesis then 
concludes with a few tentative observations about potential sources of such change. 
Path Dependence, Critical Junctures, and Mechanisms of 
Institutional Development 
 
By using path dependence to explain the persistence of landed power in 
Punjab, this study has attempted to examine the mechanisms through which 
institutions are developed and reproduced. In doing so, emphasis has been placed on 
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three main things; firstly, the roles played by self-reinforcing and reactive sequences, 
secondly, the processes through which critical junctures create and potentially 
challenge particular institutional outcomes, and thirdly, the distinction between 
mechanisms of production and reproduction. Precisely how these three attributes of 
path dependence, as conceptualized in this study, interact and contribute to the 
analysis has been shown by disaggregating time periods into smaller sets of events 
and interventions, and then examining the causal connections between them that 
constitute the mechanisms through which institutional development takes place. 
Dealing first with the question of self-reinforcing and reactive sequences, path 
dependence, as used in this thesis, is premised upon the assumption that choices made 
at particular points in time and under particular circumstances have an effect on 
subsequent events, and potentially generate institutional outcomes that become 
‘locked-in’. As this lock-in deepens over time, due to the costs associated with 
switching to alternative paths, or in response to elite interventions aimed at preserving 
the status quo, established paths of institutional development become self-reinforcing 
sequences governed by mechanisms of reproduction that serve to further entrench 
them over time. More often than not, these mechanisms of reproduction involve the 
creation of positive feedback loops, whereby actors enmeshed within these 
institutional frameworks continue to invest in them as they adapt to them, thereby 
further strengthening the institutions in question. Self-reinforcing sequences are also 
characterized by the presence of increasing or constant returns, which is the benefit 
actors are able to derive from their adherence to a particular institutional path. Under 
conditions of asymmetrical power relations, this inevitably entails the strengthening of 
elites and in the case of Punjab, these mechanisms have served to reinforce and 
entrench the power of the landed classes and the state. This is in contrast with reactive 
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sequences, which are simply chains of events that may not have occurred but for the 
emergence of a particular outcome during a foundational moment. 
In order to capture the role played by initial conditions in generating 
sequences of institutional development and reproduction, the idea of ‘critical 
junctures’ has been employed by this study. Representing periods of time that are 
triggered by generative events and which open up the possibility for institutional 
change, this study has distinguished between two types of critical juncture. 
‘Foundational junctures’ give rise to new institutional outcomes that subsequently 
follow particular trajectories of development. As shown in Chapter 3, the period from 
1849-1868, during which the relationship between Punjab’s landed elite and the 
colonial state was forged, represents the foundational juncture that gave rise to 
Punjab’s institutional framework of landlord-dominated politics. ‘Contestational 
junctures’ arise when dominant institutional paths and frameworks are challenged by 
new actors, sometimes the products of reactive sequences emerging from earlier 
foundational junctures, attempting to transform the institutional status quo. Chapter 2 
provides detailed criteria on how to identify these junctures, chief amongst which is 
how contestational junctures are characterized by failure; the inability to deliver on 
the promise of institutional change demonstrates precisely how institutions are 
reproduced in periods of crisis, and how actors respond to challenges to their power. 
The passage of the Land Alienation Act of 1900, which is discussed in Chapter 3, the 
collapse of  Unionist government and Partition, which are examined in Chapter 5, and 
the election of Zufiqar Ali Bhutto’s PPP in 1970, which is analyzed in Chapter 8, are 
treated as examples of contestational junctures. 
 Finally, the study also distinguishes between mechanisms of production and 
reproduction when considering how institutions are created and reinforced. The 
 318
former, which come into play during foundational junctures, govern the selection of a 
particular institutional outcome from amongst a range of possible options during 
periods of time governed by a degree of contingency and uncertainty.  In the case of 
Punjab, the bargain between the state and the landed elite is a mechanism of 
production, driving the processes through which the institutional framework of 
Punjabi politics was developed during the initial foundational juncture. Once stable 
institutional outcomes emerge out of foundational junctures, mechanisms of 
reproduction play the role of reinforcing and reproducing these outcomes, with the  
original mechanisms of production sometimes producing an additional impetus for 
institutional persistence. In this study, the use of electoral politics, bureaucratic 
interventions, and legislation have been highlighted as means through which the 
landed elite and the state have reproduced their bargain and maintained the 
institutional status quo. These three processes, while not the only ones through which 
landed power has been reproduced, collectively demonstrate precisely how 
mechanisms such as increasing returns and positive feedback loops can contribute to 
institutional persistence over time. 
The Persistence of Landed Power in Punjab – Colonial 
Foundations and Mechanisms of Reproduction 
 
 When the British annexed Punjab in 1849, they were faced with the problem 
of erecting an administrative apparatus that could be effectively deployed for the 
maintenance of order and the appropriation of agrarian surplus. Having come to 
power by eradicating much of the order that had characterized Ranjit Singh’s rule, 
itself a brief respite from the turbulence and conflict that marked the collapse of 
Mughal authority in North-West India, the British believed that Punjab represented a 
blank slate upon which they could inscribe an entirely new institutional order. 
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Drawing on their experiences in the NWP, and informed by the insights of Utilitarian 
thought, the British set about their task by attempting to introduce a system of peasant 
proprietorship in the province that, in tandem with the creation of a ‘modern’ 
bureaucracy and legal system, was felt to be the most efficient and optimal means 
through which to collect revenue.  
The influence of the so-called ‘Punjab tradition’ of bureaucratic management 
meant that the province’s earliest administrators displayed a strong tendency towards 
paternalistic intervention in society, and this was most prominently displayed in their 
attitude towards the province’s traditional aristocracy; while exceptions were made 
for the predominantly Muslim chiefs who had aided the British in their campaign 
against the Sikhs, it was generally felt that the abolition of ‘parasitic’ landlordism in 
Punjab was necessary for the province’s economic and political development. As 
such, when creating their new system of peasant proprietorship293, Punjab’s British 
rulers actively engineered the slow excoriation of the province’s agrarian ruling class, 
believing that the success of colonial rule depended on the creation, and co-optation, 
of a prosperous peasantry freed from the oppressive control of the traditional 
aristocracy. 
All of this would change with the Revolt of 1857. Spearheaded by 
dispossessed landed aristocrats from the NWP, the Revolt was a clear demonstration 
of the enduring power of India’s traditional agrarian elite, and served to vindicate 
Henry Lawrence, Punjab’s head of Political Affairs and member of its Board of 
Administration, who argued that the traditional aristocracy constituted a potential 
source of support for the British and stability in the province. Although his views 
were not shared by his brother John, who chaired the BoA and the Revenue 
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 As discussed in Chapter 2, these peasant proprietors were really rich peasants who constituted part 
of the landed elite. 
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Administration, the Revolt had the effect of galvanizing Indian colonial opinion in 
favour of landed elites. Faced with uncertainty in 1857, and realizing that the initial 
strategy pursued in Punjab might prove to be insufficient for effectively controlling 
the province, the ‘Aristocratic Reaction’ that now gripped the colonial government, 
and Edward Prinsep’s claim that the initial revenue settlements had unfairly 
expropriated rightful landowners by conferring previously non-existent rights upon 
the tenants who now formed the core of Punjab’s proprietors, provided a rationale for 
rectifying the institutional framework of the revenue administration by restoring the 
aristocracy’s ownership rights and by conferring administrative and magisterial 
powers upon them. However, it was also recognized that correcting the initial 
‘mistakes’ in the revenue settlement was not something that could simply be resolved 
by re-allocating land that had already been granted to peasant proprietors, since 
undertaking such a course of action ran the risks of generating a backlash from these 
proprietors. This, coupled with the continued hostility of John Lawrence (now the 
Governor-General) to the idea of empowering the landed aristocracy, meant that when 
the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1868 was passed, it contained provisions that guaranteed 
the rights of proprietors who had been granted rights after 1849 while simultaneously 
ensuring that preference would be given to the aristocracy’s claims in the future.  
What is important to note is that the institutional regime that emerged from 
these events was one that was not exclusively based on either peasant proprietorship 
or landlordism. Instead, the passage of the Punjab Tenancy Act in 1868 cemented the 
creation of a hybrid framework in which ‘new’ peasant proprietors and old landed 
aristocrats were both brought into alliance with the colonial state. During the 
foundational juncture from 1849-1868, the initial decision to introduce peasant 
proprietorship to Punjab, despite Henry Lawrence’s misgivings, was one that 
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represented a radical departure from Punjab’s extant agrarian structure, and illustrated 
the way in which the institutional choices made by the British were characterized by a 
degree of contingency, even if they were informed by the broader approach being 
taken by the British to governance in other parts of India at the time. That this initial 
moment gave rise to a path dependent process of institutional development was shown 
after 1857, when the decisions made in the previous decade constrained the choices 
now available to the British. The subsequent fusion of peasant proprietorship with 
aristocratic landownership was thus not simply a result of careful calculation or 
informed decision-making; instead, it was a product of contingent historical 
circumstances and pragmatic choices made under conditions of uncertainty. 
While the colonial state explicitly acknowledged the active role that could be 
played by the traditional aristocracy in ensuring order in Punjab, it also realized that 
relatively prosperous peasant proprietors could provide it with an enduring source of 
passive loyalty and stability. Representing as they did the upper strata of the agrarian 
economic hierarchy, a fact reinforced by their membership in the agriculturalist 
biraderis, Punjab’s rich peasant proprietors and landed aristocracy constituted the 
province’s landed elite. After 1849, the colonial state sought to co-opt this elite, albeit 
in stages, in response to the imperatives of ensuring order and accumulation under 
conditions of uncertainty. The state-landlord bargain that thus emerged, and whose 
genesis was examined through the use of process tracing in Chapter 3, was the main 
mechanism behind the creation of an institutional framework of politics explicitly 
geared towards strengthening the power of these actors. 
Between 1868 and 1898, the colonial state undertook a significant number of 
interventions in Punjabi society that reinforced the institutional outcomes of the first 
two decades of colonial rule. In addition to implementing laws that safeguarded the 
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economic position of the landed elite, and gradually incorporating them within the 
organs of bureaucratic, military, and representative government, the colonial state 
actively reproduced the logic of the state-landlord bargain when setting up the canal 
colonies in the Western parts of Punjab that would eventually become part of 
Pakistan. Allocating land to a mix of peasant proprietors and elements of the 
traditional aristocracy, the colonial state explicitly strengthened extant social 
hierarchies and enhanced the economic control exercised by the landed elite over the 
subordinate peasantry. For their own part, the landed elite, and particularly the 
aristocracy, made ample use of their newfound protections and position to deliver on 
their end of the bargain; for the most, Punjab remained relatively quiescent as the 
landed elite brought their political, social and economic power to bear on the task of 
ensuring order and, in contrast with many other parts of India, the province, and 
especially the canal colonies, remained a source of economic prosperity and political 
stability.  
As Chapter 4 shows, the introduction of a Legislative Assembly in Punjab in 
1898, and the gradual expansion of representative government and electoral politics, 
gave rise to new mechanisms of institutional reproduction. Where the state had 
previously been the senior partner in the state-landlord bargain, the landed elite were 
now able to play a more direct role in shaping colonial policy for the pursuit of their 
mutual goals. Amidst an increasing entrenchment within the administrative 
apparatuses of the state through bodies like the District Boards and Panchayats, and in 
the context of electoral rules that were geared towards ensuring the dominance of 
landed politicians, as opposed to the numerically small but increasingly vocal 
professionals and capitalists who had begun to emerge in the cities, the rise of the 
Unionist Party as a supra-communal party of landed interests exemplified the 
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ascension of the landed elite as the most powerful force in Punjabi politics. Within the 
province, and even at the All-India level, Punjab’s politicians were able to exert a 
tremendous amount of influence, passing legislation that allowed them to more 
effectively pursue their interests while simultaneously ensuring the province’s 
continued loyalty to the colonial government at a time of rising nationalist sentiment. 
Indeed, by the time the first autonomous Punjabi government was elected to power in 
1937, the landed elite had reached a point where they could start to extract greater 
economic concessions from the state while also using their power to impose 
constraints on subordinate groups, like tenant farmers, and rivals, like the capitalist 
classes. Collectively, feedback loops created through the use of bureaucratic, 
electoral, and legislative power ensured that both the state and the landed elite in 
Punjab received constant, if not increasing, returns from the institutional framework 
of politics, further deepening the bargain between the two actors. 
Independence from colonial rule in 1947 triggered tremendous upheavals in 
the new state of Pakistan. However, while the bloody fallout of Partition, the urgent 
need for refugee resettlement, and the presence of a weak civilian government were 
sources of considerable instability, the power of the landed elite in Punjab remained 
relatively unchanged. As shown in Chapter 5, the landed elite were successfully able 
to secure their place within the nationalist Muslim League during the late 1930s and 
early 1940s, ensuring their continued political relevance and importance during a 
period of time that might have otherwise resulted in significant changes to the 
province’s pattern of politics. The factionalism endemic to landed politics in Punjab, 
rooted as it was in competition over power and patronage, had the effect of splintering 
the Unionist Party at a time when the colonial state, wracked by the strains imposed 
by Second World War and the Indian national movement(s), could no longer present 
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itself as an effective guarantor of landed interests. The subsequent defection of landed 
politicians, and their vote banks, to the Muslim League served to secure the power of 
the landed elite as a class post-Partition, with this being demonstrated by the ease with 
which they were able to entrench themselves within positions of power in the new 
provincial and federal governments. At the same time, Pakistan’s powerful military-
bureaucratic establishment continued to exercise tremendous influence from behind 
the scenes during the first ten years of independence, making use of the factionalism 
and opportunism of the landed elite to pursue its own interests in tandem with allied 
sections of the landed classes. 
Matters would come to a head in 1958, when provincial discord between East 
and West Pakistan, coupled with the clear incompetence of the civilian government, 
would lead to Pakistan’s first military coup. The first five years of General Ayub 
Khan’s regime, discussed in Chapter 6, were interesting because they demonstrated 
the resilience of the landed elite and their bargain with the state. Epitomizing the 
military-bureaucratic establishment’s belief that it could rule Pakistan more 
effectively without the help of incompetent and corrupt landed politicians, Ayub Khan 
assumed power under the assumption that he could reduce the power of the landed 
elite while also pursuing a path of capitalist development that would eventually 
empower alternative classes and actors. By 1963, these hopes would prove to be 
completely unfounded. The ability of the landed elite to continue dominating the local 
levers of politics and the state, despite being barred from formal electoral 
participation, and their enduring capacity to mobilise rural support, led an increasingly 
besieged and de-legitimized Ayub Khan to initiate a rapprochement with the very 
same landed politicians he had sought to displace. Rather than fundamentally altering 
the institutional status quo, Ayub Khan ended up reproducing and reinforcing it. 
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The implications of this have been explored in Chapters 6 and 7, which 
examine the role played by the same mechanisms of reproduction that were identified 
in the colonial period in reinforcing the power of the state and the landed elite. 
Starting with electoral politics, the history of post-colonial Punjab demonstrates how 
the system remains completely dominated by landed politicians. Partly as a result of 
interventions by successive military establishments to ensure the selection of pliant 
‘democratic’ partners, partly due to the persistence of electoral rules embodying a 
rural bias, and partly due to the counter-intuitive effects of landed factionalism, 
whereby intra-class conflict leads to landed elites enmeshing themselves within a 
competing political formations, mainstream political parties in Pakistan remain 
beholden to landed politicians who mobilize support in exchange for patronage. This 
is supplemented by the continued existence of landed links with the bureaucracy and 
military which enables the landed elite to continue their manipulation of local level 
governance for the purposes of receiving and disbursing patronage, evading attempts 
at regulation, as was the case during attempts at Land Reform, and to impose 
sanctions on rivals. Finally, the landed elite in post-colonial Punjab have also been 
able to effectively use their legislative power to reinforce their position, shaping laws 
on taxation and agrarian reform that have ensured that they remain free to pursue their 
economic interests, thus reinforcing their power. 
Over the course of the century and a half since the imposition of colonial rule 
in Punjab, electoral, bureaucratic, and legislative mechanisms have reproduced the 
state-landlord bargain underpinning the path dependent process of institutional 
development in Punjab. Together, these mechanisms have had the cumulative effect 
of entrenching landed power, making it increasingly difficult over time for alternative 
options to be explored. These particular mechanisms also illustrate the active role 
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played by the landed elite and the state in re-entrenching their bargain, making 
choices and decisions in response to changing societal circumstances. 
 
Contestational Junctures and Challenges to the Institutional Order 
 
 For all the emphasis that this thesis has placed on the reinforcement of landed 
power in Punjab, there have nonetheless been episodes where the province’s 
institutional framework was challenged. In 1900, the passage of the Land Alienation 
Act was part of a contestational juncture during which the colonial state was forced to 
choose between protecting the interests of either its landed allies or emerging 
capitalist classes who threatened the stability of the rural order. Between 1944 and 
1947, the precipitous collapse of the Unionist government in Punjab represented a 
similar juncture. In a different context, the rise of Bhutto’s PPP from 1968-71 brought 
with it the promise of a more progressive, participatory politics that had the potential 
to empower the masses while constraining the power of the traditional elite and their 
partners in the state.   
 These moments in time, dealt with at length in Chapters 3, 5 and 8 
respectively, are important for two main reasons; firstly, they illustrate the 
circumstances under which challenges to the institutional order have emerged despite 
the existence of the state-landlord bargain and the attendant mechanisms through 
which it has been produced and reproduced. Secondly, their failure provides further 
insight into precisely how the state and landed elite respond to such challenges, 
making use of their extant resources and power to weather these storms. The 
resilience of the state-landlord bargain during these episodes of contention strengthens 
the argument presented in this thesis about the path dependent nature of institutional 
development in Punjab.  
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 Despite the obvious differences between the events of 1900, 1944-47, and 
1968-1971, three important similarities between these periods allow for them to be 
treated together as contestational junctures in this study. Firstly, in all three cases, the 
events that triggered the contestational junctures were defined by a considerable 
degree of contingency, in that their timing and outcomes could not be predicted 
beforehand. Secondly, all three junctures failed to deliver on their radical promise. 
Thirdly, to the extent that it existed, the potential for radical change primarily rested 
in the hands of ‘new’ actors empowered by a combination of exogenous 
circumstances and the unintended consequences of earlier institutional interventions.  
In the case of the Land Alienation Act, the capitalists who had begun to threaten the 
rural order in Punjab were, at least in part, a product of the administrative changes 
introduced by the British in the mid-19th Century; the same legal institutions that 
protected private property rights and enshrined the power of the landed elite also 
provided the means through which moneylenders could begin to acquire land by sale 
and mortgage. In the 1940s, India’s nationalist parties were able to successfully peel 
support away from the Unionists, setting themselves up as a new political alternative 
in the province. In Punjab under Ayub Khan, the urban working class represented a 
new political actor that gravitated towards the PPP in the late 1960s. 
 The events that generated and empowered these actors led them to evolve in 
tandem with the dominant institutional trajectory set in place during the formative 
years of British and military rule in Punjab, and their conflicts with the landed elite 
represented significant moments in which the power of the latter was challenged. The 
subsequent failure of these contestational junctures to usher in new institutional 
regimes provides important insights into the mechanisms through which landed power 
has been reproduced in Punjab. As explained in Chapter 3, the decision to implement 
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the Land Alienation Act was one that was taken despite the presence of countervailing 
trends and opinions in other parts of British India, within the Punjabi administrative 
establishment, and amongst the landed elite itself.  Faced with the prospect of 
instability in the province, the state-landlord bargain that underpinned the framework 
of British rule constrained the choices that were available to the government, 
necessitating the implementation of pro-landlord measures and providing a clear 
illustration of the path dependent nature of institutional development in Punjab. 
Through their increasing involvement within the military and local government, as 
well as their proven ability to ensure the maintenance of order and the provision of 
revenue, as seen in the canal colonies, the landed elite had proven to be effective 
partners for the British in Punjab. Having produced a structure of government 
predicated on the co-optation of the landed elite, the bargain between the state and 
Punjab’s landlords ensured that, almost fifty years later, the costs of switching to an 
alternative model of governance in Punjab were simply too high for the British to 
countenance.  
 In the 1940s, the economic strain imposed on the colonial government by the 
Second World War limited the ability of the state to guarantee the continued provision 
of patronage to Punjab’s landed elite. Already wracked by factionalism, the Unionist 
Party began to lose support to the Muslim League, whose rising national relevance 
was increasingly viewed as evidence of its inevitable importance in any post-War 
political dispensation. However, while the fracturing of landed politics through 
factionalism could have arguably led to the collapse of landed power in Punjab, 
particularly given the Muslim League’s urban roots, the landed elite were able to use 
their position in the party to undermine any progressive agenda that it may have had. 
Lacking popular support in a predominantly rural electorate, the Muslim League had 
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little choice but to accommodate the interests of entrenched landed politicians who 
could guarantee its electoral victory. That Partition could not dislodge the landed elite 
from their position of political strength was evinced by how, despite the persistence of 
factionalism, landed politicians were able to dominate West Punjab’s politics in the 
first decade after independence. 
 Similar mechanisms came into play when the PPP’s attempts at reform were 
stymied following their electoral victory. From the very outset, the PPP was a party 
that had to deal with the contradictory tendencies of the left-of-centre activists who 
had been instrumental in its formation and the landed politicians from Punjab and 
Sindh (including Bhutto himself) who had begun to gravitate towards the party as its 
popularity grew. Between 1968 and 1970, the former remained in ascendancy, 
formulating PPP policy and effectively using the anti-Ayub movement to bolster the 
party and mobilize the urban working class. However, by the time the PPP assumed 
power at the end of 1971, many of its supporters from the Left had been marginalized 
as the party struggled to assert its authority in the face of opposition from the NAP in 
Balochistan and the NWFP, as well as from the military establishment, industrialists, 
the religious Right, and those elements of the landed elite, particularly from the 
traditional aristocracy, who remained outside of the fold of the party. Faced with these 
challenges, Bhutto responded by becoming increasingly autocratic and, like Ayub 
Khan and the British before him, by leaning on the Punjabi (and Sindhi) landed elite 
for support. While the PPP retained an overtly Leftist orientation, particularly with 
regards to its relationship with Capital, the power of its landed politicians ensured 
that, despite attempts at land and tenancy reform, the party was unable to initiate any 
significant agrarian change in Punjab. By 1977, landlords had become crucial to the 
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PPP’s electoral strategy, demonstrating once again how the landed elite remained a 
potent force to be deployed in the service of the government.  
The relative uniqueness of the contestational junctures described above can be 
gauged through comparison with the anti-Musharraf movement of 2007-08 which, 
prima facie, represented a direct challenge to the state-landlord relationship. Indeed, 
the comparison seems all the more compelling when considering how this movement, 
like the events of 1968-1971, took place under conditions of economic crisis and state 
weakness. However, despite toppling a military dictatorship, the anti-Musharraf 
movement lacked the capacity to challenge the state-landlord bargain not least of all 
due to the urban bias of the movement and the absence of any mainstream political 
parties committed to reforming the rural power structure. Indeed, the position of the 
PPP in the movement, as a party largely beholden to landed interests in the Punjabi 
and Sindhi countryside, provided a stark contrast with its earlier incarnation in the late 
1960s, precluded its playing a role as a force for progressive change, and illustrated 
the enduring capacity of the landed elite to make use of their electoral significance to 
entrench themselves within the party system. While the junctures of 1900, 1944-47 
and 1968-1971 also failed to radically impact the state-landlord bargain at the heart of 
Punjabi politics, the interests articulated by the regime-challenging actors in these 
moments at least opened up the possibility of change, as opposed to 2007-08 when 
such options were not even brought to the table.  
The Future of Landed Power in Punjab 
 
 One of the elements of the explanation provided in this thesis for the 
persistence of landed power in Punjab is that the institutional system that underpins its 
reproduction is one that is incredibly difficult to dislodge. Over time, the landed elite 
and their partners in the state have actively sought to prevent rival actors from 
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challenging their dominance, and have used a variety of mechanisms of reproduction 
to maintain their pre-eminent political position. The implications of this for politics 
and democracy in Punjab, and indeed Pakistan, are clear. The intrinsic link between 
authoritarianism and ‘feudal’ power in Punjab confirms the point, made by Moore 
(1966) and Rueschemeyer et al. (1992), that landlords represent the most reactionary 
impediment to substantive democratization, and it clear that any steps taken in that 
direction in Punjab are likely to be undermined by a landed elite that retains the ability 
to control electoral and legislative politics, and evade attempts at curtailing their 
influence. 
 Nonetheless, within this thesis, several potential sources of change have been 
identified that could contribute towards engineering a radical transformation of the 
institutional status quo. Firstly, as increasing urbanization and capitalist development 
transform the electoral geography and economic dynamics of Punjab, the landowning 
classes could eventually be displaced by broader societal transformations that leave 
them with fewer means through which to maintain their power. Indeed, in the semi-
urban ‘ruralopolises’ that Qadeer (2000) argues are now home to almost half of 
Punjab’s population, the presence of urban population densities in predominantly 
agrarian economies will inevitably, over time, result in a shift towards more urban 
social relations and forms of accumulation. It can be argued that the resultant 
weakening of the ability of the landholders to dominate the social and economic life 
of the countryside could, in the presence of formal democracy, provide the rural 
population with the space within which to expand their political participation. While 
this outcome would not necessarily result in an end to patronage politics, it would 
certainly allow for the possibility, over time, of alternative actors emerging as sources 
of political influence and power in rural Punjab. This potential development also fits 
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with Wilkinson’s (2007) depiction of patronage politics in contemporary India. 
According to Wilkinson, a combination of middle class development, increasing 
demands from voters, and rising government deficits, have created a situation in 
which elite politicians and parties are no longer able to provide the level of state 
patronage required to ‘buy’ vote banks, leading to a gradual shift towards more 
programmatic politics. It is possible that repeated rounds of elections in Pakistan in a 
more urban electoral environment might generate such changes in Punjab.  
 Of perhaps greater significance is the role that could be played by Pakistan’s 
subordinate classes. The one episode in which the power of the state-landlord nexus 
was challenged post-Partition was during the period from 1968-1971, when the PPP 
espoused a platform of socio-economic reforms in an attempt to cultivate the support 
of the urban working class and the peasantry. While the party was successful, to an 
extent, in winning the support of the former, the lack of support from the latter 
arguably limited the PPP’s prospects of effectively challenging the power of the 
landed elite. As has been argued by Sandbrook (2006), the mobilization of the 
subordinate classes, both urban and rural, by a political party committed to political 
reform, holds the key to facilitating a successful transition to democracy in the Third 
World. Whether or not such a strategy could succeed in Pakistan, or indeed come to 
pass at all, is open to speculation. But, given that there have been successful mass 
movements in Pakistan in the past, not just in the cites but also in rural areas, like the 
farms of Okara, it seems clear that future movements would have to generate a 
broader ‘geography of opposition’, linking the peasantry to the urban working class as 
a means through which to effectively challenge the state and its allies in the propertied 
classes.  
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